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International tribunals, whose jurisdiction is based on international treaties that 
address issues relevant to cross-border investments (“Investment Treaties”), 
have recently dealt with investment arbitration crossing with international 
commercial arbitration (so-called cross-over arbitration). More precisely, the 
cases brought before the said investment tribunals concerned the assessment of 
whether the actions of national courts, which interfered with the recognition 
and/or enforcement of a commercial award, could constitute a breach of 
Investment Treaties. In fact, such treaties normally contain a set of provisions 
aimed at protecting foreign investments, including the right of the private 
investor to bring a claim before an arbitral tribunal against the State that hosted 
its investment and violated the standard of protections and other provisions set 
out in said instruments.  
 
This work analyses these cases in order to understand if the cross-over between 
commercial arbitration and investment arbitration in the sense explained above 
represents a viable and grounded solution for an award winner of a commercial 
arbitration frustrated by the actions of the local judiciary, or if those investment 
tribunals dealing with cross-over arbitration that accepted jurisdiction can be 
seen as part of the strongly criticised over-expansion of investment arbitration. 
The work is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the jurisdictional 
thresholds to access investment arbitration. In particular, since the presence of 
an investment seems to be an essential element for an investment tribunal to 
accept jurisdiction, it investigates whether a commercial arbitral award can 
qualify as an investment, also in light of the most common wordings of 
Investment Treaties and the rules applied by ICSID and non-ICSID tribunals. 
The second part of the work makes the assumption that the conditions relevant 
for the acceptance of jurisdiction are met, and analyses which standards of 
protection included in Investment Treaties may be relevant for the assessment 
of a liability of the State for the wrongful interference by its municipal courts in 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. This part also inquires if 
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investment tribunals can find a State liable where provisions of public 
international law, different from those included in the Investment Treaty on 
which the jurisdiction of the tribunal itself is based, have been breached, such 
as customary international law or provisions of treaties not primarily dealing 
with investments (at least in their ordinary meaning).  
 
This work is innovative as it systematically addresses the topics referred to 
above from a critical and analytical perspective, and as it reaches a number of 
conclusions that differ, in some respects, from those of other scholars who 
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION 
1. The issue 
Nowadays most international investment and commercial agreements provide 
for dispute settlement clauses, pursuant to which claims arising from, or 
connected to, the transactions contemplated thereby shall be settled through 
arbitration, rather than by national courts. 
There are several reasons underlying this trend. First of all, private parties may 
deem that arbitrators are more qualified than ordinary national judges. Indeed, 
most of the times arbitrators are appointed among persons of specialised 
knowledge or experience in the specific sphere relevant to the claim. Second, 
national courts may be perceived as lacking impartiality, and therefore the 
parties may prefer a neutral venue to have their dispute solved. However, it 
may be argued that the main advantage of arbitration for private parties is 
represented by the ease of enforcing arbitral awards, principally due to the 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards1 (the “New York Convention”). In more than half a century 
since its signing, the New York Convention – which is currently in force in 
more than 150 countries all over the world2 – has created a largely uniform 
legal regime for, inter alia, the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards, imposing on the courts of the contracting States a public international 
law obligation to recognise and enforce awards rendered in other States, 
subject to limited exceptions.3 Moreover, according to the New York 
Convention, contracting States are also obliged to recognise valid written 
arbitration agreements concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration,4 which also facilitates recourse to international arbitration, 
preventing interference by national courts. 
                                                          
1 Available at: http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-
York-Convention-E.pdf.  
2 For a list of the contracting States, see http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries. 
3 For more on the topic, see section 4 of this Chapter I.  
4 For more on the topic, see section 4 of this Chapter I. 
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With reference to this latter aspect, however, in recent years there has been a 
number of cases in which national courts of States have unduly interfered with 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and/or arbitration 
agreements, entailing a breach by the State of its obligations under investment 
treaties, the New York Convention and customary international law. 
A sequence of recent decisions issued by arbitral tribunals set up on the basis 
of investment treaties suggests that public international law has a substantial 
role in the cases, with the purpose of protecting international commercial 
arbitration rights against wrongful interferences by States, through actions of 
their domestic courts. Indeed, there are various investment treaty cases in 
which investment arbitral tribunals have examined whether the non-
enforcement of arbitral awards and/or active State interference with 
recognition and enforcement proceedings may amount to a breach of 
investment treaties. Some of the tribunals that dealt with these cases found the 
existence of a breach of the applicable investment treaty, others believed that 
no provision of the applicable investment treaty was breached and others again 
simply declined jurisdiction on the grounds that an arbitral award and/or an 
arbitration agreement cannot be qualified as an investment, which is one of the 
obvious requirements to access investment arbitration. Interestingly, in none of 
the cases did the tribunals investigate whether the conduct of the States' courts 
implied a violation of the New York Convention and/or customary 
international law that could per se be sanctioned by the tribunal under the 
investment treaty arbitration.5 
Also in light of the cases referred to above, this work aims at analysing: (i) as to 
the jurisdiction, in which cases an aggrieved award creditor may access 
investment treaty arbitration; and, (ii) as to the merits, which conducts of a 
State’s national courts can entail the relevant State’s responsibility for unlawful 
interference with arbitration. 
More precisely, this work will focus, with respect to jurisdictional requirements, 
on the concept of investment. Indeed, only if an award can qualify as an 
                                                          
5 For more on this aspect, see Chapter III, sections. 10 and 11.3. 
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investment can the frustrated award winner access investment arbitration.6 
With respect to the merits, the attention will be shifted to the analysis of the 
situations in which the interference by the national courts may entail a breach 
of the State’s international obligations, which may be enforced before 
investment arbitral tribunals.7 
Before that, in this Chapter, I will introduce certain concepts that will be useful 
to understand the topics that will be treated in the main Chapters of this work. 
More precisely, I will briefly illustrate: (i) what an investment arbitration is; (ii) 
the differences between investment and commercial arbitration and the main 
fora for international arbitration; (iii) the role that a State can play in relation to 
commercial arbitration and how the State can interfere with it; and (iv) the 
main provisions regarding recognition and enforcement of international 
arbitration agreements and awards. 
 
2. Investment arbitration: main features and differences with commercial 
arbitration 
In the field of international arbitration, a distinction can be made between 
international investment arbitration and international commercial arbitration. 
International investment arbitration is a dispute settlement mechanism for 
claims concerning investments made by an investor in a foreign State. There 
are two main typologies of disputes concerning investments on the basis of the 
parties thereto: those between two States, and those between a private investor 
and a State.8 The former is the traditional manner for the peaceful resolution of 
State disputes.9 The latter is more recent10 and allows a private investor to bring 
a direct claim against the State hosting its investment. 
                                                          
6 For more on the topic, see Chapter II. 
7 For more on the topic, see Chapter III.  
8 Disputes between private parties arising from investments are not discussed here.  
9 According to J.W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, Oxford University Press, 
2010, at p. 362, the modern history of interstate arbitration dates from the 1974 Jay Treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain, which provided for the final settlement of 
disputes between two States by an arbitral tribunal and indicated the standards to be 
applied in arriving at a decision.  
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The possibility for an investor to bring a claim against a State represented a 
remarkable achievement from the investors’ perspective in the protection of its 
rights. Indeed, State-to-State arbitration proved deficient in several ways. First, 
the remedy is highly politicized, for it requires the involvement of the investor’s 
home government. In addition, no State would pursue an interstate arbitration 
solely on the basis of one investor’s claim; a more comprehensive evaluation of 
the States’ diplomatic, political and economic relations would be taken into 
consideration. 
Like any other form of arbitration, investor-State arbitration is based on 
consent both parties granted to it. Consent is, thus, an indispensable 
requirement for the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Obviously, the kind of disputes that 
can be submitted to investment arbitration depends on the breadth of the 
consent granted by the parties. 
In practice, consent to investor-State arbitration may be given in one of the 
following three ways: (i) in a direct agreement between the parties; (ii) in 
national legislation of the host State; and (iii) in investment treaties. 11 
With respect to the first source of consent, an arbitration agreement may be 
included in a clause provided in an investment contract between the host State 
and the foreign investor. Nowadays, most investment contracts contain 
provisions allowing either party to the contract to settle the dispute arising 
therefrom via arbitration. Notably, the parties may also submit to investment 
arbitration a dispute that has already arisen through consent expressed in a 
compromis. 
                                                                                                                                                            
10 It is after the adoption of the ICSID Convention (as defined hereinafter in this section) 
that investment treaties began to provide the settlement of investor-State disputes through 
arbitration. According to A. NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and Practice of Investment 
Treaties, Standards of Treatment, Kluwer Law International, 2009, at p. 42, the first 
bilateral investment treaty that expressly incorporates provisions for investor-State 
arbitration is the Agreement on economic cooperation (with protocol and exchanges of 
letters dated on 17 June 1968) between The Netherlands and Indonesia, signed in Jakarta 
on 7 July 1968 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3329). 
11 On this topic, see also section 2 of Chapter II. 
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The host State may also offer consent to arbitration to foreign investors in its 
national legislation. A legislative provision containing consent to arbitration 
must be read as a mere offer to arbitrate to the foreign investor. In order to 
realize the arbitration agreement, the investor must accept the offer. 
However, the documents that most often enshrine the host State’s consent are 
investment treaties that can either be bilateral (“BITs”) or multilateral, 
including free trade agreements, which may contain chapters protecting 
investments. This work will focus exclusively on investor-State arbitration 
based on investment treaties, which will be hereinafter referred to as 
investment arbitration, investment treaty arbitration or investor-State 
arbitration. 
An investment treaty is an agreement embodied in one or more written 
documents by which two or more States agree to certain legal rules to govern 
investments undertaken by nationals of one treaty party in the territory of 
another treaty party.12 With specific reference to BITs, they are considered the 
most important source in contemporary investment law.13 BITs started to be 
entered into in the late 1950s, but became common during the 1980s and 1990s 
as a means of encouraging capital investments in developing markets. Most of 
the time, their aim is to encourage and create favourable conditions for the 
investors of each contracting party to make investment in the territory of the 
other contracting party.  
Besides BITs, there are also multilateral treaties that, inter alia, protect 
investments at regional level14 or with respect to industry sectors.15 Most of the 
                                                          
12 Definition retrieved from J.W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, supra, note 9, at 
p. 126. 
13 C. SCHREUER, Investments, International Protection, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (voice of), Oxford Public international Law, para. B.1. 
14 This is the case, for instance, of the North American Free Trade Agreement, signed on 17 
December 1992 (available at: https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-
American-Free-Trade-Agreement?mvid=1&secid=539c50ef-51c1-489b-808b-
9e20c9872d25#A1101) (the “NAFTA”). 
15 See, for instance, the Energy Charter Treaty, signed on 17 December 1994 (available in its 
consolidated version at: 
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investment treaties16 contain obligations that each government undertakes 
towards investors of the other contracting States to this end.17 Consent to 
investment arbitration is part of the protection afforded to the foreign investor. 
According to a scholarly work, ‘[i]nvestor-State arbitration is the defining mark 
of modern international investment protection.’18 Indeed, in the absence of 
international arbitration mechanisms, dispute settlement between a foreign 
investor and the host State would take place before the national courts of the 
relevant host State, which may not be perceived as sufficiently impartial and 
with sufficient knowledge of investment law and international law.19 
                                                                                                                                                            
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf) 
(“ECT”). 
16 The expression ‘investment treaties’ is used through this text to refer to standalone BITs, 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements that include foreign investment obligations 
such as the NAFTA, and sectorial treaties such as the ECT, that include investment 
obligations.  
17 As to the substantial protection accorded to international investments, in many investment 
treaties, governments make a commitment to provide foreign investors with: 
- national treatment (i.e., treatment no less favourable to that provided to the host 
State’s citizens); 
- most favoured nation treatment (i.e., treatment as favourable as that given to other 
States’ citizens); 
- fair and equitable treatment; 
- full protection and security for the investment; and 
- treatment at least as favourable as that accorded by international law. 
In addition, States often agree not to engage in arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory 
conduct that limits the operation, management, maintenance or expansion of the 
investment. Standards for lawful expropriation are also set out. Some investment treaties 
also provide for the so-called ‘umbrella clause’, pursuant to which the host State shall 
comply with any obligation it has undertaken vis-à-vis the investor (including through an 
investment agreement). 
18 J.C. THOMAS Q.C., M. EWING-CHOW, The Maturation of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
ICSID Review, Vol. 25, Issue 1, pp. 3-20, at p. 5. 
19 As is better explained in section 5 of this Chapter I, an investor also has the right to seek 
redress before the courts for the protection of human rights. However, as will be illustrated 
hereinafter, the scope of such protection is narrower than the one provided under 
investment treaty arbitration, as it exclusively concerns cases of illegal expropriation and 
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Alternatively, the aggrieved investor has the possibility to obtain redress 
through diplomatic protection, by means of which the investor requires the aid 
of its home State to assist him.20 Diplomatic protection represents the 
traditional international technique to settle international disputes originating 
from disagreements between States and private parties. Diplomatic protection 
does not require advance agreement between disputing parties, but does have 
several disadvantages.21 First, the availability of diplomatic protection depends 
entirely on the State’s willingness to extend assistance to the investor in a given 
situation. Indeed, international law considers diplomatic protection as a right of 
the State. Therefore, there is no duty on the State to embrace a claim, no 
matter how egregious the misconduct has been. Second, once the claim has 
been espoused, the State owns it, which means that the State can decide on 
settlements of the claim and whether any portion of any settlement will be paid 
to the investor. Third, before diplomatic protection, the foreign investor must 
have exhausted all local remedies in the host State, which entails a possible 
waste of time and resources for the aggrieved investor. Finally, facts have 
shown that diplomatic protection does not necessarily result in meaningful 
redress for the investor: it often ends with the exchange of oral or written 
                                                                                                                                                            
lack of due process. Additionally, access to such courts may be more complicated and the 
aggrieved investor shall have first exhausted all available local remedies. 
20 More precisely, pursuant to the definition provided in Art. 1 of the Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection (adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-eighth 
session, in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s 
report covering the work of that session (A/61/10)): ‘diplomatic protection consists in the 
invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of 
the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of 
that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to 
the implementation of such responsibility.’ For an analysis of the interaction between 
diplomatic protection and investment treaties, see, inter alia, B. JURATOWITCH, The 
Relationship between Protection and Investment Treaties, ICSID Review, Vol. 23, Issue 1, 
2008, pp. 10-35.  
21  As noted by J.W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, supra, note 9, at p. 358, 
diplomatic protection can be considered ‘far from perfect means of resolving […] 
disputes’. 
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statements and the injured investor does not receive any material 
compensation.22 
As to the mechanism of investment arbitration, the consent of the State is 
usually presented through an irrevocable standing offer to refer to arbitration 
disputes with the investor who is a national of the other contracting State(s) 
concerning a pre-defined range of investments.23 Notably, the investor is not a 
party to the investment treaty; therefore, the investors’ consent to arbitrate is 
usually provided by means of submission of a dispute to arbitration through 
the presentation of a request of arbitration under the applicable rules. A State is 
consequently unaware of the identity of the potential claimants until it is 
notified of the submission of a claim under a given investment treaty. This type 
of arbitration is also referred to as ‘arbitration without privity’24 since there is 
no need for a direct contractual link between a State and the investor to 
establish the arbitration. 
Depending on how the consent clauses are drafted under the relevant 
investment treaty, investors are granted with different rights.25 Very often, the 
State’s offer is broad and provides the investor with a variety of dispute 
resolution options. More precisely, investment treaties often provide that, after 
a so-called ‘cooling-off’ period during which the concerned State and the 
investor shall try to negotiate an amicable solution to the dispute,26 the investor 
                                                          
22 J.W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, supra, note 9, p. 359. As already seen, also 
State-to-State arbitration is available to the investor, with the illustrated downsides.  
23 For more on the topic, see C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The 
ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd Edition), Cambridge University Press, 2009, 
passim; M. NOLAN, F.G. CAIVANO, Limits of Consent – Arbitration without Privity and 
Beyond, in M.A. FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS, D. ARIAS (eds.), Liber Amicorum Bernando 
Cremades, Kluwer Espana; La Ley, 2010, pp. 873-991. 
24 Professor J. PAULSSON, in its seminal writing ‘Arbitration Without Privity’ (ICSID Review, 
Vol. 10, Issue 2, 1995, pp. 232-257) was the first to coin this term, which has been 
unanimously employed by subsequent writings.  
25 For more, see Chapter III, section 10. 
26 As noted by N. BLACKABY, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration (or the 
tale of the dolphin and the shark), in L.A. MISTELIS, J. LEW (eds.), Pervasive Problems in 
International Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 2006, pp. 217-233, at pp. 220-221, this 
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is entitled to sue the State before different arbitral tribunals and according to 
different procedures.27  
In most instances, investment treaties provide for the competence of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID” or the 
“Centre”) created by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 1965 (the 
“Convention”, the “ICSID Convention” or the “Washington 
Convention”). ICSID is not a permanent arbitral tribunal: the settlement of 
investment disputes is not carried out by the Centre itself, but by arbitral 
tribunals that are constituted on an ad hoc basis for each dispute.28 Rather, the 
Centre provides facilities for the arbitration of investment disputes,29 including: 
keeping lists of possible arbitrators,30 screening and registering arbitration 
requests,31 assisting in the constitution of the tribunals and the conduct of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
period has not been seriously considered by States to explore potential settlements and its 
purpose appears to have been largely ignored by States. Indeed, some tribunals considered 
this requirement as procedural rather than jurisdictional, so that they could assess the 
merits without being blocked from an excessive formalism. 
27 See, for instance Art. 24(3) of the 2012 US Model BIT, according to which: ‘[p]rovided that 
six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant may submit a 
claim referred to in paragraph 1: 
(a) under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration 
Proceedings, provided that both the respondent and the non-disputing Party are 
parties to the ICSID Convention; 
(b) under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, provided that either the respondent or the 
non-disputing Party is a party to the ICSID Convention; 
(c)  under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or 
(d) if the claimant and respondent agree, to any other arbitration institution or under any 
other arbitration rules.’ 
28 Notably the Convention foresees also the possibility to set up conciliation commissions, 
but these are rarely used. Conciliation is a flexible and informal method designed to assist 
the parties in reaching an agreed settlement. 
29 Art. 1 of the Convention. 
30 Art. 12 and following of the Convention. 
31 Art. 36(3) of the Convention. 
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proceedings, 32 and adopting rules and regulations.33 Many investment treaty 
dispute settlement clauses also provide for ad hoc arbitration under the 
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (the “UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules”)34 and/or arbitration under the 
rules of other administering arbitration institutions, such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”),35 the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(“SCC”), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) or the London Court 
of International Arbitration (“LCIA”).36  
In case of multi-tiered dispute settlement clauses, the investor has, thus, the 
right to decide which route to follow, but, when a forum is selected, the choice 
is final and made to the exclusion of any other option. Therefore, the investor 
shall carefully evaluate which is the most appropriate dispute settlement 
mechanism in light of all circumstances. 
In particular, the option of ICSID arbitration entails some specific features, 
which distinguish it from non-institutional proceedings and proceedings 
administered by other arbitration institutions.37 Interestingly, the ICSID regime 
                                                          
32 Art. 38 of the Convention. 
33 Art. 6(1) of the Convention. 
34 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) is a 
subsidiary organ of the United Nations General Assembly, created with the purpose of 
removing disparities in national laws governing international trade. The text of the revised 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules adopted in 2010 by GA Res 65/22 is available at: 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf  (the 
“UNCITRAL 2010 Rules”). 
35  The rules of arbitration from time to time issued by the ICC are hereinafter referred to as 
the ICC Rules.  
36  A distinction can be made between institutional arbitration, which is administered by an 
arbitration institution such as ICSID or the ICC, and non-institutional arbitration, where 
the proceeding is conducted without any supervision or support from a specialized 
institution. Ad hoc arbitration is, for the purposes of this work, one that is not administered 
by an institution, even if technically also ICSID and SCC arbitrations are ad hoc.  
37  In this work, unless otherwise specified, any reference to ICSID arbitration shall be 
deemed made exclusively to arbitration under the Rules. However, on 27 September 1978 
the Administrative Council of ICSID adopted the Rules Governing the Additional Facility 
for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the International Centre for 
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has been referred to as the ‘sleeping beauty’38 of investment arbitration, as until 
the mid-1990s only a couple of cases were filed annually.39 Nowadays the 
situation is different: one needs only to consider that, in 2015, 52 cases have 
been filed under the ICSID Convention and the Additional Facility Rules.40 
The reason for this success probably rests in the system’s peculiar features, 
which in principle makes it advantageous to both investors and host States.  
First, ICSID is an arbitral institution specialised in international investment 
disputes, which is different to all other institutions that deal with both 
commercial and investment arbitration. More precisely, the Centre’s 
                                                                                                                                                            
Settlement of Investment Disputes (the “Additional Facility Rules”), (available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/AFR_English-
final.pdf), which allow the resolution of disputes under the auspices of the Centre even 
when not all the jurisdictional conditions set out in Art. 25 of the Convention are met, 
provided that the ICSID Secretary General has given approval for the use of the Additional 
Facility Rules in a specific case. For instance, although Mexico has not ratified the 
Convention, NAFTA disputes concerning Mexico may be brought before an ICSID 
tribunal. The same holds true for other jurisdictional requirements, such as the necessity 
for the underlying transaction to be an investment, which is not needed under the 
Additional Facility Rules, provided that the transaction from which the dispute arose is not 
an ordinary commercial transaction. Indeed, pursuant to Art. 4(3) of the Additional Facility 
Rules, the Secretary General shall deny its approval if the transaction underlying the dispute 
is an ‘ordinary commercial transaction.’ Proceedings pursuant to the Additional Facility 
Rules, despite being administered by the Centre, are not governed by the Convention. 
Therefore, inter alia, awards rendered under the Additional Facility Rules are subject to 
review by the domestic courts and the enforcement thereof shall be made through the 
application of the New York Convention.  
38 C. MCLACHLAN, Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Legal Framework, in A.J. VAN DEN 
BERG (ed.), 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration 
Conference, ICCA Congress Series, Volume15, Kluwer Law International 2009, pp. 95-
145, at p. 96. 
39 Data retrieved from ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2016-2), available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID%20Web%
20Stats%202016-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf . 




jurisdiction is limited ‘to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, 
between a Contracting State […] and a national of another Contracting State, 
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.’41 
The presence of an investment represents an objective requirement that cannot 
be replaced by the parties’ will. 
Second, the ICSID Convention is an international treaty and, therefore, the 
State party to the dispute is bound to respect its obligations under the ICSID 
Convention not only vis-à-vis the State of the investor’s nationality, but also to 
all other State parties. The non-enforcement of an ICSID award may invoke 
the international responsibility of the non-enforcing State, which is different 
from the responsibility for breach of the investment treaty undertakings. 
Moreover, ICSID is a division of the World Bank and, therefore, States tend to 
voluntarily comply with its awards ‘so as not to give offense to the World 
Bank.’42 But probably the most important feature of ICSID is that arbitration 
proceedings under the Convention are self-contained. This means that they are 
independent from the intervention of any outside body and, in particular, they 
are free from interference of national legislation and domestic courts. This 
entails a number of consequences. For instance, any provisional measure is to 
be established by the ICSID tribunal and not by any domestic court, unless 
otherwise agreed between the parties.43 In addition, each and any contracting 
State is obliged to recognise and enforce an ICSID arbitration, independently 
                                                          
41 Art. 25(1) of the Convention. The jurisdictional requirements of the Centre are better 
described in Chapter II. 
42 R.D.R. BISHOP, J. CRAWFORD, W.M. REISMAN, Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, 
Materials and Commentary, Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 11. With specific reference 
to compliance with interim measures, see J. LEW, ICSID Arbitration: Special Features and 
Recent Developments, in S.M. KROLL, N. HORN (eds.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment 
Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects, Studies in Transnational Economic 
Law, Vol. 19, Kluwer Law International, 2004, pp. 267-282, at p. 271, whereby it is stated 
that: ‘[i]n practice parties will tend to comply given the possibility that the Word Bank may 
take any inaction into account in its future economic dealings with that state.’ 
43 Art. 47 of the Convention provides that: ‘[e]xcept as the parties otherwise agree, the 
Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, recommend any provisional 
measures which should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.’ 
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of the New York Convention.44 In addition, ICSID awards are binding and 
final and cannot be reviewed by national courts: the ICSID Convention itself 
provides an entirely separate and autonomous regime for the recognition, 
enforcement and annulment of awards. The only recourse available to a party is 
to apply to the Centre to have the award annulled by an ICSID annulment 
committee. In this respect the ICSID arbitration is a truly delocalised 
proceeding. In a nutshell, national courts are not expected to play any role in a 
dispute submitted to ICSID arbitration, except for the implementation of the 
ICSID award.45 
As mentioned, outside the ICSID system, there may be other options available 
to settle investor-State disputes. Ad hoc arbitration requires an arbitration 
agreement that regulates a number of aspects, including the selection of the 
arbitrators, applicable law, applicable fees, as well as several procedural 
questions. Institutions have developed standard rules that may be incorporated 
in the parties’ agreements. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are the most 
popular ad hoc arbitration option found in BITs and multilateral international 
instruments.46 Their success is probably due to the fact that they are considered 
to reflect a modern, universally established set of international arbitration rules. 
                                                          
44 This represents another upside of ICSID arbitration. The Convention requires each 
contracting State to ‘recognise that an award rendered pursuant to this Convention is 
binding’ and ‘to enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its 
territories as if it were a final judgment of court in that State.’ This mechanism may not 
yield flawless enforcement in every case: sovereign immunity may protect State assets and 
any domestic law ground ordinarily available to challenge final judgments may also be used 
against ICSID awards. Still, it remains superior to the alternatives that exist today and, 
more precisely, to the enforcement mechanism for ordinary commercial arbitration, which 
leaves much more room for domestic courts to overturn arbitral awards (also in case of 
application of the New York Convention). 
45 Please note that the scope of this work is limited to the non-enforcement of commercial 
arbitration. On the contrary, issues connected to the non-enforcement of investment 
arbitration will not be dealt with in this dissertation. 
46 H.A. GRIGERA NAÓN, The Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Private 
Parties. An Overview from the Perspective of the ICC, The Journal of World Investment, 
Issue 1, 2000, pp. 59-101, at p. 83. 
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Moreover they are a comprehensive set of articles that should address all issues 
that may arise in international arbitration, from the appointment of the 
arbitrators to the decision on costs. The UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules per se do 
not entail the intervention of any administered institution. However, treaties 
may provide support for an institution helping to administer the application of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules.47 Available institutions may include ICSID, as 
well as the ICC,48 SCC, LCIA and PCA49. Indeed, institutions dealing primarily 
with commercial arbitration do not exclude investor-State arbitration. 
The main advantage of having the arbitration supervised or supported by an 
institution is the fact that the institution is charged with taking certain measures 
aimed at permitting the arbitration to be carried out within a self-contained 
framework, thereby avoiding, to the maximum extent possible, the intervention 
of municipal courts. This task is performed in several ways, including taking 
care of the financial aspects of the arbitration and deciding on challenges 
against or replacement of arbitrators. In the absence of support of an 
institution, the relevant decisions would have required the involvement of 
                                                          
47 For a summary of the content of the Rules, see U. ONWUAMAEGBU, International Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms – Choosing Between Institutionally Supported and Ad Hoc; and 
Between Institutions, in K. YANNACA-SMALL (ed.), Arbitration under International 
Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 
63-88, at pp. 83-87. 
48 For more on the ICC, see H. A. GRIGERA NAÓN, The Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Private Parties. An Overview from the Perspective of the ICC, supra, 
note 46, at pp. 89-100. 
49 For a brief outline of the main features of these institutions, see R.D. BISHOP, J. 
CRAWFORD, W.M. REISMAN, Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials and 
Commentary, supra, note 42, pp. 365-379; R. DOLZER, C. SCHREUER, Principles of 
International Investment Law (2nd Edition), Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 242; U. 
ONWUAMAEGBU, International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms – Choosing Between 
Institutionally Supported and Ad Hoc; and Between Institutions, supra, note 47, at pp. 63-
82. For a comparative analysis of the manner in which various international institutional 
rules address issues regarding fees, composition of the tribunals, arbitral authority to 
determine jurisdiction and arbitrability see J.M. GAITIS (ed. in chief), The College of 
Commercial Arbitrators Guide to Best Practices in Commercial Arbitration (3rd Edition), 
JurisNet, 2013, pp. 404-413. 
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national courts. The downside is represented by the fact that the proceeding 
may be less flexible and that the institution requires the payment of 
administrative fees to compensate the services provided.  
In all cases of ad hoc arbitration or arbitration administered by an institution 
different from the ICSID, investment treaty arbitration is in the same position 
as any other international arbitration and, therefore, as it will be more 
thoroughly explained in the next section, the arbitration is ultimately governed 
by municipal law in the seat of the arbitration.50 In addition, the awards 
rendered by non-ICSID tribunals are subject to challenges and to control by 
the courts according to local arbitration statutes in the country where they are 
rendered. These often follow the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (the “UNCITRAL Model Law”),51 which limits 
courts intervention in the arbitral process except where expressly provided in 
law.52 The recognition and enforcement abroad of the arbitration agreements 
                                                          
50 For more on the relationship between national courts and the arbitration proceeding, 
please refer to section 3 of this Chapter I. 
51 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (United Nations 
documents A/40/17, annex I and A/61/17, annex I), as adopted by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law on 21 June 1985, and as amended by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 7 July 2006 (available at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf). By 
means of this document, which represents a proposal for national legislation, UNCITRAL 
has strongly influenced the development of international arbitration. This model law is 
considered as having had a significant impact on the progressive harmonization of the law 
relating to the review of international arbitral awards.  
52 Art. 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, titled ‘Extent of court intervention’, provides that: 
‘[i]n matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in 
this Law.’ In addition Art. 34 of the Model Law provides a close-end list of grounds upon 
which recourse against an award can be made and it excludes appeal on a point of law. 
Please however note that legal systems that have not adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law 
may provide for grounds for annulment different from those identified in the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. For an outline of the annulment provisions included in certain main 
jurisdictions, see P. BERNARDINI, ICSID Versus Non-ICSID Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, in M.A. FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS, D. ARIAS (eds.), Liber Amicorum 
Bernando Cremades, Kluwer Espana; La Ley, 2010, pp. 159-188, at paras. 52-58 (available 
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and arbitral awards are based on the local laws and international conventions, 
the most important of which is the New York Convention.53 Such conventions 
introduce uniform criteria for ensuring the extraterritorial effectiveness of 
arbitration agreements, and furthering the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards by reducing controls exercised by the courts of the country of 
recognition or enforcement of the minimum safeguards needed to protect 
national public policy. However, also in case of application of the New York 
Convention, the role for national law has been left relatively open and thus 
there is room for national courts’ intervention. Not surprisingly, it has been 
deemed that “this has contributed to the failure in reaching a truly international 
standard for arbitration”.54 
In light of the above, it is clear how the investor should carefully decide, if so 
allowed by the relevant investment treaty, how to bring an investment claim 
against the host State. Indeed, while the ICSID seems the most specialised and 
effective system, its costs and the length of its process55 may persuade an 
investor to opt for a non-ICSID arbitration. Another challenge of the ICSID 
system is the annulment of awards, which may be perceived to be unsteady. In 
fact, in recent times, the annulment of investment awards before national 




53 Indeed, as noted in C. MCLACHLAN, L. SHORE, M. WEINIGER, International Investment 
Arbitration: Substantive Principles, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 65, domestic courts 
have consistently maintained that non-ICSID investment arbitrations are considerable as 
‘commercial’ for the purposes of the application of the New York Convention. For more 
on the New York Convention, see section 4 of this Chapter I. 
54 L. SILBERMAN, The New York Convention After Fifty Years: Some Reflections on the 
Role of National Law, The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 
38, 2009, pp. 25-46, at p. 26. 
55 In fact, as remarked by P. BERNARDINI, ICSID Versus Non-ICSID Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, in M.A. FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS, D. ARIAS (eds.), Liber Amicorum 
Bernando Cremades, supra, note 52, at para. 81, ‘[t]he long time normally needed for a 
tribunal to be constituted and operational is another critical aspect of the ICSID system’. 
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courts has produced a more consistent jurisprudence.56 One of the reasons for 
this result is that decisions on challenges to non-ICSID awards are within the 
competence of a body of judges normally of the higher level of jurisdiction, 
who are expected to follow, at least in the common law system, the precedents 
established by other courts of the same State, thus ensuring a higher level of 
consistency.57 On the contrary, ICSID annulment decisions are entrusted to 
arbitrators that have to review the work performed by other arbitrators who 
may possibly have greater experience. Furthermore, prior ICSID decisions do 
not have precedential value. Another aspect that may depose investors against 
ICSID is the fact that access to its jurisdiction is rather complex, as the 
Convention itself sets out its own mandatory conditions that must be met in 
order for a dispute to fall within the competence of the Centre, while in non-
ICSID arbitration the agreement of the parties to arbitrate is sufficient.58 
Additionally, ICSID is an option open when the State party to the dispute and 
the State of the private disputing party have both ratified the Convention.59 In 
all cases where either of the two States has not ratified the Convention, the 
investor can only start another institutional or ad-hoc proceeding according to 
the provisions of the applicable treaty.  
Despite its increasing growth in importance, investment arbitration represents 
only a small fraction of all international arbitrations. The vast majority of 
international arbitration is still represented by international commercial 
arbitration, which is an alternative form of resolution of disputes having one or 
                                                          
56 P. BERNARDINI, ICSID Versus Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, in M.A. 
FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS, D. ARIAS (eds.), Liber Amicorum Bernando Cremades, supra, 
note 52, at paras. 83 and following.  
57 P. BERNARDINI, ICSID Versus Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, in M.A. 
FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS, D. ARIAS (eds.), Liber Amicorum Bernando Cremades, supra, 
note 52, at para. 84. 
58 Interestingly, also non-ICSID tribunals seem to require additional conditions to establish 
their jurisdiction. See Chapter II, section 4. 





more transnational aspects between two or more parties that prefer to rely on 
decisions taken by arbitrators rather than national courts.  
However, there are several differences between investment arbitration and 
commercial international arbitration. The first difference concerns the parties 
to the dispute. While in commercial arbitration the dispute concerns two 
private individuals, investment arbitration sees an investor as the claimant, and 
a State as the respondent. The second major difference regards the interests 
involved: as a State is one of the parties to the dispute, there are public interests 
that come into play in the arbitral proceedings which must be considered by 
the tribunal. The third major difference concerns the law to be applied by the 
tribunal. While in international commercial arbitration the panel is to apply a 
municipal law which is determined by the parties, or by the lack of a parties’ 
decision by the tribunal itself, investment treaty arbitration is essentially 
decided on the basis of public international law. In the first instance, such 
public international law rules are to be found in the treaty where the State’s 
consent to jurisdiction is granted, but customary international law, international 
conventions stipulated by the parties and the general principles of law can also 
be applied.60 This does not mean that national law does not also find room for 
application in investment arbitration;61 however, international law has the 
predominant role with respect to procedural and substantial matters. Another 
important difference lies in the subject matter of the dispute: in investment 
arbitration there must be a foreign investment, otherwise arbitrators shall 
decline their jurisdiction, while in commercial arbitration the transaction 
underlying the claim shall be a commercial transaction (which may also take the 
form of an investment).62  
                                                          
60 For more see Chapter III, section 10. 
61 On the role played by national law in investment arbitration (as well as on other differences 
between the two kinds of arbitration), see, inter alia, K. BÖCKSTIEGEL, Commercial and 
investment Arbitration: How Different are they Today? The Lalive Lecture 2012, 
Arbitration International, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2012, pp. 577-590. 
62 For a detailed analysis of the various differences between investment and commercial 
arbitration, see, inter alia, H.V. HOUTTE, M. BRUNETTI, Investment Arbitration – Ten Areas 
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Yet, as mentioned, a group of recent cases has shown how these two forms of 
arbitration are not entirely distinct. Reference is made to investment arbitration 
cases where the claimants invoked provisions of the applicable investment 
treaty to challenge actions of national courts with respect to the recognition or 
enforcement of commercial arbitral awards. These are the so-called ‘cross-over 
arbitration’ cases, which represent the subject matter of this work.63  
 
3. The relationship between national courts and arbitration (a first look) 
Even if one of the main purposes of arbitration agreements is to avoid the 
involvement of national courts, which are often perceived as non-independent, 
municipal courts of the seat of the arbitration or where enforcement of an 
award is sought also have a role to play in the context of international 
arbitration. Indeed, the support of the courts is widely considered as an 
indispensable part of the arbitration mechanism, as no arbitration can achieve 
its aims without the assistance of the domestic juridical system.64 This 
                                                                                                                                                            
of Caution for Commercial Arbitrators, Arbitration International, Vol. 29, Issue 3, 2013, 
pp. 553-574. 
63 With this term are defined those ‘arbitrations where international commercial arbitration 
meets investment arbitration, which is used to obtain redress against unlawful actions by 
State courts against commercial arbitration’ (L.G. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, Remedies 
against State Interference with International Arbitration (text of the talk given at the 




64 A.J. BĚLOHLÁVEK, Seat of Arbitration and Supporting and Supervising Function of 
Courts, in A.J. BĚLOHLÁVEK, N. ROZEHNALOVÁ (eds.), Czech (& Central European) 
Yearbook of Arbitration,Vol. 5 (2015), JurisNet, 2015, pp. 21-48, at p. 21; G. CARBONE, 
The Interference of the Court of the Seat with International Arbitration, Journal of 
Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, 2012, pp. 217-244, at p. 1; W.M. REISMAN, H. IRAVANI, 
The Changing Relation of National Courts and International Commercial Arbitration, 
American Review of International Arbitration, Vol. 21, Issues 1-4, 2010, pp. 5-46; and S. 
SATTAR, National Courts and International Arbitration: A Double-edged Sword?, Journal 
of International Arbitration, Vol. 27, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 51-73, at pp. 51 and 52.  
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statement is widely accepted by the advocates of both the territorialism theory 
and the delocalised theory.65 
There are several ways in which national courts may interact with arbitration. 
The interaction may come to existence before the arbitration begins, in the 
course of the proceeding itself or in the post-arbitration phase (i.e., in the 
context of the enforcement of the award). 
Before the commencement of arbitral proceedings themselves, municipal 
courts may settle claims regarding the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in a 
specific case, for example, examining whether the arbitration agreement is valid 
and enforceable and whether the dispute submitted for adjudication is included 
in the scope of the arbitration agreement. This role rests within the 
competences of national courts as illustrated in Art. 2(3) of the New York 
Convention, pursuant to which: ‘[t]he court of a Contracting State, when seized 
of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement 
within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, 
refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed’ (emphasis added). The national courts can 
also assist the parties with establishing an arbitral tribunal if they have not 
previously selected any appointing authority or arbitral rule. 
                                                          
65 S. SATTAR, National Courts and International Arbitration: A Double-edged Sword?, supra, 
note 64, at p. 52. For clarification purposes, the traditional territorialism theory envisages 
that arbitrators derive their powers from the law of the seat of the arbitration. According to 
the most rigid fringe of this theory, the law of the seat determines the procedural rules, 
which govern the arbitral procedure in the absence of a different agreement between the 
parties, and the choice of law rules, which identifies the law applicable to the merits of the 
dispute. Delocalization theory, on the contrary, maintains that international arbitral 
tribunals are detached from the law of the State in whose territory the arbitral proceedings 
are conducted. According to this approach the sources of the arbitrators' powers derive 
from the international legal community. Nowadays, even without embracing the full 
delocalised theory, court practice seems to suggest that international arbitration has 
achieved a certain degree of independence from national law systems. As a final remark, it 
is worth noting that the only de-localised arbitration is ICSID arbitration, for the reasons 
given in section 2 of this Chapter I. 
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In the course of the arbitral proceedings, it may be necessary for the municipal 
courts of the State of the seat to issue orders with the purpose, for instance, of 
preventing a party from destroying evidence or requesting documents under 
the control of third parties that are not subject to the powers of the arbitrators. 
Finally, once the award has been rendered, if a party to arbitration proceedings 
does not voluntarily enforce an award issued against it, the winning party may 
seek the enforcement of the award before the courts of the State(s) where the 
losing party holds its assets. Analogously, if a party intends to challenge an 
arbitral award, that party shall bring an action before the courts of the State in 
whose territory the arbitration was placed. 
In light of the above, it emerges that national courts and international 
arbitration are complementary and the former should act with the aim of 
ensuring that the arbitration proceedings are carried out in accordance to the 
will of the parties, intervening only and to the extent it is necessary to 
supplement the powers of the arbitrators or supervise the exercise thereof. 
However, it is possible that national courts pathologically interfere with 
international arbitration, which occurs when courts exercise their powers to 
impede the effectiveness of the arbitration proceedings, rather than to support 
and supervise them. There are several ways in which the national courts may 
interfere in international arbitration. For instance, they can unduly revoke the 
authority of the arbitral tribunal, issue anti-arbitration injunctions for parochial 
local law reasons, or deny enforcement to arbitral awards. 
As illustrated, this work will focus on the possibility of having recourse to 
investment arbitration in the event of wrongful interference of national courts 
in the arbitration process. 
In fact, in all the cases of wrongful activity by national courts, the State may be 
held liable therefor. Indeed, it is a well-established principle66 that the conducts 
of any organ of a State, including the judiciary, are attributable to the State they 
                                                          
66  The principle that States are responsible for the conduct of their organs is considered as 
the typical case of State responsibility and an indispensable part of international law. See, 
for instance, Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina/Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007, I.C.J. 43 
(February 26). 
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belong to. This principle is also codified in Art. 4 of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (the “ILC Articles”), which reflects one of the basic customary rules 
concerning the responsibility of States under international law.67 According to 
this article, ‘[t]he conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that 
State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, 
judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of 
the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or 
of a territorial unit of the State.’ 
 
4. The New York Convention 
Without prejudice to what has been described in section 3 of this Chapter, the 
role and the degree of the powers that courts may exercise relating to 
arbitration vary from State to State, depending mainly on the content of 
national legislation. In particular, with reference to the recognition of 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards and on the enforcement thereof, it 
should be noted that besides the New York Convention, there are no 
overarching international obligations and mechanisms capable of ensuring the 
non-interference of national courts in international arbitration. 
The New York Convention is widely considered as the centrepiece of the legal 
regime governing international arbitration.68 It provides for a speedy and 
efficient method of obtaining recognition and enforcement of both arbitration 
                                                          
67 See, for instance, Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina/Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007, I.C.J. 43 
(February 26), paras. 385, 398 and 401 (available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf ); and MCI v. Ecuador (see, infra, note 231), para. 85. 
68 G.B. BORN, International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements: Drafting and 
Enforcing, Kluwer Law International, 2013, at p. 141. It should be noted that the success 
of modern international commercial arbitration is considered to be also based on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, which contributed to the harmonization of international 
arbitration law which, in turn, assists in achieving certainty and predictability in decisions 
(see, inter alia, N. KAPLAN, Introduction, in N. KAPLAN (ed.) ICCA’s Guide to the 
Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges, International 
Council for Commercial Arbitration, 2011, pp. ix-xiv, at p. x). 
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agreements and arbitral awards. Notably, it is not the only international treaty 
dealing with this matter,69 but it is undoubtedly the most successful one.70 In 
broad outline, the New York Convention requires national courts to recognise 
and enforce international arbitration agreements, subject to certain exceptions. 
In addition, it limits the grounds of judicial review of binding foreign awards by 
local courts, as national courts are due to recognise and enforce foreign arbitral 
awards, and enforcement may only be refused if basic notions of justice have 
been violated or public policy reasons prevent enforcement. 
The New York Convention is based on a pro-recognition and pro-enforcement 
bias. It is probably due to the New York Convention that arbitration has 
become a very attractive alternative to traditional litigation. Indeed, one of the 
most important advantages of arbitration over litigation as a means of resolving 
trans-border business disputes is the degree of certainty a party can have that 
an award will be recognized and enforced in all the many contracting States. 
                                                          
69 Since 1958 a number of regional conventions have followed. In the European context, for 
instance, the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961 was 
elaborated with the aim of facilitating trade between Eastern and Western Europe (even if 
also non-European States can become a party to it). This convention has the merit that it 
limits the grounds for setting aside an award in the country of origin, as they must also be 
recognized in the country where recognition is sought. Another important instrument in 
the American context is the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration of 1975 (the “Panama Convention”), which has been ratified by the United 
States and 20 South and Central American States. The Panama Convention was conceived 
at a time when many South American States were reluctant to ratify the New York 
Convention, and it was aimed at being a more acceptable regional alternative. The Panama 
Convention largely reproduces the content of the New York Convention with respect to 
the treatment of international arbitration agreements and awards. For an outline of the 
main regional conventions, see E. GAILLARD, J. SAUVAGE, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 963-965; J. 
KLEINHEISTERKAMP, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, in Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (voice of), 2008, para. C.  
70 The New York Convention is considered one of the most successful instruments in the 
history of international treaties. At the date of this work, more than 140 States are party to 
it.  
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On the contrary, there is no almost universal instrument on recognition and 
enforcement of national court decisions. 
The scope of the New York Convention is not related to the nationality of the 
parties to the arbitration. Pursuant to Art. 1 thereof,71 it applies to all ‘foreign’ 
awards, which include both: (i) awards made in the territory of a State other 
than the State where recognition or enforcement is sought; and (ii) awards that 
are not considered as domestic awards in the State where recognition or 
enforcement is sought. With respect to the first category of awards, in the 
absence of an explanation by the New York Conventions itself of where an 
award is deemed to be made, the vast majority of contracting States consider 
that an award is made at the seat of the arbitration, regardless of where 
hearings, deliberations and other parts of the arbitral process effectively take 
place.72 With respect to the category of non-domestic awards, the New York 
                                                          
71 Art. 1 of the New York Convention provides that: ‘(1) This Convention shall apply to the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than 
the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising 
out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral 
awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and 
enforcement are sought.  
(2) The term "arbitral awards" shall include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed 
for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have 
submitted.  
(3) When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension under 
article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the 
Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of 
another Contracting State. It may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to 
differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are 
considered as commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration.’ 
72 See H. BAGNER, Article I, in H. KRONKE, P. NACIMIENTO, D. OTTO, N.C. PORT, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the 
New York Convention, Kluwer Law International, 2010, pp. 19-36, at pp. 20-23; and N. 
KAPLAN, The New York Convention as an Instrument of International Law, in N. 
KAPLAN (ed.) ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A 
Handbook for Judges, International Council for Commercial Arbitration, 2011, pp. 12-31, 
at p. 20). 
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Convention does not provide for a definition thereof and each Contracting 
State is, therefore, free to decide which awards it does not consider as non-
domestic. States generally consider all or some of the following awards as non-
domestic: (a) awards made under arbitration laws of another State; (b) awards 
involving a foreign element; (c) a-national awards. 
Contracting States may limit the scope of their obligations under the New York 
Convention, adopting either of the following two reservations: (a) first, the 
reciprocity reservation, which allows contracting States only to recognise and 
enforce foreign awards made in other Contracting States;73 and (b) second, the 
commercial reservation, which limits recognition and enforcement of foreign 
awards to those disputes that arise out of a commercial relationship, and it is 
left to the national law of the reserving State to determine what a ‘commercial 
relationship’ is in this context.74 
Notably, the New York Convention does not apply only to international 
arbitral awards, but also to written arbitration agreements, provided that they 
are not merely domestic. The internationality of the agreement may result 
either from the nationality or domicile of the parties or from the underlying 
transaction, while there is no need that the arbitration agreement will result in a 
foreign award.75 Art. 2 of the New York Convention governs the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitration agreements.76 Provided that certain conditions 
                                                          
73 According to N. KAPLAN, The New York Convention as an Instrument of International 
Law, supra, note 72, at p. 23, approximately two-thirds of the Contracting States have made 
this reservation. 
74 According to N. KAPLAN, The New York Convention as an Instrument of International 
Law, supra, note 72, at p. 24, approximately one-third of the Contracting States have made 
this reservation. 
75 This proposition is supported by national courts of various countries, including the United 
States, India and France (for more on this, see UNCITRAL, Guide on the Convention on 




76 Art. 3 of the New York Convention provides that: '1. Each Contracting State shall 
recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to 
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are satisfied, the New York Convention mandates contracting States to 
recognize an agreement in writing to submit disputes to arbitration and to 
enforce such an agreement by referring the parties to arbitration. According to 
Art. 2(3) of the New York Convention, national courts are not obliged to refer 
the parties to arbitration if they find that the relevant agreement is ‘null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.’ 
Turning to the analysis of the provisions regarding the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards, the cornerstone is laid down in Art. 3, pursuant 
to which contracting States shall recognize arbitral awards as binding.77 This 
Article obliges Contracting States to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral 
awards under the rules of procedure in the country where the award is being 
relied on, unless one of the grounds expressly indicated in the New York 
Convention is proven to exist. Interestingly, upon the existence of any such 
grounds, the New York Convention does not oblige, but only allows, the 
foreign national courts to deny recognition and enforcement.78 These basic 
                                                                                                                                                            
arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in 
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject 
matter capable of settlement by arbitration. 
2. The term “agreement in writing” shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an 
arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or 
telegrams. 
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of 
which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the 
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.’ 
77 Art. III of the New York Convention provides that: ‘[e]ach Contracting State shall 
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of 
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down 
in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions 
or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which 
this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic 
arbitral awards.’ 
78 This proposition is not unanimously supported by scholarly writings. As will be illustrated 
in Chapter III, section 4.2.4, some authors believe that, once an award is annulled in the 
State of the seat, it ceases to exist and, thus, cannot be recognised and enforced anywhere.  
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provisions ensure that the arbitral award will finally resolve the dispute between 
the parties and that no revision of the merits of the award can be made by 
foreign domestic courts in the context of recognition and/or enforcement 
proceedings. In order to benefit from the New York Convention, the award 
winner is not required to initiate any proceedings in the country of origin of the 
award (i.e., there is no need to achieve a ‘double exequatur’), as it only needs to 
have ‘a binding award’79 to be presented before the foreign courts from which 
recognition and/or enforcement is sought.80 
As already mentioned, once a party seeking recognition or enforcement has 
complied with the procedure outlined in the New York Convention,81 a court 
may (on its discretion) refuse enforcement only if a party proves the existence 
of one of the grounds expressly listed in the New York Convention.82 In this 
                                                          
79 Notably, the New York Convention does not clarify when an award is to be considered as 
‘binding’. This ambiguity had generated controversy as to whether the word ‘binding’ 
should be given a specific meaning under the Convention or whether, on the contrary, an 
award can only be considered as ‘binding’ for the purposes of the Convention if it is 
binding under the law of the country of origin. For more on the interpretations given to 
the word ‘binding’, see E. GAILLARD, J. SAUVAGE, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration, supra, note 69, pp. 971-977. 
80 The Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed in Geneva on 26 
September 1977, on the contrary, required the ‘double exequatur’ in order to apply for 
recognition or enforcement. Therefore, a party was asked to initiate proceedings in the 
country of origin of the award.  
81 Art. 4 of the New York Convention provides that: ‘1. To obtain the recognition and 
enforcement mentioned in the preceding article, the party applying for recognition and 
enforcement shall, at the time of the application, supply:  
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof;  
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy thereof.  
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official language of the country in 
which the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the 
award shall produce a translation of these documents into such language. The translation 
shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.’ 
82  Art. 5 of the New York Convention provides that: ‘1. Recognition and enforcement of the 
award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that 
party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is 
sought, proof that:  
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respect, it is worth noting that the New York Convention makes a distinction 
between two types of grounds on which recognition and enforcement may be 
refused: (i) those which must be raised by the party resisting recognition or 
enforcement; and (ii) those which can be raised by the courts of the host 
country on their own motion. The list of grounds is exhaustive, and it of 
course excludes any revision of the merits of the award. The effects of a refusal 
of recognition and enforcement pursuant to Art. 5 remain limited to the 
country where it occurs. 
Interestingly, while the New York Convention offers parameters for 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award before foreign courts, it does 
not regulate the grounds for setting aside an award at the place of arbitration. 
                                                                                                                                                            
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to 
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which 
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the 
country where the award was made; or 
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable 
to present his case; or 
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms 
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope 
of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which 
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; 
or 
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or 
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of 
which, that award was made.  
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent 
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:  
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under 
the law of that country; or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of 
that country.’ 
33 
Therefore, each State is free to determine, with its national rules, on which 
grounds an arbitral award can be annulled. However, once the award is 
annulled in the State of the seat, then its recognition or enforcement may be 
refused83 by a foreign State. 
In light of the above, it is clear that the New York Convention has created an 
international framework in which arbitral awards can circulate and be easily 
recognised and enforced by the contracting States, except when any of the 
limited grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement set out by the New 
York Convention are met. 
As already mentioned, there are cases in which the New York Convention 
system breaks down, as the courts of the State in which the award is to be 
recognised and enforced wrongfully fail to do so. In the absence of a provision 
in the New York Convention establishing a body allowed to supervise the 
application of the New York Convention itself, it is essential to outline the 
remedies available to the frustrated award winner or aggrieved party to the 
arbitration agreement.  
 
5. Alternative remedies 
As already illustrated, the purpose of this work is to analyse if, and subject to 
which conditions, an investor whose arbitral award and/or arbitration 
agreement was/were set aside on specious grounds by local courts and/or 
whose arbitral award was wrongfully non-enforced can bring an investment 
treaty claim against the State whose courts have acted improperly. 
This work will focus only on the remedy of investor-State arbitration based on 
the dispute settlement clause set out in an investment agreement. 
It is however worth recalling that the aggrieved award creditor may also have 
recourse to other remedies. As illustrated in section 3 of this Chapter, investors 
may seek their home State’s diplomatic protection, although, as seen, this is a 
less than perfect remedy.84 Alternatively, a public international law option 
                                                          
83 Or must be refused, according to a line of thought (see, supra, note 78). 
84 With respect to diplomatic protection in cases of non-compliance with arbitral awards, see 
R. ECHANDI, Non-Compliance with Awards: The Remedies of Costumary International 
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potentially available is to seek redress before one of the regional human rights 
courts.85 The three major institutions established by international human rights 
treaties are: the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”), whose 
jurisdiction extends to all 47 States of the Council of Europe;86 the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (the “IACtHR”), with competence in 
respect of the 20 States within the Organization of American States that have 
adhered to its jurisdiction;87 and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (the “ACtHPR”), covering the 29 Member States of the African 
Union.88 Any claim before these tribunals must be brought under the relevant 
constituent treaty, i.e., respectively, the European Convention on Human 
                                                                                                                                                            
Law, in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law, Vol. 
16, American Society of International Law, March 2012, pp. 118-122; and D.B. KING, R. 
MOLOO, Enforcement after the Arbitration: From National Courts to Public International 
Law Fora, in F. FERRARI (ed.), Forum Shopping in the International Commercial 
Arbitration Context, pp. 393-457, at pp. 439-444. 
85 For a comparative analysis of the protection afforded under the investor-State arbitration 
and the European Court of Human Rights, see U. KRIEBAUM, Is the European Court of 
Human Rights an Alternative to Investor-State Arbitration?, in P.M. DUPUY, E.U. 
PETERSMANN, F. FRANCIONI (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Law and 
Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 219-245. 
86 I.e., Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; 
Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; 
Luxembourg; Malta; Republic of Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; Norway; 
Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; San Marino; Serbia; Slovak Republic; 
Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 
Turkey; Ukraine; and the United Kingdom. 
87 I.e., Argentina; Barbados; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican 
Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Guatemala; Haiti; Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; 
Paraguay; Peru; Suriname; and Uruguay. 
88 I.e., Algeria; Benin; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cote d’Ivoire; Comoros; Congo; Gabon; 
Gambia; Ghana; Kenya; Libya; Lesotho; Mali; Malawi; Mozambique; Mauritania; Mauritius; 
Nigeria; Niger; Rwanda; Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic; South Africa; Senegal; 
Tanzania; Togo; Tunisia; Uganda; and Cameroon. 
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Rights (the “ECHR”),89 the American Convention on Human Rights (the 
“ACHR”),90 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the 
“ACHPR”).91  
As to the gateway conditions, there are substantial issues limiting access to the 
IACtHR and the ACtHPR,92 while the ECtHR affords a greater degree of 
access, allowing both natural and legal persons to bring direct claims before the 
Court on their own initiative, provided that the offending State is a party to the 
ECHR.93 As to the substantive protection, it shall be noted the ECHR grants 
protection against illegal dispossession94 and enshrines the right to a fair and 
                                                          
89 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed on 4 
November 1950, as subsequently amended and supplemented (available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/sites/digitalagenda/files/Convention_ENG.pdf). 
90 American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of San Jose ́, Costa Rica” signed on 22 
November 1969 (available at: http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.pdf). 
91 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (also known as the Banjul Charter), signed 
on 27 June 1981 (available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3630.html) 
and Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment 
of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights signed 9 June 1998 (establishing the 
Court). 
92 For more see, inter alia, A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, The Righs of Access to Justice in the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection, in B. CONFORTI ET AL. (gen. 
eds.), Italian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 17 (2007), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2007, pp. 9-24; D.B. KING, R. MOLOO, Enforcement after the Arbitration: From National 
Courts to Public International Law Fora, supra, note 84, at pp. 427-428.  
93 For more on, inter alia, the gateway conditions of the three Courts, see D.B. KING, R. 
MOLOO, Enforcement after the Arbitration: From National Courts to Public International 
Law Fora, supra, note 84, at pp. 427-428. 
94 Art. 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR provides that: ‘[e]very natural or legal person is entitled 
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions 
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the 
general principles of international law.’ 
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reasonably timely trial.95 On these grounds, the ECtHR has found on several 
occasions that a State’s wrongful annulment of an arbitral award or agreement, 
or its failure to enforce a binding award in full and within a reasonable 
timeframe, can result in liability under either Art. 1 of Protocol 1 or Art. 6 of 
the ECHR.96 Despite the fact that the IACtHR and the ACtHPR have not yet 
encountered a case involving the non-enforcement of an arbitral award, one 
scholarly work97 argued that an approach similar to that of the ECtHR may be 
expected, since the constitutive elements under those instruments are 
reasonably similar to the ECHR. 
In any event, one should consider that the regional human rights courts are not 
an easily available remedy or one involving a short path to enforcement. In 
addition, before accessing such courts, the investor must have first exhausted 
                                                          
95 Art. 6(1) provides: ‘[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations [...] everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law [...]’. 
96 The trailblazer of this jurisprudential line is Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. 
Greece, ECtHR, No 13427/87, Judgement, 9 December 1994, paras. 59-62 (“Stran v. 
Greece”), which concerned the validity and enforcement of a purely domestic arbitral 
award, although the Court extended the same principles to international arbitral awards in 
its subsequent jurisprudence: See also, Regent Company v. Ukraine, ECtHR, No. 773/03, 
Judgement, 3 April 2008; and Kin-Stib & Majkic ́ v. Serbia, ECtHR, No. 12312/05, 
Judgement, 20 April 2010. For an analysis of the mentioned jurisprudence, see D.B. KING, 
R. MOLOO, Enforcement after the Arbitration: From National Courts to Public 
International Law Fora, supra, note 84. See also, inter alia, A. ÇOBAN, Protection of Property 
Rights within the European Convention on Human Rights, Ashgate Publishing, 2004, pp. 
244-247; D. GOMIEN, Short Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2005, pp. 125-131; P. LEMMENS, The right to a fair trial and 
its multiple manifestations, Art. 6(1) ECHR, in E. BREMS, J. GERARDS (eds.), Shaping 
Rights in the ECHR. The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining 
the Scope of Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 294-314; M.W. JANIS, 
R.S. KAY, A.W. BRADLEY, European Human Rights Law. Text and Materials (3rd Edition), 
Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 519-553 and 718-826; and S. KONRAD, M.M. BIRCH, 
Non-Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Only a Pyrrhic Victory?, Transnational Dispute 
Management, Vol. 7, Issue 1, April 2010, pp. 1-9. 
97 D.B. KING, R. MOLOO, Enforcement after the Arbitration: From National Courts to 
Public International Law Fora, supra, note 84, at pp. 438-439.  
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all local remedies. It is for these reasons that this work will not focus on 
diplomatic protection and to the recourse to treaties for the protection of 
human rights, but exclusively to investor-State arbitration pursuant to 
provisions of investment treaties, which seems, prima facie, to be the most 
effective remedy. However, it is noted that human rights treaties often 
complement investment treaties, and investment arbitration refers to decisions 
of the ECtHR.98 Indeed in many cases investment tribunals relied on human 
rights jurisprudence to support their findings.99 This shows how investment 
treaties do not operate in isolation from other treaties that party States have 
concluded: non-investment treaties may provide jurisprudential explanation for 
substantive rules and principles that are common to both treaties.100 
 
6. Outline of the work 
All this premised, to conclude this introductory Chapter, it is useful to briefly 
outline the content of the following Chapters of this work. 
In Chapter II, the gateway conditions to investor-State arbitration will be 
analysed. In particular, since all investment treaties require as the jurisdictional 
pre-condition at least the existence of an investment, the Chapter will analyse if 
an arbitral award and/or an arbitration agreement can qualify as such. Notably, 
investment treaties may provide for different definitions of investment and, 
thus, different solutions may be reached depending on the wording of the 
specific treaty that may be enforced by the frustrated award winner. In 
addition, the Convention itself sets out its own jurisdictional requirements that 
add to those provided in the applicable investment treaty in the context of 
ICSID arbitration.  
                                                          
98 See, for instance, Mondev v. US (see, infra, note 318). 
99 In particular with respect to the concepts of protection of property and fair trial that have 
both been developed considerably by human rights' courts in the last fifty years. 
100 For more on this interaction, see A. GHOURI, Interaction and Conflict of Treaties in 
Investment Arbitration, International Arbitration Law Library, Vol. 32, Kluwer Law 
International, 2015, at pp. 103-148; C. MCLACHLAN, Investment Treaty Arbitration: The 
Legal Framework, supra, note 38, at pp. 121-122. 
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Notably, the topic of the subject matter jurisdiction is particularly relevant 
within the ambit of this work since the possibility to consider an arbitral 
agreement or award as an investment is rather controversial. In fact, the 
Convention does not clarify what an investment is for its purposes and, 
analogously, the vague provisions of investment treaties give leeway to 
different interpretation. After an analysis of the positions of scholars in this 
regard, the work will examine the positions taken by the few ICSID and non-
ICSID tribunals that dealt with the topic. The Chapter will only cursorily 
mention the other jurisdictional requirements, as they are not specific to the 
topic. 
After having dealt with the jurisdiction, Chapter III will analyse which conducts 
of the State can entail its liability and which provisions of the applicable 
investment treaty may be breached by the conduct of the municipal courts. 
More precisely the work will preliminarily give an outline of the standards of 
treatment included in investment treaties (and, in particular, in BITs), which 
may be invoked by the aggrieved investor. In this respect, it should be noted 
that, although the specific provisions of individual investment treaties are not 
uniform, virtually all contemporary investment treaties afford the investor with 
certain general standards of treatment (such as fair and equitable treatment, full 
protection and security, and protection from unreasonable measures) and 
protect the investor from unlawful expropriation and dispossession. Of course, 
the wording of each BIT is different, and thus the protection afforded by each 
of them is different, even when the same standards of treatment are envisaged. 
However, there are certain basic features that qualify each standard, regardless 
of the specific language, that is useful to identify before turning to the analysis 
of how these standards can be invoked in the specific context of cross-over 
arbitration.  
Also in Chapter III, the analysis will focus on how tribunals have reacted to the 
claims of investors and when a breach of the treaty has been found.  
The scrutiny will then turn to the possibility of bringing a claim under an 
investment treaty, even in the absence of a breach of the treaty itself, because 
the State has infringed, through the actions of its national courts, other 
international obligations, with a particular focus on the New York Convention. 
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In fact, as will be better illustrated on the following pages, investment tribunals 
in some of the cases on which this work focuses have recognised that the 
national courts have misapplied the New York Convention, but such a 
violation has been taken into account exclusively in the context of the 
assessment of the existence of a treaty breach. It is clear that the possibility for 
an investor to bring an investment claim for a direct breach of the New York 
Convention would represent an enormous advantage.  
As a final remark, it is clear that this work will focus on the analysis of the first 
six (and to date only published) cases that dealt with this topic in order to draw 
consequences on the effectiveness of investment arbitration as a remedy in 
cases of wrongful non-enforcement of arbitral awards. In this respect, it will be 
noted that on the international plane, arbitral awards do not have precedential 
value. However, like all other judicial decisions in international law,101 
investment arbitral awards can be looked at for an elucidation of the law. As 
stated by an eminent author, precedent does not ‘command respect, but rather 
[it] is useful’.102  
Currently, arbitral awards cannot be considered as norms in and of themselves, 
but they can contribute to the development of norms. Indeed, arbitral 
pronouncements, also outside of a system of binding precedents, have an 
influence beyond the case concerned. In addition, with the growing success of 
investment arbitration and the consequent increase in the number of decided 
cases, reliance on case law has expanded. Of course the relevance of the 
decision will depend on the authority of the arbitrator(s), on the quality of the 
award itself and on the reliance that the parties to the case have made on 
certain previous decisions (arbitrators have no duty to look at previous 
decisions unless they are pleaded by the parties). In light of the above, it seems 
                                                          
101 As clarified by Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, doctrine and 
jurisprudence do not create the law; rather, they assist in determining rules which already 
exist. For this reason, for instance, the judgements of the ICJ were not given binding 
effects, except for upon the disputing parties. 
102 J. PAULSSON, The Role of Precedent in Investment Arbitration, in K. YANNACA-SMALL 
(ed.), Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues, 
Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 699-718, at p. 710. 
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justified that six awards rendered in a few years on the same topic and in which 
the relevant arbitrators expressly referred to previous decisions may be 
considered as a material sample for this analysis.  
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CHAPTER II – COMMERCIAL AWARDS AS INVESTMENTS 
1. Preliminary remarks 
As is well known, in order to access investor-State arbitration provided under 
investment treaties certain gateway conditions, namely ratione materiae, ratione 
personae, and ratione voluntatis, must be met.103 The content of such conditions 
depends on the norms governing the relevant arbitration, as set out, inter alia, in 
the ICSID Convention, the rules to be applied by the relevant investment 
tribunal, and the applicable investment treaty. 
However, there are certain gateway conditions to investment arbitration that 
must always be met, regardless of whether the arbitration will be made under 
the auspices of the ICSID Convention and its rules or of other institutions that 
adopt different rules.104 In particular, with specific reference to the conditions 
ratione materiae, it must be highlighted that in order to access investment 
arbitration there must always be an investment. Jurisdictional questions relating 
to the scope of arbitrable investment disputes may arise, no matter which 
forum of arbitration is selected, since the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal 
under an applicable investment treaty relies on showing the existence of an 
‘investment’.105 In the event of a lack of an investment, the relevant tribunal 
                                                          
103 Depending on the wording of the applicable investment treaty, the access to investor-State 
arbitration may also depend on ratione temporis conditions.  
104 As illustrated in Chapter I, section 2, in investment treaties and agreements that do not 
submit disputes to the ICSID tribunals, reference is frequently made to the rules of 
arbitration of the ICC, the SCC or ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules. See Definition of Investor and Investment in International Investment Agreements, 
OECD, 2008 (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/40471468.pdf), at 
p. 53 and following. 
105 Another essential condition that must always be met is that the party seeking protection 
must be a foreign investor (see D.B. KING, R. MOLOO, Enforcement after the Arbitration: 
From National Courts to Public International Law Fora, supra, note 84, at p. 413). The 
analysis of the concept of investor is not included within the scope of this work, as the 
existence of an investor was not controversial in the Relevant Cases (as defined below in 
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will not have the jurisdiction over the case, and it goes without saying that the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal is essential to the authority and decision-making of 
the arbitrators: an award rendered without jurisdiction has no legitimacy and 
can be set aside and/or non-recognised for enforcement by courts.106 In light 
of the above, it is clear that, to a large extent, the definition of investment 
outlines the boundaries of a country’s exposure to investor-State claims. 
The above premised, it is not always easy to determine whether a given activity 
or asset qualifies as an investment. This is due to the fact that there is no 
common agreed understanding on what constitutes an investment. Customary 
international law does not refer to the concept of investment, but rather to that 
of property;107 the ICSID Convention does not provide for a definition of 
investment at all, despite the term being used in the context of the Convention 
and, in particular, in Art. 25 which deals with the jurisdiction of the Centre;108 
neither the ICC, nor UNCITRAL nor SCC arbitration rules filter claims 
through their own autonomous notion of investment;109 and investment 
treaties use a wide range of non-consistent wordings for defining 
                                                                                                                                                            
this section). 
106 See D.A.R. WILLIAMS, S. FOOTE, Recent Developments in the Approach to Identifying an 
“Investment” Pursuant to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, in C. BROWN, K. MILES 
(eds.), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, Cambridge University Press, 
2011, at p. 42, citing J. LEW, L.A. MISTELIS, S.M. KROLL, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 2003. See also C. SCHREUER, L. 
MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra, 
note 23, at p. 83, whereby it is clarified that in ICSID arbitration ‘[a] question of 
jurisdiction may also be raised in the context of a request for annulment: a violation of Art. 
25 may have the consequence that the tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers in 
accordance with Art. 52(1)(b) of the Convention […].’ 
107 K. YANNACA-SMALL, Definition of “Investment”: An Open-ended Search for a Balanced 
Approach, in K. YANNACA-SMALL (ed.), Arbitration under International Investment 
Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 243-269, at pp. 
243-244. For an outline of the customary international rules applicable to the protection of 
foreign investment, see, inter alia, R. DOLZER, M. STEVENS, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
Kluwer Law International, 1995, at p. 10. 
108 See section 3 of this Chapter II. 
109 See OECD, supra, note 104, p. 54. 
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investments.110 In addition, in many countries the term ‘investment’ is not even 
legally defined, while the terms ‘property’, ‘assets’ or ‘goods’ are usually defined 
as an established concept in national civil and constitutional laws. 
The difficulties in finding a common agreed understanding of investment are 
due to a number of reasons. First, the concept of investment is at the 
crossroads between economics, law and international relations; therefore any 
definition should not disregard any of these areas.111 Second, it is by itself a 
broad term invoking different meanings in everyday economic and legal usage. 
Finally, it is not a concept static in time, but it is subject to evolution with the 
passing of time and the development of trade exchanges and techniques. 
Recent ICSID statistics show that the subject matters of foreign investments 
tend to be more heterogeneous than they were in the past, when transactions 
dealing with property in sectors like oil, gas, mining, productive infrastructures, 
transportation and/or construction constituted the typical subject matters of 
foreign investments. Nowadays, transfer of intellectual property rights, trade in 
services or in foreign financial assets may also be considered as investments.112 
                                                          
110 See section 2 of this Chapter II. 
111 According to R. DOLZER, C. SCHREUER, Principles of International Investment Law, supra, 
note 49, at p. 60: ‘[e]conomic science often assumes that a direct investment involves (a) 
the transfer of funds, (b) a longer term project, (c) the purpose of regular income, (d) the 
participation of the person transferring the funds, at least to some extent, in the 
management of the project, and (e) a business risk. These elements distinguish foreign 
direct investment from a portfolio investment (no element of personal management), from 
an ordinary transaction for purposes of sale of a good or a service (no management, no 
continuous flow of income), and from a short-term financial transaction.’ As better 
described in sections 2 and 3 of this Chapter II, States have, in whole or in part, relied on 
the economic understanding of investment for drafting the definition thereof in 
investment treaties and tribunals have applied it in order to identify the salient features of 
an investment. 
112 According to the statistics contained in the ICSID 2016 Annual Report (available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID_AR16_EN
G.pdf) the distribution of ICSID cases registered in the 2014 financial year by economic 
sector has been as follows: 
- electric power and other energy sector: 35%; 
- oil, gas, and mining sector: 20%; 
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In this context of uncertainty, arbitral tribunals have tried to reach a conclusive 
definition of investment or, at least, to identify certain hallmarks that must be 
present in order for a transaction to qualify as an investment, but, as better 
described below, no satisfactory outcome has yet been achieved. 
All the above premised, it must be noted that for the purposes of this work, the 
concept of investment is particularly important. Indeed, only if a commercial 
award can be considered as a protected investment will it be possible for the 
aggrieved award creditor to bring a direct claim against the State that 
wrongfully set aside the award or refused its enforcement. 
To date, six arbitration tribunals have come to a decision on this specific issue, 
adopting different approaches in their respective awards (the “Relevant 
Cases”). In the following sections, the parts of the awards rendered by such 
tribunals relevant for this topic will be analysed. 
However, prior to deepening this analysis, it is necessary to identify the legal 
framework relevant for this matter and, in particular, what can be considered as 
an investment pursuant to investment treaties and the ICSID Convention. This 
is due to the fact that, as better illustrated below, the definition of investment 
under investment treaties is relevant for both ICSID and non-ICSID tribunals. 
Analogously, the concept of ‘investment’ set out in the Convention, as 
elaborated by ICSID practice, has shown to be relevant to a certain extent for 
jurisdictional purposes, also in the context of non-ICSID cases. 
In this Chapter, I will first examine what an investment is: (i) in investment 
treaties; (ii) for the purposes of the ICSID Convention and in the jurisprudence 
of ICSID tribunals; and (iii) in the context of non-ICSID cases. 
                                                                                                                                                            
- variety of industries (such as retail, textile manufacturing and voucher services): 11%;  
- construction industry: 9%; 
- transportation, financial sector, and information and communication sectors: 7% each; 
-  tourism and agriculture: 2% each. 
On this topic and for an outline of the sectors for which ICSID protection was sought in 
years 2012/2013, see P. ACCONCI, The Unexpected Development-friendly Definition of 
Investment in the 2013 IDI Resolution, Italian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23 
(2013), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, pp. 69-90, at pp. 71-74.  
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I will then analyse the cases (ICSID and non-ICSID) that have directly dealt 
with the specific issue concerning the possible qualification of a commercial 
award as an investment itself. 
Finally, I will consider if there is a territoriality requirement connected to the 
concept of investment and the possible consequences thereof. 
 
2. Investment under investment treaties 
As briefly illustrated in Chapter I,113 arbitration under investment tribunals, 
including ICSID tribunals, is entirely voluntary. The basis of the parties’ 
consent to investor-State jurisdiction can be found in a variety of sources, in 
particular, domestic investment laws,114 contracts concluded between a foreign 
                                                          
113 See section 2 thereof.  
114 A State may give consent to arbitration in the form of a standing offer in its domestic 
investment promotion laws. Accordingly, some States have passed laws on the promotion 
of foreign investment, which usually provide for ICSID arbitral proceedings as well as 
other types of proceedings in order to resolve investor-State disputes. When consent to the 
ICSID’s or to other investment tribunal’s jurisdiction is granted in national legislation, such 
legislation often also contains a description of the investment to which it relates. Some of 
these definitions are quite terse (see, for instance, Art. 3 of the Tanzania Investment Act 
1997 pursuant to which “investment means the creation or acquisition of new business 
assets and includes the expansion, restructuring or rehabilitation of an existing business 
enterprise”); while others are more elaborate and follow the pattern of modern BITs (see, 
for instance, Art. 1 of the Albania Law on Foreign Investments of 1993, according to 
which ‘“[f]oreign investment” means every kind of investment in the territory of the 
Republic of Albania owned directly or indirectly by a foreign investor, consisting of: 
(a) moveable and immoveable, tangible and intangible property and any other property 
rights; 
(b) a company, shares in stock of a company and any form of participation in a company; 
(c) loans, claim to money or claim to performance having economic value; 
(d) intellectual property, including literary and artistic works, sound recordings, 
inventions, industrial designs, semiconductor mask works, know how, trademarks, 
service marks and trade names; and 
(e) any right conferred by law or contract, and any license or permit pursuant to law’) 
(translation from the original).  
On the topic, see, inter alia, M. DIMSEY, The Resolution of International Investment 
Disputes: Challenges and Practical Solutions, in I. SCHWENZER (series ed.), International 
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investor and the State hosting the investment,115 and BIT or multilateral 
investment treaties.  
Investment treaties are, and have historically been, the predominant source of 
consent to jurisdiction. 116 This was confirmed most recently by the ICSID 
2014 annual report,117 according to which in the financial year 2014: (a) in 49% 
of the cases investors asserted ICSID jurisdiction on the basis of a BIT; (b) in 
22% of the cases this happened on the basis of a multilateral investment treaty 
                                                                                                                                                            
Commerce and Arbitration, Vol. 1, Eleven International Publishing, 2008, at p. 23; and C. 
SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, supra, note 23, at pp. 121-122 and 196-205. 
115 If the consent to investment arbitration is included in a clause of a contract, there is a 
strong presumption that the parties have considered the transaction contemplated 
thereunder as an investment and therefore there should not be much room for arbitrators 
to deny subject matter jurisdiction on the case. However, the ICSID Model Clauses 
(available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/model-clauses-en/main-
eng.htm) suggests, for the avoidance of any doubts, to insert in the contract the following 
specific language: ‘[i]t is hereby stipulated that the transaction to which this agreement 
relates is an investment.’ This language should demonstrate that the parties have carefully 
considered the nature of the project and that, when adopting the ICSID clause, were aware 
of the Convention’s jurisdictional requirements. In any event, it shall be highlighted that 
even in this case, certain tribunals verified whether the transaction envisaged in the relevant 
contract can effectively qualify as an investment regardless of the parties’ intent. On the 
topic, see C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID 
Convention: A Commentary, supra, note 23, at pp. 192-196. 
116 C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, supra, note 23, at p. 122; M. MALIK, Definition of Investment in 
International Investment Agreements, in IISD Bulletin, No. 1, August 2009; and M.K. 
HARWOOD, S.N. BATIFORT, Jurisdiction and Procedure in Investment Arbitration: New 
Developments, in J.H. CARTER (ed.), The International Arbitration Review (5th Edition), 
Law Business Research, 2014, pp. 1-17, at pp. 6-7. 




(in particular, the ECT); (c) in 18% of the cases on the basis of investment 
contracts; and (d) in 11% of the cases on the basis of investment laws.118 
In light of the above and in view of the fact that in the vast majority of cases in 
which tribunals had to face the issue connected to their jurisdiction consent by 
the State was granted in investment treaties (including the Relevant Cases), this 
work will focus exclusively on the definition of investment under international 
investment treaties.  
As will be discussed below, the definition of investment has a material impact 
on investment tribunals' jurisdiction. Of course, the more stringent the 
definition is, the harder it is for an investor to bring a claim against the host 
State. This is evidently of particular relevance with specific reference to the 
possible qualification of an award as an investment. 
 
2.1 International investment treaties 
With the exception of few earlier treaties,119 almost all investment treaties 
contain a definition article and provide for a definition of investment. Though 
the definitions differ from one to another, it is possible to outline certain 
trends in the manner that they are drafted, directly connected to the object and 
objectives of the relevant investment instrument.120 
                                                          
118 However, certain cases relied on the multiple basis of jurisdiction. For an outline of the 
situation in the previous years, see the relevant ICSID annual reports available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/resources/pages/ICSID-Annual-Report.aspx. 
119 Some of the earlier investment agreements (see, for instance, the OEDEC Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, OECD, 1967) did not use the notion 
of investment, but, rather, they referred to ‘foreign property’, treating imported capitals and 
other properties of resident foreign nationals analogously: substantially, no distinction was 
made between investments and other forms of property and economic activity. For more 
on this topic, see N. RUBINS, The Notion of ‘Investment’ in International Investment 
Arbitration, in S. M. KRÖLL, N. HORN (eds.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: 
Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects, Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Vol. 
19, Kluwer Law International, 2004, pp. 283-324, at pp. 283-287. 
120 For an explanation of the different purposes and objectives of investment treaties and their 
evolution in time, see P. BERNARDINI, Investment Protection under Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Investment Contracts, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 2, 
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A narrow approach was followed by earlier instruments, which aimed at the 
gradual liberalisation of capital movements and enumerated the transactions 
covered by them. More precisely, treaties signed before the 1990s usually 
provided a relatively restricted definition of investment, sometimes expressly 
linking the concept to ‘capital’ or requiring a local business enterprise to be 
established to qualify.121 The same approach was taken by the ICC in the 1972 
International Chamber of Commerce Guidelines for International Investments. 
The ICC document was ‘quite clearly directed at foreign nationals who wish to 
establish businesses and investments in the ordinary sense of the world 
bringing capital into the host State and having a management role in the 
business enterprise in which they have a clear stake.’122 
Today, most international investment treaties lay down a broad definition of 
investment, which – in certain cases – is limited at a second step.123 This can be 
easily explained by making reference to the main purpose that most of the 
recent investment treaties (especially BITs) have, i.e., the encouragement of 
foreign investments. In this context, it is clear that the broader the definition is, 
                                                                                                                                                            
Issue 2, 2001, pp. 235-247; R. DOLZER, M. STEVENS, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
supra, note 107, at p. 11 and following; R. ECHANDI, Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Investment Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements : Recent Developments in 
Investment Rulemaking, in K. YANNACA-SMALL (ed.), Arbitration Under International 
Investment Agreements: A Guide To the Key Issues, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 3-
35, at p. 6 and following; K. YANNACA-SMALL, Definition of “Investment”: An Open-
ended Search for a Balanced Approach, supra, note 107, at pp. 243-244; and UNCTAD, 
Scope and Definition (a sequel), UNCTAD Series in Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II, United Nations Publications, 2011 (available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20102_en.pdf), at p. 5.  
121 See World Bank, Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign Investment, Vol. I: Survey 
of Existing Instruments, Progress Report and Background Studies, the World Bank, 1992 
(available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/pt/790571468782168106/pdf/multi-page.pdf). 
122 N.V.S.K. NATHAN, Submissions to the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes in Breach of the Convention, Journal of International Arbitration, 
Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1995, pp. 27-52, at p. 29. 
123 See K. YANNACA-SMALL, Definition of “Investment”: An Open-ended Search for a 
Balanced Approach, supra, note 107, p. 244. 
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the more kinds of foreign investments can be attracted in the countries party to 
the treaty.124 
According to the categorization made by one author125, current international 
investment treaties use three main approaches to defining investment, i.e., 
treaties: (i) provide an ‘illustrative list’ of investments; (ii) opt for an ‘exhaustive 
list’; or (iii) contain an ‘hybrid list’. 
The approach referred to under (i) above is still the most-used in investment 
treaties.126 It consists in giving a broad and open-ended definition of 
investment. Most treaties included in this category refer to ‘every kind of 
assets’127 followed by a list of types of covered assets which is indicative rather 
                                                          
124 See, supra, note 120. 
125 N. RUBINS, The Notion of ‘Investment’ in International Investment Arbitration, supra, 
note 119, p. 292-295, quoted also by K. YANNACA-SMALL, Definition of “Investment”: An 
Open-ended Search for a Balanced Approach, supra, note 107, at p. 245. 
126 See, inter alia, R. ECHANDI, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investment Provisions in 
Regional Trade Agreements : Recent Developments in Investment Rulemaking, supra, note 
120, at p. 11; M. MALIK, Definition of Investment in International Investment 
Agreements, supra, note 116, at p. 3; and UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: 
Flexibility for Development, United Nations Publications, 2000, at p. 70 (available at: 
http://ounctad.org/en/Docs/psiteiitd18.en.pdf). 
127 As noted by R. DOLZER, M. STEVENS, Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra, note 107, at 
p. 27, this broad formula has become a standard definition in most European treaties. See, 
for example, the Agreement Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
signed on 2 October 2002 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/499), whereby investment 
is defined in Art. 1 as: ‘every kind of asset and in particular, though not exclusively, [it] 
includes:  
(i) movable and immovable property and any other property rights such as mortgages, liens 
or pledges;  
(ii) shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any other form of participation in 
a company;  
(iii) claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value;  
(iv) intellectual property rights, goodwill, technical processes and know-how;  
(v) business concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to 
search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.’ 
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than exhaustive. Despite the fact that the covered assets included in the list of 
each treaty slightly differ, it is still possible to identify the following categories 
of assets that are usually present in the definition:128 
- real estate and other property rights. Both movable and immovable 
properties are included in this category, which covers the tangible property 
traditionally safeguarded by international customary law and earlier 
investment agreements;  
- shareholdings and other forms of participation in companies. Not only are 
shares in companies included in the definition, but a broader variety of 
interests and rights in companies are also encompassed. In particular, the 
reference to other forms of participation in companies is wide and may be 
interpreted to include not only foreign direct investments, but also portfolio 
investments;129 
                                                          
128 See C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, supra, note 23, at p. 123; K. YANNACA-SMALL, Definition of “Investment”: 
An Open-ended Search for a Balanced Approach, supra, note 107, at p. 2; and N. RUBINS, 
The Notion of ‘Investment’ in International Investment Arbitration supra, note 119, at pp. 
292-293. For examples of wordings used by various treaties, see R. DOLZER, M. 
STEVENS, Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra, note 107, at pp. 27-31. 
129 According to the definition granted by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in the 
report on trade and foreign investment issued in 1996 (see WTO News: Press Releases, 
Press/57, 9 October 1996 “Trade and foreign direct investment”, New Report by the 
WTO, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm) foreign 
direct investment is a situation in which an investor, resident in its parent country, owns 
assets in another country (i.e., the host country) and aims to manage these assets. The 
management of the assets distinguishes foreign direct investment from portfolio 
investment that mainly focuses on the purchase of foreign stocks, bonds or other financial 
instruments and/or the making of loans in another country without the possibility or intent 
of influencing the running of the local enterprise. For a further analysis of the distinction 
between portfolio investments and direct investments, see, inter alia, M. DEKASTROS, 
Portfolio Investment: Reconceptualising the Notion of Investment under the ICSID 
Convention, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 443-
466; H. QI, The Definition of Investment and Its Development: for the Reference of the 
Future BIT between China and Canada, Revue Juridique Themis, Vol. 45, Issue 3, 2011, 
pp. 541-564, at p. 545 and following; and G. SACERDOTI, The concept of foreign 
51 
- claims to payment or performance having a financial value. The reference in 
this category to claims to money or to any performance having a financial 
value potentially covers a variety of commercial contracts and transactions, 
even including those for the sales of goods transactions. It should be 
highlighted that this category is particularly important in the context of the 
Relevant Cases, as in most of them the claimant argued that the rights 
arising from a commercial award were comprised therein and that, 
therefore, the commercial award, and the claims arising therefrom, were a 
protected investment;130 
- intellectual property rights. This category may also include trademarks, 
patents and copyrights which are not legally protected as traditional forms 
of intellectual property;131 and 
                                                                                                                                                            
investment and the definition of the investor in recent BITs, in The Hague Academy of 
International Law, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 
269, Brill Nijhoff, 1997, pp. 298-320. However it should be noted that the fact that the 
wording of the definition of investment expressly refers to shares and other interests does 
not automatically imply that portfolio investments are to be deemed as covered by the 
treaty. According to a restrictive interpretation that can be granted to such a definition, 
only majority stakes or shares to be held by the investor for a medium-long period of time 
fall within the scope of the definition. Such an interpretation mainly relies on a particular 
reading of the purpose of the treaty, which according to certain tribunals is principally 
aimed at fostering the economic development of the host country, so that portfolio 
investments are per se excluded from the scope of the treaty. Indeed, as noted by M. 
SORNARAJAH, Portfolio Investments and the Definition of Investment, ICSID Review, 
2009, Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 516-520, at p. 516, the possibility of fitting portfolio investment 
into the scheme of investment protection does not depend on the differences in drafting, 
but rather on “different attitudes that arbitrators adopt towards the cases they have to 
decide” (see the mentioned article also for an outline of the arguments for inclusion of 
portfolio investments within the scope of the definition of ‘investment’ present in BITs or 
their exclusion therefrom and for an analysis of relevant case law).  
130 See section 5 of this Chapter II and its sub-sections.  
131 See, for example, Art. 1 of the 2008 UK Model BIT (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2847), according to which: 
‘(a) “investment” means every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly or indirectly, and 
in particular, though not exclusively, includes: […] 
(iv) intellectual property rights, goodwill, technical processes and know-how’. 
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- business concessions under public law. This category may include 
connections to search for, extract and exploit natural resources.132 
Therefore, a concession, for example to search for gas, in itself would be an 
investment even if the investor has not provided the funds or resources 
necessary for actual exploration. 
This drafting manner is directly linked to the acknowledgement that the 
concept of investment continues to evolve and, as technologies, markets and 
commerce develop, there will be new forms of investments that are to be 
included within the scope of the treaty.133  
However, it has its downsides: terms in the definition such as ‘every kind of 
assets’ encourage claimants to seek protection under the treaty, and claimants 
have a high chance of achieving protection, since if any asset or anything 
bearing a financial value is considered as an investment, the definition of 
investment is substantially limitless and any transaction could fall within its 
scope, even a mere sale and purchase of assets.134 
With respect to the approach referred to under (ii) above, reference is made to 
those treaties that set forth a broad but exhaustive list of covered economic 
                                                          
132 See, for example, Art. 1 of the 2008 German Model BIT (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1025.pdf), according to which the 
term ‘"investments" comprises every kind of asset which is directly or indirectly invested 
by investors of one Contracting State in the territory of the other Contracting State. The 
investments include in particular: […]  
'(f) business concessions under public law, including concessions to search for, extract or 
exploit natural resources’. 
133 B. LEGUM, Defining Investment and Investor: Who is Entitled to Claim?, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 22, Issue 4, pp. 521-526, at p. 523, believes that these broad definitions 
reflect ‘an effort to accommodate the endless creativity of the capital markets. Put in 
slightly different terms, the broad definition of investment reflects a desire to encourage 
foreign investment in all its form, present and future’. See also UNCTAD, Scope and 
Definition (a sequel), supra, note 120, at p. 24 and following, where the downsides of the 
broad open-ended definition are highlighted.  
134 However, tribunals in order to assess their jurisdiction tend to verify whether the operation 
in question is expressly mentioned in the exemplificative list (see, for instance, among the 
Relevant Cases, White v. India, infra, note 444) and they do not rely on the catch-all 
reference.  
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and financial activities.135 The leading example of closed-end definitions is 
provided by Art. 1193 of the NAFTA,136 which is quite broad and includes: 
                                                          
135 Yet, as stated by B. LEGUM, supra, note 133, at p. 523, it is worth noting that the majority 
of these closed lists are so comprehensive that it is difficult to think about an investment 
covered by the open-end lists that would not be encompassed in the closed-end lists as 
well. 
136 Art. 1139 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, signed on 17 December 1992 
(available at: https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-American-Free-
Trade-Agreement?mvid=1&secid=539c50ef-51c1-489b-808b-9e20c9872d25#A1101) 
(“NAFTA”), pursuant to which ‘[i]nvestment means: 
(a) an enterprise; 
(b) an equity security of an enterprise; 
(c) a debt security of an enterprise 
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or 
(ii) where the original maturity of the debt security is at least three years, 
but does not include a debt security, regardless of original maturity, of a state enterprise; 
(d) a loan to an enterprise 
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or 
(ii) where the original maturity of the loan is at least three years, 
but does not include a loan, regardless of original maturity, to a state enterprise; 
(e) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or profits of the 
enterprise; 
(f) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the assets of that 
enterprise on dissolution, other than a debt security or a loan excluded from 
subparagraph (c) or (d); 
(g) real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or used 
for the purpose of economic benefit or other business purposes; and 
(h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a 
Party to economic activity in such territory, such as under 
(i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the territory of the 
Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions, or 
(ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the production, revenues or 
profits of an enterprise; 
but investment does not mean, 
(i) claims to money that arise solely from  
(i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national or enterprise in 
the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the territory of another Party, or 
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foreign direct investments; portfolio investments; partnerships and other 
interests that give the owner a right to a share in profits and/or liquidated 
assets; as well as tangible and intangible property ‘acquired in the expectation 
[…] of economic benefit or other business purposes.’ Loan financing falls 
within the definition of investment for the purposes of the NAFTA only if 
funds flow within a business group or if debt is issued over a medium-long 
term (i.e., more than 3 years). In addition, contract rights are protected by the 
NAFTA, but only if they involve a ‘commitment of capital or other resources 
in the territory of a Party […] to economic activity in such a territory’. NAFTA 
complements its exhaustive list with a negative definition, identifying certain 
kinds of property that are not to be considered as investments, such as money 
claims arising from commercial contracts for the sale of goods and services. 
Certain post-NAFTA bilateral treaties entered into by a State party to the 
NAFTA have followed the exhaustive-list model for defining investment.137 
It must also be mentioned that nowadays a revival of the ‘NAFTA model’ is 
occurring, mainly due to the fact that the term investment has been extensively 
interpreted in ICSID arbitral awards and this has given rise to concerns about 
the breadth of its coverage.138 In order to contrast this practice, some newer 
                                                                                                                                                            
(ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade 
financing, other than a loan covered by subparagraph (d); or 
(j) any other claims to money, that do not involve the kinds of interests set out in 
subparagraphs (a) through (h).’ 
For a recent comment on the NAFTA’s definition of investment and a recent case dealing 
with this definition, see C.T. KOTUBY JR, J. EGERTON-VERNON, Apotex Inc v The Government 
of the United States of America. Will Barriers to Jurisdiction Inhibit an Emerging Trend, in ICSID 
Review, Vol. 30, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 21-29, whereby the authors highlight how, by means of 
the restrictive terms included in the NAFTA and in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, ‘the USA 
may be attempting to row back from the wider definition of ‘investment’ it has adopted in 
older BITs.’ 
137 See, for instance, Art. G-40 of the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, signed on 6 
February 1997 (available at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/chile-chili/menu.aspx?lang=en). 
138 See section 3.2 of this Chapter II. A broad interpretation of the notion of investment is 
only one of the manners by means of which ICSID tribunals have expanded their 
jurisdiction. For an analysis of the topic, see, inter alia, C. HUIPING, The Expansion of 
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treaties have adopted the ‘closed-list’ definition with a wide, but finite, asset-
based list of examples and/or expressly excluded specific types of assets (such 
as certain commercial contracts or short-term investments) from the 
definition.139 This drafting manner ensures that anything not listed in the 
definition of investment cannot qualify as an investment. The approach is 
therefore more predictable than the typical broad non-exhaustive asset-based 
definition. 
Other techniques used in order to address this issue and narrow down the 
scope of protected investment include, inter alia:140 (a) applying protection only 
to investments made in accordance with host country law and made within the 
contracting State’s territory;141 (b) restricting the asset-based approach to direct 
                                                                                                                                                            
Jurisdiction by ICSID Tribunals: Approaches, Reasons and Damages, The Journal of 
World Investment & Trade, Vol. 12, Issue 5, 2011, pp. 671-687. 
139 See Art. 1 of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf). 
140 For a more detailed analysis of each technique, see UNCTAD, Scope and Definition (a 
sequel), supra, note 120, at pp. 21-48. 
141 See, for instance, Art. 1 of Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République Française et le 
Gouvernement de la République d’Afrique du Sud sur l’Encouragement et la Protection 
Reciproque des Investissements, signed on 11 October 1995 (available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1280), whereby investment 
is defined as ‘tous avoirs, tel que les biens, droits et intérêts de toutes nature et, plus 
particulièrement mais non exclusivement: 
a) Les biens meubles et immeubles, ainsi que tous autres droits réels tels que les 
hypothèques, privilèges, usufruits, cautionnements et tous droits analogues; 
b) Les actions, primes d'émission et autres formes de participation, même minoritaires ou 
indirectes, aux sociétés établies sur le territoire de l'une des Parties contractantes; 
c) Les obligations, créances et droits à toutes prestations ayant valeur économique; 
d) Les droits de propriété intellectuelle, commerciale et industrielle tels que les droits 
d'auteur, les brevets d'invention, les licences, les marques déposées, les modèles et 
maquettes industrielles, les procédés techniques, le savoir-faire, les noms déposés et la 
clientèle; 
e) Les concessions accordées par la loi ou en vertu d'un contrat, notamment les 
concessions relatives à la prospection, la culture, l'extraction ou l'exploitation de 
richesses naturelles, y compris celles qui se situent dans la zone maritime de la Partie 
contractante concernée. 
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investment only;142 (c) restricting covered investments depending on the time 
of their establishment; 143 and (d) granting protection only to investments of a 
certain magnitude or regarding particular sectors of interest.144 
                                                                                                                                                            
Il est entendu que lesdits avoirs doivent être ou avoir été investis conformément à la législation 
de la Partie contractante sur le territoire ou dans la zone maritime de laquelle l'investissement est effectué, 
avant ou après l'entrée en vigueur du présent accord.’ 
With respect to the requirement that the investment is to be made ‘in accordance with host 
State laws’, it is however worth noting that, according to A. CARLEVARIS, Conformity of 
Investments with the Law of the Host State and the Jurisdiction of International Tribunals, 
The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 2008, pp. 35-50, on the basis of 
the relevant scarce arbitral practice, it is still possible to maintain that the requirement of 
conformity with domestic law refers to the legality of the investment, and not to its 
definition and, therefore, to exclude jurisdiction, it is not sufficient for the State to show 
that the investment does not fit into the national definition. This relies on the assumption, 
on which the arbitral practice seems to be consistent, that the notion of investment for the 
purposes of establishing the tribunal jurisdiction can only be construed in accordance with 
international law. Of a different view is B. STERN, Are There New Limits on Access to 
International Arbitration?, ICSID Review, Vol. 25, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 26-36, at p. 33, who 
believes that ‘[a] distinction has to be drawn between illegalities or fraudulent behaviour 
committed in the initiation of the investment and illegalities or fraudulent behaviour 
committed during the lifetime of the investment. In my view, if the initiation of the 
investment is against the law or not in good faith, the investment itself is not to be 
protected and the tribunal should not have jurisdiction. If the illegalities or the bad faith 
behaviour are committed during the life of the investment, the determination of whether 
investment protection may properly be secured should be made during the merits phase.’ 
An analogous opinion is expressed by the same author in B. STERN, Scope of Investor’s 
Protection under the ICSID/BIT Mechanism: Recent Trends, in A.W. ROVINE (ed.), 
Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: the Fordham Papers 
2010, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010, pp. 33-49, at pp. 45-48. See also S.W. SCHILL, 
Illegal Investments in Investment Treaty Arbitration, The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 11, 2012, pp. 281-323, which considers that the 
illegality affects the tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae or voluntatis. The author also 
highlights how the illegality depriving an investment of treaty protection and a treaty-based 
tribunal of jurisdiction must relate to the admission of the foreign investment in the host 
State. On the contrary, incidental, peripheral or minor breaches of domestic law do not 
trigger the operation of the ‘in accordance with State law’ clause. 
142 This limitation may be included in an agreement where a host country is concerned about 
the possible detrimental effects of applying treaty provisions to certain portfolio 
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investment. For instance, Art. 4 of the Free Trade Agreement Between the European Free 
Trade Association and Mexico, signed on 27 November 2000 (available at: 
http://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/free-trade-relations/mexico/EFTA-
Mexico%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement.pdf) states that: ‘[f]or the purposes of this 
Section, investment made in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Parties means 
direct investment, which is defined as investment for the purpose of establishing lasting 
economic relations with an undertaking such as, in particular, investments which give the 
possibility of exercising an effective influence on the management thereof.’ 
143 The inclusion of a limitation based on the time of establishment of the treaty is not new. 
For instance, Art. 13 of the Agreement Between the Government of the Russian 
Federation and the Government of the Arab Republic Of Egypt on the Encouragement 
and Mutual Protection of Capital Investments signed on 23 September 1997 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1105) provides that: ‘[t]he 
present Agreement shall be applied with respect to all capital investments carried out by 
the investor of one of the Contracting Parties on the territory of the other Contracting 
Party, beginning in January 1, 1987.’ Developing countries sometimes seek to exclude 
investments established prior to entry into force of an investment protection instruments. 
See, for instance, Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République Française et le 
Gouvernement de la République d’Afrique du Sud sur l’Encouragement et la Protection 
Reciproque des Investments, signed on 11 October 1995, supra, note 141; Art. 12 of the 
Agreement Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Republic of Cyprus For the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 21 October 1998 
(available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/921), whereby 
it is provided that: ‘[t]his Agreement shall apply to all investments made by investors of 
either Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party after its entry into 
force.’ Other reference dates (e.g., the date in which the host country’s investment law will 
enter into force) are also taken into consideration by other BITs. Finally, some agreements 
may also deal with the time of disputes. Thus, the agreement may specify that it applies 
only to disputes that arise after the entry into force of the agreement itself (see, for instance, 
Art. II(2) of the Acuerdo para la Promoción y la Protección Reciproca de Inversiones entre 
el Reino De España y la Republica Argentina of 1991 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/119) which states that: ‘el 
presente Acuerdo no se aplicará a las controversias o reclamaciones que se hubieran 
originando antes de su entrada en vigor.’ In this case the tribunal shall determine when the 
dispute actually arises, since its jurisdiction is limited to those arisen after the treaty has 
entered into force.  
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The last approach to subject matter scope in investment treaties occupies a 
middle ground between the open-ended language approach and the exhaustive 
list approach. Treaties included in this category:145 (i) specify that a transaction 
must have the typical characteristic of an investment such as the commitment 
                                                                                                                                                            
144 The solutions under letter (d) are suggested by P. RANJAN, Definition of Investment in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties of South Asian Countries and Regulatory Discretion, Journal 
of International Arbitration, Vol. 26, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 217-235. 
145 See, for instance, Art. 1 of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, where investment is defined as ‘every 
asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an 
investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of 
gain or profit, or the assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include: 
(a) an enterprise; 
(b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; 
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans;  
(d) futures, options, and other derivatives;  
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue-sharing, and other 
similar contracts;  
(f) intellectual property rights;  
(g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic law; 
and 
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, 
mortgages, liens, and pledges’ (emphasis added). 
In addition, Footnote 1, relating to letter (c) of the definition above, stipulates that: ‘[s]ome 
forms of debt, such as bonds, debentures, and long-term notes, are more likely to have the 
characteristics of an investment, while other forms of debt, such as claims to payment that 
are immediately due and result from the sale of goods or services, are less likely to have 
such characteristics.’ Footnote 2, relating to letter (f) of the definition above, provides 
indication as to whether a particular type of license, authorization, permit, or similar 
instrument has the characteristics of an investment and it clarifies that it ‘depends on such 
factors as the nature and extent of the rights that the holder has under the law of the Party. 
Among the licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar instruments that do not have the 
characteristics of an investment are those that do not create any rights protected under 
domestic law. For greater certainty, the foregoing is without prejudice to whether any asset 
associated with the license, authorization, permit, or similar instrument has the 
characteristics of an investment’. Finally, Footnote 3, concerning letter (g) of the definition, 
explains that: ‘[t]he term “investment” does not include an order or judgment entered in a 
judicial or administrative action.’ 
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of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the 
assumption of risk;146 (ii) besides the typical ‘core’ investment types, also cover 
various debt instruments, futures, options, and other derivatives; and (iii) 
provide for explanatory notes, designed to clarify and narrow the apparently 
boundless definition. Such treaties remove the doubts as to whether certain 
very modern forms of economic activity can qualify as investments, and 
provide guidance to arbitrators in their case-by-case analysis, directing them to 
look past the ‘form’ to the economic essence of each project operation. 
 
3. Investment for the purposes of ICSID arbitration 
Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention states that: ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the Centre 
shall extend to any dispute arising directly out of an investment between a 
contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting 
State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the 
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre’.147 
Therefore, in order for an ICSID tribunal to have jurisdiction over a dispute 
under the Convention three conditions must be met: 
- first, a condition ratione personae: the dispute must oppose a contracting State 
and a national of another contracting State148; 
                                                          
146 The Preamble reflects some of the most recognised jurisprudential outcomes of the 
concept of investment by ICSID tribunals (see section 3 of this Chapter II). As noted by C. 
MCLACHLAN, L. SHORE, M. WEINIGER, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive 
Principles, supra, note 53, 2008, at p. 173: ‘the preamble to this definition takes up the 
Fedax criteria, albeit without referring to the cases directly. This more specific definition is 
likely to lead to more certainty by crystallizing issues that have been developed in the case 
law into the wording of the BITs.’ The definition is also in line with the economic 
definition of investment (see, supra, note 111) 
147 ICSID Convention, Art. 25(1) (emphasis added). For a comment as to the fact that the 
Convention refers to the jurisdiction of the Centre (which is an administrative body), rather 
than that of the tribunals, see C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, 
The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra, note 23, pp. 531 and 532. See also, infra, 
note 218. 
148 The Convention itself provides for a definition of a ‘national of another Contracting State’ 
in Art. 25(2), but does not specify how the nationality can be identified. It is worth noting 
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- second, a condition ratione materiae: the dispute must be a legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment; 
- third, a condition ratione voluntatis: the contracting State and the investor 
must consent in writing that the dispute is submitted to ICSID 
arbitration.149 
As already illustrated, this work will focus exclusively on the limitation to the 
jurisdiction ratione materiae and, in particular, on the concept of investment.150 
                                                                                                                                                            
that while ICSID’s nationality requirement has not traditionally been the subject of much 
litigation (at the time when the Convention was drafted investors were natural persons and, 
therefore, the requirement was easier to be verified), tribunals are nowadays more and 
more often dealing with that issue, especially in relation to veil piercing and corporate form 
issues. Indeed, Art. 25 is silent on the criteria to define corporate nationality. For an 
analysis of this topic, see, inter alia, P. GHAFFARI, Jurisdictional Requirements under Article 
25 of the ICSID Convention: Literature Review, The Journal of World Investment & 
Trade, Vol. 12, Issue 4, 2011, pp. 603-625, at p. 609-611 and 617-621; OECD, Definition 
of Investor and Investment in International Investment Agreements, supra, note 104; M. 
SASSON, Substantive Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Unsettled Relationship 
between International Law and Municipal Law, Kluwer Law International, 2010, pp. 51-64; 
E.C. SCHLEMMER, Investment, Investor, Nationality and Shareholders, in P. MUCHLINSKI, 
F. ORTINO, C. SCHREUER, The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 51-87; C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. 
SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra, note 23, at pp. 268-302; 
UNCTAD, Scope and Definition (a sequel), supra, note 120, pp. 72-98; and K. YANNACA-
SMALL, Who is Entitled to Claim? Nationality Challenges, in K. YANNACA-SMALL (ed.), 
Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues, 
Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 211-242. 
149 The ICSID process is available whenever both parties have agreed to submit their disputes 
to the Centre. That consent can arise in three principal ways: (i) it can be embodied in the 
settlement clause provided in a specific contract; (ii) it can occur on an ad hoc basis if both 
sides agree to submitting an existing controversy to ICSID; and (iii) it can take the form of 
a standing offer to arbitrate future disputes mainly included in the arbitration clause of a 
BIT or a multilateral investment treaty whereby signatory States commit to arbitrate any 
future claims raised by investors under the treaty’s substantive provision (which is the most 
frequently used; see, supra, notes 116 and 117). As better described in the body of this work, 
the consent to arbitrate is strictly linked to the concept of investment.  
150 As highlighted by J.D. MORTENSON, The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID's Travaux and 
the Domain of International Investment Law, The Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 
61 
However, this topic is tightly connected to the consent to arbitrate. As 
described above, the consent to ICSID arbitration is often included in bilateral 
or multilateral treaties providing investment protection, which contain their 
own definition of investment. The main issue is therefore to reconcile the 
definition of investment contained in the treaty with the jurisdictional 
requirement set out under the Convention. 
The starting point of the analysis is that the Convention, despite requiring the 
presence of an investment to establish the Centre’s jurisdiction, does not 
actually define investment. This lack of a definition was intentional.151 During 
the preparation of the Convention, various proposals were made by the 
delegates and the draft of the Convention circulated in September 1964152 
contained a very generic definition along the following lines: ‘any contribution 
of money or other asset of economic value for an indefinite period, or, if the 
period be defined, not less than five years’. However, many delegates 
considered the draft unsatisfactory: in particular there was considerable 
opposition to the world ‘contribution’ and to the introduction of a specific 
time element. In addition, a few delegates argued that reference to determined 
                                                                                                                                                            
51, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 257-318, at footnote 32, ‘[t]he requirement that the matter submitted 
constitutes a “legal dispute” that “aris[es] directly out of” an investment is even less 
frequently [compared to the nationality requirement] a significant issue.’ In any event, for 
an analysis of the other elements of the subject matter jurisdiction of the Centre, see, inter 
alia, C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, supra, note 23, at pp. 41-112; A.M. STEINGRUBER, Consent in International 
Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 256-259. 
151 See, among others, L. BURGER, The Trouble with Salini (Criticism of and Alternatives to 
the Famous Test), ASA Bulletin, Vol. 31, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 521–536, at p. 521; A. 
GRABOWSKI, The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of 
Salini, The Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 287-309, at p. 
289; and L.J.E. TIMMER, The Meaning of ‘Investment’ as a Requirement for Jurisdiction 
Ratione Materiae of the ICSID Centre, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 29, Issue 4, 
2012, pp. 363-374, at p. 365. 
152  Draft Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States (11 September 1964), in ICSID, History of the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Vol. II-1, 
1968, at p. 623. 
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criteria should be included, such as the risk or profit or the contribution to the 
host State’s development. Certain attempts to insert a detailed definition were 
made,153 but ultimately it proved impossible to agree on a definition and 
therefore the definition-less version of the Convention prevailed.154 Delegates 
felt comfortable omitting a definition because it was expected that each State 
party to the dispute would have to specifically consent to the arbitration and 
the terms of that consent in most cases would include a definition of 
investment. 
The only possible indication of a meaning that can be retrieved from the 
Convention is contained in the Preamble’s first sentence which refers to ‘the 
need for international co-operation for economic development and the role of 
private international investment therein.’ This declared purpose is also 
confirmed by the Report of the Executive Directors, which highlights that the 
Convention was ‘prompted by the desire to strengthen the partnership between 
                                                          
153 Notably, the Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and National of other States, 18 March 1965 (available 
at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partB.htm) that accompanied 
the final version of the Convention (“Report of the Executive Directors”) states that: 
‘[n]o attempt was made to define the term “investment” […]’. However, as pointed out by 
C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, supra, note 23, at p. 116, this statement of the position is historically 
inaccurate: ‘there were a number of attempts but they all fail.’ 
154 According to J.D. MORTENSON (The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID's Travaux and the 
Domain of International Investment Law, supra, note 150, at p. 257) there is no real lack of 
definition. Indeed, ‘the drafters adopted a clear – and extremely broad – meaning of 
“investment.” It is not that all parties agreed on this broad understanding from the start. 
Rather, the broad definition was part of a compromise reached after long and contentious 
negotiations over what that definition should be.’ In a nutshell, according to this author, 
the Convention embraced the broadest definition of investment which includes all sorts of 
transaction (also purely commercial ones) and left it to the Contracting State to narrow the 
scope of this definition through: (i) arbitration agreements; (ii) notification to the Centre 
under Art. 25(4) of the ICSID Convention (according to which any Contracting State at 
any time can ‘notify the Centre the class or classes of disputes which it […] would not 
consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre’ (emphasis added)); and (iii) 
reservation from the Convention. 
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countries in the cause of economic development.’155 In light of the above, it can 
be argued that the Convention’s purpose indicates that there should be some 
positive impact on development. However, tribunals dealing with this topic 
have taken different views: some of them, in line with Prof. Schreuer’s 
thoughts, believe that the Preamble’s wording does not ‘necessarily imply that 
an activity which does not contribute to the host State’s development cannot 
be an investment for the purposes of Art. 25’;156 others have interpreted the 
reference to the economic development included in the Preamble as a conditio 
sine qua non for the existence of an investment.157 
The relevance of the contribution to the host State’s economic development in 
the definition of investment will be discussed in detail in the following section 
3.1. For the moment, it is noted that, in the absence of a definition and given 
the importance granted to the consent of the parties, tribunals have tried to 
identify the scope of the subject matter jurisdiction of the Centre and, in 
particular, have dealt with the issue if the definition included in treaties was 
sufficient to rely on to determine ICSID’s jurisdiction, or rather if such a 
definition should in any event be tested as there are outer limits to ICSID 
jurisdiction that cannot be circumvented by the will of the contracting States. 
Tribunals that have attempted to define the term investment and clarify the 
aforementioned issue have failed to come up with a consistent approach on the 
matter, which has generated significant disharmony in jurisprudence. When 
reviewing the jurisprudence and scholarly writings on the term investment 
within the meaning of Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention, several approaches 
can be discerned.158 It is therefore difficult to categorize arbitral decisions based 
                                                          
155 See para. 9 of the Report of the Executive Directors. 
156 C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, supra, note 23, at p. 117. For tribunal practice in this sense, see section 3.1.2 
of this Chapter II. 
157 See section 3.1 of this Chapter II. 
158 The interpretation of the term ‘investment’ in ICSID and non-ICSID tribunals shall be 
based on Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties signed in 
Vienna on 23 May 1969 (“Vienna Convention”). According to Art. 31 (General Rules of 
Interpretation) thereof:  
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on the conceptual approach adopted by each tribunal. However, it seems 
possible to find two main lines of reasoning and an intermediate approach, i.e.: 
159 
                                                                                                                                                            
‘1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition 
to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a)  Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b)  Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a)  Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended’ 
(emphasis added). 
Art. 32 (Supplementary Means of Interpretation) complements the provisions of Art. 31, 
setting out that: ‘Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including 
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a)  Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b)  Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ (emphasis added). 
Though all tribunals have explicitly or implicitly applied these rules, the outcomes of their 
analysis have largely differed. 
159 While there is a large consensus among scholars on the fact that there is an objectivist and 
subjectivist approach, authors may not agree on the content of the third category, on 
possible sub-division of the objective approach as well as on the ICSID awards supporting 
any of those groups. The distinction between the typical characteristic approach and the 
jurisdictional approach is also reflected in several awards, including MHS v. Malaysia 
Award on Jurisdiction (see, infra, note 187). However, in such an award, the sole arbitrator 
concluded (para. 71) that the differences between the two approaches are likely to be 
academic and in practice it is unlikely that any difference in juristic analysis would alter the 
findings of the tribunal. More precisely: (i) if on the basis of the factual situation it is 
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- the so-called ‘objectivist’, ‘objective’, ‘restrictive’ or ‘jurisdictional’ approach, 
according to which investment has a self-standing meaning, that does not 
depend on the instrument containing consent to ICSID jurisdiction. The 
meaning of investment is based on a number of criteria which distinguish it 
from an ordinary commercial transaction and the absence of any of them 
means that the operation at issue cannot qualify as an investment;  
                                                                                                                                                            
possible to find the occurrence of all the hallmarks, the tribunal will embrace the 
jurisdictional approach; (ii) if, on the contrary, the facts show that one or more of the 
hallmarks are missing, the tribunal will opt for the typical characteristics approach. 
Nevertheless, this reconstruction cannot be accepted as a general rule. Precedent cases 
show that jurisdiction has been denied due to strict application of the objectivist approach. 
The same MHS v. Malaysia Award on Jurisdiction proves the contrary: in that case the 
tribunal denied its jurisdiction since it deemed the existence of a ‘significant contribution to 
the host State’s economy’ necessary, which in its opinion was lacking. Notably, the MHS v. 
Malaysia Award on Jurisdiction has been subsequently annulled by MHS v. Malaysia 
Decision on Annulment (see, infra, note 241). For a critical analysis to MHS v. Malaysia 
Award on Jurisdiction see J.P. GIVEN, Malaysia Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia: An 
End to the Liberal Definition of “Investment” in ICSID Arbitrations?, Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 31, Issue 3, 2009, pp. 467-500. 
Among the authors that support the reconstruction of this paragraph see M. DEKASTROS, 
Portfolio Investment: Reconceptualising the Notion of Investment under the ICSID 
Convention, supra, note 129, pp. 290-299; B. DEMIRKOL, The Notion of 'Investment' in 
International Investment Law, Turkish Commercial Law Review, Vol. I, Issue 41, 2015, 
pp. 41-50, at pp. 42-46. For different reconstructions and/or the use of other names to 
label each approach, see, inter alia, L. BURGER, The Trouble with Salini (Criticism of and 
Alternatives to the Famous Test), supra, note 151, p. 522 and following; E. GAILLARD, 
Identify or define? Reflections on the evolution of the concept of investment in ICSID 
practice, in C. BINDER ET AL. (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st Century. 
Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 403-416; M. 
HWANG S.C., J. FONG LEE CHENG, Definition of “Investment” – A voice from the Eye of 
the Storm, Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, Issue 1, January 2011, pp. 99-129; B. 
STERN, Scope of Investor’s Protection under the ICSID/BIT Mechanism: Recent Trends, 
supra, note 141, at pp. 35-41; L.J.E. TIMMER, The Meaning of ‘Investment’ as a 
Requirement for Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae of the ICSID Centre, supra, note 151, at p. 
363 and following; and K. YANNACA-SMALL, Definition of “Investment”: An Open-ended 
Search for a Balanced Approach, supra, note 107, at p. 254 and following. 
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- the so-called ‘subjectivist’, ‘subjective’ or ‘consensual’ approach, according 
to which, since the Washington Convention has not given any definition of 
the concept of investment, it is left to the subjective definition, which may 
be given by the parties in the legal instruments embodying their consent to 
ICSID jurisdiction, to identify what an investment is; and 
- the so-called ‘typical characteristics’, ‘holistic’ or ‘flexible’ approach, which 
falls between the two opposite approaches referred to above. According to 
this understanding, the criteria that have been developed by tribunals for 
the clarification of the notion of investment should not be considered as 
mandatory conditions of an investment, but rather as descriptive features. 
Therefore, the absence of any of them would not per se impair the 
qualification of a given transaction as an investment. 
In the following sections, the different approaches summarised above will be 
described in more detail in order to assess which of them (if any) provide the 
most valuable solution. It goes without saying that the application of one 
approach, rather than another, has an impact on the possibility to qualify a 
given asset (including an arbitral award) as an investment and that the ICSID 
tribunals that dealt with the issue concerning the possible qualification of a 
commercial arbitral award as an investment have, implicitly or explicitly, 
referred to one or more of these approaches. 
 
3.1  The objectivist approach 
According to this approach, the word investment has an intrinsic meaning that 
distinguishes it from other transactions and, therefore, the parties are not free 
to expand the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals bilaterally, by consent, as much as 
they desire. In other words, there are outer limits beyond which parties’ 
consent is ineffectual in creating an ICSID investment. 
The problem still is to identify this intrinsic meaning of investment, given the 
silence of the Convention. Tribunals adhering to this approach have tried to 
detect the core content of an investment, outlining certain hallmarks that need 
to be present in order for a transaction to qualify as such; the absence of even 
one of them is sufficient for the tribunal to deny its jurisdiction. 
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This conceptualisation of the term investment by tribunals has led to the 
application of the so-called ‘double keyhole’ or ‘dual’ or ‘double-barrelled’ test, 
pursuant to which the investment has to fit both the definition of the ICSID 
Convention and that of the investment treaty. Therefore, tribunals in the exam 
of their jurisdiction shall first determine whether the investment from which 
the dispute arises would satisfy the definition of investment under Art. 25(1) of 
the ICSID Convention, and then whether it would also satisfy the definition 
under the relevant treaty. In a nutshell, the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the 
tribunal rests on the intersection of the two definitions of investment. 
It is largely acknowledged that the background of this approach can be found 
in the first edition of Prof. Schreuer's commentary to the ICSID Convention.160 
In the analysis of Art. 25(1), the author identified five features that are typical 
to most of the operations that have been the subject of ICSID proceedings: (i) 
a certain duration of the enterprise; (ii) a certain regularity of profits and 
returns; (iii) an assumption of risk; (iv) a substantial commitment by the 
investor; and (v) some significance for the host State’s development. However, 
it is worth noting, as the author expressly stated, that ‘these features should not 
be necessarily understood as jurisdictional requirements, but merely as 
                                                          
160 See, among others, L. BURGER, The Trouble with Salini (Criticism of and Alternatives to 
the Famous Test), supra, note 151, at p. 521. See also E. GAILLARD, Identify or define? 
Reflections on the evolution of the concept of investment in ICSID practice, supra, note 
159, especially at pp. 404 and 405, whereby scholarly positions that, prior to Prof. 
Schreuer, identified the criteria put forward in the objective approach are also described. 
The same Fedax v. Venezuela award (see, infra, note 163) expressly refers to C. SCHREUER, 
Commentary on the ICSID Convention, ICSID Review, Vol. 11, 1996, at p. 316 and 
following. 
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characteristics of investments under the Convention’,161 while the supporters of 
the objectivist approach turned such features into prescriptive requirements.162 
All this premised and coming to the analysis of the exact content of the 
objectivist approach, it should be first remarked that that there are several 
variants to it: different hallmarks have been considered (as better explained 
below, depending on the tribunal, three, four, five or six mandatorily required 
elements of an investment have been applied) and the different tribunals made 
a more or less rigid application of these. The sub-sections below will outline 
these different trends. 
 
3.1.1 The Salini test 
The first case in the history of ICSID in which the jurisdiction of the Centre 
was contested on the grounds that the underlying transaction did not qualify as 
an investment under the Convention was Fedax v. Venezuela,163 which can also 
be considered as the trailblazer of the objectivist approach. Until then, the term 
‘investment’ had been broadly understood in the ICSID practise and by 
scholars.164 In that case, the tribunal had to decide whether the holding of 
                                                          
161 C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, supra, note 23, at p. 128. It is worth noting that in a footnote to the quoted 
sentence in the Commentary, it is stated that: ‘[t]his paragraph is substantively identical 
with para. 122 at p. 140 of the First Edition of this Commentary.’ Indeed, Prof. Schreuer 
seems to be more favourable to the typical characteristics approach that will be described 
in section 3.3 of this Chapter II. 
162 The authors of the 2009 edition of the Commentary have also expressly pointed out that: 
‘The First Edition of this Commentary cannot serve as authority for this [i.e., the 
objectivist] development’ (see C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, 
The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra, note 23, at p. 133). 
163 Fedax NV v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/03, Decision of the Tribunal 
on Objections to Jurisdiction, 11 February 1997 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0315_0.pdf) (“Fedax v. 
Venezuela”). 
164 Fedax v. Venezuela, para. 25, whereby it is stated that: ‘[p]recisely because the term 
"investment" has been broadly understood in the ICSID practice and decisions, as well as 
in scholarly writings, it has never before been a major source of contention before ICSID 
Tribunals. This is the first ICSID case in which the jurisdiction of the Centre has been 
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promissory notes issued by the respondent was an investment under Art. 25(1). 
The tribunal examined the Convention and its application in previous 
arbitrations and identified five features that must always be present for a 
transaction to qualify as an investment: 
(i) a certain duration; 
(ii) a certain regularity of profits and return; 
(iii) an assumption of risk;  
(iv) a substantial commitment; and 
(v) a significance for the host State’s development.165  
In this case, the tribunal made express reference to the descriptive 
characteristics of an investment identified by scholars166 and transformed them 
into a precondition for the valid exercise of jurisdiction by ICSID tribunals. 
The tribunal came to the conclusion that in light of the above criteria there was 
an investment and, as a consequence, jurisdiction over the transaction. 
The criteria identified in the Fedax v. Venezuela case were reformulated for the 
first time by the tribunal in Salini v. Morocco.167 In that case the tribunal 
reduced the five elements mentioned in Fedax v. Venezuela to four, and the 
four criteria identified have begun to be referred to as the so-called ‘Salini test’, 
                                                                                                                                                            
objected to on the ground that the underlying transaction does not meet the requirements 
of an investment under the Convention. On prior occasions ICSID Tribunals have 
examined on their own initiative the question whether an investment was involved, and in 
each such case have reached the conclusion that the "investment" requirement of the 
Convention has been met.’ See also: Definition of Investor and Investment in International 
Investment Agreements, OECD, at p. 62 and Salini v. Morocco, infra, note 167, para. 52, 
whereby the tribunal specified that: ‘[t]he criteria for the characterization are […] derived 
from cases in which the transaction giving rise to the dispute was considered to be an 
investment without there ever being a real discussion on the issue’ (emphasis added). 
165 Fedax v. Venezuela, para. 43. 
166 Many scholarly writings are mentioned in the body of the award. With specific reference to 
the elements characterising an investment, reference was made to C. SCHREUER, 
Commentary on the ICSID Convention, supra, note 160.  
167 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 31 July 2001 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/959) (“Salini v. Morocco”). 
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which has been extensively used, with few variations, in a vast number of 
cases.168 The transaction underlying the case concerned the construction of a 
road in Morocco. In this context the tribunal relied on the ICSID precedents 
and on scholarly writings to infer that an investment must involve the 
following four elements:  
(i) a ‘contribution’; 
(ii) a ‘certain duration of performance of the contract’; 
(iii) a ‘participation in the risks of the transaction’; and 
(iv) a ‘contribution to the economic development of the host State of the 
Investment’.169 
More precisely, according to the tribunal, the first three elements stemmed 
from international law concepts implicit in older decisions that the tribunal 
considered, while the fourth arose out of the ICSID Convention’s Preamble, 
                                                          
168 See Salini v. Morocco, in this section 3.  
169 Salini v. Morocco, para. 52. C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The 
ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra, note 23, at p. 130, on the basis of arbitral 
practice, managed to describe the content of the hallmarks of the Salini test criteria. In 
particular, according to the authors the requirement of a substantial contribution did not in 
general pose any problem; it may only be worth noting that the required commitment is 
not only financial, but can also consist of know-how, equipment, personnel and services. 
As to the duration, a period of 2-5 years can be considered sufficient and, in order to verify 
if this criterion is met, reference is to be made not only to the duration of the core period 
activity, but also time necessary for the tender, any work interruptions and extensions, as 
well as the duration of the contractor’s guarantees (depending on the type of investment 
under consideration). According to the authors, the existence of a risk is not a 
controversial element; indeed, tribunals found that long-term contractual relationships 
always entail an element of risk (see, inter alia, Fedax v. Venezuela, para. 40) and that the 
economic climate and the need to rely on the national courts of the host State always imply 
a risk (see, inter alia, Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I.- DIPENTA (Italy) v. People’s Democratic 
Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08, Award, 10 January 2005, para. 14(iii) 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/323) (“L.E.S.I. - DIPENTA v. Algeria”) ). 
The last criterion is considered by the authors as the most controversial one, not only 
because of the difficulty in determining its exact content, but also because certain tribunals 
have expressly excluded it from the number of features which must always be present in an 
investment to qualify as such (see section 3.1.2 of this Chapter II). 
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which had already made special mention of the role played by private 
investments in the economic development of host States.170 On the other side, 
the arbitrators did not consider the Fedax v. Venezuela requirement of the 
regularity of profits and returns among the characteristics of an investment.171 
In addition, the tribunal slightly amended the fifth criteria identified in the 
Fedax v. Venezuela award, limiting it to a contribution to the ‘economic’ 
development of the host State and not requiring it to be ‘significant’. In light of 
the above criteria, the Salini v. Morocco tribunal found the existence of an 
investment in the relevant case, as the project in question: (i) required heavy 
capital investments, services and other long undertakings; (ii) involved a 
manifest risk; (iii) had a duration of 36 months; and (iv) contributed to 
Morocco’s economic development.172 
The Salini test is sometimes considered as very rigid, but it should be noted 
that the tribunal after listing the criteria added that ‘[i]n reality, these various 
elements may be interdependent […] [a]s a result, these various criteria should be 
assessed globally […].’173 The acknowledgment of the interdependent character of 
the various hallmarks identified by the tribunal and the preference for a global 
assessment indicates that the tribunal was approaching the issue concerning the 
actual existence of an investment from an empirical perspective and that it did 
not look at the criteria as ‘distinct jurisdictional requirements each of which 
must be met separately’,174 but rather as elements to be looked at in 
conjunction. 
However, several tribunals followed the Salini test in a strict way: they verified 
the existence of an investment was verified through the analytical check of the 
occurrence of all the criteria identified in that case.175 Others adopted a more 
                                                          
170 Salini v. Morocco, para. 52. 
171 No reference to this criterion is made at all in the award. 
172 Salini v. Morocco, paras. 53-57. 
173 Salini v. Morocco, para. 52 (emphasis added). 
174 See, infra, note 254. 
175 See, for instance, Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 June 2006 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0439.pdf) (“Jan de Nul v. 
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flexible and pragmatic approach, pursuant to which the criteria developed for 
clarifying the content of the term investment under the ICSID Convention 
should not be considered as mandatory legal requirements, but rather as 
descriptive criteria. This second approach (i.e., the flexible approach) will be 
analysed in more detail in section 3.3 of this Chapter. 
In addition, as already mentioned, arbitral tribunals have declined several 
variants to the Salini test: some of them have added additional criteria, while 
others have reduced the Salini test’s criteria to three, 176 not taking into account 
the criterion concerning the contribution to the economic development of the 
host State.177  
                                                                                                                                                            
Egypt”), para. 91, where however the fourth criterion was considered a ‘contribution to 
the host State’s development’, while in Salini v. Morocco it was identified in the ‘contribution to 
the economic development’ (paras. 52; 57) (emphasis added). In Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. 
The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 August 
2004, para. 53 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0441.pdf) (“Joy Mining v. Egypt”), the objectivist approach was followed 
in a rigid manner, but the criteria adopted by the tribunal were those identified in Fedax v. 
Venezuela, rather than Salini v. Morocco. 
176 According to K. YANNACA-SMALL, Definition of “Investment”: An Open-ended Search 
for a Balanced Approach, supra, note 107, pp. 243-244, those tribunals that have not 
included the fourth criterion of the Salini test have adopted a ‘flexible objectivist’ or 
‘pragmatic’ approach. Of the same opinion, I.U. MUSURMANOV, The Implications of 
Romak v. Uzbekistan for Defining the Concept of Investment, Australian International 
Law Journal, Vol. 20, Issue 8, 2013, pp. 105-129, who labels this as ‘an intermediate 
approach, which combines both above mentioned approaches’ (p. 109). 
177 In relation to the fourth criterion, it shall further be noted that even the tribunals that 
accepted its existence did not agree on its exact content, requiring, depending on the case: 
(i) a contribution to the host State’s development (Fedax v. Venezuela, para. 42; Jan de Nul 
v. Egypt, para. 91); (ii) a contribution to the host State’s economic development (Salini v. 
Morocco, para. 52); (iii) a significant contribution to the host State’s development (Joy 
Mining v. Egypt, para. 53); and (iv) a significant contribution to the host State’s economic 
development (MHS v. Malaysia Award on Jurisdiction (see, infra, note 187), para. 123). In 
this latter case, the tribunal replaced the reference to the contribution to the host State’s 
development by the contribution to its economy, as, in its opinion, it is ‘impossible to 
ascertain’ a contribution to the host State’s development. However, tribunals seem to 
confuse the two parameters and use the reference to the economic development and to the 
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3.1.2 The Salini-less test 
The relevance of each individual criteria of the Salini test is often contested. In 
particular, the relevance of the contribution to the economic development of 
the host State has been a divisive issue in ICSID arbitration. The rationale 
behind the exclusion of the fourth element is not consistent in precedents: 
some cases provide interpretative grounds on which they disagree with Salini v. 
Morocco, while others adopt a more practical approach, arguing for instance 
that it is a difficult condition to verify. 
This is the case for example of the two L.E.S.I. Cases,178 in which the tribunal 
did not accept a separate requirement for the contribution to the economic 
development of the host State, stating that it was not necessary for the investor 
to give evidence of the existence of this requirement, as it is difficult to 
establish and is implicitly covered by the other three elements.179 
On the contrary, in the more recent Quiborax v. Bolivia case,180 the tribunal, in 
line with the Victor Pey v. Chile case,181 examined the Preamble of the 
Convention and argued that, while the ICSID Convention attempts to foster 
economic development via international investment, such development is not a 
                                                                                                                                                            
State’s development interchangeably. On the relevance of the inclusion of the contribution 
to the host State’s development among the hallmarks of the Salini test see P. ACCONCI, The 
Unexpected Development-friendly Definition of Investment in the 2013 IDI Resolution, 
supra, note 112, at p. 78 and following. 
178 L.E.S.I. - DIPENTA v. Algeria; and L.E.S.I. S.p.A. and ASTALDI S.p.A. v. République 
Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Decision, 12 July 2006 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/618) (“L.E.S.I. ASTALDI v. Algeria”), 
which are jointly referred to as the “LESI Cases”. 
179 L.E.S.I. - DIPENTA v. Algeria, para. 13; and L.E.S.I. ASTALDI v. Algeria, para. 72. 
180 Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 September 2012 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1098.pdf) (“Quiborax 
v. Bolivia”).  
181 Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/2, Award, 8 May 2008, para. 232 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/829) (“Victor Pey v. Chile”). 
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necessary element of the investment. Economic development is according to 
the tribunal a consequence and not a condition of the investment.182 
The arbitral tribunal in Saba Fakes v. Turkey183 went even further since it 
clearly rejected the fourth condition arguing that it would be excessive to 
attribute to the reference included in the Preamble of the Convention a 
meaning and function that is not obviously apparent from its wording.184 
Indeed, ‘in the Tribunal’s opinion, while the economic development of a host 
State is one of the proclaimed objectives of the ICSID Convention, this 
objective is not in and of itself an independent criterion for the definition of an 
investment. The promotion and protection of investments in host States is 
expected to contribute to their economic development. Such development is an 
expected consequence, not a separate requirement, of the investment projects 
carried out by a number of investors in the aggregate. […] Taken in isolation 
certain individual investments might be useful to the State and to the Investor 
itself; certain might not. Certain investments expected to the fruitful may turn 
                                                          
182 Quiborax v. Bolivia, paras. 225; 227. For a comment on the sentence see J.D. MORTENSON, 
QUIBORAX SA et al. v Plurinational State of Bolivia: The Uneasy Role of Precedent in Defining 
Investment, ICSID Review, Vol. 28, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 254-261, whereby the role that the 
award has given to precedents is strongly criticised by the author. See also A. GRABOWSKI, 
The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini, supra, 
note 151, where the author supports the traditional Salini test. 
183 Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, 14 July 2010 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0314.pdf) 
(“Saba Fakes v. Turkey”). This award is also relevant for the weight conferred by the 
tribunal to previous ICSID decisions which addressed the matter. On this point see E. 
SAVARESE, The Arbitral Practice of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) in 2010, in B. CONFORTI ET AL. (eds.), The Italian Yearbook of 
International Law Online, Vol. 19 (2010), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010, pp. 379-407, 
according to whom ‘this is a particularly apposite approach insofar as it focuses on the 
central role nowadays played by the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals’ (at p. 385). Along 
the same lines of Saba Fakes v. Turkey is the 2012 Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable 
Law and Liability issued in the case Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, para. 5.43 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1071clean.pdf). 
184 Saba Fakes v. Turkey, para. 110. 
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out to be economic disaster. They do not fall, for that reason alone, outside the 
ambit of the concept of investment.’185  
Recent tribunals have followed the Salini-less criteria, which seems to be 
predominant in the ambit of the objectivist approach nowadays.186 It is 
however worth noting that there are also ICSID tribunals that have referred to 
the contribution to the host State’s development as the most important criteria 





                                                          
185 Saba Fakes v. Turkey, para. 111. 
186 See, among others, Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/09/2, Award, 31 October 2012 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1272.pdf) (“DB v. Sri 
Lanka”), para. 295, where the tribunal stated that “[t]he development of ICSID case law 
suggests that only three of the above criteria, namely contribution, risk and duration should be used as 
the benchmarks of investment, without a separate criterion of contribution to the economic 
development of the host State and without reference to a regularity of profit and return’ 
(emphasis added). See also KT Asia Investment Group B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/09/8, Award, 17 October 2013 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3006.pdf), paras. 160-
223 (“KT Asia v. Kazakhstan”), where the tribunal adopted the jurisdictional approach 
with three elements and declined its jurisdiction mainly due to the lack of a contribution. 
187 See, for example, Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, 17 May 2007, para. 123 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0496.pdf) (“MHS v. 
Malaysia Award on Jurisdiction”). The tribunal argued that: ‘[i]n unusual situations such 
as the present case, where many of the typical hallmarks of “investment” are not decisive 
or appear to be only superficially satisfied, the analysis of the remaining relevant hallmarks 
of “investment” will assume considerable importance.’ Also Makhdoom Ali Khan in his 
Dissenting Opinion to DB v. Sri Lanka (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1273.pdf) stated that 
the contribution to the economic development is a key feature of an investment that 
cannot be disregarded. Therefore, he concluded that the hedging agreement entered into 
by the claimant did not constitute an investment under Art. 25 of the Convention. 
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3.1.3 The Salini-plus test 
On the opposite side stands the ‘Salini-plus’188 approach, which was first 
introduced in Phoenix v. the Czech Republic189. In that case the tribunal 
examined the term ‘investment’ both under customary international law and 
the general principles of international law. According to the tribunal, ‘ICSID 
Convention’s jurisdictional requirements – as well as those of the BIT – cannot 
be read and interpreted in isolation from public international law, and its 
general principles’.190 In the tribunal’s perspective, this implied that two 
analyses needed to be conducted in order to assess the existence of an 
investment. More precisely, the tribunal noted that: ‘sometimes relying on the 
ordinary meaning of the term ‘investment’ is insufficient’ and the tribunal must 
conduct a ‘contextual analysis of the existence of a protected investment’ and ‘must also 
take into consideration the purpose of the international protection of the investment, 
whether it is the specific purpose of the ICSID system or the general purpose 
of the protection granted by international law’.191 The fact that the tribunal was 
dealing with the general principles of international law implied that the case 
also needed to be analysed with due regard to the principle of good faith, which 
requires that the ICSID system is not abused.192 The tribunal then considered 
that the purpose of the ICSID/BIT system, in light of the general principles of 
international law, was to protect foreign investments: (i) whose aim is the 
development of an economic activity; (ii) performed in accordance with the 
laws of the host State; and (iii) made in good faith. 
In light of the above, the tribunal identified six elements that have to be 
present in order for an investment to benefit from the protection granted by 
the Convention:  
                                                          
188 This term was coined by K. YANNACA-SMALL in Definition of “Investment”: An Open-
ended Search for a Balanced Approach, supra, note 107, at p. 256.  
189 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0668.pdf) 
(“Phoenix v. Czech Republic”). 
190 Phoenix v. Czech Republic, para. 78. 
191 Phoenix v. Czech Republic, para. 79. 
192 Phoenix v. Czech Republic, para. 77. 
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(i) a contribution in money or other assets; 
(ii) a certain duration; 
(iii) an element of risk; 
(iv) an operation made in order to develop an economic activity in the host 
State; 
(v) assets invested in accordance with the laws of the host State; and  
(vi) assets invested in good faith.193 
Substantially, the tribunal supplemented the Salini test with two additional 
requirements. First, States cannot be deemed to offer access to the ICSID 
protection to investments made in violation of local laws. This is to be 
considered as an implicit condition, to be taken into account even when the 
relevant BIT does not mention it. In addition, no ICSID protection can be 
afforded if the foreign investment is not a bona fide investment.  
In the case, the tribunal declined its jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that 
the hallmarks of the four-prong Salini test were seemingly met. Indeed from an 
analysis of the factual circumstances, the tribunal understood that an abuse of 
right was committed: certain transactions had been performed by the claimant 
with the sole purpose of benefiting from the protection granted by the Israel-
Czech Republic BIT.194 Therefore, the investment was not a ‘bona fide’ foreign 
                                                          
193 Phoenix v. Czech Republic, para. 114. 
194 Agreement Between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the 
State of Israel for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on 23 
September 1997 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/943) (“Israel-Czech 
Republic BIT”). According to the reconstruction of the events made by the tribunal, the 
Claimant restructured its ownership in two Czech companies and became embroiled in 
various disputes with the Czech authorities with the sole purpose of seeking protection 
under the BIT. For a detailed summary of the factual circumstances and of the case, see, 
inter alia, E. SAVARESE, The Arbitral Practice of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 2009, in B. CONFORTI ET AL. (eds.), The Italian Yearbook 
of International Law Online, Vol. 18 (2009), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 353-
377, at p. 354-360. 
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investment, as required by the ICSID Convention and general principles of 
international law.195  
It is however worth mentioning that the necessity to prove the existence of the 
two additional requirements identified in the case under discussion has been 
consistently denied, implicitly or explicitly, by subsequent awards.196 The 
Phoenix v. the Czech Republic award remains therefore an insulated case, 
which nevertheless is useful to understand how case law has found it difficult 
to determine the constitutive elements of the notion of investment and how 
things are yet to be set in stone.  
 
3.1.4 Criticism of the objectivist approach 
The objectivist approach has been welcomed by part of the doctrine197 
according to which: (i) defining the notion of investment is necessary as it is a 
‘question of legal security for foreign investors and capital-importing 
countries’;198 and (ii) ‘in order to really define the notion of investment […] one 
has to reason according to criteria. […] And if several criteria are necessary to 
define, as seems for the notion of investment, the absence of one of them 
means that the analysed transaction does not correspond to the definition.’ 199 
                                                          
195 Phoenix v. Czech Republic, paras. 100-116. 
196 See, for instance, Saba Fakes v. Turkey, paras. 112-114, where the tribunal expressly takes a 
position on this aspect. 
197 See, among others, P.E. DUPONT, The Notion of ICSID Investment Ongoing ‘Confusion’ 
or ‘Emerging Synthesis’?, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 
2011, pp. 245-272; and B. DEMIRKOL, The Notion of 'Investment' in International 
Investment Law, supra, note 159, pp. 41-50. According to B. STERN, Are There New 
Limits on Access to International Arbitration?, supra, note 141, at p. 36: ‘the current trend 
of setting some limits is absolutely necessary for mature treaty arbitration in order to 
monitor the treaty arbitration mechanism and to deal with investment disputes in a 
balanced way, taking into account both state sovereignty and the necessity to protect 
foreign investment and its continuing flow.’ 
198 S. MANCIAUX, The Notion of Investment: New Controversies, The Journal of World 
Investment & Trade, Vol. 9, Issue 6, 2008, pp. 443-466, at p. 448. 
199 Phoenix v. Czech Republic, at p. 449. 
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However, it is not possible to deny the various weaknesses of this approach.200  
In my opinion, its main problem regards the fact that it follows a highly 
disputed methodology in a strict manner in order to limit the scope of the term 
investment, whose content had not been agreed by the parties to the ICSID 
Convention. When it came to the contracting States to lay down the criteria 
used to ascertain an investment, they failed; so, how is it possible that tribunals 
identify certain must-have criteria and deny their jurisdiction where any of 
them are absent? As noted by the tribunal in Biwater v. Tanzania, how can 
‘arbitral tribunals sitting in individual cases impose one such definition which 
should be applicable in all cases and for all purposes’? 201 
In addition, this approach is only allegedly ‘objective’: from the described 
precedents202 it is clear that arbitrators have a broad margin of autonomy in 
determining whether the requirements of the Salini test are satisfied, and they 
have made great use of this autonomy, as each tribunal has given its own 
interpretation based on its own views. As noted by C. Schreuer: ‘the 
development in practice from a descriptive list of typical features towards a set 
of mandatory legal requirements is unfortunate […]. A rigid list of criteria that 
must be in any event met is not likely to facilitate the task of tribunals or to 
make decisions more predictable. Each individual criterion carries out a considerable 
margin of appreciation that may be applied at tribunal’s discretion.’203 In a nutshell, 
                                                          
200 In addition to the critics set out below, H. JUNG ENGFELDT, Should ICSID Go Gangnam 
Style in Light of Non-Traditional Foreign Investments Including Those Spurred on by 
Social Media? Applying an Industry-Specific Lens to the Salini Test to Determine Article 
25 Jurisdiction, Berkley Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 44-63, 
pointed out how the Salini test would not be adequate to verify investment activities in the 
entertainment business. In the words of the author: ‘[e]ntertainment project disputes 
should not be shut out of ICSID on account of a jurisdictional test that my not be well 
suited for these new activities’ (at p. 63). 
201 See, infra, note 234, para. 130. 
202 This weakness of the objectivist approach results also from the Relevant Cases. See, for 
instance, the considerations on Saipem v. Bangladesh, in section 5.1 of this Chapter II.  
203 C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, supra, note 23, at pp. 132-133 (emphasis added). See also D.A. DESIERTO, 
Development as an International Right: Investment in the New Trade-Based IIAs, Trade, 
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although the approach is reportedly ‘objective’, it tends to become quite 
subjective in its actual applications. Professor Fadlallah204 in addition pointed 
out that imposing a mandatory criterion necessarily requires assigning a precise 
definition to that criterion, and it would take many years to reach this definition 
without any certainty of ever obtaining a uniform result. 
Finally, the simple fact there is no consensus on the ‘objective content’ of the 
term investment and that tribunals, even when invoking the Salini test, have 
not used the same number of criteria cast serious doubts on the defensibility 
and existence of objective criteria. At the same time, the removal or the 
addition of items from the Salini test creates uncertainty over the definition of 
investment and entails that it is difficult for companies to plan their 
international operations. Therefore this approach is to be discouraged. 
Specific criticisms have also been raised against the Salini-less and Salini-plus 
tests. With respect to the first one, according to one author,205 the Vienna 
Convention makes it necessary to make reference to the wording of the 
Preamble to determine the content of the term ‘investment’, and this cannot be 
simply disregarded. In relation to the Salini-plus, it has been noted that the 
newly-identified requirements are not really connected with the definition of 
investment, but rather with the one of protected investment. The conformity 
with the host State law, in particular, refers to the legality of the investment and 
                                                                                                                                                            
Law and Development, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 296-333, who at p. 332 states that: ‘[w]hile 
the aim of preserving the balance of investment protection and host State development is 
laudable, it is more than likely that the inherent imprecision and subjectivities of the Salini test would 
not be the most advisable way of achieving this balance’ (emphasis added). 
204 I. FADLALLAH 'La notion d'investissement: vers une restriction a ̀ la compe ́tence du 
CIRDI?', in G. AKSEN ET AL. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Robert Briner (2005), p. 259 and 
following, at p. 267, quoted by E. GAILLARD, Identify or define? Reflections on the 
evolution of the concept of investment in ICSID practice, supra, note 159, especially at pp. 
409-410.  
205 A. GRABOWSKI, The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense 
of Salini, supra, note 151, at p. 302. 
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not with its existence. Therefore, there can be an investment that is not made 
in compliance with national laws.206 
 
3.2  The subjectivist approach 
A diametrically opposed approach is put forward by the tribunals that adhere 
to the subjectivist approach. 
According to them, there are no outer limits to the Centre’s jurisdiction and the 
term investment should have the meaning that the parties to the arbitration 
granted to it when they consented to ICSID’s jurisdiction. This approach 
therefore does not rely on the Salini test, but rather on the intent of the parties. 
The roots of this jurisprudential line, which is also supported by certain 
scholarly writings,207 can be found in the Report of the Executive Directors, 
where, regarding the lack of any definition of investment, it was stated that: 
‘No attempt was made to define the term “investment” given the essential 
requirement of consent by the parties, and the mechanisms through which 
contracting States can make known in advance, if they so desire, the classes of 
disputes which they would or would not consider submitting to the Centre 
(Article 25(4)).’208 This was interpreted as a suggestion that the term investment 
is wholly under the control of the parties to the arbitration: if the States have 
agreed to an investment treaty where consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction is granted 
to a given transaction that is said to represent an investment, then the treaty 
controls the constitution of an ICSID investment.  
Accordingly, no double-barrelled test is made. Tribunals merely look at the 
treaty’s definition of investment, assess if it covers the asset or transaction in 
question and, on that basis, determine their jurisdiction. Any challenge by the 
contracting State to the jurisdiction in the context of the investor-State 
arbitration is irrelevant, as these tribunals focus on the State’s ex-ante policy 
decision that created a legitimate expectation on the part of the investors. 
                                                          
206 For a more detailed analysis of the ‘in accordance with the host State law’ clause, see, supra, 
note 29.  
207 M. SASSON, Substantive Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Unsettled Relationship 
between International Law and Municipal Law, supra, note 148, at p. 32 and following. 
208 See, supra, note 153, para. 27. 
82 
Substantially all tribunals prior to Fedax v. Venezuela adhered to this approach. 
However, this is not prevalent today, as most decisions recognise that it is 
difficult to reconcile with the specific language of Article 25(1) of the 
Convention, which requires a ‘dispute arising directly out of an investment.’209  
Tribunals following this approach have encompassed within the Centre’s 
jurisdiction an extraordinarily wide range of transactions, such as an 
unconsummated office construction project mainly consisting of plans and 
regulatory approvals;210 an advertising agency and print shop;211 and a 
                                                          
209 See, inter alia, Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, para. 68 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/238) (“CSOB v. Slovakia”); and Salini v. 
Morocco, para. 52. As noted by N.V.S.K. NATHAN, Submissions to the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Breach of the Convention, Journal of 
International Arbitration, supra, note 122, at p. 29 ‘[t]he flexibility shown by ICSID and 
ICSID tribunals may have been spurred by the fact that few cases were referred to ICSID 
arbitrations for over a decade after its inception, and by the fear that ICSID could suffer 
the same fate as the Permanent Court of Arbitration which was being little used despite the 
extension of the use of its facilities by natural and juristic persons. There could also be 
genuine concerns that an institution such as ICSID, with the potential for regulating the 
conduct of States and foreign investors and developing new rules of international law 
relating to economic development, could be in jeopardy’.
 
210 Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 September 2003 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0358.pdf) 
(“Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine”), whereby the tribunal, noting the lack of a definition 
of investment in the ICSID Convention, limited its analysis to the definition of investment 
contained in the relevant BIT (i.e., Treaty Between the United States of America and 
Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed 
on 4 March 1994, Art. 1(a) (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2366)), since according to 
the tribunal ‘[i]t is well settled that Contracting Parties may agree upon a more precise 
definition of “investment” in a separate legal instrument’ (para. 8). 
211 Tokios Tokéles v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Dissent, ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0863.pdf), whereby the 
tribunal, in light of the lack of definition of investment under the ICSID Convention and 
of the importance that the drafters thereof gave to the parties’ autonomy, stated that the 
parties ‘enjoy broad discretion to choose the disputes that they will submit to ICSID’ (para. 
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concession agreement to develop and operate a local port terminal.212 In all 
these cases, in determining whether an investment was given, the ICSID 
tribunals scrutinized if the requirements of an investment under the relevant 
instrument were met, stating that such instrument alone set the boundaries of 
the investment tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
 
3.2.1 Criticism of the subjectivist approach 
This approach can also be criticised on a number of grounds. 
First of all, it de facto removes one jurisdictional requirement (i.e., the presence 
of an investment), merging it into the parties’ consent. If the parties could 
determine the meaning of investment completely on their own, then the 
independent jurisdictional requirements ratione materiae under Art. 25(1) of the 
Convention would be meaningless and it would be absorbed by the consent. 
In addition, it is not possible for the parties to broaden the concept of 
investment for the purposes of ICSID arbitration as much as they like.213 As 
noted by Professor Schreuer,214 the essential requirement of consent does not 
                                                                                                                                                            
19) and considered exclusively the definition of investment set out in the relevant BIT (i.e., 
Agreement Between the Government of Lithuania and the Government of Ukraine 
concerning the Protection and Promotion of Investment, Art. 1(1), not publicly available) 
(paras. 74-86). 
212 Lanco International Inc. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary 
Decision: Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, 8 December 1998 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0450_0.pdf). In this case, 
the tribunal based its decision on its subject matter jurisdiction exclusively on the wording 
of the BIT (i.e., Bilateral Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine 
Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Foreign 
Investments, signed on 14 November 1991 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/127)) without even 
mentioning the jurisdictional requirements set out under Art. 25(1) of the Convention 
(paras. 17-20). 
213 This position is supported by a number of authors. See, for instance, G. ABI-SAAB, The 
Concept of Investment in the ICSID Convention, in N.G. ZIADÉ (ed.), Festschrift Ahmed 
Sadek El-Kosheri, Kluwer Law International, 2015, pp. 239-248, at p. 243. 
214 C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, supra, note 23, at p. 117.  
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imply unlimited freedom for the parties to determine what an investment is. In 
particular, it should be clear that ordinary commercial transactions should not 
be covered by the Centre’s jurisdiction, as this can be inferred by the terms of 
the Additional Facility Rules. As already mentioned in Chapter I,215 the 
Additional Facility Rules are designed to offer access to the Centre in situations 
where the Convention’s jurisdictional requirements are not met, including 
when the underlying transaction is not an investment.216 According to such 
Additional Facility Rules, in order to establish the jurisdiction thereunder the 
prior approval of the Secretary-General is required; such consent can be 
granted only if the Secretary-General is satisfied that the transaction at hand 
has features that distinguish it from an ordinary commercial transaction.217 
From this, it can be easily inferred that the existence of an investment is per se a 
condition to access ICSID jurisdiction that cannot be merely squeezed into the 
parties’ consent. The Centre is not accessible for any transaction that the 
parties wish to submit to its scrutiny and, in particular, the Centre should never 
                                                          
215  See, supra, note 37. 
216 Art. 2 of Additional Facility Rules provides that: ‘[t]he Secretariat of the Centre is hereby 
authorized to administer, subject to and in accordance with these Rules, proceedings 
between a State (or a constituent subdivision or agency of a State) and a national of 
another State, falling within the following categories:  
(a) conciliation and arbitration proceedings for the settlement of legal disputes arising 
directly out of an investment which are not within the jurisdiction of the Centre 
because either the State party to the dispute or the State whose national is a party to 
the dispute is not a Contracting State;  
(b) conciliation and arbitration proceedings for the settlement of legal disputes which are not within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre because they do not arise directly out of an investment, provided that either 
the State party to the dispute or the State whose national is a party to the dispute is a Contracting 
State; and  
(c) fact-finding proceedings.  
The administration of proceedings authorized by these Rules is hereinafter referred to as 
the Additional Facility’ (emphasis added). 
217 Art. 4(3) of Additional Facility Rules provides that: ‘[i]n the case of an application based on 
Article 2(b), the Secretary-General shall give his approval only if he is satisfied (a) that the 
requirements of that provision are fulfilled, and (b) that the underlying transaction has features 
which distinguish it from an ordinary commercial transaction’ (emphasis added).  
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exercise its jurisdiction with respect to merely commercial transactions, 
regardless of the fact that in any BIT such transactions are included on the list 
of protected investments. 
Finally, this approach also seems to contrast with Arts. 32(1)218 and 41(1)219 of 
the Convention: a conciliation mission or an arbitral tribunal can consider on 
its own initiative whether the dispute before it falls within the Centre’s 
jurisdiction; therefore, even if the parties agreed on the notion of the 
investment and a claim relating to a given transaction is to be submitted to the 
Centre’s jurisdiction, the ICSID Convention still envisages the possibility for 
the tribunal to deny its jurisdiction if it deems that the transaction does not 
meet the minimum requirements of an investment. This implies that not 
                                                          
218 Art. 32(1) of the Convention provides that: ‘[t]he Commission shall be the judge of its own 
competence.’ Notably, this article, as well as Art. 41(1) of the Convention, refer to the 
concept of ‘competence’, while Art. 25(1) refers to the concept of ‘jurisdiction’. As noted 
by G. ZEILER, Jurisdiction, Competence, and Admissibility of Claims in ICSID Arbitration 
Proceedings, in C. BINDER ET AL., International Investment Law for the 21st Century: 
Essays in Honour of Cristoph Schreuer, Oxford Scholarship Online, September 2009, pp. 
77-92, at p. 78-82, the Convention makes a peculiar use of the words ‘jurisdiction’ and 
‘competence’ (the jurisdiction is referred to the Centre, while the competence to the 
Commission or Tribunal). In particular, ‘the use of the term jurisdiction in Article 25 was 
controversial from the outset. There was a discussion as to the appropriateness of the word 
jurisdiction, given that the Centre only exercises administrative functions.’ However, 
analysing the use of terms in the context of the Convention, it is clear that, if the 
prerequisites set out under Art. 25 are not met, the dispute will not be administered by the 
Centre (and ‘this is what Article 25 ICSID Convention means when it stipulates the 
prerequisites under which the Centre has jurisdiction’) and, consequently, ‘the tribunal [will 
have] no competence as an ICSID tribunal’ (p. 81). To put it slightly differently: ‘[i]n the 
Convention’s terminology the word “jurisdiction” refers to the requirements set out in Art. 
25, which are conditional for the power of a conciliation commission or arbitral tribunal. 
“Competence” refers to the narrower issues confronting a specific tribunal, such as its 
proper composition or lis pendens. […] In practical terms, the distinction is of little 
consequence. Tribunals must be satisfied that both conditions are fulfilled. The two terms 
are frequently used interchangeably’ (C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. 
SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra, note 23, at pp. 531-532).  
219 Analogously, Art. 41(1) of the Convention provides that: ‘[t]he Tribunal shall be the judge 
of its own competence.’ 
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everything that the parties have agreed to be an investment can be considered 
as such, at least for the Convention’s purposes.220  
 
3.3  The typical characteristics approach 
Between the two extremities represented by the objectivist and subjectivist 
approach, a third intermediate approach has emerged,221 according to which the 
criteria identified by the jurisprudence adhering to the objectivist approach to 
characterise an investment are not mandatory, but rather descriptive and 
                                                          
220 Moreover, the fact that the ICSID Secretary-General has the power to screen requests for 
arbitration for a ‘manifest or obvious lack of jurisdiction’ (Art. 36(3) of the Convention) 
should support the position that there are outer limits to the definition of investment. 
However, as noted by J. HO, The Meaning of ‘Investment’ in ICSID Arbitration, 
Arbitration International, Vol. 26, Issue 4, pp. 633-646, at p. 642: ‘[t]he decision of the 
ICSID Secretary-General to register a request of arbitration […] is not dispositive of the 
existence of an ‘investment’ under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, and, as 
evidenced in the arbitral awards, the existence of an ‘investment’ is usually contested and 
still needs to be adjudicated by a tribunal.’ For an analysis of the Secretary-General’s 
powers under Art. 36(3) of the Convention, and of the few cases when the Secretary-
General refused to register a request of arbitration, see S. PUIG, C.W. BROWN, The 
Secretary-General's Power to Refuse to Register a Request for Arbitration Under the 
ICSID Convention, ICSID Review, Vol. 27, Issue 1, 2012 pp. 172-191. 
221 This third approach is included by certain authors within the ambit of the objectivist 
approach (see, for instance, C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The 
ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra, note 23, at p. 132, that refers to the ‘typical 
characteristic approach’ and the ‘jurisdictional approach’ within the scope of the outer-
limits approach). Other authors, given the role that is granted to the parties’ autonomy, 
consider this approach as part of the subjectivist approach (see, for example, B. STERN, 
Scope of Investor’s Protection under the ICSID/BIT Mechanism: Recent Trends, supra, 
note 141, p. 40, which however admits that in certain cases: ‘it appears that there is not 
always a clear-cut distinction between the liberal approach and the objective test’; K. 
YANNACA-SMALL, Definition of “Investment”: An Open-ended Search for a Balanced 
Approach, supra, note 107, p. 251). In my opinion, due to the fact that in more recent 
times, this jurisprudential approach has significantly departed from the objectivist approach 
to get closer to a more subjectivist one, it represents a different category that is worth 
analyzing in an autonomous manner, also in light of the growing number of tribunals that 
apply it. 
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therefore the absence of any of them in a given case does not impair the 
existence of an investment. As such, the outlined criteria can only assist the 
arbitrators in deciding whether the transaction in question is an investment. 
This approach, therefore, on the one hand, recognises that there are outer 
limits to the concept of investment which cannot be overtaken by the will of 
the parties; but, on the other hand, accepts that such limits are broad and that 
the will of the parties in deciding if a transaction is an investment has to play a 
major role. Since, also pursuant to this approach, tribunals have to perform a 
double-barrelled test, in order to establish the existence of an investment, 
certain scholarly writings consider it as a variation of the objectivist 
approach.222  
However, according to a recent deviation of this approach, the definition of 
investment contained in international agreements is to be considered the main 
(rectius, the only) factor that tribunals should take into consideration when 
deciding on the jurisdiction ratione materiae. This line of reasoning is based on 
the assumption that the objective outer boundaries imposed by Art. 25(1) are 
very broad and that an investment can substantially be anything except a mere 
sale and purchase. Therefore, even if this approach still refers to the concept of 
outside boundaries, it consider them so broad to substantially deprive them of 
much relevance, so that almost any transaction contemplated as an investment 
by the parties should pass the consistency test with Art. 25(1). By doing so, 
tribunals, despite formally recognising certain extreme limits, got closer to the 
subjectivist approach.  
It is also worth analysing some of the most remarkable decisions pertaining to 
this approach to identify the growing role that the tribunals attached to the 
parties’ will to the detriment of the application of objective criteria for the 
determination of the existence of an investment. 
The first case where the typical characteristic approach was clarified is CSOB v. 
Slovakia.223 On that occasion, the respondent argued that the transaction 
underlying the claimant’s case (i.e., a loan) did not involve a transfer of 
                                                          
222 See, supra, note 221. 
223 CSOB v. Slovakia, paras. 64-67. 
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resources into the Slovak Republic and, therefore, did not constitute an 
investment.224 The tribunal stated that the mere description of the transaction 
in question as an investment in the parties’ agreement was insufficient to satisfy 
the jurisdictional requirement under Art. 25(1). In order to establish whether 
there was an investment under Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, the 
tribunal recalled Fedax v. Venezuela in the part225 where it stated that an 
investment is frequently a rather complex operation, composed of various 
interrelated transactions, each element of which, standing alone, might not in 
all cases qualify as an investment.226 However, the tribunal also believed that 
the parties’ consent constituted ‘a strong presumption that they considered 
their transaction to be an investment within the meaning of the ICSID 
Convention’227 and that the elements suggested by the claimant as delineating 
the definition of an investment (i.e., ‘the acquisition of property or assets 
through the expenditure of resources by one party in the territory of a foreign 
country which is expected to produce a benefit on both sides and to offer a 
return in the future, subject to uncertainties of the risk involved’)228 ‘are not a 
formal prerequisite for the finding that a transaction constitutes an investment 
as the concept is understood in the Convention.’229 In light of the above 
consideration, although loans were not expressly mentioned under the Czech 
Republic-Slovakia BIT230, the tribunal found that terms as broad as ‘assets and 
monetary receivables or claims’ clearly included loans within the ambit of 
protected investments. 
                                                          
224 CSOB v. Slovakia, para. 76.  
225 Fedax v. Venezuela, para. 24. 
226 Supra, note 223, para. 72. 
227 CSOB v. Slovakia, para. 66. 
228 CSOB v. Slovakia, para. 78. 
229 CSOB v. Slovakia, para. 90. 
230 Agreement Between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the 
Czech Republic Regarding the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
signed on 23 November 1992. 
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In MCI v. Ecuador,231 where the transaction in question concerned intangible 
assets such as accounts receivable and an operating permit, the tribunal 
considered that ‘the requirements that were taken into account in some arbitral 
precedents for purposes of denoting the existence of an investment protected 
by a treaty (such as the duration and risk of the alleged investment) must be 
considered as mere examples and not necessarily as elements that are required 
for its existence.’ 232 The tribunal then looked at Art. Ia) of the Ecuador-United 
States BIT,233 which gives a broad definition of investment, and decided that 
the rights and interests alleged by the claimants would fit into that definition. 
In the Biwater v. Tanzania234 award, the tribunal also ruled that the ‘Salini 
criteria [...] are not fixed or mandatory as a matter of law’235 and that ‘a more 
flexible approach to the meaning of “investment” is appropriate, which takes 
into account the features identified in Salini, but along with all the 
circumstances of the case.’236 Notably, it also explicitly pointed out that the 
nature of the instrument enshrining the consent to ICSID jurisdiction is among 
the circumstances relevant when deciding how much weight should be given to 
the definition adopted by the parties. 237 The tribunal added that the inflexible 
application of the Salini test 'leads to a definition that may contradict individual 
agreements [...] as well as a developing consensus in parts of the world as to the 
meaning of "investment".'238 Moreover, after a review of the most recent 
                                                          
231 M.C.I. Power Group L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/06, Award, 31 July 2007 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/MCIEcuador.pdf) (“MCI v. Ecuador”). 
232 MCI v. Ecuador, para. 165.  
233 Bilateral Investment Treaty between the Republic of Ecuador and the United States of 
America signed on 27 August 1993 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1065). 
234 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 
Award, 24 July 2008 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0095.pdf) (“Biwater v. Tanzania”). 
235 Biwater v. Tanzania, para. 312. 
236 Biwater v. Tanzania, para. 316. 
237 Biwater v. Tanzania, para. 316. 
238 Biwater v. Tanzania, para. 314. 
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drafting practice in BITs, it stated that 'if very substantial numbers of BITs 
across the world express the definition of "investment" more broadly than the 
Salini test, and if this constitutes any type of international consensus, it is 
difficult to see why the ICSID Convention ought to be read more narrowly.’239 
Even if some of the considerations of the tribunal may not be acceptable – for 
example that there is an international consensus on the concept of investment 
in light of the definitions included in the BITs (indeed, in section 2 of this 
Chapter, it has been highlighted how BITs are drafted in different manners 
depending mainly on the historical moment of their execution and on their 
purposes) – this award is still to be looked at positively, as it attempted to take 
a ‘pragmatic’ position, which does not disregard the Salini criteria, but which 
also tries to combine them with the definition of investment used by the parties 
in the BIT.  
In 2009 the committee involved with the annulment of the MHS v. Malaysia 
Award on Jurisdiction240 pushed forward the findings of the previously 
mentioned cases and further broadened the outer limits of the term investment 
under the ICSID Convention.241 In rebutting the approach adopted by the sole 
arbitrator in the MHS v. Malaysia Award on Jurisdiction, the tribunal built its 
reasoning on the idea that the parties to the ICSID Convention could have 
reached a definition of the term ‘investment’ during the negotiations, but they 
refrained from doing so; thus, according to the tribunal, the history of the 
Convention makes it clear that the consent of the parties to the dispute should 
                                                          
239 Biwater v. Tanzania, para. 314. 
240 For more on the award, see supra note 159. In that case the sole arbitrator, noting the lack 
of one of the hallmarks of the Salini test, declined its jurisdiction, without verifying 
whether the definition of investment under the relevant BIT (i.e., Agreement Between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of Malaysia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on 21 
May 1981 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1972)) was met. 
241 Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, 16 April 2009 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0497.pdf) (“MHS v. 
Malaysia Decision on Annulment”). 
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be the primary factor to be taken into account when delimiting the arbitral 
tribunal’s jurisdiction.242 However, the tribunal also acknowledged that some 
‘outer limits’ to the Centre’s jurisdiction should exist and, through the analysis 
of the travaux pre ́paratoires of the Convention, came to the conclusion that the 
outer limits are very ample and that exclusively sales ‘and other transient 
commercial transactions’ would fall outside the jurisdiction of ICSID.243 In 
light of the above, the tribunal decided any transaction which is not a mere sale 
can qualify as an investment244, including the marine search and salvage 
operation which the claimant carried out in Malaysia and which represented the 
contested investment in that case. 
This trend was continued in the Inmaris v. Ukraine decision on jurisdiction.245 
The dispute concerned several contracts to renovate and operate a ship owned 
by the Ukrainian Government for the purpose of a tourist venture and to train 
Ukrainian merchant marine sailors. On the issue of whether the transactions 
constituted an investment, the tribunal explicitly stated that the ‘Salini’ criteria 
are not to be considered as a ‘compulsory, limiting definition of investment 
under the ICSID Convention’.246 On the contrary, also in this case, the tribunal 
put a great emphasis on the definition of investment provided by the parties in 
the relevant BIT, as through that definition they had agreed on the kinds of 
                                                          
242 MHS v. Malaysia Decision on Annulment, para. 70. 
243 MHS v. Malaysia Decision on Annulment, para. 69. 
244 MHS v. Malaysia Decision on Annulment, para. 72. The same approach was followed by 
Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic 
of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 July 2013 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1531.pdf), paras. 203-
206. It is also worth mentioning that in this case the Tribunal rejected considering the 
‘contribution to the host State’s development’ as part of the typical features of an 
investment, finding that it would require it to conduct an inappropriate ex post facto analysis 
of the investment’s benefits (paras. 207-209). 
245 Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GmbH and Others v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 March 2010 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0427.pdf) (Inmaris v. 
Ukraine) 
246 Inmaris v. Ukraine, para. 129. 
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economic activity that were to be protected since they believed that they 
constituted ‘investments’ within the meaning of the ICSID Convention as well. 
Thus, ‘[t]hat judgment by States that are both Parties to the BIT and 
Contracting States to the Convention, should be given considerable weight and 
deference [and a] tribunal would have to have compelling reasons to disregard 
such a mutually agreed definition of investment.’247 The tribunal went on to 
maintain that the Salini test may be useful only in the case when the definition 
included in the BIT is so broad ‘that it may capture a transaction that would 
not normally be characterized as an investment under any reasonable 
definition.' 248 
In light of the above, according to this development of the typical characteristic 
approach, the consent provided through the BIT has primary importance in 
the determination of a protected investment since it would establish a prima facie 
rebuttable presumption that the transaction in question falls within the limits of 
the ICSID Convention. 
 
3.3.1 Criticism of the typical characteristic approach 
This approach seems more adequate than the two previous ones, as it allows 
new and unconventional operations to be included in the concept of 
investment,249 though taking into consideration the existence of outer limits to 
ICSID’s subject matter jurisdiction. As stated by one author:250 ‘one could 
describe a tiger as ‘orange with black stripes’; but if that description is taken as 
                                                          
247 Inmaris v. Ukraine, para. 130. 
248 Inmaris v. Ukraine, para. 131. 
249 As stated by P. VARGIU, Beyond Hallmarks and Formal Requirements: a “Jurisprudence 
Constante” on the Notion of Investment in the ICSID Convention, Journal of World 
Investment & Trade, Vol. 10, Issue 5, 2009, p. 753-768, at p. 763: ‘[…] the “typical 
characteristics” approach appears more consistent with the rationale behind the exclusion of 
a definition of investment from Article 25 ICSID, which was to make the provision in 
question adaptable to the evolution of the international investment scenario.’ 
250 Oscar Garibaldi quoted by J. HARB, Definition Of Investments Protected By International 
Treaties: An On-Going Hot Debate, MEALEY’S International Arbitration Report, Vol. 
25, Issue 8, August 2011, pp. 1-19, at p. 13. 
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a definition, it would exclude the most sought-after tiger of all: the Bengal 
tiger.’ The holistic approach allows these sorts of issues to be overcome. 
However, the approach is not exempted from criticism. First, it is not clear 
why the hallmarks of the Salini test are the only ones to be taken into account 
when deciding whether a transaction is actually an investment. Even though 
the application of these criteria in a more flexible manner can be welcomed 
since it produces more reasonable results, from a methodological perspective 
such approach is rather ‘weak’. 
Furthermore, the line of reasoning within this school of thought that suggests 
that the consent provided through the BIT should be the primary factor to be 
taken into account may be troubling. Indeed, as seen above, recently BITs have 
tended to include a very broad definition of investment and it is difficult to 
imagine that the States had, by signing the ICSID Convention, intended to 
open themselves up to ICSID arbitration on disputes effectively concerning 
every kind of asset.251  
Also in Biwater v. Tanzania252 and MHS v. Malaysia Decision on Annulment253 
tribunals raised the possibility that there may be international consensus on an 
expanded definition of investment, due to the fact that a substantial number of 
BITs expresses the definition of investment in broader terms than the Salini 
test. However, the mere reproduction of similar definitions in various 
international treaties should not be sufficient to establish any international 
agreement on the meaning of such term. In addition, as illustrated in section 2 
of this Chapter, BIT definitions of investment have been evolving in various 
ways; accordingly there is no consistent State practice which would support 
such an international agreement. 
As a final remark, this approach has recently become very close to the 
subjectivist one. Originally it seemed to be more consistent with the thoughts 
of Professor Schreuer, who highlighted that the features he identified to 
                                                          
251 See M. HWANG S.C., J. FONG LEE CHENG, Definition of “Investment” – A voice from the 
Eye of the Storm, supra, note 159, at p. 107. 
252 See, supra, note 239. 
253 MHS v. Malaysia Decision on Annulment, para. 79, where the tribunal quoted the Biwater 
v. Tanzania award.  
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characterise an investment, which form the basis of the objectivist approach. 
But these features are not to be considered as always and mandatorily 
present,254 and in more recent times the approach substantially did not consider 
the outer limits of the term investment at all, just like the subjectivist approach, 
shrinking them to the fact that an investment cannot be a pure one-off sale.  
 
4. Investment for the purposes of non-ICSID arbitration 
As illustrated above, there are problems with the finding of a definition of 
investment for ICSID tribunals mainly derived from the jurisdictional 
requirement under Art. 25(1) of the Convention, which mentions, but does not 
define, the condition of an investment, and from the need to reconcile such a 
requirement with the definition of investment given by the parties in consent 
instruments. 
However, when the dispute is not submitted to ICSID, but to another 
institution that applies different rules, such as the ICC or the SCC, or to ad hoc 
arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, analogous problems 
should not exist. The rules applicable to those tribunals do not filter claims on 
the basis of their own notion of investment as a subject matter condition, and 
their jurisdiction is merely based on the consent of the parties: as long as the 
parties agreed to grant a certain meaning to the term investment, the tribunal 
for the purposes of its jurisdiction should only verify whether the transaction 
submitted to it is included within such definition. Substantially, it is possible for 
a particular asset to constitute an investment under an investment treaty, but 
                                                          
254 Professor Schreuer addresses this topic in the second edition of his commentary (C. 
SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, supra, note 23, p. 133), where it is stated that: ‘The development in practice 
from a descriptive list of typical features towards a set of mandatory legal requirements is 
unfortunate. The First Edition of this Commentary cannot serve as authority for this development. To 
the extent that the “Salini test” is applied to determine the existence of an investment, its 
criteria should not be seen as distinct jurisdictional requirements each of which must be 
met separately. In fact, tribunals have pointed out repeatedly that the criteria that they 
applied were interrelated and should be looked at not in isolation but in conjunction’ 
(emphasis added). 
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not under Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention. While in ICSID arbitration, the 
definitional threshold must be met under both the investment treaty and the 
ICSID Convention, non-ICSID arbitration should only require the test under 
the applicable investment treaty.   
Still, it should be noted that non-ICSID tribunals, especially in recent times, 
asked themselves whether the fact that the dispute is grounded as an 
‘investment’ has any limiting effect on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal or 
whether the parties to an investment treaty may extend the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal to cover any type of dispute, even those that arise out of mere 
commercial transactions. In other words, the problem that also non-ICSID 
tribunals face is whether the parties to an investment treaty can agree that any 
transaction, including a mere sale and purchase, is to be considered as an 
investment for the purposes of a treaty and that, therefore, a claim relevant 
thereto may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the non-ICSID investment 
tribunal, provided in the investor-State dispute settlement clause of the 
applicable treaty, as long as the contracting States have this in writing. 
Historically, non-ICSID arbitrations have contented themselves with making 
their assessment by looking at the definition of the term in the relevant 
investment treaty, including wide asset-based definitions. However, in more 
recent times, certain non-ICSID tribunals have used some ‘objective’ criteria in 
the analysis of their jurisdiction, with an effort to go beyond the dichotomy 
between the concept of investment in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. 
An example of the traditional approach can be given by Petrobart v. Kyrgyz 
Republic,255 an SCC arbitration arising out of the ECT. The case involved a 
contract between Petrobart Limited (“Petrobart”), a company incorporated in 
Gibraltar, and the joint stock company Kyrgyzgazmunaizat (“KGM”), a 
company owned by the Kyrgyz State, for the supply of gas condensate over a 
period of a year. As a result of the failure of KGM to pay to Petrobart the 
amounts due for the deliveries, Petrobart started an investment arbitration 
                                                          
255 Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. 126/2003, Award, 29 May 2005 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0628.pdf) 
(“Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic”). 
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under the ECT.256 In this case the tribunal found an investment to exist under 
the ECT, 257 despite the fact that the contract entered into between Petrobart 
and KMG ‘did not involve any transfer of money or property as capital in the 
business of the Kyrgyz Republic, but was a sale contract’.258 Indeed, the 
tribunal stressed that it had to verify only whether the transaction at issue 
qualified as an investment according to the ECT, since ‘it is obvious that, when 
there is a definition of a term in the treaty itself, that definition shall apply’.259 
This approach is still the most largely used in non-ICSID arbitration. The 
evident consequence thereof is that access to investment arbitration varies 
depending on the investor’s choice between ICSID arbitration and other 
institutional or ad hoc arbitration. In the first case, it is more difficult for the 
claimant to bring an investment claim, due to the hurdles of ICSID’s 
jurisdiction, while, in other cases, depending on the treaty’s wording, it is easier. 
                                                          
256 For the sake of completeness, it is to be highlighted that, before the ECT arbitration, 
Petrobart initiated a UNCITRAL arbitration under the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on 
Foreign Investment in the Kyrgyz Republic dated 24 September 1997, but the dispute was 
dismissed on the grounds that the underlying transaction did not constitute an investment 
according to that law, but, rather, it was only an international sale. See in this respect, V. 
HEISKANEN, Of Capital Import: the Definition of “Investment” in International 
Investment Law, in A.K. HOFFMANN (ed.), Protection of Foreign Investments through 
Modern Treaty Arbitration. Diversity and Harmonisation, Association Suisse de 
l'Arbitrage, 2010, pp. 51-73, at pp. 65-66. 
257 Pursuant to Art. 1(6) of the ECT investment means ‘every kind of asset, owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by an Investor,’ including, inter alia, ‘claims to money and 
claims to performance pursuant to a contract having an economic value and associated 
with an investment’ and ‘any right conferred by Law or contract or by virtue of any 
licenses and permits granted pursuant to Law to undertake any Economic Activity in the 
Energy Sector.’ 
258 Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic, p. 69. 
259 Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic, p. 69. It is worth noting that the tribunal made reference to 
Fedax v. Venezuela and Salini v. Morocco to support the proposition that the term 
investment can have a wide meaning, but it nevertheless approached the issue differently 
because, in contrast to such awards, it relied solely on the broad definition of investment in 
the ECT and found that the right under the contract to payment for goods delivered is an 
asset and, accordingly, an investment protected by the ECT. 
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In addition, the said understanding leads to the conclusion that the term 
investment does not have an inherent meaning. In non-ICSID investment 
arbitration, anything can be an investment: it all depends on the contracting 
States’ decisions. 
Recent non-ICSID decisions have, however, contested this approach and 
considered the Salini test either tacitly or expressly.  
The first case when this happened is apparently Nreka v. Czech Republic,260 a 
non-published case, whereby, on the basis of the information available, the 
tribunal checked whether the criteria frequently used by arbitrators to define 
‘investment’ (including an extended duration, some form of risk, a certain 
regularity of profit and return, not being wholly insignificant in the amount, 
and entailing a contribution to the host State’s economic development) were 
met, thus importing the Salini test in non-ICSID arbitration.261 
However, the most relevant decision on this point is the published award of 
Romak v. Uzbekistan.262 The factual circumstances and the line of reasoning 
behind the decision will be better described in section 5.2 of this Chapter, as 
this is one of the Relevant Case; nevertheless, it should be noted that in this 
award the UNCITRAL tribunal, although it was not constituted under the 
                                                          
260 Pren Nreka v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 5 February 2007 (“Nreka v. 
Czech Republic”). Since the award was not published, the information available on it is 
retrieved from a decision by the Paris Court of Appeal that on 25 September 2008 ruled on 
the application to set aside the award (Czech Republic v. Pren Nreka, Court of Appeal of 
Paris, Decision, 25 September 2008 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0569.pdf)). The case is 
reported in K. YANNACA-SMALL, Definition of “Investment”: An Open-ended Search for 
a Balanced Approach, supra, note 107, at p. 257. A comment on the case is also made by E. 
CABROL, Pren Nreka v. Czech Republic and The Notion of Investment Under Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: Does “Investment” Really Mean “Every Kind of Asset”?, in K.P. 
SAUVANT (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2009-2010, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, pp. 217-231. 
261 It is worth noting that the Paris Court of Appeal rejected the request to set aside the award, 
but, in establishing if an investment was made, simply relied on the wording of the 
applicable BIT. 
262 See, infra, note 320. 
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auspices of the Washington Convention, still applied the Salini test. The 
tribunal dismissed Romak’s contention that the definition of investment in 
UNCITRAL proceedings is wider than in ICSID arbitration. The tribunal 
considered that the view implying that the substantive protection offered by 
the BIT would be narrowed or widened, depending on the choice between 
dispute resolution mechanisms offered in the treaty, would be ‘absurd and 
unreasonable’,263 and would lead to illogical results. According to the tribunal, 
therefore, the word investment should always have a core content and, thus, 
the subject matter jurisdictional requirements should be similar under both 
ICSID arbitration and other institutional or ad hoc arbitrations: it is not so much 
the term ‘investment’ in the ICSID Convention, as the term ‘investment’ per se, 
that should be considered as having an objective meaning in itself, whether it is 
mentioned in the ICSID Convention, a BIT, or a different instrument.264  
The same approach was also followed by the subsequent Alps Finance v. 
Slovakia case,265 whereby the tribunal, citing several ICSID cases where the 
Salini test was applied,266 stated that the ‘constant jurisprudential trend has led 
the most prominent doctrine to exclude in categorical terms that a mere one-
off sale transaction may qualify as an investment. The tribunal cannot ignore 
                                                          
263 Romak v. Uzbekistan, para. 194. 
264 For the sake of precision, according to the tribunal (Romak v. Uzbekistan, para. 205), 
‘contracting States are free to deem any kind of asset or economic transaction to constitute an investment as 
subject to treaty protection. Contracting States can even go as far as stipulating that a 
“pure” one-off sales contract constitutes an investment, even if such a transaction would 
not normally be covered by the ordinary meaning of the term “investment.” However, in such 
cases, the wording of the instrument in question must leave no room for doubt that the intention of the 
contracting States was to accord to the term “investment” an extraordinary and counterintuitive meaning’ 
(emphasis added). The point that the tribunal left unresolved is how the contracting States 
should declare that they want to include such transactions in the concept of investment, if 
the plain meaning of the words used in the BIT is disregarded (as happened in this case). 
265 Alps Finance and Trade AG v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 5 March 2011 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0027.pdf) 
(“Alps v. Slovakia”). 
266 Including Salini v. Morocco, Joy Mining v. Egypt, the L.E.S.I. Cases, etc. 
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the general consensus formed around the above doctrine.’267 The tribunal, 
therefore, applying the ICSID’s Salini test, declined its jurisdiction, considering 
the transaction at issue a mere one-off sale and not an investment.268 
The above cases notwithstanding, it is important to highlight that, as already 
mentioned, Romak v. Uzbekistan cannot at the moment be considered as the 
leading case of a new jurisprudential line. As stated by the arbitrators in 
Guaracachi v. Bolivia:269 Romak v. Uzbekistan and Alps Finance v. Slovakia 
‘are very “fact-specific” cases that can partially explain their reasoning, which 
remains exceptional in the case law outside the ICSID system.’270 The tribunal 
continued stating that it was ‘not appropriate to import “objective” definitions 
of investment created by doctrine and case law in order to interpret Article 25 
of the ICSID Convention in the context of a non-ICSID arbitration’271 and 
that, therefore, the only relevant definition was that included in the applicable 
investment treaty. In light of the above consideration, the tribunal accepted its 
jurisdiction on the basis of the wide asset-based definition of investment 
included in the applicable BIT.272 
                                                          
267 Alps v. Slovakia, para. 245. 
268 The claim was borne out of an agreement between Alps Finance and Trade AG and a 
Slovakian company, in which the claimant purchased credits owed by a bankrupt debtor. 
Efforts to enforce the credits were blocked by a Slovakian regional court, in what the 
claimant argued was a wrongful decision. Alps Finance held the Slovakian government 
responsible for the alleged misbehaviour of its regional court. 
269 Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 2011-17, Award, 31 January 2014 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3293.pdf) 
(“Guaracachi v. Bolivia”). 
270 Guaracachi v. Bolivia, para. 364. 
271 Guaracachi v. Bolivia, para. 364. 
272 Art. 1 of the Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investment entered into on 24 May 1988 provides that: ‘"investment" means every kind 
of asset which is capable of producing returns and in particular, though not exclusively, 
includes: 
(i)  movable and immovable property and any other property rights such mortgages, liens 
or pledges; 
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Analogously, the tribunal in Anatolie v. Kazakhstan273 stated that ICSID 
jurisprudence cannot be applied when the Convention is not concerned, and 
therefore ‘the so-called Salini test, controversial and much discussed both by 
the Parties in this case and otherwise in ICSID and similar arbitrations, even if 
applied as a flexible guideline rather than as a strict jurisdictional requirement, 
cannot be used for the definition of investment under the ECT or, likewise, in 
the present case.’274 
From the above, it can be deduced that, despite certain attempts to align the 
concept of investment in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, and to have a 
consistent definition of investment, no successful result has been achieved.275 
This however does not necessarily need to be regarded in a negative manner.276 
States entering into an investment treaty know exactly what the differences are 
between ICSID tribunals and all the other tribunals, also in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                            
(ii)  shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any other form participation in 
a company; 
(iii)  claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value; 
(iv)  intellectual property rights and goodwill; 
(v)  any business concessions granted by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their 
respective laws, including concessions to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural 
resources.’ 
273 Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan, 
SCC, Award, 19 December 2013 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3083.pdf) (“Anatolie v. 
Kazakhstan”). 
274 Anatolie v. Kazakhstan, para. 806. 
275 For a comment on this point and possible suggestions to overcome this issue, see J.M. 
BODDICKER, Whose Dictionary Controls?: Recent Challenges to the Term “Investment” 
in ICSID Arbitration, American University International Law Review, Vol. 25, Issue 5, 
2010, pp. 1031-1071. 
276 In this respect, it should however be noted that several authors welcomed the Romak v. 
Uzbekistan award and its attempt to fill the gap between ICSID and non-ICSID 
jurisdictional requirements. See, among others, L. HALONEN, Bridging the Gap in the 
Notion of ‘Investment’ between ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitrations: Note on an Award 
Rendered under the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Switzerland and Uzbekistan, ASA 
Bulletin, Vol. 29, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 312–326. 
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jurisdiction. If the contracting States decide in their treaty to allow investor-
State arbitration before ICSID and/or other tribunals, they should be aware of 
the potential consequences. Also the fact that even a mere sale and purchase 
can be considered as an investment should not represent a problem, as long as 
the parties are not dealing with ICSID tribunals. Indeed, the basis of non-
ICSID jurisdiction is entirely grounded on consent: the parties agree to submit 
to an arbitral tribunal certain transactions that they label as ‘investments’. The 
tribunal has only to verify whether the transaction that the claimant has 
brought to its attention is included in what the parties have agreed to be as 
such, and not to verify whether the Salini test’s criteria have been met. Of 
course, the broad asset-based definition of investment may entail that anything 
having an economic value is an investment and this may sound unreasonable. 
Still, if on the basis of the applicable provisions of the Vienna Convention it is 
believed that this was the intent of the contracting States, the tribunal cannot 
override their will and establish that investment must have an inherent 
meaning. It is highly likely that States will try to invoke ICSID’s objectivist 
jurisprudence in order to exclude the tribunal’s jurisdiction and avoid any 
discussions on the merits of the case, but this is trial strategy and it does not 
mean that the parties to the investment treaty did not have a clear common and 
agreed view on what was to be an investment thereunder.277 
In light of the above, if States do not wish to bear the risk of losing their 
sovereign immunity278 for a claim concerning any asset having an economic 
value, they can either: (i) select ICSID tribunals as the exclusive forum in case 
                                                          
277 Still, certain authors have welcomed the approach purported by, inter alia, Nreka v. Czech 
Republic and Romak v. Uzbekistan. See, for instance, E. CABROL, Pren Nreka v. Czech 
Republic and The Notion of Investment Under Bilateral Investment Treaties: Does 
“Investment” Really Mean “Every Kind of Asset”?, supra, note 260, according to whom: 
‘[…] the emergence of a notion of “investment” in investment arbitration and the search 
for satisfactory criteria should not be limited to the ICSID Convention, but should also 
play a role where tribunals examine their jurisdiction under a BIT. Applying similar criteria 
to investment under all investment treaties […] would contribute to bring unity to a field 
that lacks cohesion’ (p. 231). With respect to Romak v. Uzbekistan, see, infra, note 357. 
278 A State cannot claim sovereignty exemption from dispute resolution proceedings if it had 
committed to submit to the jurisdiction of that forum by, inter alia, international treaties. 
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of disputes arising from the investment treaty;279 and/or (ii) reduce the scope of 
the definition of investment in investment treaties.  
As a final remark, the fact that ICSID’s jurisdictional requirements are stricter 
is somewhat balanced by the upsides afforded by the Convention and, mainly, 
by the fact that national courts should not play any role in a dispute submitted 
to the Centre, except for the implementation of the arbitral award, which 
anyway is facilitated too.280 
 
5. Commercial arbitral awards as investments: is it possible? An analysis of 
the Relevant Cases 
From the analysis conducted above, a few preliminary conclusions may be 
drawn. First of all, for the purposes of non-ICSID arbitration, tribunals tend to 
give the predominant role to the definition of investment given by the parties 
in the international instrument whereby consent to the jurisdiction is granted. 
Only a minority of cases have adopted a different view, pursuant to which, in 
order to have a consistent approach with ICSID tribunals, also non-ICSID 
tribunals must take into account the ‘intrinsic’ meaning of the term investment 
and deny jurisdiction in case the transaction in question is not comprised in 
that meaning of investment, any different will of the parties notwithstanding. 
This latter reconstruction in my view does not deserve to be followed, as the 
set of provisions of the Washington Convention does not apply to non-ICSID 
tribunals, which, therefore, are not bound to respect the limits set out under 
Art. 25(1) thereof. 
In addition, such an approach would contribute to create uncertainty among 
States and investors on the requirements to access investor-State arbitration. 
Indeed, from the contracting States’ perspective, States entering into 
investment treaties should know that they have two options: (i) to limit the 
possibility to bring investor-State claims under the relevant investment treaty to 
                                                          
279 However, notably, in this case it remains the risk of recourse by the tribunal to the 
subjectivist approach, as occurred in one of the Relevant Cases (ATA v. Jordan, infra, note 
362). 
280 See, supra, Chapter I, section 2. 
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ICSID’s jurisdiction, whose access is more likely narrower (the subjectivist 
approach has been in more recent times substantially non-applied),281 but that, 
at the same time, grants more certainty in terms of recognition and 
enforcement of the award; or (ii) to opt for the exclusive or concurring 
jurisdiction of non-ICSID tribunals, which implies that a wider range of claims 
can be in theory decided by the tribunal, mainly depending, in terms of the 
subject matter conditions, on the scope of the definition of investment 
provided under the applicable investment treaty, but which does not bring the 
advantages of having the proceeding administered by the Centre. States should 
be aware of these differences and take them into due consideration when 
drafting investment treaties. If, however, non-ICSID tribunals impose, as a 
matter of fact, the same jurisdictional ratione materiae conditions as those 
required by the Convention, through the application of the Salini test, States 
cannot rely on the above assumptions and will not be in a position to assess in 
advance the consequences in terms of access to justice in case of inclusion in 
the treaty of provisions, according to which disputes are to be settled through 
arbitration not governed by the Convention. One solution to overcome this 
issue may be to insert in the investment treaty a very precise and circumscribed 
definition of investment, for example detailing that certain features must exist 
or that certain assets or transactions shall, or shall not, as the case may be, 
qualify as an investment.282  
Analogously, from the investor’s perspective, in case the treaty gives the 
investor multiple choices of fora, the investor will know that its protection will 
be different, depending on the tribunal he/she/it selects: he should balance the 
pros and cons of each tribunal and decide accordingly, taking into account the 
                                                          
281 Notwithstanding the fact that this consideration is largely accepted by commentators (see 
section 3.2 of this Chapter II), it should however be noted that, as better described below 
in this Chapter, one of the Relevant Cases (ATA v. Jordan, infra, note 362) applied the 
subjectivist approach, relying exclusively on the wording of the applicable BIT. 
282 In this respect, for example, States may decide to have ICSID and non-ICSID subject 
matter jurisdictional requirements substantially coincide under the treaty. See, for example, 
the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, whereby in the definition of investment the necessity of certain 
hallmarks (duration, risk and contribution) is expressly mentioned. 
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circumstances of the case. For instance, if it is clear that the underlying 
transaction is an investment, the investor may opt to bring his/her/its claim 
before an ICSID tribunal. On the contrary, he may prefer SCC or the other fora 
envisaged by the treaty, which more likely will consent to their jurisdiction, in 
case the underlying transaction falls within the definition of investment laid 
down in the treaty, but less likely under Art. 25(1) of the Convention. 
However, also in this case it must be noted that the rules that apply for each 
tribunal are different for a number of reasons. Deciding to bring an action 
before one or the other arbitral tribunal is a strategic decision, which should be 
made having taken into consideration all such differences, of which access to 
jurisdiction evidently represents just one element. In any event, in order to 
allow the investor to make a complete and reasoned assessment, there must be 
a good level of predictability as to the jurisdictional requirements applicable to 
each tribunal. 
Moreover, I also believe that levelling the playing field on the jurisdiction ratione 
materiae between ICSID and non-ICSID tribunals does not make any sense if 
the rules that apply to the proceedings and to the recognition, enforcement, 
and annulment of awards are in any event different. 
All this premised, it is worth analysing the Relevant Cases to see which 
approach has been adopted in order to establish if it has had an impact on the 
acceptance/denial of jurisdiction.  
The analysis will follow a chronological order, as the tribunals seem to interplay 
with each other, taking into account previous awards to criticise them or to use 
them to support their decisions. Indeed, although investor-State decisions do 
not have precedential value per se, the sheer paucity of cross-over arbitration 









5.1 Saipem v. Bangladesh 
The first known investment arbitration that decided upon a State’s liability for 




The underlying dispute arose out of a gas pipeline construction contract 
entered into on 14 February 1990 between Saipem S.p.A. (“Saipem”), an 
Italian oil and gas company, and a Bangladeshi State entity, named Bangladesh 
Oil, Gas and Mineral Corporation, also known as Petrobangla 
(“Petrobangla”).284  
The contract was governed by the laws of Bangladesh and contained a clause 
providing for the resolution of disputes arising therefrom by arbitration in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh, under the ICC rules.285  
Ultimately the transaction envisaged under the contract went sour. During the 
execution phase, the project suffered significant delays, due, according to 
Saipem, to the rebellion of the local population against the project, and, 
therefore, the completion date was postponed.286 In addition, upon completion 
of the project and its takeover, Petrobangla refused to repay Saipem the 
outstanding retention amount, even if Saipem issued the corresponding 
warranty bond, as agreed under the contract. A dispute then arose between the 
parties over the compensation and additional costs for the delays and the 
                                                          
283 Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07 (“Saipem v. 
Bangladesh”), Decision on Jurisdiction And Recommendation On Provisional Measures, 
21 March 2007 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0733.pdf) (“Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction”) and Award, 10 June 2009 
(“Saipem Award”) (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0734.pdf).  
284 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 6; Saipem Award, para. 7. 
285 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 10; Saipem Award, para. 10. 
286 Bangladesh, on the contrary, maintained that the problems with the population were 
caused by Saipem itself and that Saipem was already late before their occurrence. 
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return of the retention amount. Saipem referred the dispute to the ICC on 7 
June 1993 and the ICC tribunal was constituted on 4 May 1994.287 
During the arbitration proceeding, Petrobangla raised a number of procedural 
requests, which the ICC tribunal dismissed. Petrobangla also requested the ICC 
tribunal to order Saipem to provide information about its insurance policy and 
claims made under it, which Saipem had refused to provide, but the ICC 
tribunal issued an order pursuant to which Saipem’s refusal to provide the 
requested information would be assessed when appropriate at a later stage.288  
Following the ICC tribunal’s decision on these matters, on 16 November 1997, 
Petrobangla sought revocation of the ICC tribunal’s authority before the First 
Court of the Subordinate Judge of Dhaka. The basis of Petrobangla’s claim was 
that the arbitrators had committed misconduct and had breached the party’s 
procedural rights when rejecting its procedural requests. The day after, 
Petrobangla also applied to the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh to stay all further proceedings of the arbitration pending before the 
ICC tribunal and/or restrain Saipem and/or the tribunal from proceeding 
further with the arbitration. On 24 November 1997, the Supreme Court issued 
an injunction restraining Saipem from continuing with the arbitration, and 
subsequent decisions confirmed and maintained the stay of arbitration. 289 In 
addition, on 5 April 2000, the First Court of the Subordinate Judge of Dhaka 
rendered a decision by means of which it revoked the authority of the ICC 
tribunal on the grounds that the arbitral tribunal misconducted the arbitration, 
improperly dismissing Petrobangla’s procedural requests and disregarding 
Bangladeshi law. Using the words of the Bangladeshi court, there was a 
‘likelihood of miscarriage of justice.’290 Although Saipem could have challenged 
this decision, it decided not to do so, as in its view such an attempt would have 
been fruitless. 
                                                          
287 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 11-19; Saipem Award, paras. 11-25. 
288 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 22-23; Saipem Award, paras. 27-33. 
289 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 24-26; Saipem Award, paras. 34-39. 
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Notwithstanding the above decisions of the Bangladesh courts, on 30 April 
2001, the ICC tribunal decided to resume proceedings ‘on the ground that the 
challenge or replacement of the arbitrators in an ICC arbitration falls within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC Court and not the courts of Bangladesh’ and 
that ‘the revocation of the authority of the ICC Arbitral Tribunal by the 
Bangladeshi courts was contrary to the general principles governing 
international arbitration',291 while Bangladeshi courts were continuing to issue 
injunctions to Saipem not to pursue the ICC arbitration. Despite the 
interference by the local courts, on 9 May 2003, the ICC award was rendered. It 
ruled that Petrobangla breached its contractual obligations and therefore it had 
to pay high sums of money as compensation to Saipem.292 
On 19 July 2003, Petrobangla filed an action before the High Court Division of 
the Supreme Court to set aside the ICC award.293 Although denying the 
application, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favour of Petrobangla by 
stating that the ICC award was ‘a nullity in the eye of the law’, 294 which could 
‘neither be set aside nor [could] it be enforced.’295 This was because the ICC 
tribunal’s authority had been revoked and the arbitral tribunal had proceeded 
with the arbitration illegally and without jurisdiction. 
Saipem did not appeal against that decision and therefore was not in a position 
to seek enforcement of the ICC award in Bangladesh, the only place where 
Petrobangla had any asset to attack.  
 
The investment arbitration – The jurisdiction ratione materiae  
Against this background, on 5 October 2004, Saipem filed a request for 
arbitration with ICSID under the Italy-Bangladesh BIT296, claiming that the 
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undue intervention of the Bangladeshi courts in the ICC arbitration, which 
precluded the enforcement of the ICC award, constituted an expropriation.297  
The first issue that the investment tribunal had to face concerned its 
jurisdiction, as Petrobangla contested, inter alia,298 the tribunal’s subject matter 
jurisdiction. Though Bangladesh only claimed the lack of an investment under 
                                                                                                                                                            
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/268) (Italy-Bangladesh 
BIT). 
297 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 42. As better explained in section 4.1 of this 
Chapter II, unlike more modern BITs, the Italy-Bangladesh BIT only provided 
compensation in the case of expropriation, while violations of fair and equitable treatment 
provisions were not envisaged and, therefore, a claim for denial of justice could not be 
raised thereunder.  
298 Several jurisdictional aspects were investigated in the Decision on Jurisdiction, including: (i) 
the existence of a real treaty claim or rather a purely contract-based commercial arbitration 
dressed up as investment treaty claim; (ii) the attribution of the acts of Petrobangla and of 
the Bangladeshi courts to Bangladesh; and (iii) the application to the claim of the 
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. As to the first aspect, the tribunal limited to 
rule that: ‘[i]n the Tribunal’s view, the essence of Saipem’s case is that the courts of 
Bangladesh acted in violation of the New York Convention and in an “illegal, arbitrary and 
idiosyncratic” manner amounting to a violation of the protection afforded to foreign 
investors under Article 5 of the BIT. Saipem does not request relief under the Contract; it 
does not raise contract claims over which the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction’ (Saipem 
Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 141) (on this point, see R. TEITELBAUM, Case Report on 
Saipem v. Bangladesh, Arbitration International, Vol. 26, Issue 2, 2010, pp. 313-321, at p. 318 
and following; E. SAVARESE, In margine al caso Saipem: tra allargamento della nozione di 
espropriazione e coordinamento "successivo" di giurisdizioni, Diritto del commercio 
internazionale: pratica internazionale e diritto, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2007, pp. 933-960). As to the 
issue of attribution, the tribunal in its preliminary analysis stated that: ‘[a]t this jurisdictional 
stage, there is no indication that either the courts of Bangladesh or Petrobangla could 
manifestly not qualify as state organs at least de facto’ (Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, 
para. 149). Finally, with respect to the exhaustion of local remedies, the tribunal highlighted 
that ‘[a]s a matter of principle, exhaustion of local remedies does not apply in expropriation 
law’ (Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 151); it continued by stating that ‘[w]hether the 
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies may be applicable by analogy to an 
expropriation by the acts of a court and whether, in the affirmative, the available remedies 
were effective are questions to be addressed with the merits of the dispute’ (Saipem 
Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 153). 
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Art. 1(1) of the BIT, the tribunal considered subject matter jurisdiction both 
under Art. 25(1) of the Convention and under the Italy-Bangladesh BIT.299  
This implies that the tribunal did not adhere to the subjectivist approach and 
considered that, in addition to the content of the Italy-Bangladesh BIT, the 
Convention itself imposes outer limits to the concept of investment. On this 
basis, the tribunal started its enquiry. 
With respect to Art. 25(1) of the Convention, despite the presence of Prof. 
Schreuer (one of the main supporters of the typical features approach) on the 
panel, the tribunal applied the standard four-prong Salini test in order to 
determine whether Saipem had made an investment, thus adhering to the 
objectivist approach.300  
The application of this very strict test notwithstanding, the tribunal found that 
Saipem had made an investment for the purposes of the Convention. In its 
reasoning, the tribunal emphasized that it considered the ‘entire operation’,301 
which included the construction contract, the construction itself, the warranty, 
the retention money and the ‘related ICC Award’.302 Considering the totality of 
these elements (and, in particular, the original transaction underlying the ICC 
award), it found that: 
(i) Saipem made a significant contribution in both technical and human 
resources, and this fact was not contentious between the parties;303  
(ii) the transaction had a sufficient duration, as it lasted in the aggregate 
(including the periods when the works were suspended) more than two 
years. In this, the tribunal did not follow the Bangladeshi positions pursuant 
to which only the periods during which the works were actually performed 
(i.e., less than a year) were relevant, as, according to the panel, ‘[t]he time of 
the project during which the works are interrupted or suspended entails 
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301 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 110 (emphasis added).  
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risks that may be even higher than those incurred while the works are being 
performed’;304 
(iii) Saipem incurred commercial risks, as is typical for long-term contracts, 
which is demonstrated by the undisputed stopping of the works and the 
necessity to renegotiate the completion date. Also in this case the tribunal 
disregarded the Bangladeshi line of argument according to which Saipem 
did not incur any commercial risk because it received an advanced payment; 
the tribunal in this respect also highlighted that the contractual mechanism 
providing for retention money created a risk for Saipem which indeed 
materialised;305 and 
(iv) the transaction contributed to the economic development of Bangladesh, as 
recognised by both parties.306 
In this case the tribunal, in order to establish the subsistence of Art. 25’s 
jurisdiction, also analysed whether the dispute arose directly out of an 
investment.307 In this context the tribunal further elaborated the concept that 
the transaction shall be considered in its entirety and that the ICC award 
cannot be viewed in isolation. This is because the ‘rights arising out of the ICC 
Award arise only indirectly from the investment.’308 The tribunal suggested that 
an opposite finding would have implied that the award itself is an investment, 
which was a finding that the tribunal was ‘not prepared to accept.’309 However, 
having found that investment under the ICSID Convention includes all the 
elements of the operation (i.e., in this case, the construction contract, the 
construction, the construction itself, the warranty, the retention money and the 
ICC award), the tribunal was prepared to accept that the claimant’s dispute 
arose directly out of the global investment.310 
                                                          
304 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 102. 
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308 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 113. 
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Having found the subsistence of the jurisdiction for the purposes of the 
Convention, the tribunal moved to the analyses of its jurisdiction under the 
Italy-Bangladesh BIT.311 The definition of investment contained therein was 
quite broad and comprised ‘any kind of property’, including any ‘credit for 
sums of money’.312 The tribunal accepted Saipem’s argument that the 
construction contract was an investment under Art. 1(1) of the Italy-
Bangladesh BIT and that the ‘rights accruing from the ICC Award fall squarely 
within the notion of ‘credit for sums of money [...] connected with 
investments’ set out in Article 1(1)(c) of the BIT.’313 Considering the ordinary 
meaning of the words ‘credit for sums of money’, the tribunal deemed that 
rights under an award ordering a party to pay an amount of money, such as the 
ICC award relevant to the dispute, were also covered by the definition. 
Nevertheless, the tribunal added that: ‘the rights embodied in the ICC Award 
were not created by the Award, but arise out of the Contract. The ICC Award 
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312 The definition of investment under the Italy-Bangladesh BIT is as follows: ‘The term 
"investment" shall be construed to mean any kind of property invested before or after the 
entry into force of this Agreement by a natural or legal person being a national of one 
Contracting Party in the territory of the other, in conformity with the laws and regulations 
of the latter.  
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the term "investment" comprises: 
a) movable and immovable property and any other right " in rem" including, in so far as 
they may be used for investment purposes, real guarantees on others' property;  
b) shares, debentures, equity holdings and any other negotiable instrument or document 
of credit, as well as Government and public securities in general;  
c) credit for sums of money or any right for pledges or services having an economic value 
connected with investments, as well as reinvested income as defined in paragraph 5 
hereafter; 
d) copyright, commercial trademarks, patents, industrial designs and other intellectual and 
industrial property rights, know-how, trade secrets, trade names and goodwill;  
e) any right of a financial nature accruing by law or by contract and any licence, 
concession or franchise issued in accordance with current provisions governing the 
exercise of business activities, including prospecting for cultivating, extracting and 
exploiting natural resources’ (emphasis added). 
313 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 125. 
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crystallized the parties’ rights and obligations under the original contract.’314 In light of 
this, the tribunal avoided determining whether the contract rights crystallized 
by the award constituted an investment by themselves.  
 
Consideration 
Before considering the relevance of this decision for the purpose of jurisdiction 
in cross-over arbitration, it is worth analysing the approach taken by the 
tribunal with respect to the concept of investment. 
As already mentioned, the tribunal formally adhered to the most strict 
approach, i.e., the objectivist approach, pursuant to which a transaction to 
qualify as an investment must pass the double-barrelled test, first under the 
ICSID Convention, through the application of the Salini test, and then under 
the applicable BIT, by fitting the definition of investment provided therein. It 
is also worth noting that the tribunal applied the standard Salini test, which is 
composed of four elements, even though in recent years the trend is not to 
consider the contribution to the host State’s development.315 Despite this very 
rigid approach, the tribunal came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction ratione 
materiae was met. This was possible thanks to recourse to an artifice: the 
tribunal did not consider the rights arising out of the ICC award or the ICC 
award by themselves. Instead, the tribunal chose to consider the ‘entire 
operation’ performed by the claimant, consisting of the construction contract, 
the construction itself, the warranty, the retention money and the related ICC 
award, whereby the parties’ rights and obligations under the original transaction 
were crystallised.  
In this respect, it should be noted that it is consolidated in ICSID’s 
jurisprudence that the entire transaction made by the investor is to be taken 
into consideration for the purposes of establishing the tribunal’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.316 However, this was the first time that the concept of entire 
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ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1, Decision of Jurisdiction, 12 May 1974, unpublished, reported 
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operation was broadened as much as to include an award, which ruled on the 
original investment. By acting in this way, the tribunal was able to assume a 
jurisdiction that otherwise it may have had to decline. Indeed, it is relatively 
easy to assess that the construction of a gas pipeline is an investment. Linking 
the ICC award and the rights arising therefrom to the construction activities 
and considering them as a whole permitted the tribunal to say that the overall 
transaction was an investment, and that therefore it also had the right to rule 
on the ICC award and on the behaviour of Bangladesh in this respect.  
This case shows how the jurisdictional approach is absolutely subjective and 
ultimately can be the object of manipulation. The tribunal had no problems in 
using the strictest test as it considered a wider transaction, which, as a whole, 
met such a test. In addition, the approach’s final subjectiveness results also 
from the analysis of the risk and duration elements. The tribunal opted for a 
solution, but it may have well taken the opposite decision, which in my view 
may have been grounded as well.  
Having said that, this is to be considered as a seminal case,317 which survives as 
an example of how an ordinary commercial dispute can evolve into one that 
triggers a host Sate’s liability.318 Acting as it did, the tribunal applied investment 
law (both the Convention and the Italy-Bangladesh BIT) to assume jurisdiction 
without the need to establish whether an ICC award constituted an investment. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Problems, in British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 51 (1980), Oxford Univeristy 
Press, 1980, pp. 123-162, at p. 159. 
317 Of this opinion are L.A. MISTELIS, Award as an Investment: The Value of an Arbitral 
Award of the Cost of Non-Enforcement, in ICSID Review, Vol. 28, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 64-
87, at p. 75; and L.G. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, Remedies against State Interference with 
International Arbitration, supra, note 63, at p. 6. 
318 R. TEITELBAUM, Case Report on Saipem v. Bangladesh, Arbitration International, supra, note 
298, at p. 321. Many subsequent tribunals that dealt with the same issue have adopted an 
analogous approach (see, for instance, Frontier v. Czech Republic (infra, note 398); White v. 
India (infra, note 444)). For the sake of completeness, it is worth clarifying that the first 
time this line of reasoning was adopted was in Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of 
America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 11 October 2002 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1076.pdf) (“Mondev v. 
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Still, as noted by one author, ‘[t]his functional equivalence […] is more than 
sufficient to trigger investment protection and, if the factual circumstances are 
appropriate, provide significant additional support for arbitral awards.’319  
 
5.2 Romak v. Uzbekistan 
The second case that dealt with cross-over arbitration was Romak v. 
Uzbekistan.320 This case was already briefly discussed in section 4 of this 
Chapter, as it was one of the first times in which a non-ICSID arbitral tribunal 
opened the door to the Salini test for the identification of an investment.321 
As better described below, the case did not go to the merits phase, as the 
tribunal dismissed the claim denying its jurisdiction ratione materiae, but it is still 
relevant for the issue concerning the definition of investment and for the 
investigation as to whether an arbitral award can qualify as a protected 
investment under a BIT. 
 
Facts 
The factual circumstances do not play a major role in this case, as the tribunal 
declined its jurisdiction over the case and did not analyse the merits of the 
claim. Therefore, the description will be limited to the salient elements 
necessary to understand the tribunal’s decision. 
In the context of a more complicated transaction in July 1996, Romak S.A. 
(“Romak”), a Swiss company specialized in international trade in cereals, 
entered into a supply agreement with Uzdon Foreign Trade Company 
                                                          
319 L.A. MISTELIS, Award as an Investment: The Value of an Arbitral Award of the Cost of 
Non-Enforcement, supra, note 317, at p. 75. 
320 Romak S.A. (Switzerland) v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA280, 
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321 See section 4 of this Chapter II. It must be pointed out from now that this has been 
possible for the tribunal thanks to the existence of a provision of the applicable BIT 
allowing the investor to bring an investor-State claim either to an ad hoc UNCITRAL 
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(“Uzdon”), an Uzbek company, pursuant to which Romak undertook to 
supply to Uzdon up to 50,000 of milling wheat before the end of the year. In 
return, Uzdon agreed to provide a letter of guarantee issued by the National 
Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of Uzbekistan.322 The supply agreement 
provided for arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the GAFTA.323 
Between July and November 1996, Romak delivered almost all the due wheat, 
but never obtained payment in return.324 In March 1997, Romak was informed 
that the promised letter of guarantee had never been issued by the National 
Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of Uzbekistan, as any delivery of wheat in 
Uzbekistan was subject to certain import quotas. Given the fact that these 
quotas had not been allocated to Romak, the letter of guarantee could not be 
issued, and the supply agreement was invalid.325  
After unsuccessful attempts to recover the amounts owed by Uzdon, Romak 
initiated a GAFTA arbitration against Uzdon under the supply agreement.326 
On 22 August 1997, the GAFTA tribunal issued its award whereby it ruled in 
favour of Romak and ordered Uzdon to pay Romak damages.327 The award 
became definitive, and further to lack of voluntary compliance by Uzdon, 
Romak tried to enforce it in Uzbekistan and France, but without success.328 
Indeed, in Uzbekistan, on 2 October 2000, the Commercial Court of the City 
of Tashkent declined enforcement, on the grounds that Romak had failed to 
submit a valid translation of the GAFTA award pursuant to Art. IV of the New 
York Convention, since it had submitted a Russian translation rather than one 
in the Uzbek language. On 24 November 2000, the Appellate Jurisdiction of 
the Commercial Court upheld the lower court's decision.329 Further to this 
decision, Romak dropped its enforcement action in France and on 20 March 
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2006 filed a claim against Uzbekistan under the auspices of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration. 330 
Romak alleged that Uzbekistan, through the actions of, inter alia, Uzdon and its 
courts violated several provisions of the Swiss-Uzbek BIT,331 including the 
most favoured nation clause, the umbrella clause and the fair and equitable 
treatment clause. 
 
The investment arbitration – The jurisdiction ratione materiae 
The interesting aspect of this case is how the tribunal came to decline its 
jurisdiction, through the application of the Salini test, even though the case was 
not subject to the Convention. As noted by one author,332 the panel was 
perhaps inspired to narrow its view of the concept of investment and apply 
ICSID jurisprudence because, merely relying the literal meaning of the BIT’s 
definition, any arbitral award would qualify for its protection and that would 
create a ‘new instance of review of State court decisions concerning the 
enforcement of arbitral awards’,333 for which the tribunal was not ready. 
The starting point of the reasoning of the tribunal was the wording of the 
Swiss-Uzbek BIT that provided for a broad asset-based definition of 
investment supplemented with a non-exhaustive list of examples of what 
constituted an investment according to the signatories’ will.334 In particular, 
                                                          
330 Romak v. Uzbekistan, para. 71. 
331 Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 16 April 1993 (available 
at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2328) (“Swiss-Uzbek 
BIT”). 
332 J.E. ALVAREZ, Crossing the “Public/Private” Divide: Saipem v. Bangladesh and Other 
Crossover Cases, in A.J. DEN BERG (ed.), International Arbitration: The Coming of a New 
Age?, ICCA Congress Series, Vol. 17, Kluwer Law International, pp. 400-430, at p. 416. 
333 Romak v. Uzbekistan, para. 186. 
334 Article 1(2) provides that: ‘The term "investment," shall include every kind of assets and 
particularly: 
(a) movable and immovable property as well as any other rights in rem, such as 
servitudes, mortgages, liens, pledges; 
(b) shares, parts or any other kinds of participation in companies; 
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within the list of investments, the Swiss-Uzbek BIT expressly mentioned any 
‘claims to money’ and, according to Romak’s reconstruction, this reference was 
sufficient to establish the tribunal’s jurisdiction in this case. However, the 
tribunal did not follow Romak’s argument and rejected a literal interpretation 
of the definition of investment. It rather declared that it had to resort to the 
‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms of the Swiss-Uzbek BIT in ‘their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose’,335 applying the ordinary rules of 
interpretation of treaties as set out by the Vienna Convention and, in particular, 
by Arts. 31 and 32 thereof.336 
The tribunal therefore began its analysis by looking at the ordinary meaning of 
the term investment as well as of the term asset (which was used in the 
investment’s definition used in the Swiss-Uzbek BIT),337 referring in both cases 
to Black’s Law Dictionary.338 Then, the tribunal moved swiftly to the object 
and purpose and context of the Swiss-Uzbek BIT and discussed why a literal, 
mechanical reading of Art. 1(2) would have led to manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable results.  
                                                                                                                                                            
(c) claims to money or to any performance having an economic value; 
(d) copyrights, industrial property rights (such as patents, utility models, industrial 
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technical processes, know-how and goodwill;  
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335 Romak v. Uzbekistan, para. 176. 
336 Romak v. Uzbekistan, para. 172. With respect to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention, see, supra, note 158. 
337 Romak v. Uzbekistan, para. 177. 
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On the level of textual analysis, the tribunal deemed that a literal interpretation 
would have deprived the term investment of its inherent meaning, which was 
contrary to the logic of Art. 1(2). Indeed, according to the tribunal, the fact that 
the categories enumerated in that article were not exhaustive implied that there 
could have been other assets, which, despite not being expressly mentioned, 
may have been included in the concept of investment. For this reason the 
tribunal believed that there should have been ‘a benchmark against which to 
assess those non-listed assets’.339  
The tribunal then looked at the ‘object and purpose’ and ‘context’ of the Swiss-
Uzbek BIT, referring in particular to the ‘need to promote and protect foreign 
instruments with the aim to foster the economic prosperity of both States’, 
mentioned in the Preamble. Considering that on the same date the signatory 
States also concluded an agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, the 
tribunal came to the conclusion that the object and purpose of the Swiss-
Uzbek BIT was not trade and, therefore, purely commercial sales transactions 
fell outside of its scope.340 
The tribunal subsequently explained why a mechanical application of the 
categories listed in Art. 1(2) of the Swiss-Uzbek BIT would have also produced 
a ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable result’, contrary to Art. 32(b) of the 
Vienna Convention.341 According to the tribunal, such a reading would have 
eliminated any practical limitation of the concept of investment and led to the 
inclusion of any contract between a Swiss national and Uzbekistan within the 
scope of the protected investments, since any contract implies a claim to 
money. Besides, any rejection of enforcing an arbitral award could have 
amounted to a breach of the Swiss-Uzbek BIT’s provisions as any award or 
judgment would have qualified as an investment, making the tribunal into 
another 'instance of review' of court decisions concerning the enforcement of 
arbitral awards.342  
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Following this line of reasoning, the arbitrators considered that a lot of claims 
to money could constitute an investment, but not ‘all such assets necessarily so 
qualify.’343 In light of the above, the arbitrators concluded that the term 
investment must have an intrinsic meaning ‘independent of the categories 
enumerated in article 1(2) of the BIT’,344 which needed to be determined taking 
into due account the object and the purpose of the Swiss-Uzbek BIT. The 
point was for the tribunal to determine this meaning, since, as already seen, the 
Swiss-Uzbek BIT’s objective and purpose shed ‘little light on the meaning of 
the term “investments”’, which remained ‘ambiguous and obscure.’345 
At this point, as stated by one author, a ‘providential escape was found in the 
arbitration clause itself’,346 which permitted the tribunal to apply ICSID’s 
precedents. Art. 9(3) of the Swiss-Uzbek BIT provided a dual option with 
respect to dispute resolution, allowing an investor to bring an investor-State 
claim either before an ad hoc UNCITRAL tribunal or before an ICSID one. 
Considering this alternative, the arbitral tribunal deemed that it had no choice 
than to rule that the definition of the term investment should not vary 
depending on the investor’s choice of the forum.347 It would have been ‘absurd’ 
and ‘unreasonable’348 to have two different notions of investment, depending 
on the choice of dispute resolution mechanism, as suggested by Romak. 
Indeed, according to the tribunal’s reconstruction, first of all, there was no 
basis to assume that BIT parties distinguished the use of the word ‘investment’ 
from the way it is used in the ICSID Convention. Second, it would not have 
made any sense that the contracting States contemplated a definition of 
investment that would effectively exclude recourse to ICSID and would 
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346 J. BURDA, A New Step Towards a Single and Common Definition of an Investment? – 
Comments on the Romak versus Uzbekistan Decision, The Journal of World Investment 
& Trade, Vol. 11, Issue 6, 2010, pp. 1085-1101, at p. 1092. 
347 Romak v. Uzbekistan, para. 193. 
348 Romak v. Uzbekistan, para. 194. 
120 
therefore render without effect the BIT’s provision granting the investor a 
choice between ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration.349 
Based on these premises, the tribunal felt free to consider ICSID jurisprudence, 
including Salini v. Morocco, CSOB v. Slovakia and Joy Mining v. Egypt, and to 
apply to its case. It is acknowledged in the award that ICSID’s precedents are 
not consistent and, therefore, the tribunal distinguished between the 
‘conceptualist’ approach, which envisages the application of the Salini test, and 
the ‘pragmatic’ approach, according to which the Salini test’s hallmarks are 
mere typical features that may also not be present in a specific case.350 It did not 
enter into the debate as to whether the Salini criteria were mandatory or not, 
instead deciding to adopt a minimal approach, i.e., the Salini-minus test, where 
exclusively contribution, duration and risk are considered as the basic hallmarks 
of an investment.351  
It should be noted that the tribunal also briefly considered the subjectivist 
approach, arguing that the parties are free to include among the protected 
investments any kind of asset or economic transaction, including one-off sales 
contracts, which would not normally be covered by the ordinary meaning of 
the term investment. However, the tribunal continued stating that ‘in such 
cases, the wording of the instrument in question must leave no room for doubt 
that the intention of the contracting States was to accord to the term 
investment an extraordinary and counterintuitive meaning. As explained above, 
the wording of the BIT does not permit the Arbitral Tribunal to infer such an 
intent in the present case.’352 
Before applying the Salini test to the circumstances of the case, the tribunal 
made some important considerations, which substantially aligned its reasoning 
with that of Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction. First of all, also in this case, the 
tribunal refused to rule in abstract whether an arbitral award in itself could be 
considered as an investment. It then continued arguing that a determination on 
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whether Romak held an investment under the BIT could not be made without 
taking into consideration the entire economic transaction that is subject to the 
arbitral proceeding. Indeed, the GAFTA award by itself ‘merely constitute[d] 
the embodiment of Romak’s contractual rights’ and, as such, was irrelevant for 
its analysis.353 
In light of the above and resting its scrutiny on the supply contract, the 
arbitrators found that: 
(i) there was no evidence of contribution, since the supply of wheat with an 
expectation of immediate payment was not sufficient;354  
(ii) the duration of the operation, i.e. the 5 months during which wheat was 
delivered, did not reflect a commitment greater than an ordinary 
commercial transaction;355 and 
(iii) the risk of non-payment of the wheat supplied was a purely commercial 
risk and did not indicate an investment.356  
In summary, the tribunal denied the existence of an investment as the 
transaction underlying the GAFTA award was a mere commercial transaction 
not meeting the inherent meaning of investment. 
 
Considerations 
The Romak v. Uzbekistan award has been welcomed by certain scholarly 
writings as it ‘takes a substantial stride towards bridging the gap between the 
jurisdictional requirements ratione materiae in ICSID and UNCITRAL 
arbitrations.’357  
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highlights how the ‘Tribunal’s reasoning for arriving at the conclusion that the definition of 
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As discussed above, the arbitrators, departing from a consolidated UNCITRAL 
jurisprudential trend that relied on the definition of investment included in the 
investment treaty to determine the tribunal’s jurisdiction, considered that the 
word investment had an inherent meaning that must be considered. The 
problem for the arbitral panel was to identify that meaning. For that purpose it 
applied the Salini test, borrowing it from ICSID jurisprudence. The underlying 
reason was that if there is a concept of investment it must always be the same, 
regardless of the tribunal where a claim is brought, especially when the 
investment treaty allows the investor to choose to bring its claim before an 
ICSID or a non-ICSID arbitral tribunal. The tribunal stated that it could not 
accept that whether a claimant went to ICSID with its claims could have an 
impact on the definition of the term investment. According to the tribunal 
‘[t]his would imply that the substantive protection offered by the BIT would be 
narrowed or widened […] merely by virtue of a choice between the various 
dispute resolution mechanisms sponsored by the Treaty’.358 However, this 
statement is not persuasive: the substantive protection does not change, as the 
substantive provisions are the same for UNCITRAL and ICSID arbitration. 
What is different, and is rightly different, is the access to the two instruments’ 
jurisdiction, since the relevant jurisdictional requirements are not the same. 
Moreover, the tribunal seems to contradict itself when it expressly accepted 
that the parties are free to include – by means of an express and clear provision 
in that sense – any kind of asset among the protected investments, including 
one-off sales contracts, which would not normally be covered by the ordinary 
                                                                                                                                                            
“investment” is the same in the BIT and the ICSID Convention is problematic’ (at p. 322). 
It should also be noted that the approach of Romak v. Uzbekistan’s tribunal is similar to 
the one proposed by Z. DOUGLAS, The International Law of Investment Claims, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 164, whereby he stated that ‘the open-textured nature 
of the standard formulation in investment treaties [i.e., the wide asset based definition 
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preserves the ordinary meaning of the term “investment” and therefore its consistency 
with the characteristics that must be attributed to the same term as employed in Article 25 
of the ICSID Convention.’ 
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meaning of the term investment. In fact, if this were acceptable, the line of 
reasoning applied by the tribunal would evidently cease to work.  
In any event, by ‘bridging the gap in the notion of investment’,359 the tribunal 
increased rather than reduced uncertainty in investment arbitration. After this 
award, if at least in non-ICSID arbitration an investor was sure that the only 
relevant matter for the subject matter jurisdiction was the definition included in 
the investment treaty, what non-ICSID tribunals will take into consideration 
has become more unpredictable. 
In addition, as represented in section 3 of this Chapter, there is no common 
agreed definition of investment in ICSID jurisprudence. The Romak v. 
Uzbekistan tribunal applied the objectivist approach to verify whether there 
was an investment, without giving any clarification on the reasons behind its 
choice. In this respect, it must however be noted that the application of the 
typical features approach would have not led to a different outcome, as the 
underlying transaction was a mere sale of goods that had constantly been kept 
out of the concept of investment, also by the ICSID tribunal that adhered to 
the pragmatic approach.  
There are two final remarks to be made. The first one concerns the possibility 
of qualifying the rights arising out of a commercial award as an investment, in 
light of this decision. In this respect, as noted by one author, ‘[d]espite its 
rejection of the claim on jurisdictional grounds, the arbitral tribunal seems to 
imply that it could have come to a different result had the underlying 
operation, which had been the subject of the previous commercial arbitration, 
been an investment.’360 Therefore, in that case the outcome of the decision 
would have probably been different. 
The second one is that the reasoning of the tribunal, whether right or wrong, is 
strictly connected to the dual option to submit a claim, envisaged in the Swiss-
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Uzbek BIT. If the provision does not make any reference to ICSID, I find it 
hard to see how non-ICSID tribunals can open the door to ICSID’s 
jurisdictional requirements. This has not happened yet and, as noted, the 
approach chosen by the Romak v. Uzbekistan tribunal with respect to the 
interpretation of the term investment has not, in general, proliferated361 — 
luckily, I venture to add.  
 
5.3 ATA v. Jordan 
ATA v. Jordan362 is the third Relevant Case. The ICSID decision relating to the 
case was issued on 18 May 2010, three years after the Saipem Decision on 




The case concerned whether: (i) the annulment of a commercial award and/or 
(ii) the extinguishment of the underlying arbitration agreement, by the Jordan 
courts, amounted to a breach of the applicable Jordan-Turkey BIT.363  
The commercial dispute involved the collapse of a dike constructed by ATA 
Construction, Industrial and Trading Company (“ATA”), an entity 
incorporated in Turkey, for the Arab Potash Company (“APC”), a Jordanian 
entity at the time controlled by the State, at a site on the Dead Sea, pursuant to 
a contract entered into on 2 May 1998.364 When the dike collapsed in 2000, 
APC, on the basis of the arbitration clause contained in the aforementioned 
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contract, commenced an arbitration proceeding against ATA, which brought a 
counterclaim. On 30 September 2003, the arbitral tribunal dismissed APC’s 
claim and held in favour of ATA, exonerating it of any liability for the collapse 
and awarding compensation in relation to the counterclaim.365 
Shortly thereafter, on 29 October 2003, APC applied to the Jordanian Court of 
Appeal to have the arbitral award annulled pursuant to the Jordanian 
arbitration law promulgated in 2001 (“JAL”), due to the alleged errors that the 
arbitral tribunal made in the application of Jordanian law. The relevant court 
issued its judgment on 24 January 2006 (incidentally, one day after the Jordan–
Turkey BIT came into force), annulling the arbitral award on the basis that the 
tribunal erred in applying Jordanian law. In addition, the court extinguished the 
arbitration agreement between ATA and APC through the retroactive 
application of the JAL which entered into force after the commercial 
arbitration was set up and which mandated the extinguishment of the arbitral 
agreement in the event of a final decision on the part of the Jordanian courts, 
nullifying an arbitral award.366 The claimant later appealed to the Jordanian 
Court of Cassation, which upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment on 16 
January 2007. Following this decision, APC commenced proceedings against 
ATA before the Jordanian Court of First Instance in relation to its original 
claims regarding the collapse of the dike.367  
 
The investment arbitration – The jurisdiction ratione materiae (and ratione temporis) 
Having no other remedy available against the decisions taken by the Jordan 
courts, on 14 January 2008, ATA filed an ICSID arbitration against Jordan 
alleging violations of the Jordan–Turkey BIT, including unlawful expropriation 
and breach of the fair and equitable treatment clause, by way of serious and 
repeated denials of justice by the Jordanian courts. Jordan, the respondent, 
contested jurisdiction on the grounds that the Jordan–Turkey BIT did not 
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apply as the dispute arose before its entry into force and that, in any event, 
there was no ‘investment existing’ at the time of the BIT’s entry into force or 
‘made or acquired thereafter’368, as requested by the Jordan–Turkey BIT. 
In May 2010, the ICSID tribunal issued its awards and, with respect to its 
jurisdiction, it considered two aspects: (i) the annulment of the commercial 
arbitral award; and (ii) the extinguishing of the arbitration agreement in the 
contract between ATA and APC. 
With respect to the first aspect, the ICSID tribunal mainly focused on the issue 
of jurisdiction ratione temporis, rather than ratione materiae. It is not the purpose of 
this work to analyse jurisdiction ratione temporis in investor-State arbitration; 
however, in this case, an exception must be made as the time matter is strictly 
related to that of the existence of an investment. 
First of all, it is worth noting that the Jordan–Turkey BIT, which entered into 
force on 23 January 2006, ‘shall apply to investments existing at the time of entry into 
force as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter’,369 while it does not 
contain any specific time limitation on temporal jurisdiction.370 Indeed, the 
dispute settlement clause of the Jordan-Turkey BIT371 merely stated that: 
‘[d]isputes between one of the parties and one investor of the other Party, in 
connection with his investment’ shall be settled amicably or, if not possible, through 
investor-State arbitration before a selection of fora, including ICSID tribunals. 
On the basis of these provisions, the tribunal denied its jurisdiction ratione 
temporis with respect to the dispute over the annulment of the award. More 
precisely the tribunal found that such a dispute, which was ‘crystallized’372 by 
means of the decision of the Jordan Court of Cassation in 2007, was ‘legally 
equivalent’373 to, and ‘really indistinguishable’374 from, the original dispute 
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initiated when the commercial arbitration proceeding was commenced on 6 
September 2000. Therefore, since the original dispute arose more than five 
years before the entry into force of the Jordan–Turkey BIT – which, according 
to the reconstruction of the tribunal, does not apply retroactively with respect 
to disputes existing prior to its entry into force – the ATA v. Jordan panel 
established that all claims in connection with the annulment of the award, 
including claims of denial of justice, were per se inadmissible because of the lack 
of jurisdiction ratione temporis.375 In short, the tribunal did not consider whether 
there was an investment existing at the time of entry into force of the Turkey-
Jordan BIT, as required by Art. IX thereof, but rather analysed whether the 
dispute between the parties arose after the entry into force of the Turkey-
Jordan BIT. The debatable arbitrators’ argument in this respect was that: 
‘[a]rticle IX(1) of the BIT expressly makes the BIT retroactive with respect to 
“investments existing at the time of entry into force [...]”.’ The provision does 
not make the BIT retroactive with respect to disputes existing prior to the 
entry into force of the BIT. Under the plain meaning of Article IX(1), the 
'Tribunal may only exercise jurisdiction ratione temporis over the Claimant’s claims if it finds 
that the dispute arose after the entry into force of the Treaty on 23 January 2006.’376 
The tribunal, always in connection with the annulment of the arbitral award by 
the Jordanian Courts, considered the claim made by the ATA with respect to 
Jordan’s denial of justice separately.377 According to the claimant, such a claim 
was ‘subject to a different clock’,378 as there cannot be a denial of justice before 
the exhaustion of local remedies, i.e., before the issuance of the decision of the 
Jordan Court of Cassation in 2007. The panel also rejected this claim, stating 
that it was not possible to distinguish the denial of justice in the relevant 
dispute, which originated prior to the entry into force of the decision of the 
Jordan–Turkey BIT.379 In this context, the tribunal also considered, ‘assum[ing] 
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arguendo that the alleged denial of justice represented a discrete claim’, whether 
‘an international commercial arbitral award constitute[d] an investment that 
could be […] expropriated by an otherwise lawful annulment by a national 
court’.380 Noting that Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention does not define the 
term investment, the tribunal looked to Art. I(2)(a) of the Jordan–Turkey BIT, 
which provides that a ‘claim to money’ is an investment, separate from the 
investment which gave rise to it.381 The question for the tribunal remained 
whether ‘an arbitral award in itself qualifies as a claim to money or if the 
underlying investment must still exist in order for the claim to be asserted’.382 
The panel refrained from giving a reply to this question and limited itself to 
referring to the Saipem v. Bangladesh case, whereby the entire operation 
(consisting of the construction contract, the construction itself, the retention 
amount, the warranty and the award) was considered. The tribunal went on to 
state that ‘measured by the standards in Saipem, the Final Award [i.e., the 
commercial award] at issue in the present arbitration would be part of an 
“entire operation” that qualifies as an investment.’383 However, the tribunal still 
denied its jurisdiction on temporal grounds, alleging that, since the first legal 
confrontation over the ‘Final Award’ occurred before the entry into force of 
                                                          
380 ATA v. Jordan, para. 110. 
381 Art. 1.2(a) of the Jordan-Turkey BIT provided that: ‘the term “investment”, in conformity 
with the hosting Party’s laws and regulations, shall include every kind of asset in particular, 
but not exclusively: 
(i) shares, stocks or any other form of participation in companies 
(ii) returns reinvested, claims to money or any other rights to legitimate performance 
having financial value related to an investment, 
(iii) movable and immovable property, as well as any other rights in rem such as 
mortgages, liens, pledges and any other similar rights, 
(iv) copyrights, industrial and intellectual property rights such as patents, licenses, 
industrial designs, technical processes as well as trademarks, goodwill, know-how and 
other similar rights, 
(v) business concessions conferred by law or by contract including concessions to search 
for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources on the territory of each Party as 
defined hereafter.’ 
382 ATA v. Jordan, para. 112. 
383 ATA v. Jordan, para. 115. 
129 
the Jordan-Turkey BIT, the dispute connected to the investment arose after its 
entry into force. Also this time the tribunal, on obscure grounds, rather than 
considering the existence of an investment at the time the Jordan-Turkey BIT 
entered into force, exclusively verified whether the dispute which resulted in 
the commercial award started before or after the BIT’s coming into effect. 
With respect to the second aspect (i.e., the extinguishment of the arbitration 
agreement), the tribunal considered whether there was an investment and, in 
case of a positive answer, whether the jurisdiction was barred ratione temporis.384 
With regard to the first question, the tribunal first observed that the 
extinguishment of the arbitration agreement amounted to the extinguishment 
of the right to arbitration. The tribunal then noted, ‘in [a] rather cursory 
manner’,385 that the right to arbitration ‘is a distinct “investment” within the 
meaning of the BIT because Article I(2)(a)(ii) defines an investment inter alia as 
“claims to […] any other rights to legitimate performance having financial 
value related to an investment”’ and that ‘[t]he right to arbitration could hardly 
be considered as something other than a “right […] to legitimate performance 
having financial value related to an investment”.’386 
With regard to the second question, the tribunal noted that the right to 
arbitrate ceased to exist upon the issuance of the decision of the Court of 
Cassation on 16 January 2007 (and not through the enactment of the JAL in 
2001). Therefore, since the decision of the Court of Cassation occurred after 
the entry into force of the Jordan-Turkey BIT, the annulment of the arbitration 
clause fell within the competence of the tribunal because it was never in 
contention until the annulment.  
 
Considerations 
A few comments need to be made about this award. First of all, as illustrated, 
the tribunal denied its jurisdiction with respect to the decision concerning the 
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annulment of the award rendered by the Jordanian courts, due to the lack of 
ratione temporis jurisdiction. However, the line of reasoning used by the tribunal 
to come to such conclusion is based on an at least ‘arguable’ interpretation of 
the Jordan-Turkey BIT.  
As a preliminary remark, it is worth noting that many investment treaties limit 
consent to arbitration to disputes arising after the treaty’s entry into force or, 
even more restrictively, to disputes based on factual circumstances arising after 
the treaty’s entry into force.387 However, this is not the case for the Jordan-
Turkey BIT, which, as seen, contains no explicit temporal restrictions in the 
dispute settlement clause. The only temporal clause in the BIT is in Art. IX, 
which provides that the treaty ‘shall apply to investment existing at the time of 
entry into force as well as to investments or treaty acquired thereafter.’ 
Accordingly, the tribunal should have first analysed whether there was an 
investment for the purposes of the Jordan-Turkey BIT at the time of its entry 
into force and, in case an investment existed, accept its jurisdiction, both ratione 
materiae and ratione temporis, since the only temporal restriction related to 
‘investments’ and not ‘disputes’ and, therefore, the Jordan-Turkey BIT covers 
any dispute as long as it is a dispute concerning investments existing at the time 
of entry into force. 
On the contrary, the tribunal, in establishing its jurisdiction, focused on 
whether there was a dispute that arose after the entry into force of the Jordan-
Turkey BIT.388 This approach was based, in my opinion, on a wrong 
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interpretation of the treaty. The arbitrators, probably relying on the principle of 
non-retroactivity of treaties set out in Art. 28 of the Vienna Convention,389 
believed that a specific provision was necessary in order to apply the 
jurisdictional clause of the Jordan-Turkey BIT retroactively to disputes arising 
before its entry into force. This approach however cannot be supported, since, 
as stated in various precedents, by using the word ‘disputes’ without any 
qualification in the jurisdictional clause of a BIT, the parties thereto intended to 
consent to jurisdiction over all disputes existing after the entry into force.390 The 
tribunal, in order to support this line of thought, referred instead to the 
Lucchetti v. Peru case,391 completely disregarding the differences in the 
language of the respectively applicable treaties. Indeed, in the BIT applicable to 
that case, the consent to jurisdiction clause explicitly excluded jurisdiction over 
disputes that arose before the entry into force of the treaty392 and, on this 
ground, the tribunal came to the conclusion that, since the relevant dispute 
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arose before the entry into force of the BIT, it had to deny its jurisdiction.393 
Resting on that decision, the ATA v. Jordan tribunal established that since the 
dispute over the annulment of the award was indistinguishable from the 
original legal dispute between ATA and APC, it lacked jurisdiction ratione 
temporis, as the dispute arose in 2000, while the Jordan-Turkey BIT came into 
force in 2006.394  
It goes without saying that if the tribunal had properly applied the BIT it may 
have come to a different solution as to its jurisdiction, admitting it on the basis 
of the fact that an investment existed when it entered into force. In fact, the 
tribunal, when considering the issue relating to the expropriation, seemed open 
to applying the line of reasoning used in the Saipem v. Bangladesh case.395 On 
the basis of that line of reasoning, the tribunal may have declared that it had 
jurisdiction ratione temporis over the claim as the investment existed at the time 
of the entry into force of the Jordan–Turkey BIT: indeed, the rights of the 
claimant under the award which crystallized the investment existed on 23 
January 2006 when the Jordan–Turkey BIT came into force and, as already 
stated, such BIT applied to all investments existing at the time of its entry into 
force.396  
                                                          
393 It is also worth noting that, in any case, the approach adopted by the tribunal in Lucchetti 
v. Peru has been disregarded by subsequent tribunals that reached different outcomes on 
the same issue. See, for instance, Jan de Nul v. Egypt, para. 117. In this respect, see also J. 
DINGWALL, H. HAERI, Jordan: ICSID Tribunal finds Jordan in Violation of its Investment 
Treaty Obligations, International Arbitration Law Review, Vol. 13, Issue 4, 2010, pp. N-
33-N-35, at p. N-34, that criticizes ATA v. Jordan because it follows Lucchetti v. Peru, 
rather than Jan de Nul v. Egypt. However, this consideration misses the point, as it does 
not consider that in ATA v. Jordan the wording of the Jordan-Turkey BIT does not bar on 
temporary grounds disputes arisen before its entrance into force. 
394 Please however note that the ATA v. Jordan case may have relied on other cases adopting 
a different solution (see, supra, note 391). 
395 However, it is not crystal clear whether the tribunal effectively adhered to the line of 
reasoning applied by the tribunal in the Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction. 
396 In the Chevron Interim Award, the tribunal had to face an analogous issue in relation to a 
BIT, which contained the same provisions as the Jordan-Turkey BIT with respect to the 
definition of investment and the consent to jurisdiction. However, in that case the tribunal 
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A second element of interest of this decision is that, in the analysis of its 
subject matter jurisdiction with regard to the extinguishment of the arbitration 
agreement, the tribunal surprisingly adhered to the old-fashioned purely 
subjectivist approach: it merely considered the literal and plain meaning of the 
definition of the Jordan–Turkey BIT to determine whether there was an 
investment. And it is this approach that allowed the tribunal to determine that 
the right to arbitrate is an investment. The application of any other approach 
would probably have led to a different outcome. In any event, it must be noted 
that, by adopting a purely subjectivist approach, ATA v. Jordan sets out an 
interesting unprecedented declaration, according to which the right to 
arbitration is per se an investment. This represents the most extreme position so 
far taken by an arbitral tribunal in a cross-over case. However, in ICSID cases, 
this statement seems hardly replicable, unless the tribunal: (i) applies the 
subjectivist approach, which is quite obsolete and disused; and (ii) the 
definition of investment is broad enough to cover claims to money. 
To close, it must be noted that this tribunal, despite the criticism outlined 
above, reinforces the decision of the Saipem v. Bangladesh tribunal as to the 
liability of States that interfere with arbitral rights and lawfully obtained arbitral 
awards. Such liability would normally entitle an award creditor to initiate ICSID 




                                                                                                                                                            
carried out a clear and extensively reasoned analysis, which should have been taken into 
consideration by the arbitrators in ATA v. Jordan. 
397 This is also stated by L.A. MISTELIS, Award as an Investment: The Value of an Arbitral 
Award of the Cost of Non-Enforcement, supra, note 317, at p. 78. However, the author 
went on to specify that: ‘[i]t is also worth noting that both the Saipem and the ATA 
Tribunals consider an award ‘as an aspect of the ‘entire operation’ for purposes of deciding 
whether there had been an investment for the purposes of’ the relevant treaty.’ As already 
said in this section, I do not endorse this statement. The tribunal in this case referred to the 
Saipem v. Bangladesh concept of investment, but it did not use it to determine the 
existence of an investment. 
134 
5.4  Frontier v. Czech Republic 
In 2010 another cross-over arbitral award was delivered,398 this time by a non-
ICSID tribunal. It was the first time that, base on public available data, a non-
ICSID tribunal ruled on the interference by national courts with the 
enforcement of an arbitral award after Romak v. Ukraine. However, in this 
case, the tribunal did not consider the Romak v. Ukraine precedent and instead, 
in deciding on its subject matter jurisdiction, relied exclusively on a literal 
interpretation of the applicable Canada-Czech Republic BIT.399 
 
Facts 
In August 2001, Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. (“Frontier”), a Canadian 
company, made an investment in an aircraft production business in the Czech 
Republic, through a joint venture with a local partner, Moravan Aeroplanes, a.s. 
(“MA”), a company controlled by the State-owned entity Moravan s.a.. Under 
the joint venture agreement, Frontier agreed to finance the acquisition of the 
assets of LET a.s. (“LET Assets”), a State-owned aircraft manufacturing 
company, which were to be transferred to a joint venture project company 
(“LZ”), 49% owned by Frontier and 51% by MA.400  
In August 2001, Frontier extended the loans and the LET Assets were duly 
purchased.401 Further to the perfection of the acquisition, various fraudulent 
activities were conducted by MA with respect to the investment of Frontier in 
LZ, including the delivery to Frontier of fake share certificates and the 
amendment to LZ’s articles of association without the consent of Frontier.402 
                                                          
398  Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 12 November 
2010 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/517) (“Frontier v. Czech 
Republic”). 
399 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on 15 
November 1990 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/60) (“Canada-Czech 
Republic BIT”). 
400 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 53. 
401 Frontier v. Czech Republic, paras. 54; 85. 
402 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 59. 
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In the meantime, in August 2002 Moravan s.a. was declared bankrupt and the 
LET Assets were included in the relevant bankruptcy estates.403 Further to the 
occurrence of these events, Frontier sought the assistance of various officials 
of the Czech government and initiated, inter alia, certain civil proceedings to 
protect its investment, also in light of the ongoing bankruptcy proceedings in 
respect of MA and LZ.404  
Finally, on 23 July 2003, Frontier referred the dispute to arbitration in 
Stockholm under the auspices of the SCC pursuant to the dispute resolution 
clause of the joint venture agreement, alleging breaches of the joint venture 
agreement by MA and LZ, including: (i) failure to deliver 49% of LZ’s shares 
to Frontier; and (ii) failure to reimburse the loan.405 On 30 December 2004, the 
Stockholm tribunal rendered its final award,406 ruling in Frontier’s favour, but, 
before that, respectively in June and July 2004, the respondents in the 
arbitration were declared bankrupt in the Czech Republic.407 
Frontier later sought recognition and enforcement of the Stockholm awards in 
the Czech Republic against the bankrupt respondents, but the Czech courts 
refused to enforce any of them. In particular, with respect to the final award, 
the municipal courts refused the enforcement, citing Article V(2)(b) (public 
policy) of the New York Convention, on the basis that such enforcement 
would be inconsistent with the Czech Republic's laws requiring equality of 
creditors in bankruptcy proceedings and the equitable and orderly distribution 
of assets.408 
Frontier claimed that the Czech courts’ wrongful refusal to enforce the awards 
amounted to a breach of the Canada-Czech Republic BIT, including fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security standards.  
 
                                                          
403 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 78. 
404 Frontier v. Czech Republic, paras. 92-108. 
405 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 107. 
406 Notably, on 30 January 2004 the SCC issued an interim award, enjoining LZ and MA for 
improperly selling and disposing of the LET Assets acquired with the claimant’s funds. 
407 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 141. 
408 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 172. 
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The investment arbitration – The jurisdiction ratione materiae  
On these grounds, by notice of arbitration dated 3 December 2007, Frontier 
commenced arbitration against the Czech Republic pursuant to the Canada-
Czech Republic BIT, which provides for arbitration exclusively under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.409 
Also in this case the tribunal needed to first assess certain jurisdictional issues 
raised by the respondents, including the existence of an investment. Indeed, the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae is limited to ‘[a]ny dispute […] relating to 
the effects of a measure […] on the management, use, enjoyment or disposal of 
an investment’, where investment is defined according to the broad asset-based 
definition supplemented by a list of non-exhaustive examples of what an 
investment could consist of.410 
In liaising with this issue, the tribunal considered that the claimant made an 
original investment consisting of the payments made to MA, which ‘were 
transformed into an entitlement to a first secured charge’411 by means of the 
arbitral award of the Stockholm tribunal. The tribunal based its ruling on the 
definition of investment of the Canada-Czech Republic BIT and on the 
clarification set out in Art. 1(1) thereof which provides that ‘[a]ny change in the 
                                                          
409 Frontier v. Czech Republic, 178. 
410 More precisely, Art. 1(1) provides that: ‘[f]or the purpose of this Agreement: 
(a) the term “investment” means any kind of asset held or invested either directly, or 
indirectly through an investor of a third State, by an investor of one Contracting Party in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party in accordance with the latter’s laws and, in 
particular, though not exclusively, includes: 
(i) “movable and immovable property and any related property rights, such as mortgages, 
liens or pledges”; 
(ii) “shares, stock [...] or any other form of participation in a company, business enterprise 
or joint venture”;  
(iii) “claims to money, and claims to performance under contract having a financial value”; 
(iv) “intellectual property rights, including rights to [...] patents, trademarks as well as trade 
names, industrial designs, good will, trade secrets and know-how”; and 
(v) “rights, conferred by law or under contract, to undertake economic and commercial 
activity”. 
Any change in the form of an investment does not affect its character as an investment.’ 
411 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 231 (emphasis added). 
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form of an investment does not affect its character of an investment.’ On these 
grounds, the tribunal accepted that by refusing to recognize and enforce the 
arbitration award, the respondent could be said to have affected the 
management, use, enjoyment or disposal by Frontier of ‘what remained of its 




The part of the award concerning the subject matter jurisdiction is rather short: 
the tribunal liaised with it in a couple of pages, in which it expended more ink 
on the concept of measure than on that of investment. 
However, despite being succinct, the decision on jurisdiction is dense in 
meaning. First of all, the tribunal implicitly took a position on the existence of 
outer limits to the concept of investment in non-ICSID tribunals. By non-
consideration of the precedent Romak v. Ukraine and relying on the mere 
wording of the Canada-Czech Republic BIT, the tribunal refused to apply the 
ICSID jurisprudence to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. It 
stuck to the jurisprudence of non-ICSID tribunals and limited its analysis to 
the literal interpretation of the definition of investment set out in the applicable 
BIT.413 It should however be noted that the Romak v. Uzbekistan’s lines of 
reasoning could have not been easily applied in this case, as the Canada-Czech 
Republic BIT did not provide for a dual option (ICSID and non-ICSID) 
jurisdiction and, as seen in section 5.2 of this Chapter, it was mainly the dual 
option jurisdiction clause provided in the Swiss-Uzbek BIT that allowed the 
Romak v. Uzbekistan tribunal to open the door to the Salini test. 
Second, although the tribunal stuck to the literal interpretation of the definition 
of investment included in the Swiss-Uzbek BIT, it did not come to the 
conclusion that the arbitral award by itself is an investment. The tribunal, 
substantially in line with Saipem v. Bangladesh, preferred to state that the 
                                                          
412 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 231(emphasis added). 
413 It should be noted that the parties to the case did not raise the issue concerning the 
application of ICSID jurisprudence on outer limits, as happened in Romak v. Uzbekistan. 
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original transaction was an investment – which was easy to establish on the 
basis of the Canada-Czech Republic BIT – and that the arbitral award 
transformed such an investment into the claimant’s claim to money. The 
tribunal also clarified that, further to the transformation, there was no new 
investment, but the original investment remained with different features.  
An explanation for this may be found in the fact that, differently from the 
Jordan-Turkey BIT applied in ATA v. Jordan, which included in the list of 
protected investments ‘[…] claims to money or any other rights to legitimate 
performance having financial value related to an investment’, the Canada-
Czech Republic BIT referred to ‘claims to money, and claims to performance 
under contract having a financial value’, thus requiring that the claims to money 
arise out of a contract. A literal interpretation of this wording would have not 
let the tribunal say that the claims to money under the award represented an 
investment.  
In any event, it must be noted that the Jordan-Turkey BIT contains a non-
exhaustive list of investment and that, therefore, the tribunal may have well 
decided that an award was to be included within the meaning of investment 
thereunder, as it is included in the initial catch-all sentence which simply refers 
to ‘any kind of asset held or invested either directly, or indirectly through an 
investor of a third State, by an investor of one Contracting Party in the territory 
of the other Contracting Party in accordance with the latter’s laws […]’.414 
Conclusively, the tribunal in Frontier v. Czech Republic applied the right 
principle, i.e. that ICSID’s jurisdictional requirements cannot apply to non-
ICSID arbitration. However, this decision remains very fact-specific: only a 
BIT envisaging the possibility that an award can ‘transform’ itself without 






                                                          
414  Jordan-Turkey BIT, art. I(A). 
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5.5  GEA v. Ukraine 
In GEA v. Ukraine,415 differently from ATA v. Jordan, the ICSID tribunal 
analysed in details the issue concerning its jurisdiction ratione materiae, expressly 
evaluating: (i) the approach to be followed in order to establish if there is an 
investment for the purposes of the ICSID Convention; and (ii) the possible 
qualification of an ICC award as an investment.  
Even if the arbitration panel declined its jurisdiction, it still analysed the merits 
of the dispute finding that no breach of the BIT was made by the Ukrainian 
courts. This aspect will be better illustrated in Chapter IV below. 
 
Facts 
As to the facts, the commercial dispute arose out of a fuel conversion contract 
(“Conversion Contract” (as subsequently amended)) entered into in 1995 
between a State-owned entity known as OJSC Oriana (“Oriana”) and GEA 
Group Aktinengesellschaft416 (“GEA”).417 Under the Conversion Contract, 
GEA undertook to supply naphtha fuel to Oriana, which, in turn, undertook to 
process it and return it to GEA in exchange for a tolling fee. Further to an 
incident in which a GEA’s inspector was shot in the kneecap, GEA alleged that 
material discrepancies were discovered between the quantity of raw materials 
shipped to Oriana and the quantity of finished products returned to GEA.418  
Further to such allegations, in 1998, the parties entered into a settlement 
agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) and a repayment agreement 
                                                          
415 GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, 31 March 
2011 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0356.pdf) (“GEA v. Ukraine”). 
416 GEA v. Ukraine, paras. 44-45. 
417 For the ease of reference, hereinafter, reference will be generically made to GEA. 
However, for the sake of precision, it shall be highlighted that the Conversion Contract 
was originally entered into by Klo ̈ckner & Co Aktiengesellschaft, which, further to the 
acquisition by a subsidiary of GEA, changed its name into Solvadis International GmbH. 
Solvadis International GmbH then merged into Solvadis Chemag AG, which, on 28 June 
2004, assigned all of its rights deriving from the business with Oriana to its controlling 
entity, MG Technologies AG, that in 2005 became GEA.  
418 GEA v. Ukraine, paras. 46-47. 
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(“Repayment Agreement”), whereby, inter alia, Oriana acknowledged its 
indebtedness to GEA and undertook to pay to GEA USD 27.6 million as 
compensation. Both agreements provided that any disputes arising therefrom 
would have been referred to arbitration under the ICC Rules in Vienna, 
Austria.419  
However, Oriana did not comply with its payment obligations towards GEA 
set out in the above-mentioned agreements in full and therefore GEA filed an 
ICC arbitration against Oriana.420 In 2002 the ICC tribunal rendered its award 
in favour of GEA setting out more than 30 million USD as primary 
compensation.421 
As Oriana did not voluntary comply with the ICC award, in 2003 GEA sought 
recognition and enforcement of the ICC award in the Appellate Court of the 
Ivano-Frankivsk Region of Ukraine, but its application was rejected by the 
court, which found the repayment agreement to have been signed by 
unauthorized persons and thus invalid. GEA then filed a complaint with the 
Supreme Court of Ukraine, but also in this case without success. Alongside the 
enforcement proceedings, GEA attempted to claim under the ICC award in 
bankruptcy proceedings brought by a third party against Oriana. Here too, after 
a number of appeals, GEA was unsuccessful.422  
 
The investment arbitration – The jurisdiction ratione materiae  
Having been frustrated in all of its attempts to obtain enforcement of the ICC 
award, on 24 October 2008 GEA filed an ICSID request for arbitration 
pursuant to Art. 13(2) of the Germany-Ukraine BIT423 for alleged 
                                                          
419 GEA v. Ukraine, paras. 51-53. 
420 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 57. 
421 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 62. 
422 GEA v. Ukraine, paras. 63-85. 
423 Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Ukraine on the Promotion and 
Mutual Protection of Investments, signed on 15 February 1993 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1442) (Germany-Ukraine 
BIT). The official language of the BIT is German. The English translations used in this 
work were retrieved from the GEA v. Ukraine award. 
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expropriation, and breaches of the following: full protection and security, fair 
and equitable treatment, arbitrary and discriminatory measures, national 
treatment and most favoured nation treatment obligations. 
The ICSID tribunal was constituted in 2009 and rendered its final award in 
2011. As normal, the first aspect that the arbitral tribunal considered was its 
jurisdiction over the case, including its subject matter jurisdiction, as the 
respondent, among other allegations,424 contested that GEA had never made an 
investment in Ukraine, while the latter deemed that the jurisdiction ought to be 
upheld as each of: (i) the Construction Contract, (ii) the Settlement Agreement 
and the Repayment Agreement, and (iii) the ICC award constituted an 
investment. 
Before deepening into the analysis of each single instrument that according to 
GEA’s reconstruction represented an investment, the tribunal acknowledged 
that ICSID tribunals have different views on the concept of investment, as, in 
some well-known cases, tribunals have articulated objective criteria for the 
definition of the term,425 while, in other (again well-known) cases, tribunals 
have adopted a more flexible approach.426 However, the arbitration panel, 
rather than opting for one of the two approaches, limited itself to state that 
‘this is a controversy that need not to be resolved’, as either of the two 
approaches ‘leads to the same conclusion with respect to each of the alleged 
“investments” in question.’427 Despite this statement, it should be noted that 
the tribunal, when making its evaluations on the alleged investments, applied 
                                                          
424 Ukraine also alleged that GEA did not have standing under the Convention and that the 
tribunal lacked ratione temporis jurisdiction. 
425 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 139. 
426 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 142. 
427 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 143. As noted by J. FELLENBAUM, GEA v. Ukraine and the Battle 
of Treaty Interpretation Principles over the Salini Test, Arbitration International, Vol. 27, 
Issue 2, 2011, pp. 249-266, at p. 249: ‘[i]nstead of crafting an award that provides guidance on the 
critical question of interpretation [of Art. 25 of the Convention], the high calibre arbitral tribunal in 
the recent case of Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine ultimately sidestepped the controversy leading the 
distinguished arbitral tribunal away from what could have been a legally significant decision on this 
longstanding debate [i.e., the prevalence of the objectivist or of the typical features approach].’ 
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the short-form Salini test (i.e., the Salini-less test), considering the elements of 
contribution, risk and duration. 
The tribunal passed then to the analysis of the Conversion Contract.428 In line 
with its previous reconstruction on case law as to subject matter jurisdiction, 
the panel carried out the double-barred test, analysing whether the asset in 
discussion fitted the definition of the Germany-Ukraine BIT429 and the concept 
of investment under the Convention. With respect to the first aspect, the 
tribunal noted that the Conversion Contract squarely fell into the definition of 
investment of the Germany-Ukraine BIT, as, inter alia, ‘it confers “rights to the 
exercise of an economic activity”’.430 Turning to Art. 25 of the ICSID 
Convention, the tribunal had ‘no doubt that the Conversion Contract also 
meets this test.’431 In particular, this contract satisfied all the elements of the 
objective definition of investment, as the claimant had provided a ‘contribution to 
Ukraine, during a certain period of time, while assuming the risks of the economic 
operation it was performing.’432 In light of the above, the tribunal concluded 
                                                          
428 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 146. 
429 The Germany-Ukraine BIT defines “investment” as follows: ‘For purposes of this 
agreement 1) the term “investments” means assets of any kind, in particular 
a) movable and immovable property and other rights in rem such as mortgages and security 
interests; 
b) equity interests and other stakes in companies; 
c) claims to funds used to create material or immaterial values and claims to performances 
having such value; 
d) intellectual property rights such as, in particular, copyrights, patents, utility models, 
industrial designs and models, trademarks, trade names, company and business secrets, 
technological processes, know- how and goodwill; 
e) rights to the exercise of an economic activity including rights to the search for and the 
exploration, extraction and utilisation of natural resources on the basis of statutory 
provisions or granted under an agreement concluded in accordance with such statutory 
provisions. 
Any change to the form in which assets are invested shall not affect their nature as 
investments.’ 
430 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 147. 
431 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 151. 
432 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 151. 
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that ‘with respect to the Conversion Contract […] the Claimant made an 
“investment” in Ukraine, both within the meaning of Articles 1(1)(e) and 
1(1)(a) of the BIT and (if needed) Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.’433  
The tribunal then moved on to analyse the Settlement Agreement and the 
Repayment Agreement,434 in relation to which it found that they could not be 
considered, in and of themselves, as investments, either under the German-
Ukraine BIT, or under the ICSID Convention, as these were ‘legal acts’ that 
could not be treated as identical to an actual investment in Ukraine. Specifically 
the tribunal concluded that the Settlement Agreement ‘merely established an 
inventory of undelivered goods and recorded the difference as a debt’, while 
the Repayment Agreement ‘merely established a means for the repayment’.435  
The tribunal took a similar approach with respect to the last alleged investment, 
i.e., the ICC award. The tribunal first argued that the award is only a ‘legal 
instrument’,436 which provides for the disposition of rights and obligations 
arising out of the Settlement Agreement and the Repayment Agreement, which 
are not investments. Most importantly, the tribunal continued to state that 
‘even if – arguendo – the Settlement Agreement and Repayment Agreement 
could somehow be characterized as “investments”, or the ICC Award could be 
characterized as directly arising out of the Conversion Contract […], the fact 
that the Award rules upon rights and obligations arising out of an investment 
does not equate the Award with the investment itself.’437 To the tribunal, the 
ICC award was ‘analytically distinct’ from the underlying investment and 
involved ‘no contribution to, or relevant activity within, Ukraine such as to fall 
– itself – within the scope of Article 1(1) of the BIT or (if needed) Article 25 of 
the ICSID Convention.’438 
 
 
                                                          
433 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 153 (emphasis added). 
434 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 154. 
435 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 157. 
436 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 161. 
437 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 162. 
438 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 162 (emphasis added). 
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Considerations 
Of all the findings of the GEA v. Ukraine case on the existence of an 
investment, two are the most noteworthy here, namely: (i) the general approach 
adopted towards the concept of investment; and (ii) the tribunal's ruling on the 
ICC award. 
As to the first aspect, the decision does not rely upon a hard distinction 
between the different approaches to the notion of investment for the purposes 
of the Convention, as in this specific case, according to the tribunal, any 
approach would have led to the same result. In fact, all of the elements 
identified as typical of (or essential to) an investment were matched by the 
Construction Contract, while none of them were met by the other alleged 
investments. However, it should be noted that the tribunal applied the Salini 
test in its reduced form, in other words considering only the hallmarks of 
contribution, duration and risk, as it believed that these were ‘the elements of 
the “objective definition” that are commonly applied under Article 25.’439 
Maybe the tribunal would have reached a different conclusion had it applied 
the standard Salini test, which also requires a contribution to the host State’s 
development, or the Salini-plus test, which adds the elements of good faith and 
compliance with local laws. It should also be noted that the tribunal initially 
seemed to consider only the purely objectivist approach and the typical 
characteristics approach, by mentioning cases such as Phoenix v. Czech 
Republic and Biwater v. Tanzania. However, in the analysis of the Conversion 
Contract and of the award, the tribunal referred to Article 1(1) of the 
Germany-Ukraine BIT, and (if needed) Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention. By 
specifying ‘if needed’, the tribunal implicitly also considered the purely 
subjectivist approach, according to which only the BIT’s wording is relevant to 
establish the jurisdiction.440 This was probably due to the fact that the result of 
the analysis of the BIT’s wording with respect to each of the alleged 
                                                          
439 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 151. 
440 This was also noted by J. FELLENBAUM, GEA v. Ukraine and the Battle of Treaty 
Interpretation Principles over the Salini Test, supra, note 427, at p. 262, who highlights how 
‘[t]his raises the question whether a ‘double keyhole’ approach is necessary or appropriate 
and apparently contradicts the arbitral tribunal’s analysis above.’ 
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investments was always confirmed by the application of the Salini test and vice-
versa. 
With respect to the second and most important aspect, it should be highlighted 
that the tribunal denied that the ICC award could represent an investment per se 
or a part thereof. For the tribunal, a commercial award is to be considered 
analytically different from the underlying transaction (i.e., in this case, the 
Convention Contract, the Settlement Agreement and the Repayment 
Agreement). Therefore, even if any of the operations on which the award ruled 
could qualify as an investment, the award would not be considered as part of 
that investment or as a toll by means of which the rights and obligations arising 
from the original investment are crystallized. In other words, for the tribunal an 
arbitral award does not represent the continuation or the transformation of an 
investment, not even in the case when the award concerns rights and 
obligations arising from an investment, as stated by most of the analysed 
precedent awards.  
In my opinion this line of reasoning has to be welcomed.441 As noted above, I 
find it difficult to accept that an investment also includes the subsequent 
award, which many tribunals have allowed.442 While the award may arise out of 
a claim connected to the initial investment, it is logically and structurally 
different from it. The tribunal in this case clearly departed from Saipem v. 
Bangladesh, Frontier v. Czech Republic and GEA v. Ukraine, narrowing down 
the scope of ICSID’s jurisdiction. In this respect, it is worth noting that the 
tribunal, in its arguments, explicitly mentioned the Saipem v. Bangladesh case. 
However, it limited itself to stating that in that case the tribunal ‘made 
statements that are difficult to reconcile’443 and, therefore, it could not rely on 
it. By means of these words, GEA v. Ukraine seemed to say that, in order to 
                                                          
441 By the way, other authors are more doubtful. See for instance S. FIETTA, J. UPCHER, Public 
International Law, Investment Treaties and Commercial Arbitration: an emerging system 
of complementarity?, Arbitration International, Vol. 29, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 187-221, at p. 
203, that considers that ‘the jurisdictional aspects of the GEA award [...] are open to 
debate’. 
442 See, supra, note 318. 
443 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 163. 
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come to the conclusion that the award is part of the investment, the Saipem v. 
Bangladesh tribunal had to say everything and its opposite, as a logical 
argumentation could not lead to that result. 
 
5.6  White v. India 
White v. India444 represents the first time an award had been rendered against 
India in investment arbitration. The three arbitrators declared India to be in 
breach of its obligations towards the Australian investors, due to the conduct 
of its courts, which interfered with the enforcement of a commercial arbitral 
award. In addition, in jurisdiction, this case is relevant as the tribunal made 




The origins of this decision can be traced back to 28 September 1989, when 
Coal India, a State-owned company, through its subsidiary Central Coalfields 
Ltd., entered into a contract with White Industries Australia Limited (“White”) 
for the supply of equipment with the primary objective of developing a coal 
mine at Piparwar, India (“Contract”). The Contract was governed by Indian 
law and contained an arbitration clause, pursuant to which all disputes were to 
be submitted to arbitration under the ICC Arbitration Rules. Under the 
Contract, White was to be paid approximately AUD 206.6 million in exchange 
for its services. In addition, the Contract provided that White was entitled to a 
bonus if production exceeded the target figure, but liable to a penalty if 
production was below the target figure.445  
Disputes subsequently arose between Coal India and White as to whether 
White was entitled to the bonuses and/or whether Coal India was entitled to 
penalty payments. A number of other related technical disputes also arose, 
                                                          
444 White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 30 
November 2011 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0906.pdf) (“White v. India”).  
445 White v. India, paras. 3.2.13-3.2.21. 
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primarily concerning the quality of the washed and processed coal and the 
sampling process by which quality would be measured. More precisely, 
according to Coal India the quality of washed coal produced by the coal mine 
did not meet the contractual standard and for this reason it considered that a 
penalty was due under the Contract. Therefore, Coal India rejected White’s 
demand for payment of a bonus and cashed a bank guarantee for AUD 2.77 
million.446 
In light of the above, on 28 June 1999, White filed a request of arbitration with 
ICC under the Contract.447 On 27 May 2002, the tribunal, in majority, rendered 
an award in favour of White, setting out that it was entitled to USD 4.08 
million. However, the award issued by the tribunal was not the end but just the 
beginning of a long drawn litigation before the Indian courts.448 
On 6 September 2002, Coal India applied to the High Court of Calcutta to 
have the award set aside. Shortly thereafter, on 11 September 2002, White 
applied for enforcement of the award in the Delhi High Court, not being aware 
of Coal India’s application. Subsequently, in the first quarter of 2003, White’s 
application to have Coal India’s application rejected was dismissed by the 
Calcutta High Court. White appealed this decision of a single judge before the 
Division Bench of the Civil Appellate Division of the High Court at Calcutta at 
the end of 2003. This appeal was also dismissed, and against this White 
appealed to the Supreme Court of India in July 2004, following which the 
Delhi High Court stayed the enforcement proceedings.449 By 2010, the 
Supreme Court had not begun hearings on White’s appeals.450  
                                                          
446 White v. India, para. 3.2.24. 
447 White v. India, para. 3.2.29. 
448 White v. India, para. 3.2.23. 
449 White v. India, paras. 3.2.35-3.2.63. 
450 For a detailed summary of the proceedings concerning the set-aside and the enforcement 
of the commercial award in India, see S. KACHWAHA, The White Industries Australia Limited-
India BIT Award: A Critical Assessment, Arbitration International, Vol. 29, Issue 2, 2013, 
pp. 275-293, at pp. 277-281. The author highlights the reasons that, in his view, justify the 
delay (including interpretative questions on a new law on the setting aside and enforcement 
of the arbitral award) and how, in his opinion, White had not done everything it could to 
mitigate the delay of Indian courts. 
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Between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010, White wrote several 
letters to the Indian government claiming that the actions of Coal India and the 
Indian courts amounted to breaches of various provisions of the Australia-
India BIT and asking the government to intervene and solve the matter, by 
coming to an amicable solution, as envisaged under the Australia-India BIT.451 
Since the government did not respond to White’s letter in the six-month period 
envisaged under the Australia-India BIT, on 27 July 2010, White initiated the 
investment arbitration proceedings by way of filing a notice of arbitration.452 In 
particular, White contested that India had expropriated its investment, failed to 
afford fair and equitable treatment by subjecting White to a denial of justice, 
frustrated its legitimate expectations, and failed to encourage and promote 
favourable conditions for investors from Australia. In addition, White 
contended that nine years for the enforcement of an international arbitral 
award in a country that is party to the New York Convention implied a breach 
of India’s obligation to provide effective means of asserting claims and 
enforcing rights with respect to its investment. 
 
The Investment Arbitration – The jurisdiction ratione materiae  
Since, also in this case, the claimant’s cause of action was based on non-
enforcement of its ICC award, it was first necessary for the tribunal to establish 
whether the award constituted a protected investment under the Australia-
India BIT. Were this not the case, White would have not been entitled to any 
protection, as they would not have met the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
tribunal. 
                                                          
451 White v. India, para. 3.2.64. Art. 13(2) of the Agreement Between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of the Republic of India on the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments, signed on 26 February 1999 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/154) (“Australia-India 
BIT”) provides that: ‘[i]f a dispute between the Contracting Parties cannot thus be settled 
within six months of one Contracting Party receiving a request in writing for such 
negotiations or consultations, it shall upon the request of either Contracting Party be 
submitted to an arbitral tribunal.’ 
452 White v. India, para. 3.2.65. 
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In assessing its jurisdiction, the tribunal importantly agreed with White’s 
reconstruction, according to which, since the tribunal was not established 
under the auspices of the ICSID Convention, there was no need to carry out 
the double-keyhole test. Rather, the tribunal should have simply relied on the 
definition of investment under the BIT.453 India, on the contrary, contested 
White’s position, suggesting that the Salini test had to be fulfilled irrespective 
of whether the ICSID Convention applied, since the term investment had an 
inherent meaning, which the parties could not overtake.454 In this respect India 
contested that White’s rights under the contract did not qualify as an 
investment under the Australia-India BIT, as they were merely rights in personam 
                                                          
453 According to Art. 1 (c) of the Australia-India BIT, ‘ "investment" means every kind of 
asset, including intellectual property rights, invested by an investor of one Contracting 
Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party in accordance with the laws and 
investment policies of that Contracting Party, and in particular, though not exclusively, 
includes: 
(i) moveable and immovable property as well as other rights such as mortgages, liens, or 
pledges; 
(ii) shares, stocks, bonds and debentures and any other form of participation in a company; 
(iii) right to money or to any performance having a financial value, contractual or 
otherwise; 
(iv) business concessions and any other rights required to conduct economic activity and 
having economic value conferred by law or under a contract, including rights to search for, 
extract and utilise oil and other minerals; 
(v) activities associated with investments, such as the organization and operation of 
business facilities, the acquisition, exercise and disposition of property rights including 
intellectual property rights’. 
454 India based its position principally on the writing of Z. DOUGLAS, The International Law 
of Investment Claims, supra, note 357, whereby it is stated that there is a test to identify the 
existence of an investment, which is applicable in all investment treaty claims, regardless of 
whether they are brought under the ICSID Convention, the UNCITRAL or any other 
rules of arbitration. More precisely, the author – in his ‘Rules’ 22 and 23 – identified certain 
legal and economic characteristics that an investment must always have to qualify as such. 
The tribunal dismissed these allegations on the basis that the Australia-India BIT’s 
definition of investment ‘simply does not provide that the investment […] must have 
Douglas’ economic characteristics’ (White v. India, para. 7.3.8). 
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without any proprietary foundation.455 In addition, according to India’s 
reconstruction, White did not prove the existence of an investment under the 
Convention, as it lacked the elements of the Salini test. The tribunal, as 
mentioned above, dismissed India’s position and analysed exclusively the 
definition of investment under the Australia-India BIT, which covered ‘every 
kind of assets’, including ‘(ii) right to money […], contractual right or 
otherwise’, looking at its plain and ordinary meaning, in light of its purpose and 
objective. Based on that wording and on the fact that the Australia-India BIT 
did not limit its terms to rights in rem or to those investments having certain 
economic features, it found that White’s rights under the contract constituted a 
protected investment and upheld jurisdiction on that basis. The tribunal also 
took a position on the Salini test, arguing that it applies only to ICSID cases. It 
is however worth noting that the tribunal evidenced that, even if the Salini test 
had been applied, White would have nevertheless showed that an investment 
had been made. 456 
The tribunal also accepted the claimant’s contention that its rights under the 
arbitral award, while not an investment per se, were part of its original 
investment.457 By doing that, the tribunal agreed with the Saipem v. Bangladesh 
Decision on Jurisdiction that commercial awards crystallise the parties’ original 
contract rights and ‘as such are subject to the protection as is afforded under 
the BIT.’458 In deciding on the matter, the tribunal also considered GEA v. 
Ukraine, which was cited by the respondent to support its argument that the 
award and the underlying investment are different and the former is not 
covered under the BIT. In this respect, the tribunal first noted that the position 
                                                          
455 India, always on the basis of Douglas’ writings (see, supra, note 454), contested that White’s 
rights under the Contract cannot be considered as investment because they do not satisfy 
the meaning of investment under the Australia-India BIT, as they are merely rights in 
personam without any proprietary foundation. 
456 White v. India, paras. 7.4.9-7.4.10. 
457 White v. India, paras. 7.6.2-7.6.3. 
458 White v. India, para. 7.6.10. 
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of the tribunal was only an obiter dictum,459 and went on to state that ‘the 
conclusion expressed by the GEA tribunal represents an incorrect departure 
from the developing jurisprudence on the treatment of arbitral awards to the effect that awards 
made by tribunals arising out of disputes concerning ‘investments’ made by ‘investors’ under 
BITs represent a continuation or transformation of the original investment.’460 Finally, the 
tribunal referred to a recent case where it was stated that: ‘[o]nce an investment 
is established, it continues to exist and be protected until its ultimate disposal 
'has been completed.’'461   
 
Considerations 
This case reflects a notable return to the broad approach to the protection of 
rights arising out of commercial arbitration set out in Saipem v. Bangladesh. In 
fact, the UNCITRAL award confirms that commercial award rulings on rights 
arising from an investment benefit from the protection of the applicable 
investment treaties. It is worth noting that the tribunal, also in this case, did not 
state that an award represents an investment in and of itself. The tribunal first 
considered the contract and, once it found that it represented an investment, it 
found it easy to state that the commercial award was the continuation of the 
initial investment.462 
This line of reasoning is in contrast with GEA v. Ukraine which took the 
opposite approach, denying that an arbitral award can be considered an 
                                                          
459 As noted by S. KACHWAHA, The White Industries Australia Limited-India BIT Award: A 
Critical Assessment, supra, note 450, pp. 275-293, at p. 283, it is not correct to qualify that 
paragraph as an obiter dictum; rather it is a judicial dictum, as it is not a passing remark, nor 
does it pertain to a collateral matter. 
460 White v. India, para. 7.6.8 (emphasis added). 
461 Chevron Interim Award, para. 185, referring to Mondev v. US, para. 81. These cases did 
not involve domestic courts interfering with commercial arbitration. In any event, they 
established certain principles that are important for further development of jurisprudence 
on this topic (and in particular with respect to the application of the obligation to provide 
‘effective means’ of enforcing rights, which will be better described in Chapter III). 
462 See I. KALNINA, White Industries v. The Republic of India: A Tale of Treaty Shopping and 
Second Chances, in Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 2012, pp. 1-8, at 
p. 4. 
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investment, and keeping it analytically separate from the underlying transaction 
(which may well be an investment). The White v. India tribunal expressly 
departed from that precedent, stating that it was contrary to the developing 
jurisprudence on the treatment of arbitral awards. 
As already mentioned in my previous comments, I find it a little too far-
reaching to say that a commercial award is the continuation of an investment 
made years ago, only because it ruled on that investment. However, this can be 
considered a pragmatic solution to ensure protection to an aggrieved award 
winner. Still, in non-ICSID cases, it would be easier to take a more 
straightforward approach: if from the wording of the BIT it is possible to 
qualify the award as an investment per se, the tribunal should follow that path 
and consider the award in and of itself rather than as the 
continuation/crystallisation of the original investment. Nevertheless, acting this 
way, if the BIT has a more restrictive language, there is a risk that the tribunal 
cannot give the award creditor access to jurisdiction. Considering the overall 
transaction makes it easier for the investment tribunal to uphold jurisdiction. 
My final consideration goes to the fact that the tribunal distinguished the 
Romak v. Uzbekistan award. As already stated above, White v. India’s line of 
thought is to be considered more correct because in non-ICSID arbitration the 
only relevant parameter to establish one tribunal’s jurisdiction should be the 
wording of the BIT. Adding supplementary requirements through arbitral 
practice may only create confusion for investors and States.463 It should also be 
noted that, even if the tribunal did not analyse this point and simply rejected 
Romak v. Uzbekistan’s position, in this case, different to the previous one, the 
applicable BIT did not provide for ICSID and non-ICSID alternative fora. 
Therefore, the application of Romak v. Uzbekistan’s lines of reasoning would 
probably not have been possible.464 
                                                          
463 For more on the topic, see sections 4 and 5 of this Chapter II. 
464 For more on the topic, see section 4 of this Chapter II. As a general remark, it should be 
noted that all the Relevant Cases are very fact-specific and, therefore, their value as 
precedents could sometimes be limited. On this point, with respect to the White v. India 
case, see P. NACIMIENTO, S. LANGE, White Industries Australia Limited v The Republic of 




From the analysis of the Relevant Cases, it is possible to draw some 
conclusions as to the access to investor-State justice for an aggrieved creditor 
whose award and/or arbitral agreement has/have been wrongfully set aside or 
non-enforced by the courts of the State hosting the original investment. 
First of all, none of the Relevant Cases stands for the proposition that an 
arbitral award per se constitutes an investment for the purposes of a BIT or the 
ICSID Convention. 
The case where the tribunal pushed itself more forward in this respect is ATA 
v. Jordan, whereby the arbitrators recognised that the arbitration agreement in 
itself represented an investment. However, this case does not seem a precedent 
on which an investor can easily rely on, mainly for a couple of reasons: (i) the 
ICSID tribunal did not consider the additional jurisdictional ratione materiae 
requirement set out in Art. 25(1) of the Convention and simply based its 
decision on the plain literal meaning of the definition of investment included in 
the applicable BIT, thus adhering to the nowadays neglected ‘subjectivist’ 
approach; and (ii) the Turkey-Jordan BIT’s definition of investment was 
drafted in a very broad manner, according to the asset-based formula, and 
included among the illustrative examples of what may constitute an investment 
‘claims to money and any other right to legitimate performance having financial 
value related to an investment’, while many more modern BITs are drafted 
with less broad wordings.465  
However, even if none of the tribunals expressly recognised the award as an 
investment per se, in four out of the six Relevant Cases the jurisdiction ratione 
materiae accepted letting the aggrieved investor access investor-State arbitration. 
In analysing the reasoning behind such decisions, I think that a distinction 
should be made between ICSID and non-ICSID Relevant Cases, as, in 
principle,466 the jurisdictional requirements are different. 
                                                          
465 For more on the topic, see section 2 of this Chapter II. 
466 Indeed, in ATA v. Jordan, the tribunal, by means of the application of the subjectivist 
approach, substantially erased the subject matter gateway condition set out in Art. 25(1) of 
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In Saipem v. Bangladesh, which can be considered as the trailblazer of cross-
over arbitration, the tribunal granted Saipem access to the ICSID’s jurisdiction, 
considering the entire economic operation out of which the arbitral award 
resulted. The entire operation, according to the tribunal, started with the 
construction contract and ended at the award, which crystallized the rights and 
obligations arising from the original contract. In applying the Salini test to 
establish its jurisdiction, the tribunal basically referred exclusively to the 
features of the transaction underlying the commercial award (i.e., the 
construction activity) that resulted in it being an investment. The ICC award 
was, therefore, part of Saipem’s investment. This decision suggests that access 
to ICSID jurisdiction can be obtained only and at the times when the 
transaction upon which the commercial award ruled is an investment for the 
purposes of the Convention and the applicable BIT.  
It is worth noting that the tribunal in this case applied the Salini test to 
establish the existence of an investment, probably as it was rather sure of the 
outcome of the analysis and to exempt itself from any criticism that a more 
flexible approach may have brought. Notably, the tribunal applied the 
objectivist approach de plano without giving any explanation about the choice. 
In this situation, the statement made in the MHS v. Malaysia Award on 
Jurisdiction, according to which the differences between the objectivist and the 
holistic approach are more academic than real, seems to reflect the truth. This 
is because a tribunal will embrace the objectivist approach if, on the basis of 
the factual situation, it is possible to find the occurrence of all the hallmarks, 
while on the contrary, if the facts show that one or more of the hallmarks are 
missing, the tribunal will opt for the typical characteristics approach.467  
                                                                                                                                                            
the Convention; while Romak v. Uzbekistan applied to a non-ICSID case the Salini test to 
establish the existence of an investment. 
467 As stated, supra, in note 159, I do not agree in principle with the mentioned MHS v. 
Malaysia Award on Jurisdiction’s statements, since, as described in section 3.1 of this 
Chapter II, tribunals denied their jurisdiction further to the application of the Salini test. 
Still, it can be argued that in all cases when the existence of an investment is well provemn, 
tribunals may prefer to apply the strictest test to avoid any criticisms. 
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Despite the tendency to associate the approach adopted in Saipem v. 
Bangladesh and the one in ATA v. Jordan, I do not see many similarities 
between these two cases. Indeed, in ATA v. Jordan, the tribunal recalled the 
Saipem v. Bangladesh case to verify whether it had jurisdiction over the 
annulment of the commercial award, but then it declined the jurisdiction on 
temporal grounds. On the other side, as already mentioned in this section, the 
panel accepted its jurisdiction with respect to the wrongful annulment of the 
arbitration agreement considering the arbitration agreement as a protected 
investment per se, through the application of the subjectivist approach. 
Moving on to the analysis of the non-ICSID Relevant Cases, in which 
jurisdiction was accepted, the first case to mention is Frontier v. Czech 
Republic, where the tribunal substantially aligned with Saipem v. Bangladesh’s 
line of reasoning, considering not the award per se, but rather the overall 
operation carried out by the investor. However, differently from Saipem v. 
Bangladesh, the UNCITRAL tribunal did not have to consider the gateway 
conditions set out by the Convention and simply relied on the wording of the 
BIT, according to which ‘[a]ny change in the form of an investment does not 
affect its character as an investment’. On that basis, the panel ruled that 
Frontier made an investment by way of, inter alia, the loans granted to a JV 
company incorporated in the Czech Republic, which was transformed into an 
entitlement of a first security charge by means of the commercial arbitral 
award. 
Also in White v. India, the most recent of the Relevant Cases, the tribunal 
considered, in line with Saipem v. Bangladesh, that the award was part of the 
overall transaction made by the investor and that, through it, the rights of the 
investor arising from the original investment had been crystallised. 
Interestingly, in this case, the tribunal identified a developing jurisprudence, 
pursuant to which awards made by tribunals arising from investments represent 
a continuation or a transformation of the original investment and therefore are 
capable of being protected under the applicable investment treaty.  
In both the above-mentioned cases, the tribunal, in assessing its jurisdiction, 
exclusively considered the wording of the applicable BIT, without importing 
the jurisdictional threshold developed by ICSID tribunals, as on the contrary 
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Romak v. Uzbekistan did.468 Indeed, in Romak v. Uzbekistan, the tribunal 
denied its jurisdiction beyond the controversial application of the Salini test to 
the operation underlying the commercial award. Being an UNCITRAL case, 
the tribunal could have simply relied on the very broad wording of the BIT and 
accepted its jurisdiction taking into consideration either the award per se or the 
entire transaction. Bringing the Salini test into play has been perceived by 
commentators as a stratagem used by the arbitrators to deny their jurisdiction, 
as they were not ready to either review the host State’s courts behaviour or 
judge over a mere commercial dispute. However, it must be noted that also in 
this case the tribunal followed the path traced by Saipem v. Bangladesh. 
Indeed, rather than considering the commercial award per se, the tribunal 
scrutinized the overall transaction performed by the claimant to assess its 
jurisdiction, as, in its opinion, the award was inextricably linked to the supply 
agreement from which the dispute arose, and it merely constituted the 
embodiment or crystallization of Romak’s legal position thereunder. Since the 
underlying commercial transaction did not pass the Salini test, the tribunal 
denied its jurisdiction. Notably, the result of the analysis would have been 
different had the underlying transaction qualified as an investment on the basis 
of the Salini test.  
In light of the above, it is possible to recognize a trend, pursuant to which 
tribunals are willing to accept their jurisdiction to review acts of the judicial 
body of a State that interfered with the recognition and enforcement of a 
commercial award or arbitration agreement. This is probably based more on a 
‘sense of justice’, rather than on purely legal grounds, as none of the tribunals, 
including non-ICSID tribunals, whose gateway conditions are less narrow, 
dared to say that an award by itself represents an investment that can be 
protected under the Convention/applicable BITs. Rather, the tribunals worked 
on the concept of investment as to broaden its boundaries in order to include 
commercial awards and the rights arising therefrom in the overall transaction, 
which began with an investment. As noted by the tribunal in White v. India, it 
                                                          
468 Even if the tribunal stated that, if the Salini test was to be applied, the overall transaction 
would have passed it. 
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is possible to assist in ‘developing jurisprudence on the treatment of arbitral 
awards to the effect that awards made by tribunals arising out of disputes concerning 
‘investments’ […] represent a continuation of transformation of the original investment’.469  
However, while this approach is probably necessary in the context of ICSID 
arbitration, whereby it is commonly agreed that there are outer limits to the 
concept of investment and an award would hardly fall within those limits per se, 
in my opinion it is not strictly necessary in non-ICSID arbitration. As already 
stated, in that context, the arbitrators should base their jurisdiction exclusively 
on the will of the contracting States, as reflected in the wording of the 
applicable investment treaty. Therefore, if the parties drafted the treaty in such 
a broad manner as to include awards in the concept of investment, the 
arbitrators should simply state that, pursuant to the language of the treaty and 
the relevant definition of investment, they have subject matter jurisdiction. 
In this respect, it is however worth noting that, as described in more detail in 
section 2 of this Chapter, most recent investment treaties narrowed down the 
definition of investment in a number of ways and, as a consequence, it will 
become more and more difficult to consider the award as an investment per se 
even in non-ICSID arbitration. Taking into consideration the global transaction 
and include the award therein may be a solution to overcome this problem.  
Nevertheless, it must be noted that not all tribunals accepted considering the 
award included in the transaction underlying the award itself. This was the case 
in GEA v. Ukraine, where the tribunal deemed the award analytically distinct 
from the underlying investment and, therefore, applied the Salini test first to 
the Conversion Contract, and found the existence of an investment, and then 
to then award, when it found that none of the hallmarks of the test were met.470 
Notably, the tribunal took an express position with regard to the Saipem v. 
Bangladesh case, stating that it could not be considered as a precedent as it 
could be read in three different ways: as suggesting that the commercial 
arbitration was part of a cognizable investment, as suggesting that the award is 
                                                          
469 White v. India, para. 7.6.8. 
470 For a more precise reconstruction of the tribunal’s lines of thought, see section 5.5 of this 
Chapter II. 
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not part of an investment, and as concluding that it is unnecessary to determine 
the precise status of the award. Probably, this position is due to the complex 
reconstruction made in Saipem v. Bangladesh as to whether the dispute before 
the tribunal arose directly out of an investment.471 Personally, I do not agree 
with this statement: in Saipem v. Bangladesh, the tribunal considered the 
overall transaction and performed a consistent analysis under the Convention 
and the BIT, never coming to the conclusion that a commercial award is by 
and in itself an investment. More likely, the GEA v. Ukraine panel simply did 
not agree that the overall investment could be extended in such a way to 
include the award that logically and temporally came into existence at a 
moment when the underlying investment had ceased to continue. Both lines of 
reasoning are acceptable, though from a more rigorous logical perspective my 
preference is for the GEA v. Ukraine one. But this is, evidently, only my 
opinion, since as seen in this Chapter, Saipem v. Bangladesh’s line of reasoning 
seems to prevail in today’s jurisprudence, probably also on the grounds that it 
is the only interpretation which allows the aggrieved award creditor to access 
the investor-State jurisdiction. 
A last aspect concerning the access to investment arbitration deserves to be 
mentioned, as it may have an impact on the possibility for the prejudiced award 
creditors to seek justice before investor-State tribunals. This aspect regards the 
condition that the investment must be located in the territory of a contracting 
State (obviously different from the one in which the investor is a national). 
Many bilateral and multilateral investment treaties472 expressly contain such a 
                                                          
471 Also of this view is J.E. ALVAREZ, Crossing the “Public/Private” Divide: Saipem v. 
Bangladesh and Other Crossover Cases, supra, note 332, at p. 417, footnote 76. 
472 See, for instance, Art. 1101(1)(b) of the NAFTA which states that: ‘[t]his Chapter applies to 
measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to: […] (b) investments of investors of 
another Party in the territory of the Party existing at the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter by such investors […]’ 
(emphasis added), or Art. 1 of the 2008 German Model BIT (supra, note 132). The 
territorial requirement may be included in the consent to jurisdiction clause, rather than in 
the definition of investment, as in the case of Art. 26(1) of the ECT, which provides that: 
‘[d]isputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party 
relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the former, which concern an alleged breach 
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requirement in their definition of investment. These treaties explicitly limit 
their territorial application to investments made within the relevant State. 
According to certain authors,473 even if this condition is not explicitly 
mentioned, as in the cases of the ICSID Convention, it should still operate 
implicitly, as it is by itself included in the notion of an investment. Still, the 
majority of scholarly writings seem to be of the opposite view.474 In any event, 
the condition of territoriality, whether it is an explicit, or possibly implicit, 
restriction may be particularly relevant as its application entails the impossibility 
for the frustrated award creditor to bring a claim against the State whose courts 
wrongfully interfered with the enforcement of its award, unless such State 
coincides with the one where the original investment was made. The question 
was not addressed in the Relevant Cases, whereby jurisdiction was accepted 
probably because the decision dealt with the jurisdiction of the place where the 
debtor was domiciled and in which the investment had the closest link. 
However, investment treaty protection may not be available when it comes to 
the enforcement of the award in other countries.  
An example may better explain this point: an investor that has made an 
investment in the territory of State ‘X’ initiates an arbitration proceeding 
against an enterprise national of State ‘Y’, and the seat of arbitration is agreed 
to be in State ‘Z’. The investor wins the arbitration proceeding, but the courts 
of State ‘Z’ wrongfully annul the arbitral award, or the courts of a State ‘K’ 
abusively deny its enforcement on spurious public policy reasons. In these 
scenarios, the internationally wrongful act is committed by a State that is not 
the same as the State in which the investor made the most of its investment. 
If the award is not considered by itself as an investment, but a crystallisation of 
the previous original operation, as prevailing precedents seem to suggest, there 
                                                                                                                                                            
of an obligation of the former under Part III shall, if possible, be settled amicably’ 
(emphasis added).  
473 See, inter alia, M. WAIBEL, Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 9/2014, University of Cambridge, 2014, at p. 38. 
474 See for all C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID 
Convention: A Commentary, supra, note 23, at p. 198, according to which: ‘[n]o such 
additional requirement should be read into the ICSID Convention.’ 
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is the risk that the aggrieved award creditor cannot bring any direct claim 
against the State that denied enforcement to its award, if the territoriality 
condition applies. Indeed, in such a case the investment is constituted not by a 
single activity but by a number of activities that collectively make it. Thus, it 
needs to be determined at what point sufficient activity has taken place in the 
host country to meet the territoriality requirement. The existing case law does 
not come with a conclusive answer on this issue.475 However, on the basis of 
the few cases that considered the question,476 it seems that the operation in the 
entirety should be decisive, not whether a particular aspect of it is performed 
inside or outside the territory of the host State. In this line of reasoning, it 
seems plausible that if an arbitral award is rendered in a State different from the 
one where the underlying transaction was performed (State Z, using the terms 
of the example made above), and then the State (State Y) where such a 
transaction was on the whole made denies the enforcement, there should be no 
issues, since the territoriality requirement is respected. But, if on the contrary, it 
is the third State (State Z or State K) which, for any reason whatsoever, 
interferes with the enforcement of the arbitral agreement or with the award, the 
investor would not have much to claim, as the main part of the investment was 
not located in that State, but exclusively a very limited portion thereof. In such 
a case, the tribunal should deny its jurisdiction and the award creditor would 
not be granted with any protection.477 
                                                          
475 C. KNAHR, Investment ‘in the Territory of the Host State’, in C. BINDER ET AL., 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Cristoph Schreuer, 
Oxford Scholarship Online, September 2009, pp. 42-53. 
476 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0782.pdf) 
(“SGS v. Philippines”), which referred to the CSOB v. Slovakia case. 
477 See S. BALTHASAR, White Industries v India: redefining the interface between commercial 
and investment arbitration?, International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute 
Management, Vol. 78, Issue 4, 2012, pp. 395-400, at p. 398; and G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, 
Commercial Arbitration Before International Courts and Tribunals: Reviewing Abusive 
Conduct of Domestic Court, Arbitration International, Vol. 29, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 153-173, 
at p. 167. 
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CHAPTER III – CAUSES OF ACTION 
 
1. Introduction 
In light of the analysis conducted in Chapter II, it can be seen that investment 
tribunals may consider commercial awards as part of an investment. Therefore, 
an aggrieved investor whose award has been non-enforced or set aside on 
specious grounds478 may have access to investor-State arbitration to seek 
protection in case of misconduct of the courts of the State, subject to the 
occurrence of the conditions identified in Chapter II.479 The point is now to 
understand under which circumstances a State can be held liable for its national 
courts not having recognised and enforced or having set aside on arbitrary or 
parochial grounds480 a commercial arbitral award made by an arbitral tribunal 
set up on the basis of an investment agreement. 
In this respect, it should be preliminarily noted that it is an established principle 
of international law that the acts of a State’s courts are attributable481 to that 
State for the purposes of engaging a State’s responsibility.482 It is not relevant 
whether the judiciary is independent of other governmental organs and there is 
no need for governmental or other intervention in order for the wrongful acts 
of the judiciary to be attributable to the State.483 
                                                          
478 The same issue concerns the non-recognition and/or set-aside of arbitration agreements.  
479 See, Chapter II, passim, and, for a summary thereof, section 6 thereof.  
480 Any time reference made to non-enforcement or arbitral awards shall also be deemed to be 
made to the issue of non-recognition of arbitration agreements.  
481 Attribution is a legal operation by which the conduct of a range of domestic law entities is 
treated as conduct of an international law entity, the State. This definition is provided by J. 
CRAWFORD, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, Arbitration International, Vol. 
24, No. 3, 2008, pp. 351-374, at p. 356. 
482 For an analysis of the cases where this principle was established, see, inter alia, S. FIETTA, J. 
UPCHER, Public International Law, Investment Treaties and Commercial Arbitration: an 
emerging system of complementarity?, supra, note 441, 2013, pp. 187-221, at p. 192. 
483 S. FIETTA, J. UPCHER, Public International Law, Investment Treaties and Commercial 
Arbitration: an emerging system of complementarity?, supra, note 441, at p. 192; and C. 
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This principle of customary international law484 is codified in Article 4(1) of the 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
whereby it is stated that: ‘[t]he conduct of any State organ shall be considered 
an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises 
legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds 
in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the 
central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.’485  
Thus, a State may be judged by investment arbitral tribunals according to the 
international standards for the acts and omissions of its courts, since their 
transgressions of international law are attributable to the relevant States. With 
specific respect to international arbitration, the liability of the State for the 
undue disruption of arbitration proceedings caused by its national courts has 
been supported in recent times by Judge Schwebel, according to whom: ‘[...] 
when a domestic court, an organ of the State in the eyes of international law, 
blocks access to arbitration through issuance of an anti-suit injunction, that too 
constitutes a denial of justice for which the state of which the court is part 
(whether or not the judicial branch be independent) is internationally 
responsible’.486 
                                                                                                                                                            
LIEBSCHER, Monitoring of Domestic Courts in BIT Arbitration: a Brief Inventory of Some 
Issues, in C. BINDER ET AL. (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st Century. 
Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 105-128, at 
pp. 105-106. 
484 S. SATTAR, International Arbitration and Judicial Interference: Progressive Development of 
International Investment Law or a Threat to Its Legitimacy?, Asian International 
Arbitration Journal, Vol. 9, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 63-77, at p. 64. 
485 Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and 
submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the 
work of that session (A/56/10) (available at: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf).  
486 S. SCHWEBEL, Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration: An Overview, in E. 
GAILLARD (ed.), Anti-Suit Injunctions In International Arbitrations, Juris Publishing, 2005, 
pp. 12-13. This view is also supported by other doctrinal writings (see, among others, S. 
SATTAR, International Arbitration and Judicial Interference: Progressive Development of 
International Investment Law or a Threat to Its Legitimacy?, supra, note 484, at pp. 65-66 
for an outline). 
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Indeed, as already noted in Chapter I,487 arbitration tribunals and national 
courts, despite being very different, are inseparable.488 However, a court’s 
intervention should not take the form of an unjustified interference with the 
arbitration proceeding, which may occur when local courts do not exercise 
their powers legitimately and/or misuse their powers for ulterior motives. In 
case of such behaviours, the acts and/or omissions of the judiciary can entail 
an international liability of the relevant State. 
Still, while it is firmly established that the acts of the judiciary can in principle 
engage the responsibility of the State, it is clear that public international law 
should not provide for a right of appeal against such decisions. In light of the 
above, international courts and tribunals have traditionally been reluctant to 
scrutinize the decisions of domestic courts and also in recent times have shown 
a certain level of deference towards municipal decisions.489 
With respect to the sources of a State’s liability for acts of the judiciary, being 
the municipal courts in charge of the administration of justice, their failure to 
respect international law has traditionally been considered within the ambit of 
denial of justice, which represents a fundamental part of customary 
international law on the treatment of aliens and is usually included in the 
                                                          
487 See Chapter I, section 3. 
488  W.M. REISMAN, B. RICHARDSON, Tribunals and Courts: An Interpretation of the 
Architecture of International Commercial Arbitration, in A. JAN VAN DEN BERG (ed.), 
Arbitration – The Next Fifty Years. 50th Anniversary Conference, Geneva, 2011, ICCA 
Congress Series No. 16, 2012, pp. 17-65, at p. 18. Along the same lines see also N. 
BLACKABY, C. PARTASIDES, A. REDFERN, M. HUNTER, Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration (5th Edition), Oxford University Press, 2009, at p. 439, where it 
states that: ‘national courts could exist without arbitration, but arbitration could not exist 
without the courts’. As illustrated in Chapter I, section 3, the role of national courts is 
scaled down by supporters of the so-called delocalization theory. Anyway, also pursuant to 
this line of thought, national courts are involved in the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards. 
489 See, for instance, among the Relevant Cases, Frontier v. Czech Republic in section 7 of this 
Chapter III. Please also note that, in Government of the Kaliningrad Region v. Republic of 
Lithuania (infra, note 788), the tribunal declined its jurisdiction, stating that acting otherwise 
would have implied that the panel would have to act as an appellate body with respect to 
the domestic courts’ decisions applying the New York Convention. 
164 
notion of fair and equitable treatment (“FET”). Broadly speaking, according to 
this doctrine a State is internationally responsible if it administers its system of 
justice to foreigners in an unfair, arbitrary and/or discriminatory manner.490  
Importantly, however, denial of justice is not the only means by which the 
conduct of the domestic courts can entail the State’s responsibility at 
international level. In fact, in more recent times, ‘the claims that most naturally 
take the form of denial of justice are being diverted into the other main 
branches of investment law: expropriation, effective means and unfair 
treatment more generally.’491 Each of these causes of action has different 
meanings and thresholds that will be more extensively analysed in the following 
sections of this Chapter.  
Of course, the possibility to bring an investment treaty claim against the State’s 
courts that acted wrongfully and the choice of the claims to be raised rest upon 
the provisions of the applicable investment treaty and, in particular, the set of 
the protected entitlements subject to the relevant dispute settlement 
mechanism.492  
In this Chapter, I will first introduce the causes of actions (i.e., the treaty 
standards) invoked in the Relevant Cases by the challenging investors. In this 
respect, by way of clarification, it should be noted that it is not the purpose of 
this work to discuss the content of the treaty standards exhaustively; I will 
rather outline the main principles that are necessary to understand the focal 
arguments of this work. I will then consider how the investment tribunals have 
dealt with them in the Relevant Cases. I will finally analyse if and how a 
                                                          
490 For more, see section 2 of this Chapter III.  
491 M.D. GOLDHABER, The Rise of Arbitral Power Over Domestic Courts, Stanford Journal 
of Complex Litigation, Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2012-2013, pp. 373-416, at p. 384. Indeed, 
according to the author, these are only deceptive transformations of denial of justice 
claims. His opinion is supported by other scholarly writings that will be better analysed in 
the following sections.  
492 As better explained in sections 10 and 11 of this Chapter III, not all investment treaties 
guarantee the same substantial protection to investments. Moreover, dispute settlement 
clauses may be narrow and limit the possibility to bring investment claims. 
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violation of the New York Convention can constitute an autonomous cause of 
action under investment treaty arbitration. 
 
2. Denial of Justice 
Despite the fact that in none of the Relevant Cases did the arbitral tribunal find 
the State in breach of the prohibition to deny justice and, more generally, that 
denials of justice have rarely proved to exist in investment arbitration, this 
cause of action deserves to be analysed first for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, this is because traditionally the failure of a national legal system to 
provide due process to aliens was exclusively subsumed under the doctrine of 
denial of justice. This rule was established in international law well before its 
inclusion in investment treaties – where nowadays most of the times is 
encompassed within the FET standard –493 and can be considered as one of the 
oldest principles of customary international law.494  
Second, according to certain authors,495 causes of actions, different from denial 
of justice, which concern mistreatment of aliens by local courts should be 
considered instrumental ‘transformations’ of denial of justice aimed at avoiding 
                                                          
493  See, for instance, the 2004 and 2012 US Model BITs, where in Art. 5(2) it is provided that: 
‘“fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, 
or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process 
embodied in the principal legal systems of the world; […]’; and the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement, signed on 26 February 2009 (available at: 
http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119035519.pdf), which, in its Article 
11(2), specifies that ‘[f]or greater certainty: (a) fair and equitable treatment requires each 
Member State not to deny justice in any legal or administrative proceedings in accordance 
with the principle of due process; [...]’. For a description of the main features of the FET 
standard, see section 5 of this Chapter III. 
494 G. CARBONE, The Interference of the Court of the Seat with International Arbitration, 
supra, note 64, pp. 217-244, at p. 237. 
495 Z. DOUGLAS, International Responsibility for Domestic Adjudication: Denial of Justice 
Deconstructed, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 63, Issue 4, October 
2014, pp. 867-900, at p. 869; 893 and following; M.D. GOLDHABER, The Rise of Arbitral 
Power Over Domestic Courts, supra, note 491, at p. 384; P. NAIR, State responsibility for 
non-enforcement of arbitral awards: revising Saipem two years on, Kluwer Arbitration 
Blog, posted on 25 August 2011. 
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the difficulties in proving the existence of the conditions required for a denial 
of justice to exist.496 Indeed, for other causes of action the conditions for the 
responsibility of a State to be recognized are easier to meet.497 Moreover, it may 
happen that the applicable treaty does not allow investors to bring an investor-
State claim grounded on the denial of justice,498 and consequently investors may 
be forced to sue a State for an action of its national courts on the basis of 
guarantees different from the prohibition to deny justice, regardless of the fact 
that the claim would have had better framed as one for denial of justice. 
Finally, denial of justice also has a role to play in the Relevant Cases, regardless 
of the fact that, as mentioned, none of the involved tribunals found a violation 
thereof. For instance, in GEA v. Ukraine and White v. India, the claimants 
alleged that a violation of the FET standard by the relevant State had led to a 
denial of justice;499 and, in Frontier v. Czech Republic, the respondent 
contested that Frontier’s claim had to be dismissed, as it should have been 
framed as a denial of justice, whose conditions were not met.500  
All this premised, turning to the analysis of the standard, it should be noted 
that the international violation of denial of justice may be considered to exist, 
at its most general, when a State administers justice to aliens in a fundamentally 
unfair manner.501 Denial of justice is indeed an element of the minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens, according to which, regardless of the treatment 
that a State affords to its nationals, foreigners are entitled to a minimum 
standard of justice.  
                                                          
496 See, infra, in this section. 
497 As better explained later on in this section, a claim for denial of justice will be successful 
only if the misconduct of the State can be qualified as egregious and if all available local 
remedies have been exhausted. 
498 This was for example the case for Saipem v. Bangladesh, where the investor was entitled to 
bring a claim exclusively for matters connected to an expropriation in breach of the Italy-
Bangladesh BIT. See section 4 of this Chapter III. For more on the breadth of dispute 
resolution clauses in investment treaties, see section 10 of this Chapter III.  
499 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 269.  
500 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 487. 
501 J. PAULSSON, Denial of Justice in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005, at 
p. 4. 
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According to the majority of scholars, denials of justice occur exclusively in the 
event of procedural misbehaviours.502 As stated by a leading scholar on the 
topic, ‘[d]enial of justice is always procedural.’503 Pursuant to the theory at 
work, international law should intervene exclusively when the decision of the 
judiciary is in violation of the fundamental requirements of an adjudicative 
procedure. A denial of justice can, therefore, arise only from procedural 
irregularities in judicial proceedings, such as refusal of access to justice, undue 
delays,504 lack of due process, failure to provide a fair hearing or the non-
                                                          
502 A. DIEHL, The Core Standard of International Investment Protection. FET, International 
Arbitration Law Library, Vol. 26, Kluwer Law International, 2012, at p. 463; F. MUTIS 
TÉLLEZ, Does the Annulment of Arbitral Awards by National Courts Engage State 
Responsibility Under International Law?, CEPMLP Annual Review – CAR Vol. 16, 2013, 
pp. 1-18, at pp. 6-7; A. NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and Practice of Investment 
Treaties, Standards of Treatment, supra, note 10, at p. 240; J. PAULSSON, Denial of Justice 
in International Law, supra, note 501, at p. 98. For a contrary opinion, see Z. DOUGLAS, 
International Responsibility for Domestic Adjudication: Denial of Justice Deconstructed, 
supra, note 495, at p. 882; and D. WALLACE, JR., Fair and Equitable Treatment and Denial 
of Justice: Loewen v US and Chattin v Mexico, Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 
3, Issue 2, 2006, pp. 1-17. See also M. PAPARINSKIS, The International Minimum Standard 
and Fair and Equitable Treatment, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 195-197 for an 
outline of the spectrum of doctrinal and jurisprudential positions with respect to the 
possible configurations of denial of justice. 
503 J. PAULSSON, Denial of Justice in International Law, supra, note 501, at p. 98. 
504 The topic of undue delays is particularly important in the context of this work, as was 
considered by the tribunal in White v. India (see section 9 of this Chapter III). Notably, in 
that case, the tribunal maintained that the delays did not amount to a denial of justice, but 
rather to a breach of the effective means clause set out in the applicable treaty. In this 
respect, it should be noted that, in the context of denial of justice, the bar to establish the 
occurrence of a denial of justice for delays is rather high and requires the delay to be 
‘studied, wrongful, continuous and unwarranted, equivalent to a refusal’ or a delay that is 
‘[i]n some respects…even more ruinous than an absolute refusal of access or wrongful 
rejection’ (A.P. KARREMAN, K. DHARMANANDA SC, Time to Reassess Remedies for 
Delays Breaching ‘Effective Means’, ICSID Review, Vol. 30, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 118-141, at 
p. 123). 
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execution of a judgment.505 Still, there may be extreme cases where denial of 
justice has been deemed to exist upon the occurrence of gross defects in 
substance of the decision.506 Also in this case eminent scholarly writings507 have 
deemed that a procedural denial of justice effectively occurred, as the 
substantive injustice evidenced only a procedural defect.508 In fact, the 
substance of the decision was so egregiously wrong that no honest or 
competent court could possibly have made it. If a judgment is grossly unjust it 
is because fair treatment was not accorded and the State has failed to provide a 
judicial system that meets international standards.509 
                                                          
505 A. NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties, Standards of 
Treatment, supra, note 10, at p. 240.  
506 See Mondev v. US, para. 127; Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of 
America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, 26 June 2003 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0470.pdf) (“Loewen v. 
US”), para. 133. 
507 See, for all, J. PAULSSON, Denial of Justice in International Law, supra, note 501, at p. 82. 
508 It should however be noted that part of the doctrine considers this as a case of substantive 
denial of justice. See, for instance, Z. DOUGLAS, International Responsibility for Domestic 
Adjudication: Denial of Justice Deconstructed, supra, note 495, at p. 882, according to 
whom: ‘[t]he theory at work here is that denial of justice is limited to instances of 
procedural injustice but that substantive injustice can provide conclusive or strong 
evidence of procedural injustice. The problem with this theory is that it is nothing more 
than semantic camouflage for what amounts to a review of the substantive outcome 
produced by the domestic court. An international court cannot draw inferences from an 
injustice caused by substantive error unless it has determined that there has actually been a 
substantive error through an assessment of the applicable domestic law and that it is a 
particularly grave error. There is simply no difference in principle between the statements: 
‘the domestic court got the point hopelessly wrong’ and ‘no competent domestic court 
could have decided the point in that way’. The latter statement is merely a reformulation of 
the first but perhaps with a different rhetorical sting.’ For more, see, supra, note 502. 
509 Notably, according to J. PAULSSON, Denial of Justice in International Law, supra, note 501, 
at p. 60, a domestic court can commit substantive violations of international law that 
should not be catalogued as a denial of justice, but, rather, as a mere violation of the 
relevant obligation of the State. 
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In addition, for a denial of justice to occur, the factual situation must be 
egregious,510 embodying a fundamental violation of the principle of fair 
process. Several investment arbitral tribunals have highlighted the high 
threshold of misconduct required to establish a denial of justice.511 
The last, but very important, main element of denial of justice is represented by 
the fact that most likely a claim for denial of justice will not succeed unless the 
victim has exhausted municipal remedies.512 Notably, exhaustion of local 
remedies represents a general principle of customary international law and, 
broadly, a condition precedent to bringing a claim against a State.513 According 
to this procedural rule, which developed in the context of diplomatic 
protection, a State cannot espouse a claim of one of its nationals against 
another State, unless the national has exhausted local remedies. In the context 
of investor-State arbitration this rule would require the investor to make any 
available appeal and obtain a final decision issued by the highest court of the 
host State before commencing a claim against a State. It has been noted that 
the main purpose of this rule is to give the State the opportunity to redress the 
alleged injury before having to defend an international claim.514 
                                                          
510 J. PAULSSON, Denial of Justice in International Law, supra, note 501, at p. 60. 
511 See, inter alia, Loewen v. US, paras. 142-217; Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. 
v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Award, 6 November 2008 (available 
at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0440.pdf) para. 192 
(“Jan de Nul Award”); and Mondev v. US, paras. 126-127. 
512 Of course, it is possible that the concerned State specifically waives this requirement. 
513 See International Court of Justice, Decision, 21 March 1959, on the Interhandel Case 
(Switzerland v. United States of America) (available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/34/2297.pdf), whereby the Court stated that: ‘[t]he rule that local 
remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-
established rule of customary international law […].’ 
514 G.K. FOSTER, Striking a Balance Between Investor Protections and National Sovereignty: 
The Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, Issue 49, 2011, pp. 201-267, at p. 211. The author also highlights how 
in the context of diplomatic protection this rule ‘may also benefit the State whose national 
has allegedly suffered injury by relieving it of the need to espouse claims that could be 
resolved by other means.’ 
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However, some exceptions to this rule have been recognized. First, a remedy 
should not be pursued if it is ‘ineffective’ or ‘futile’, taking into account all the 
circumstances of the case.515 Arbitral tribunals have applied this principle in 
different manners. In Loewen v. US, the tribunal adopted a very strict 
approach, requiring the claimant to prove that the exercising of local remedies 
was impossible or excessively difficult.516 Other tribunals made reference to a 
reasonableness requirement, which was also backed by Prof. Paulsson.517 For 
instance, in Pantechniki v. Albania, 518 the tribunal stated that ‘denial of justice 
does not arise until a reasonable opportunity to correct aberrant judicial 
conduct has been given to the system as a whole. That does not mean that remedies 
                                                          
515 The question of futile remedies that emerges in relation to denial of justice is analogous to 
the one that arises with respect to the extent of the obligation to exhaust local remedies 
before seeking diplomatic protection. In this respect see Art. 15 of the Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, Text adopted by the International Law 
Commission at its fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly as 
a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (U.N. doc. A/61/10) 
(available at: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_8_2006.pdf). 
According to this Article, called Exceptions to the local remedies rule, ‘[l]ocal remedies do 
not need to be exhausted where: 
(a) There are no reasonably available local remedies to provide effective redress, or the local 
remedies provide no reasonable possibility of such redress; 
(b) There is undue delay in the remedial process which is attributable to the State alleged to 
be responsible; 
(c) There was no relevant connection between the injured person and the State 
alleged to be responsible at the date of injury; 
(d) The injured person is manifestly precluded from pursuing local remedies; 
or 
(e) The State alleged to be responsible has waived the requirement that local remedies be 
exhausted’ (emphasis added). 
516 Loewn v. US, paras. 165-171. 
517 J. PAULSSON, Denial of Justice in International Law, supra, note 501, at p. 100. 
518 Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. 




must be pursued beyond a point of reasonableness. It may not be necessary to initiate 
actions which exist on the books but are never in fact used. Oblique or indirect 
applications to parallel jurisdictions (an administrative appeal to remove a foot-
dragging judge) may similarly be held unnecessary. Such determinations must 
perforce be made on a case-by-case basis.’519 
In addition, the exhaustion of local remedies condition can be excluded by 
consent, such as in the case of an express waiver set out in an international 
agreement or treaty. For instance, the Convention treats the exhaustion of local 
remedies as an exception.520 Analogously, most of recent investment treaties 
tend to contain a waiver to that principle.521 
While the first exception has been deemed applicable to the cases of denial of 
justice – as stated by an eminent scholar, ‘[t]he victim of denial of justice is not 
required to pursue improbable remedies’522 – tribunals’ awards and scholarly 
writings tend to consider that the second exception does not apply in the cases 
of denial of justice.523 Therefore, even if an investment treaty contains a general 
                                                          
519 Pantechniki v. Albania, para. 96 (emphasis added). Along the same lines is Jan de Nul 
Award (para. 258). 
520 See Art. 25 of the Convention, according to which: ‘[c]onsent of the parties to arbitration 
under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such 
arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. A Contracting State may require the exhaustion 
of local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under 
this Convention’ (emphasis added). 
521 For instance Art. 10(5) of the Agreement Between the Republic of Austria and the United 
Arab Emirates for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on 17 June 2001 
(available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/224), provides 
that ‘[i]f the investor chooses to file for arbitration, the host Contracting Party agrees not 
to request the exhaustion of local settlement procedures.’ For more on the topic, see W.S. 
DODGE, Investment Treaties between Developed States: The Dilemma of Dispute 
Resolution, in C.A. ROGERS, R.P. ALFORD, The Future of Investment Arbitration, Oxford 
University Press, 2009, pp. 165-181, at pp. 171-180; and C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. 
REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra, note 23, at pp. 
405-406. 
522 J. PAULSSON, Denial of Justice in International Law, supra, note 501, at p. 113. 
523 See Loewen v. US, paras. 162-163. As to the scholarly writings, see, for instance, G.K. 
FOSTER, Striking a Balance Between Investor Protections and National Sovereignty: The 
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waiver by means of which the contracting States have accepted that an investor 
can bring an investment claim without having first exhausted local remedies, 
such a waiver would apply with respect to any claim, except denial of justice. 
Indeed, in the context of denial of justice, the exhaustion of local remedies 
does not represent a mere procedural condition that can be waived, but rather a 
constituent element of the delict of denial of justice. The claim simply cannot 
be considered to exist until the self-correcting mechanisms of the local system 
have failed. In fact, such a delict comes into existence exclusively when there is 
a fundamental breakdown of the entire nation’s judicial system, not when there 
is misbehaviour of a single court. More precisely, denial of justice occurs only 
when ‘there is no reasonably available national mechanism to correct the 
challenged action.’524  
 
3. Expropriation 
As illustrated in section 2 of this Chapter III, the threshold to be met in order 
to find a denial of justice is very high. Therefore, the award winner frustrated 
by a wrongful set-aside or non-enforcement of its arbitral award may seek to 
pursue other causes of action to obtain reparation. In this context, one of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration, supra, note 514, at pp. 240-
243; A. MOURRE, A. VAGENHEIM, Some Comments on Denial of Justice in Public and 
Private International Law After Loewen and Saipem, in M.A. FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS, 
D. ARIAS (eds.), Liber Amicorum Bernardo Cremades, Kluwer España; La Ley, 2010, pp. 
993-1012, at p. 852; J. PAULSSON, Denial of Justice in International Law, supra, note 501, at 
p. 100; C. SCHREUER, Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in 
Investment Arbitration, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 
4, Issue 1, 2005, pp. 1-17, at p. 14. However, it shall be noted that an ad hoc waiver by the 
State with specific reference to the application of exhaustion of local remedies in the 
context of denial of justice is considered acceptable. As a final remark please note that the 
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies in the ambit of denial of justice has been 
criticized by some commentators that deemed it inconsistent with the purpose of investor-
State arbitration mechanism, where the investor is expressly dispensed from pursuing local 
remedies before suing a State. See, for instance, C. MCLACHLAN, L. SHORE, M. WEINIGER, 
International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles, supra, note 53, at p. 233. 
524 J. PAULSSON, Denial of Justice in International Law, supra, note 501, at p. 100. 
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treaty guarantees that have been enforced in cross-over cases is the protection 
from unlawful expropriation. 
Before deepening into the analysis of what an expropriation is and when a State 
can be deemed responsible therefor, it should be noted that arbitral tribunals 
have long recognized that the conduct of the judicial organs of the State can 
amount to an expropriation of property.525 However, this finding is not 
unanimously agreed. As already mentioned,526 certain authors527 believe that the 
conduct of the judiciary can only entail the international liability of the State for 
denial of justice and this view has also been supported by arbitral tribunals.528  
Since in the Saipem v. Bangladesh case, the ICSID tribunal found that the 
Bangladeshi municipal courts committed unlawful expropriation, this section 
will briefly give a few basic notions on the delict of expropriation, while 
considerations as to the relationship between denial of justice and judicial 
expropriation will be made in sub-section 4.2.1 of this Chapter in order to also 
take into account the position taken by the ICSID tribunal in the Saipem v. 
Bangladesh case.  
Expropriation means, in its broadest sense, the right of the State to affect 
private property by varied means and for different reasons and objects.529 
                                                          
525 See Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0728.pdf) (“Rumeli v. 
Kazakhstan”), para. 702. In this case, the investment tribunal deemed that the acts of the 
Kazakhstan courts were not so egregiously wrong as to constitute a denial of justice, but 
found that a decision of the Kazakh Supreme Court amounted to a creeping expropriation. 
See, also, Sistem Mühendislik In_aat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.. v. Kyrgyz Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/06/1, Award, 9 September 2008 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1074.pdf), paras. 118-119.  
526 See section 2 of this Chapter III. 
527 See, supra, note 491. 
528 See Loewen v. US, para. 141. In this case, the tribunal substantially considered the claim for 
expropriation absorbed by that of denial of justice. 
529 S. JHA, Expropriation: A Crisis in International Law, Student Advocate, Vol. 13, 2001, at p. 
123, quoting F.V. GARCÍA AMADOR, L.B. SOHN, R. BAXTER, Recent Codification of the 
Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, Oceana Publications, 1974, at p. 46. This 
definition seems particularly appropriate, as it is very generic and does not make any 
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Traditionally, expropriations have been carried out through actions of the State, 
which openly and deliberately seized property and/or compulsorily transferred 
titles thereto to itself or a State-mandated third party.530 This type of 
expropriation is commonly labelled as ‘direct expropriation’, as opposed to 
‘indirect expropriation’, which does not affect titles to property, but results in 
the long-lasting total or near-total destruction of the economic value of the 
investment, or depriving the owner of the ability to manage, use or control 
their property in a meaningful way.531  
In recent times direct expropriations have become rare,532 while indirect 
expropriations have gained in importance.533 There are several explanations for 
                                                                                                                                                            
reference to the taking of property (which characterizes direct expropriation) or to other 
specific manners by means of which expropriation can be pursued. However, it must be 
noted that, as remarked many Authors (see, inter alia, C. MCLACHLAN, L. SHORE, M. 
WEINIGER, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles, supra, note 53, at 
pp. 266-267; A. RUZZA, Expropriation and Nationalization, Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (voice of), Oxford University Press, 2013, para. 10), a clear and 
agreed definition of investment has not developed, neither in national nor in international 
law. Other definitions of expropriation can be found in any of the scholarly writing 
mentioned in this section.  
530 A. NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties, Standards of 
Treatment, supra, note 10, at p. 324. 
531 For the sake of completeness, it is worth noting that it now accepted in doctrinal papers 
and case-law that indirect expropriations can occur as a result of a series of measures taken 
over time that, if considered as a whole, have an expropriatory effect (the so-called 
‘creeping expropriation’). See, inter alia, C. MCLACHLAN, L. SHORE, M. WEINIGER, 
International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles, supra, note 53, at p. 268; A. 
NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties, Standards of 
Treatment, supra, note 10, at p. 293 and following; C. SCHREUER, The Concept of 
Expropriation under ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties, in C. RIBEIRO (ed.), 
Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, Juris Publishing, 2006, pp. 108-147, 
at p. 122 ad following, where the relevant jurisprudence is also illustrated. 
532 C. SCHREUER, The Concept of Expropriation under ECT and other Investment Protection 
Treaties, supra, note 531, at p. 108. 
533 R. DOLZER, C. SCHREUER, Principles of International Investment Law, supra, note 49, at p. 
101; A.K. HOFFMANN, Indirect Expropriation, in A. REINISCH (ed.), Standards of 
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this shift. First, States are reluctant to damage their investment climates by 
taking the drastic step of openly taking property.534 Second, through indirect 
expropriations, States can achieve many of the benefits of an expropriation 
without taking titles or seizing control. Finally, the boundaries between 
legitimate regulation or exercise of judiciary powers and violation of foreign 
investors' rights for unlawful indirect expropriation are often difficult to 
determine.535 Indeed, all countries have the legitimate right to regulate 
investments in their territory, but the exact limit between legitimate regulation 
and illegal expropriation is not always clearly established. An analogous 
reasoning can be made with respect to the decisions of the national courts 
concerning foreign investments. On this basis, States have generally denied the 
existence of an indirect expropriation and not contemplated payment of any 
compensation to the expropriated foreign investor.536  
Actually, the contours of indirect expropriations are not clearly identified. As 
Prof. Schreuer puts it, in the modern world of the law of expropriation, the 
question is not so much whether the requirements of a legal expropriation have 
been met, but whether an expropriation has occurred in the first place.537  
                                                                                                                                                            
Investment Protection, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 151-170, at p. 151; J.W. 
SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, supra, note 9, at p. 297. 
534 For an outline of the cases in which direct expropriations have exceptionally occurred in 
recent times, see A. REINISCH, Expropriation, in P. MUCHLINSKI, F. ORTINO, C. SCHREUER 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, Oxford University Press, 
2008, pp. 408-456, at p. 408. 
535 See A. RUZZA, Expropriation and Nationalization, supra, note 529, para. 8. This distinction 
is considered as one of the ‘[…] more important and more challenging distinction for 
arbitral tribunals […]’ by J.W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, supra, note 9, at 
p. 297. 
536 This is considered a typical feature of indirect expropriation by R. DOLZER, C. SCHREUER, 
Principles of International Investment Law, supra, note 49, at p. 102.  
537 C. SCHREUER, The Concept of Expropriation under ECT and other Investment 
Protection Treaties, supra, note 531, at p. 110. This point has also been raised by other 
Authors. See, for instance, A.K. HOFFMANN, Indirect Expropriation, supra, note 533, at p. 
152. 
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This is also due to the fact that international documents dealing with the 
protection of foreign investments contain a reference to indirect expropriations 
and/or to measures tantamount to expropriation, but they refrain from 
providing a circumscribed definition thereof or from explaining if there is a 
difference between direct/indirect expropriations and measures tantamount to 
expropriation.538 These provisions give little guidance to the parties or arbitral 
tribunals confronted by concrete cases. 
                                                          
538 This drafting approach has been remarked in a number of decisions. See, inter alia, LG&E 
Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006 (“LG&E v. Argentina”) 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0460.pdf) 
para. 185; Tecmed v. Mexico (see, infra, note 541), para. 113. As an example of treaties 
drafted in this manner, reference can be made to Art. 1110(1) of the NAFTA, which 
provides that: ‘[n]o Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment 
of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"), except: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and 
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.’ 
Analogously, Art. 13 of the ECT provides that: ‘(1) Investments of Investors of a 
Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, 
expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having effect equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation […]’. 
In these texts, ‘expropriation’ is explained by reference to the verbs ‘expropriate’ and 
‘nationalize’, but no clarification is provided with regard to the meaning of these words. In 
addition, there is no indication of the differences between ‘direct expropriation’, ‘indirect 
expropriation’ and ‘measures tantamount to expropriation’. As noted by A. REINISCH, 
Expropriation, supra, note 534, at p. 422, in general investment treaties rarely try to defined 
indirect expropriation; rather they acknowledge the possibility of indirect expropriation. 
Still, in recent times there has been an attempt to provide more details for the identification 
when State measures amount to indirect expropriation. Such an attempt may be seen as a 
‘“legislative” response to the growing field of investment dispute settlement involving an 
interesting mix of aiming at correcting judicial and arbitral findings and at the same time 
codifying judicial and arbitral trends' (A. REINISCH, Expropriation, supra, note 534, at p. 
424). 
With specific reference to the category consisting in measures tantamount to expropriation, 
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In the absence of firm guidance, arbitral tribunals have identified a series of 
tests relevant to analysing when an indirect expropriation has occurred. 
However, the exact content of such tests, as well as the relevance thereof, is 
still debated, as arbitral tribunals have taken different approaches in such 
respect.539 Nevertheless, it is still worth analysing them, in order to have a 
better understanding of what an indirect expropriation is. 
It is commonly agreed that, in order to have an indirect expropriation, the 
relevant measure must have a destructive and long-lasting effect on the 
                                                                                                                                                            
arbitral tribunals have taken two views on its content,, in the lack of explanatory notes in 
the body of the treaty. One is that the category is somehow broader and more expansive 
than simple indirect expropriations (see Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 30 April 2004 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0900.pdf) (“Waste 
Management v. Mexico”), paras. 995-996). On the other hand, the concept of ‘measures 
tantamount to expropriation’ has been considered as co-extensive with that of direct or 
indirect expropriation (see Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, 16 December 2002 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0319.pdf), para. 366). In 
any event, as noted by J.W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, supra, note 9, at p. 
300: ‘[i]n practice, the distinction between indirect expropriations and measures equivalent 
to expropriations does not appear to be a meaningful one. No case has yet identified a 
measure that was tantamount to an indirect expropriation but not itself an indirect 
expropriation.’ 
It is also worth noting that expropriation provisions in treaties, though often similar, 
sometimes contain distinctions in wording. According to C. MCLACHLAN, L. SHORE, M. 
WEINIGER, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles, supra, note 53, at 
p. 268, these discrepancies have reinforced the difficulty in determining with precision the 
meaning of expropriation in international law. 
Against this background, it is worth noting that certain investment treaties of the last 
generation have made an attempt to give a more detailed definition of direct and indirect 
expropriation. For examples thereof, see UNCTAD, Expropriation, UNCTAD Series on 
Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 2012, at pp. 9-10. 
539 I substantially endorse the reconstruction made in A. NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and 
Practice of Investment Treaties, Standards of Treatment, supra, note 10, at p. 341, which is 
consistent with the one made by the UNCTAD (supra, note 538, at pp. 57-77). 
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economic value of the investment and its benefit to the investor.540 This 
analysis is complicated due to the fact that there is no exact numerical 
threshold of what represents a substantial deprivation. In any event, the 
deprivation in question must amount to a lasting removal of the availability of 
the owner to make use of the economic rights connected to the investment. 
More precisely, according to arbitral tribunals’ practice, the State interference 
must lead to a substantial or radical deprivation of the owner’s rights and shall 
not be merely ephemeral.541 At the same time, it has been recognized that the 
                                                          
540 See, inter alia, K. YANNACA-SMALL, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: How 
to Draw the Line, in K. YANNACA-SMALL (ed.), Arbitration Under International 
Investment Agreements: A Guide to Key Issues, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 445-
477. 
541 One of the early decisions introducing the requirement of ‘substantial deprivation’ in order 
for an expropriation to be affirmed is Pope v. Canada Interim Award (see, infra, note 548), 
where the claimant asserted that the export control regime reduced its ability to export a 
product. The tribunal (para. 102) stated that: ‘[e]ven accepting (for the purpose of this 
analysis) the allegations of the Investor concerning diminished profits, the Tribunal 
concludes that the degree of interference with the Investment's operations due to the 
Export Control regime does not rise to an expropriation (creeping or otherwise) within the 
meaning of Article 1110. While it may sometimes be uncertain whether a particular 
interference with business activities amounts to an expropriation, the test is whether that 
interference is sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the property has been ‘taken’ from the 
owner. [...] under international law, expropriation requires a ‘substantial deprivation’ (emphasis added). 
The concept is also expressed with detail in Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0854.pdf) (“Tecmed v. 
Mexico”), para. 115, whereby it is stated that: ‘[t]o establish whether the Resolution is a 
measure equivalent to an expropriation under the terms of section 5(1) of the Agreement, 
it must be first determined if the Claimant, due to the Resolution, was radically deprived of 
the economical use and enjoyment of its investments, as if the rights related thereto —such as 
the income or benefits related to the Landfill or to its exploitation— had ceased to exist. In 
other words, if due to the actions of the Respondent, the assets involved have lost their value or economic 
use for their holder and the extent of the loss. This determination is important because it is one of 
the main elements to distinguish, from the point of view of an international tribunal, 
between a regulatory measure, which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of the state’s 
police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto expropriation that 
deprives those assets and rights of any real substance.’ Other relevant cases on this point 
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substantial deprivation can be of a partial nature542 and temporary in time.543 
Loss of control that prevents the investor from using or disposing of the 
investment is an alternative to the destruction of value: a valuable investment 
                                                                                                                                                            
are, inter alia, Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award, 30 August 2000 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0510.pdf); and CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 
Partial Award, 13 September 2001 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0178.pdf); and Generation 
Ukraine v. Ukraine.  
542 Some tribunals have accepted that an expropriation can regard also a mere portion of the 
original investment, provided that it consists in rights individually identifiable within the 
context of the wider investment, without looking at the control over the entire investment. 
See, for instance, Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0531.pdf), paras. 138; 144 (“Middle East Cement v. Egypt”). 
543 Normally, in order to constitute an expropriation, the measure should be definitive and 
permanent (see, for instance, Tecmed v. Mexico, para. 116). However, this approach is not 
universal: also temporary measures have been considered expropriatory, depending on the 
circumstances of the case. Notably, since each decision is very fact-specific, it has not been 
possible for investment tribunals to set a formula for temporal duration of measures and, 
as a consequence, decisions on this topic are inconsistent. For instance, in S.D. Myers v. 
Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf), para. 283, 
although the tribunal agreed that generally an expropriation ‘[…] amounts to a lasting 
removal of the ability of an owner to make use of its economic rights, […] it may be that in 
some contexts and circumstances, it would be appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to an 
expropriation, even it were partial or temporary’ (emphasis added). Notably, in that case, the 
tribunal did not find that a temporary interference lasting for about 18 months amounted 
to an expropriation. On the contrary, in Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, 20 December 2000 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0902.pdf), para. 9, the 
tribunal found that the seizure of two hotels for about one year was not merely 
‘ephemeral’, but sufficient to constitute an expropriation.
 
Similarly, in Middle East Cement 
v. Egypt, para. 107, the tribunal considered the suspension of an export license for four 
months as not merely ‘ephemeral’.  
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would be useless if the owner cannot use, dispose of or enjoy it.544 It is debated 
whether, as maintained by the supporters of the so-called ‘sole effect doctrine’, 
an effective deprivation alone automatically constitutes an expropriation. More 
precisely, according to this approach, which is still adopted by the majority of 
arbitral tribunals,545 the effect of the government action is the only factor to be 
considered in the determination of the existence of an indirect expropriation. 
The motivations behind the measure are irrelevant. Despite the success that the 
sole effect doctrine has in jurisprudence, the trend in investment treaties is to 
explicitly state the contrary: most recent BITs clarify that the mere fact that 
measures have an adverse effect on the economic value of the investment does 
not necessarily mean that an indirect expropriation has occurred.546 Indeed, 
                                                          
544 See for instance, Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16, Award, 28 September 2007 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0770.pdf), whereby the 
tribunal stated that: ‘[a] finding of indirect expropriation would require more than adverse 
effects. It would require that the investor no longer be in control of its business operation, or that the 
value of the business have been virtually annihilated’ (emphasis added). 
545 The tribunal in the case Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. The Republic of Latvia, 
SCC, Award, 16 December 2003, para. 4.3.1 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0570.pdf), described this 
approach as follows: ‘[t]he Tribunal finds that ‘regulatory takings’ may under the 
circumstances amount to expropriation or the equivalent of an expropriation. The decisive 
factor for drawing the border line towards expropriation must primarily be the degree of possession taking or 
control over the enterprise the disputed measures entail’ (emphasis added). 
546 See, for instance, the Agreement For the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
Between the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of India, signed on 10 November 
2009 (available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/796), 
whose Art. 6(b) provides that: ‘[t]he determination of whether a measure or series of 
measures of a Contracting Party constitute indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, 
fact-based inquiry considering: 
(i) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures; however, the sole fact of a measure 
or series of measures having adverse effects on the economic value of an investment does not imply that an 
indirect expropriation has occurred; [...]’ (emphasis added).  
Analogously, the 2004 and 2012 US Model BITs, after stating in Art. 6(1) that: ‘[n]either 
Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly 
through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization’, in a special Annex B 
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while the severity of the impact and the degree of interference play a central 
role in the determination of whether a measure is tantamount to an 
expropriation, they should not be considered as the decisive or exclusive 
elements. Following this trend, more recent case law seems to adopt a more 
flexible approach, also taking into account other elements.547  
For example, some tribunals somehow considered the intention of the 
government to expropriate or the form of the measure. According to 
traditional case law the form of the measure is not determinative, and nor is the 
intent of the State: international law takes a functional, effect-based approach 
to the expropriation analysis, and so the formal status of a governmental 
measure does not shield this measure from scrutiny.548 Likewise, while in direct 
expropriation there must be a convergence of intent and result, in indirect 
expropriations there may not be a discernible intent to expropriate. Therefore, 
tribunals generally denied a primary relevance to the governments’ intentions.549 
                                                                                                                                                            
entitled ‘Expropriation’ add that: ‘(a) The determination of whether an action or series of 
actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires 
a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: (i) the economic 
impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has 
an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect 
expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with 
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the 
government action’ (emphasis added).  
547 In LG&E v. Argentina, the tribunal held that (para. 194): ‘[t]he question remains as to 
whether one should only take into account the effects produced by the measure or if one 
should consider also the context within which a measure was adopted and the host State’s 
purpose. It is this Tribunal’s opinion that there must be a balance in the analysis both of the causes 
and the effects of a measure in order that one may qualify a measure as being of an expropriatory nature’ 
(emphasis added). 
548 For instance, in Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Interim Award, 
26 June 2000 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0674.pdf) (“Pope v. Canada Interim Award”), para. 99, the tribunal did 
not accept Canada’s defence that a non-discriminatory regulation cannot be expropriatory. 
549 In Tecmed v. Mexico, the tribunal stated that: ‘[t]he government's intention is less 
important than the effects of the measures on the owner of the assets or on the benefits 
arising from such assets affected by the measures; and the form of the deprivation 
182 
Intent, however, is not wholly irrelevant: a tribunal is more likely to find an 
expropriation if there is a clear evidence of the intent to expropriate. Moreover, 
many recent treaties have explicitly introduced these criteria (i.e., the nature, 
purpose and character of the measure) in the assessment on whether a State’s 
conduct represents an indirect expropriation.550 Such an explicit reference to 
those elements means that tribunals must pay close attention to them. 
Also the investment-backed legitimate expectations of the investor have been 
considered somewhat relevant in assessing whether there has been an indirect 
expropriation. In investment arbitration, legitimate expectations have gained a 
particular prominence in the context of the FET standard.551 However, this 
concept also has a role to play in the context of expropriation claims, as proven 
by the recent investment treaties, which mention legitimate expectations as a 
factor that must be considered when deciding a claim of indirect 
                                                                                                                                                            
measures is less important than its actual effects’ (para. 116). Analogously, the tribunal in 
Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, 20 August 2007 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0215.pdf), para. 7.5.20 held 
that: ‘[t]here is extensive authority for the proposition that the state's intent, or its 
subjective motives are at most a secondary consideration. While intent will weigh in favour 
of showing a measure to be expropriatory, it is not a requirement, because the effect of the 
measure on the investor, not the state's intent, is the critical factor’. One of the rare cases in 
which a tribunal relied exclusively upon the intention of the government is CCL v. Republic 
of Kazakhstan, SCC Case 122/2001, Final Award, 1 January 2004 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0289_1.pdf). There, the 
tribunal rejected an expropriation claim on the basis that the claimant had not shown that 
any motivation to expropriate laid behind any of the contested government's actions.  
550 For instance the Canada-Romania BIT, provides in its Annex B named Clarification of 
indirect expropriation, the following explanation: ‘[...] (b) The determination of whether a 
measure or series of measures of a Contracting Party constitute an indirect expropriation 
requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: […] 
(iii) The character of the measure or series of measures, including their purpose and rationale; [...]’ 
(emphasis added).’ 
551 See section 5 of this Chapter III. 
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expropriation.552 Investment tribunals use divergent approaches concerning 
expectations for the purposes of expropriation claims. For some tribunals, 
expectations to be legitimate need not be based on specific and explicit 
representations or undertakings of the State, and implicit assurances may be 
sufficient. 553 By contrast, the majority of tribunals554 require the State to make 
specific assurances to the investor, on which the latter relies. In any event, 
assessment of legitimate expectations is not to be considered as an exclusive 
test to be applied to an alleged expropriation. Although a State’s commitments 
                                                          
552 See, for instance Art. 4 of the Bilateral Agreement For the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments Between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government 
of The People's Republic of China, signed on 22 November 2008 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/720), whereby it is 
provided that: ‘b) The determination of whether a measure or series of measures of a 
Contracting Party constitute indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based 
inquiry considering: […] 
ii) The scope of the measure or series of measures and their interference on the reasonable and 
distinguishable expectations concerning the investment; [...]’ (emphasis added). 
553 In Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, 
Award, 12 January 2011 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0384.pdf), para. 141, the tribunal stated that: ‘[o]rdinarily, reasonable or 
legitimate expectations of the kind protected by NAFTA are those that arise through 
targeted representations or assurances made explicitly or implicitly by a State party’ (emphasis 
added).  
554 This is supported by Z. DOUGLAS, J. PAULSSON, Indirect Expropriation in Investment 
Treaty Arbitrations, in S.M. KROLL, N. HORN (eds.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment 
Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects, Studies in Transnational Economic 
Law, Vol. 19, Kluwer Law International, 2004, pp. 145-258, at p. 156; and S. OLYNYK, A 
Balanced Approach to Distinguishing Between Legitimate Regulation and Indirect 
Expropriation in Investor-State Arbitration, International Trade and Business Law Review, 
Vol. 15, 2012, pp. 254-296, at pp. 289-291. Among the tribunals that adopted this 
approach, see Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award of 
the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2005 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf), where it is 
stated that: ‘specific commitments […] given by the regulating government to the then 
putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain 
from such regulation’ are required (Part IV, Chapter D, para. 7). 
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or representations with respect to an investment are an important aspect of the 
expropriation analysis, legitimate expectations based on these commitments or 
representations would not normally be, in and of themselves, acquired rights 
under a host State’s laws. Where a State fails to honour its commitments or 
representations, but there is no substantial deprivation of the underlying 
acquired rights, the investor's claim should be framed as a denial of FET or 
breach of another minimum standard of treatment.555 
Once it is established that an expropriation has been made, the tribunal shall 
then assess if the expropriation is to be considered lawful. Expropriation is not 
illegal per se under international law, as it represents an expression of the State’s 
sovereignty. But, in order to be lawful, expropriation must respect certain 
conditions. The majority of investment treaties556 stipulate that for an 
expropriation to be lawful it must not be discriminatory against the investor, it 
must be for a public purpose in accordance with due process of law, and it 
must be accompanied by an appropriate compensation.557 It is largely agreed 
that these conditions have crystallized sufficiently to represent customary 
international law on expropriation and thus an expropriation that does not 
respect these conditions entails the international responsibility of the 
expropriating State.558 
                                                          
555 A. NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties, Standards of 
Treatment, supra, note 10, at p. 351. 
556 UNCTAD, Expropriation, supra, note 538, at p. 27 
557 A. REINISCH, Legality of Expropriations, in A. REINISCH (ed.), Standards of Investment 
Protection, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 172-204, at p. 181. 
558 See, inter alia, J.W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, supra, note 9, at p. 320; and 
UNCTAD, Expropriation, supra, note 538, at p. 27. However, it is to be noted that A. 
REINISCH, Legality of Expropriations, supra, note 557, at p. 175-176, seems to state that 
only the first two requirements (i.e., the presence of a public purpose and the absence of 
discrimination) are generally accepted. In particular, the Author raises some doubts as to 
the possibility to see the requirement that an expropriation shall be calculated in 
accordance with due process as part of customary international law (at p. 192). Moreover, 
A. RUZZA, Expropriation and Nationalization, supra, note 529, para. 6, believes that the 
conditions for the lawful expropriation that acquired a customary status are: ‘territorial 
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The requirement that an expropriation must be made for a public purpose 
means that it must be motivated by the pursuance of a legitimate welfare 
objective, as opposed to a purely private gain or an illicit end. A precise 
definition of the public purpose for which an expropriation may be lawfully 
made ‘has neither been agreed upon in international law nor even suggested.’559 
However, this term has been broadly interpreted, given the acceptance of a 
State’s right to expropriate, and therefore States have been granted great 
discretion. Indeed, international tribunals have traditionally given strong 
deference to States as to whether an expropriation was motivated by a public 
interest and investors tend not to challenge expropriations on this ground.560 
Nevertheless recent cases have proven that the test is not wholly irrelevant. For 
instance, in a case from 2006, a tribunal found that the taking was not legal 
because it was not possible to identify the public interest being served. 
Importantly the tribunal noted that: ‘[…] “public interest” requires some genuine 
interest of the public. If mere reference to “public interest” can magically put 
such interest into existence and therefore satisfy this requirement, then this 
requirement would be rendered meaningless since the tribunal can imagine no 
situation where this requirement would not have been met.’561 As to the timing, 
the public interest must exist when the expropriation was made, while it is not 
                                                                                                                                                            
limitation, implying the host State’s right to expropriate only property located within its 
territory, public interest, non-discrimination, and payment of compensation’. 
559 A. REINISCH, Legality of Expropriations, supra, note 557, at p. 181. 
560 See, with respect to ICSID tribunals, for instance, Goetz and Others v. Republic of Burundi, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Decision on Liability, 2 September 1998, para. 126, whereby 
the tribunal stated that: ‘[i]n the absence of an error of fact or law, of an abuse of power or 
of a clear misunderstanding of the issue, it is not the Tribunal's role to substitute its own 
judgment for the discretion of the government of Burundi of what are ‘imperatives of 
public need […] or of national interest’, quoted by A. REINISCH, Legality of 
Expropriations, supra, note 557, at p. 182. 
561 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, 2 October 2006 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0006.pdf) (“ADC v. 
Hungary”), para. 432.  
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relevant if the expropriated property is subsequently used to satisfy an interest 
of the public. 
Expropriation is unlawful if it is discriminatory. This principle is recognized by 
customary international law, as well as by most treaty provisions addressing the 
legality of expropriations.562 Tribunals have found this requirement to be 
violated when a State has discriminated against foreign nationals on the basis of 
their nationality. However, if the discrimination may be the result of legitimate 
governmental policies and concerns only some foreigners, tribunals have taken 
a more nuanced approach. It should be noted that an expropriation that targets 
foreign investors is not discriminatory per se: it must be proved that the 
expropriation was based, linked to or taken for reason of the investor’s 
nationality. 
With respect to the due process principle, it should be noted that its exact 
content remains vague. Only a few of the most recent investment treaties 
provide a clarification of its meaning that may be of guidance to arbitral 
tribunals,563 while most of the time investment agreements remain inexplicit. 
Based on the very limited case law on the topic, it seems possible to argue that 
the due process principle requires that the expropriation complies with 
procedures set out in domestic law as well as with fundamental internationally 
recognized rules in this regard and that the affected investor has the right to 
have its case reviewed by an independent body.564 Therefore, if the 
                                                          
562 A. NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties, Standards of 
Treatment, supra, note 10, at p. 372; A. REINISCH, Legality of Expropriations, supra, note 
557, at p. 186. 
563 See, for instance, Art. 5(3) of the Agreement between the Republic of Austria and Georgia 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on 1 October 2001 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/188), whereby it is 
specified that: [d]ue process of law includes the right of an investor of a Contracting Party 
which claims to be affected by expropriation by the other Contracting Party to prompt review 
of its case, including the valuation of its investment and the payment of compensation in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article by a judicial authority or another competent and 
independent authority of the latter Contracting Party’ (emphasis added). 
564 See A. REINISCH, Legality of Expropriations, supra, note 557, at p. 193; UNCTAD, 
Expropriation, supra, note 538, at p. 36. As to the relevant case law, see, for instance, the 
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expropriation lacks a legal basis or the investor has no recourse to domestic 
courts or administrative tribunals to challenge the measure, this means that the 
due process principle has been violated. 
The last condition for an expropriation to be lawful is that it must be 
accompanied by compensation. In recent investment agreements there has 
been an increasing convergence regarding the features of the compensation to 
be considered as lawful.565 In particular, most investment treaties incorporate 
the standard of prompt, adequate and effective compensation,566 which is 
largely considered as representing the expression of customary international 
law.567 Compensation is considered prompt if it made without undue delay, 
adequate if it has a reasonable relationship with the market value of the 
investment concerned, and effective if paid in convertible or freely usable 
currency.568 Modern investment agreements usually spell out what constitutes 
an adequate compensation, making reference to the fair market value of the 
investment or to other parameters.569  
                                                                                                                                                            
recent ICSID case of ADC v. Hungary which briefly analysed the due process requirement 
provided for under the applicable BIT (which merely required the expropriation to be 
made, inter alia, in accordance with due process). More precisely, the ADC tribunal in para. 
435 held that: ‘[s]ome basic legal mechanisms, such as reasonable advance notice, a fair 
hearing and an unbiased and impartial adjudicator to assess the actions in dispute, are 
expected to be readily available and accessible to the investor to make such legal procedure 
meaningful. In general, the legal procedure must be of a nature to grant an affected 
investor a reasonable chance within a reasonable time to claim its legitimate rights and have 
its claims heard. If no legal procedure of such nature exists at all, the argument that ‘the 
actions are taken under due process of law’ rings hollow.’ 
565 See UNCTAD, Expropriation, supra, note 538, at p. 40. 
566 This is known as the Hull standard, as it was fist formulated in a diplomatic note of the US 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull to his Mexican counterparty. 
567 A. REINISCH, Legality of Expropriations, supra, note 557, at p. 195. The Author however 
notes that the communist expropriations in Eastern Europe and large scale nationalizations 
have partially eroded the traditional consensus as to the fact that the Hull formula 
represents customary international law.  
568 See UNCTAD, Expropriation, supra, note 538, at p. 40. 
569 Reference is sometimes made to the genuine value (see the Agreement on the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the 
188 
Finally, with respect to the assets that can be subject to expropriation, it is 
unanimously agreed570 that all rights and interests having an economic value are 
relevant, including immaterial and contractual rights.571 This principle is 
reflected in the broad definition of the term investment, which is still prevailing 
in investment instruments.572 It should however be noted that not every failure 
by a government to perform a contract implies an expropriation of the 
underlying contractual rights, even when the breach entails a loss of rights 
under the agreement. A mere violation of a contract by a State (attributable to 
the latter) does not automatically represent an expropriation. Scholarly writings, 
based on jurisprudence,573 have identified the determining factor in whether a 
State acted in its commercial role as a party to the contract or in its sovereign 
capacity.574 In any event, as noted by one author, ‘determining when a state is 
invoking its governmental powers with respect to a contract and when it is 
engaged in simple non-performance is not always easy, clear or self-evident.’575 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Netherlands and the Sultanate of Oman, signed on 17 January 2009 (The Netherlands-
Oman BIT) (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2068)) or to the real value 
(see Agreement Between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Slovenia On the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on 23 March 2004 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2274)). 
570 C. SCHREUER, The Concept of Expropriation under ECT and other Investment Protection 
Treaties, supra, note 531, at pp. 19-24, were case law is also illustrated. 
571 See, for instance, Consortium RFFC v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, 
Award, 22 December 2003 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0226.pdf) paras. 61-62, whereby it is stated that any right arising out of a 
contract which is considered as an investment is a right that can be expropriated. 
572 For more, see Chapter II, section 2. 
573 For a recent case, which refers to a previous and well-established jurisprudence, see Biwater 
v. Tanzania, paras. 112-154. 
574 R. DOLZER, C. SCHREUER, Principles of International Investment Law, supra, note 49, at 
pp. 126-129; C. SCHREUER, The Concept of Expropriation under ECT and other 
Investment Protection Treaties, supra, note 531, at p. 25. 
575 J.W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, supra, note 9, at p. 304. 
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4. Saipem v. Bangladesh 
As already illustrated in Chapter II,576 in the Saipem v. Bangladesh case, the 
arbitral tribunal accepted its competence, considering, inter alia, that the dispute 
arose directly from an investment, as required by the Convention, as the ICC 
award crystallized the rights and obligations of the original investment. 
It is now time to analyse the merits of this cause. 
 
4.1. The merits phase 
At the merits phase, Saipem claimed that, as a consequence of the unlawful 
interference of the domestic courts with the arbitration and the de-facto 
annulment of the ICC award rendered in its favour,577 it was deprived of the 
sums awarded by the award, and was therefore a victim of an illegal 
expropriation carried through the actions of Bangladesh’s judiciary. Indeed, 
according to Saipem, the revocation of the panel’s authority and the 
subsequent recognition of the ICC award issued by the latter as a nullity 
rendered useless a perfectly valid award and thus amounted to an indirect 
expropriation of its investment, and more precisely of: ‘(i) its right to 
arbitration of its disputes with Petrobangla; (ii) the right to payment of the 
amounts of the due under the Contract [i.e., the construction contract], as 
ascertained in the ICC Award; (iii) the rights arising under the ICC Award, 
including the right to obtain its recognition and enforcement in Bangladesh and 
abroad; and therefore (iv) the residual value of its investment in Bangladesh at 
the time of the ICC Award.’578 
Hence, Saipem formulated a claim of indirect expropriation, rather than one of 
denial of justice or for violation of the FET standard, as would perhaps have 
been more appropriate.579 The point is that Saipem in this case did not have any 
                                                          
576 See Chapter II, section 5.1, also for a description of the facts of the cause. 
577 The claimant alleged that the courts of Bangladesh acted illegally when they declared the 
ICC tribunal incompetent on specious grounds and the relevant award a nullity in the eye 
of the law. For more see Chapter II, section 5.1. 
578 Saipem Award, para. 120. 
579 Saipem itself confirmed that the claimed misconducts of the Bangladesh courts would have 
amounted also to a denial of justice and a violation of the fair and equitable treatment 
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choice: unlike most modern BITs, the Italy-Bangladesh BIT provided that 
investor-State disputes could exclusively regard ‘[…] compensation for 
expropriation, nationalization, requisition or similar measures […]’.580 For the 
sake of completeness, it should be noted that the clause of the Italy-Bangladesh 
BIT regarding expropriation is one of the standard old-fashioned provisions, 
where a State is prohibited from performing any direct or indirect 
expropriation vis-à-vis the other contracting State’s nationals, except for public 
purpose or national interest, against an immediate, full and effective 
compensation, and on condition that the measures amounting to the 
expropriation are taken on a non-discriminatory basis and in conformity with 
all legal provisions and procedures.581 
                                                                                                                                                            
standard provided by the BIT and customary international law, see Saipem Award, para. 
121. 
580 Art. 9(1) of the Italy-Bangladesh BIT. 
581 More precisely, Art. 5 of the Italy-Bangladesh BIT provides that: 
‘(1) The Investments to which this Agreement relates shall not be subject to any measure 
which might limit permanently or temporarily their joined rights of ownership, 
possession, control or enjoyment, save where specifically provided by law and by 
judgments or orders issued by Courts or Tribunals having jurisdiction. 
(2) Investments of investors of one of the Contracting Parties shall not be directly or 
indirectly nationalized, expropriated, requisitioned or subjected to any measures 
having similar effects in the territory of the other Contracting Party, except for public 
purposes, or national interest, against immediate full and effective compensation, and 
on condition that these measures are taken on a non-discriminatory basis and in 
conformity with all legal provisions and procedures. 
(3) The just compensation shall be equivalent to the real market value of the investment 
immediately prior to the moment in which the decision to nationalize or expropriate is 
announced or made public, and shall be calculated according to internationally 
acknowledged evaluation standards. Whenever there are difficulties in ascertaining the 
market value the compensation shall be calculated on the basis of a fair appraisal of 
the establishment's constitutive and distinctive elements as well as of the firms 
activities components and results. Compensation shall include interest calculated on a 
six-month LIBOR basis accruing from the date of nationalization or expropriation to 
the date of payment. In the event of failure to reach an agreement between the 
investor and the Contracting Party having liability, the amount of the compensation 
shall he calculated following the settlement of dispute procedure provided by Article 9 
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The preliminary analysis of the claim was made in the Saipem Decision on 
Jurisdiction, where the tribunal had to determine whether the facts alleged by 
Saipem were capable prima facie of constituting an expropriation. In this regard, 
the tribunal – also recalling the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights –582 noted in its succinct motivation that rights determined by 
an arbitral award could, in theory, be the subject matter of an expropriation. In 
addition, the tribunal accepted that an action of the judiciary could amount to 
an expropriation. In this respect, the tribunal noted that though ‘[…] more 
often expropriation results from an act of the executive power […] there is no 
reason why a judicial act could not result in an expropriation.’583 
However, the tribunal left open for the merit stage the issue regarding whether 
or not Petrobangla and the courts of Bangladesh effectively breached the 
expropriation clause of the Italy-Bangladesh BIT.  
The issue was therefore explored in the Saipem Award, where the tribunal, in 
order to solve the case, addressed the following questions: (i) did the actions of 
the Bangladeshi courts meet the general conditions of an expropriation?;584 (ii) 
were such actions illegal?; (iii) was the principle of exhaustion of local remedies 
applicable to the case?; and (iv) did Saipem accept the risk of the Bangladeshi 
                                                                                                                                                            
of this Agreement. Once the compensation has been determined it shall be paid 
promptly and authorization for its repatriation in convertible currency issued. […]’. 
582 The leading case quoted in the Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction is Stran v. Greece. For 
more, see Chapter I, section 5.    
583 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 131-132. 
584 Notably, despite Saipem’s claims concerned also the conduct of Petrobangla, the arbitral 
tribunal dismissed such position stating that ‘[...] it is generally accepted that an act must be 
governmental in nature to constitute an expropriation. In other words, only acts of the 
government that cannot be performed by private parties can constitute an expropriation. 
In the present case, it is undisputable that Petrobangla did not act in a governmental 
capacity in connection with the ICC proceedings. Therefore, Petrobangla’s actions in the 
course of the ICC proceedings, whether justified or not, cannot amount to an 
expropriation’ (Saipem Award, para. 131). 
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courts' wrongful interference by choosing Dhaka as the seat of the 
arbitration?585 
With respect to the first question, according to the tribunal the actions of the 
Bangladeshi courts represented measures having similar effects to a direct 
expropriation (i.e., an indirect expropriation), as they substantially deprived 
Saipem of its residual rights of the original investment. Using the words of the 
panel, this conclusion was ‘[…] plain in light of the decision of the Bangladeshi 
Supreme Court that the ICC Award is “a nullity”. Such a ruling is tantamount 
to a taking of the residual contractual rights arising from the investments as 
crystallised in the ICC Award. As such, it amounts to an expropriation within 
the meaning of Article 5 of the BIT.’586 The tribunal overtly ruled on this point 
on the basis of the sole effect doctrine,587 which, as previously illustrated,588 
exclusively considers the impact of the measure on the investment. In this 
respect, two important considerations shall be made. 
First, the application of the sole effect doctrine implies that an expropriation to 
exist must have a substantial and irreversible character. However, in this case, 
the award rendered by the tribunal could have been recognized and enforced in 
countries different from Bangladesh according to the New York Convention.589 
The tribunal acknowledged this aspect, but it decided to adopt a practical 
approach, ruling that, since Petrobangla had no assets outside Bangladesh, ‘[…] 
the perspective that the ICC Award could possibly be enforced under the New 
                                                          
585 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 117. The tribunal considered also the issue 
regarding attribution of the disputed actions to Bangladesh. This point will not be analysed 
here, as the tribunal simply relied on the well-settled principle pursuant to which a State is 
responsible also for the acts of its judiciary, regardless of its independence from the 
executive (see section 1 of this Chapter III). 
586 Saipem Award, para. 129 
587 Saipem Award, para. 131.  
588 See section 3 of this Chapter III. 
589 Saipem could have also sold its award to another entity, which had the possibility to set-off 
debts vis-à-vis Petrobangla, for instance. Anyway, this is one of the controversial aspects of 
this award, which will be better analysed in para. 4.2 of this Chapter III. 
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York Convention outside Bangladesh despite having been declared “a nullity” 
by the Bangladeshi courts has no realistic basis.’590 
The second consideration is strictly connected to the second question posed by 
the tribunal (i.e., whether the Bangladeshi courts’ actions were illegal). Notably, 
the ICSID tribunal underscored that, in line with the parties’ allegations, the 
courts’ actions could amount to an indirect expropriation exclusively to the 
extent the judicial decision was found to be illegal.591 Therefore, the tribunal 
supplemented the sole effect doctrine through the consideration of an 
additional element, represented by the illegality of the actions of the judiciary. 
The tribunal justified its position in light of the very peculiar kind of 
interference in the case at hand. Indeed, if the illegality item was not taken into 
consideration ‘[…] any setting aside of an award could then found a claim for 
expropriation, even if the setting aside was ordered by the competent state 
court upon legitimate grounds.’592 According to Saipem, the courts' actions 
were illegal since the jurisdiction over the revocation of the ICC tribunal's 
authority rested with the appointed panel pursuant to the rules governing the 
arbitration.593 The arbitral tribunal rejected this claim, stating that the ICC 
Rules, while binding on the parties, are not binding on national courts and 
national arbitration laws can provide a solution that is different from that of 
the ICC Rules. Saipem also alleged that the action of the national courts were 
illegal on the grounds that, according to the Bangladeshi Arbitration Act, the 
                                                          
590 Saipem Award, para. 130. 
591  This concept shall not be confused with the lawfulness of an expropriation, which was 
illustrated in section 3 of this Chapter III. Indeed, in relation to the latter aspect, the 
tribunal limited to state that: ‘Bangladesh did not claim that the intervention of the local 
courts was driven by public purposes or national interest, and it is common ground that no 
compensation was paid. Hence, the question that the Tribunal must answer is whether the 
disputed actions constitute an expropriation within the meaning of Article 5 of the BIT. 
This presupposes that “property” has been “taken” by the State’ (Saipem Award, para. 
126). 
592 Saipem Award, para. 133. 
593 Saipem Award, paras. 137-144. From this position, it clearly results that Saipem adhered to 
the theory of delocalisation of international arbitration. On the contrary, the tribunal 
endorsed the territorialism theory. For more on this, see section 4.2.4 of this Chapter III.  
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intervention of the courts was permitted only once the contractually agreed 
method had been exhausted, while in the case at issue the national courts’ 
intervention occurred in the course of the arbitral proceeding. The ICSID 
tribunal, however, refused to engage in its own independent interpretation of 
the local arbitration law and relied on the contrary position of Bangladesh that 
was supported by a legal opinion on local law (while Saipem did not have any 
legal opinion to support its position).594  
Notwithstanding the rejection of both the allegations made by Saipem, the 
tribunal still concluded that the local court decisions were illegal in relation to 
two aspects.595 On the one hand, it found that the national courts committed 
an abuse of right, exercising their supervisory powers for a purpose that was 
different from the one for which the right was created.596 Further to a careful 
review of the procedural orders, which the ICC arbitrators had rendered in the 
course of the arbitration between Petrobangla and Saipem, the ICSID tribunal 
did not find any misconduct and miscarriage of justice by the ICC tribunal. The 
ICSID tribunal concluded that, in the absence of any basis for inferring a 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice in the ICC tribunal's conduct, the 
Bangladeshi courts, when revoking the ICC tribunal's authority, issued a grossly 
unfair judicial ruling. This position was strengthened by the fact that the 
decision of the Bangladeshi court concerning the revocation of the ICC 
tribunal was not sufficiently reasoned, as it simply took for granted 
                                                          
594 Notably, according to L.G. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, L. MALINTOPPI, Unlawful Interference 
with International Arbitration by National Courts of the Seat in the Aftermath of Saipem 
v. Bangladesh, in M.A. FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS, D. ARIAS (eds.), Liber Amicorum 
Bernardo Cremades, Kluwer España; La Ley, 2010, pp. 993-1012, at p. 1004, ‘[t]his 
position seems to contrast with the now generally accepted view that arbitral tribunals 
(presumably including ICSID tribunals) have the power, and arguably the duty, to ascertain 
the content of the applicable rules on their own, without necessarily relying on the 
positions of the parties […]’.  
595 The tribunal dismisses also the first item on the ‘merits’ of the courts’ decision to revoke 
the authority of the arbitrators (i.e., the one relating to the conspiracy and collusion 
between Petrobangla and the national courts), due to the lack of sufficient evidence in this 
respect (see Saipem Award paras. 146-148). 
596 Saipem Award, para. 160. 
195 
Petrobangla’s false allegations. Another important consideration to support the 
illegality of the local courts' decisions was identified in the fact that the ICC 
arbitrators were never consulted by the Bangladeshi courts during the process 
leading to the revocation decision.  
In light of the above, the tribunal came to the conclusion that the Bangladeshi 
courts ‘[…] abused their supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration 
process.’597 Indeed, according to the panel, ‘[i]t is true that the revocation of an 
arbitrator's authority can legitimately be ordered in case of misconduct. It is 
further true that in making such an order national courts have substantial 
discretion. However, they cannot use their jurisdiction to revoke arbitrators for reasons 
wholly unrelated with such misconduct and the risks it carries for the fair resolution of the 
dispute. Taken together, the standard for revocation used by the Bangladesh 
courts and the manner in which the judge applied that standard to the facts 
indeed constituted an abuse of right.’598  
On the other hand, the tribunal found a violation of the New York 
Convention, to which Bangladesh was bound. More precisely, Article II(1) 
thereof imposes an obligation on the contracting States to recognize valid 
written arbitration agreements and, in the tribunal's view, ‘[a] decision to 
revoke the arbitrators' authority can amount to a violation of Article II of the 
New York Convention whenever it de facto «prevents or immobilizes the 
arbitration that seeks to implement that [arbitration] agreement» thus 
completely frustrating if not the wording, at least the spirit of the 
Convention.’599 In this respect too, the ICSID tribunal yielded to a pragmatic 
approach.600 Indeed, the ICC arbitration could in theory have been pursued 
with a new arbitral tribunal. However, ‘[g]iven the abusive way in which the 
courts of Bangladesh exercised their supervisory jurisdiction […] over the first 
ICC tribunal, the tribunal finds this perspective unrealistic. There is every 
likelihood that Saipem would have been exposed to similar risks with a new 
                                                          
597 Saipem Award, para. 159. 
598 Saipem Award, para. 167. 
599 Saipem Award, para. 167. 
600 E. SAVARESE, The Arbitral Practice of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 2009, supra, note 194, at p. 369. 
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arbitral tribunal.’601 Finally, the ICSID tribunal found the unappealed decision 
holding the ICC award inexistent to be flawed under international law, and that 
it given ‘the “coup de grâce” [...] to the arbitral process, thus removing any 
doubt that might have remained [about the effect of the courts' intervention].’ 
602 
Having decided that the Bangladeshi courts illegally expropriated the residual 
part of Saipem’s investment, the tribunal had to establish whether the 
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies was also to be applied to a claim 
of judicial expropriation or if it was limited to the specific circumstances of 
denial of justice. 603 This analysis needed to be made as Saipem decided not to 
appeal the decision declaring the ICC award non-existent and thus did not 
exert all available remedies. Broadly, the tribunal concurred with Saipem that 
the claim was one of expropriation and not denial of justice, and that 
exhaustion of local remedies ‘does not constitute a substantial requirement of a 
finding of expropriation by a court.’604 However, the tribunal refrained from 
explaining why the local remedies' rule should not apply in all cases of investor-
State arbitrations concerning conducts of the judiciary. It also emphasized that 
the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies is met every time the investor 
has exerted all reasonable remedies, even though the ultimate appeal formally 
remains available to such an investor. The tribunal therefore went on to 
conclude that Saipem could ‘[…] be held to have exerted reasonable local 
remedies, having spent considerable time and money seeking to obtain redress 
without success although the allegation of misconduct was clearly ill-founded. 
Requiring it to do more and file appeals would amount to holding it to 
«improbable» remedies. This is even more true knowing that Saipem's case was 
precisely that the local courts should never have become involved in the 
dispute, since the parties had entrusted the ICC Court of Arbitration with the 
power to revoke the arbitrators' authority.’605 
                                                          
601 Saipem Award, para. 169. 
602 Saipem Award, para. 173. 
603 See section 2 of this Chapter III.  
604 Saipem Award, para. 181. 
605 Saipem Award, para. 183. 
197 
Finally, with respect to the last question, the ICSID tribunal utterly rejected 
Bangladesh's defence that, by agreeing to Dhaka as the seat of the arbitration, 
the foreign contractor ‘had accepted the risk of interference by the local 
courts.’606 Indeed: ‘[t]here is no question that, under most legal systems 
including the Bangladeshi one, by choosing the seat of the arbitration the 
parties submit to the jurisdiction of the courts at the seat, which jurisdiction 
can be exercised in aid and in control of the arbitration process. That 
submission obviously implies that the courts exercise their jurisdiction to the 
ends for which it is created and do not abuse their powers. In the present case 
it has been established above page that the courts' intervention was abusive 
[…]. Hence the choice of Dhaka as the seat of the arbitration cannot change 
the conclusions drawn earlier by the tribunal.’607 
In light of the above considerations, the tribunal found that the conduct of the 
Bangladeshi judiciary under discussion constituted an illegal expropriation and 
the expropriated rights were Saipem's residual contractual rights under the 
investment as crystallized by the ICC award.608 
 
                                                          
606 Saipem Award, para. 185. 
607 Saipem Award, para. 187. 
608 As to the amount of the compensation, the Tribunal held (paras. 201-207) that the sums 
awarded by the ICC award was the best evaluation of the compensation due by Bangladesh 
to Saipem according to customary principles of international law and, in particular, the 
principle set forth by the Permanent Court of Justice in the Chorzow Factory case (Chórzof 
Factory case (Merits), Germany v. Poland, Judgment of the PCIJ, 13 September 1928 (available 
at: http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_17/54_Usine_de_Chorzow_Fond_Arret.pdf)) 
regarding compensation of damages for breach of international obligations. In particular, 
in the Chorzow Factory case (at p. 47), the Permanent Court of Justice established that: 
‘[t]he essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a principle which 
seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of 
arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences 
of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed 
if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment 
of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if 
need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind 
or payment in place of it […]’. 
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4.2. Considerations 
The Saipem Awards has incited interest and comments from many authors. 
Some of them looked at the award from a positive angle, for instance 
welcoming the fact that eventually the abusive interference of a State with 
international arbitration was considered an international wrong.609 Others 
highlighted its flaws, for instance stating that the ICSID tribunal acted as an 
international court of appeal against the decisions taken by the Bangladeshi 
courts610 and that the tribunal did not sufficiently explain certain positions it 
maintained with respect, for example, to the requirements for a judiciary 
expropriation to occur or the application in the case at work of the exhaustion 
of local remedies.611 
Certainly, this award needs to be analytically examined, also to establish if, and 
to what extent, other arbitral tribunals can follow the path traced by it. 
                                                          
609 J.D. CAYRE, Introductory Note to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes: Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic Of Bangladesh, International Legal 
Materials, Vol. 48, Issue 5, 2009, pp. 996-998, at p. 998; and L.G. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, 
L. MALINTOPPI, Unlawful Interference with International Arbitration by National Courts 
of the Seat in the Aftermath of Saipem v. Bangladesh, supra, note 594, at pp. 1110-1111.  
610 See, for instance, P.J. MARTINEZ-FRAGA, H.J. SAMRA, The Role of Precedent in Defining 
Res Judicata in Investor-State Arbitration, Northwestern Journal of International Law, Vol. 
32, 2012, pp. 419-450, at p. 440, whereby it is stated that the Saipem Award has the effect 
of ‘transforming and deforming international tribunals into second-instance appellate 
venues sitting in judgment of the manner in which municipal courts process applications 
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.’ See, also, P. NAIR, State 
responsibility for non-enforcement of arbitral awards: revising Saipem two years on, supra, 
note 495; and W.M. REISMAN, H. IRAVANI, The Changing Relation of National Courts and 
International Commercial Arbitration, supra, note 64, Vol. 21, Issues 1-4, 2010, pp. 5-46, at 
p. 40. 
611  With respect to the issue of judicial expropriation, see, inter alia, E. SAVARESE, The Arbitral 
Practice of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 
2009, supra, note 194, at p. 370 (for more see sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of this Chapter). For 
the application of the exhaustion of local remedies, see, for instance, A. MOURRE, A. 
VAGENHEIM, Some Comments on Denial of Justice in Public and Private International 
Law After Loewen and Saipem, supra, note 523, at pp. 864-866 (for more see sections 4.2.3 
of this Chapter).  
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4.2.1. Judiciary expropriation or disguised denial of justice? 
One of the most problematic passages of the Saipem Award regards the 
qualification of the international wrong perpetrated by the national courts as a 
delict different from denial of justice. In fact, as illustrated in section 4.1 of this 
Chapter, in the case at issue, the tribunal accepted Saipem’s reconstruction that 
the illegal setting aside of an international commercial award could amount to 
an indirect expropriation.612  
This position aroused criticisms of certain authors,613 according to whom any 
claim based on national courts’ conducts may exclusively regard denial of 
justice, irrespective of any possible attempt to recast it, for example, as an 
expropriation.614 Pursuant to this line of thought, a denial of justice occurs all 
the times the harm suffered by the investor is directly caused by miscarriage of 
justice. International arbitration should have a deferential approach vis-à-vis 
the decisions taken by the national courts615 and this is why claims for denial of 
justice can exclusively be hosted if certain specific circumstances are met: there 
                                                          
612 Notably an analogous issue had arisen in the past with respect to regulatory 
expropriation/breach of the FET standard. As noted by O.T. JOHNSON, D.Z. PINSKY, 
Representing Claimant: Pre-Arbitration Considerations, in C. GIORGETTI (ed.), Litigating 
International Investment Disputes. A Practitioner’s Guide, Brill Nijhoff, 2014, pp. 19-40, 
at pp. 30-31, ‘it has become common for claims of indirect expropriation and denial of fair 
and equitable treatment to appear in the same case, based on the same acts of the 
respondent state. This should not be surprising when one considers that both claims are, in 
essence, claims that the state has misused its regulatory authority.’ 
613 A. MOURRE, A. VAGENHEIM, Some Comments on Denial of Justice in Public and Private 
International Law After Loewen and Saipem, supra, note 523, at pp. 865-866; and Z. 
DOUGLAS, International Responsibility for Domestic Adjudication: Denial of Justice 
Deconstructed, supra, note 495, at pp. 893-896. 
614 Notably, the same considerations made in this paragraph apply to ATA v. Jordan and 
White v. India, where the tribunals considered the national courts liable for treaty breaches 
different from denial of justice. 
615 See, inter alia, D. WALLACE, JR., Fair and Equitable Treatment and Denial of Justice: 
Loewen v US and Chattin v Mexico, supra, note 502, at p. 7, according to whom ‘there 
must be a presumption of deference to the foreign court whose performance is being 
judged’. 
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must be a procedural error, the error has to be egregious and all local remedies 
available to correct the error need to have been tested. On the contrary, the 
option to bring investor-State claims for an action of local courts under a 
different treaty guarantee would entail a circumvention of such constraints. Of 
course, such circumvention may represent an advantage for the individual 
investor; however it could also ‘compromise significantly the integrity, 
credibility and sustainability of investment treaty law’.616 Indeed, if it is possible 
to put different labels on the same conduct, an investor could simply chose to 
follow the simpler path in order to avoid, for instance, the application of the 
rule of exhaustion of local remedies or to access investor-State arbitration 
when the consent to jurisdiction clause included in the applicable treaty does 
not allow claims for denial of justice. This was exactly what happened in the 
Saipem v. Bangladesh case, where the Italy-Bangladesh BIT allowed investment 
treaty claims only on the grounds of expropriation.617  
Broadly, I do not concur with this reconstruction. If it is accepted that the 
actions of the municipal courts can entail a State liability, why should such 
liability be limited to the cases of denial of justice? As long as the constitutive 
elements of a different cause of action are met by a conduct of the judiciary, 
such conduct should entail a liability of the State.618 Notably, arbitral awards 
have recognized that the delict of denial of justice can be also committed by 
                                                          
616 M. SATTOROVA, Denial of Justice Disguised? Investment Arbitration and the Protection of 
Foreign Investors from Judicial Misconduct?, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 61, Issue 1, January 2012, pp. 223-246, at p. 244. 
617 E. ALVAREZ, Crossing the “Public/Private” Divide: Saipem v. Bangladesh and Other 
Crossover Cases, supra, note 332, at p. 410 addressed the issue demanding if the way that 
an investor-claimant categorizes its claim should matter to the result. 
618 In the same vein seems to be M. PAPARINSKIS, The International Minimum Standard and 
Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra, note 502, pp. 207-208; and J. PAULSSON, Denial of 
Justice in International Law, supra, note 501, at p. 72. However, it shall be noted that 
Paparinskis argues that ‘the delineation of denial of justice from other international wrong 
is still challenging’ and strongly criticizes the Saipem Award, as the tribunal did not clearly 
distinguish denial of justice from judicial expropriation. 
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administrative bodies;619 therefore, denial of justice should no longer be 
considered as a delict exclusively pertaining to the conduct of the judiciary and, 
as such, the only one to be tested every time the local courts’ conducts are 
under scrutiny. With specific reference to this case, judicial expropriation has 
been correctly treated as a different cause of action from denial of justice.620 As 
noted by one author, ‘not every [judicial] expropriation is a denial of justice and 
not every denial of justice is an expropriation.’621 For instance, in a case of 
denial of justice it is not required that an investor is deprived of its investment, 
and in order for a judicial expropriation to occur there is no need that an entire 
legal system fails to accord a fair process. 
Of course, an arbitral tribunal dealing with this issue should be very careful and 
should verify the existence of the constitutive elements of an expropriation in a 
rigorous manner. Otherwise, claims for expropriation can be simply ‘deployed 
to fill the gaps in investment protection, even when such gaps have been 
expressly agreed by contracting state parties in the relevant treaty instrument.’622 
 
4.2.2. Are the constitutive elements of expropriation present in the 
Saipem v. Bangladesh case? 
                                                          
619 See, Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine. However, it shall be noted that this position has been 
subject matter of criticisms (see, for instance, C. MCLACHLAN, L. SHORE, M. WEINIGER, 
International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles, supra, note 53, at p. 233). 
620 As noted in sections 3 of this Chapter III, tribunals have not taken a univocal orientation 
on this aspect. Some of them (issued after the Saipem Award) have recognised judiciary 
expropriation as a different cause of action from denial of justice (see, supra, note 525), 
while a different tribunal has considered the claim of expropriation as overlapping with the 
one of denial of justice (see, supra, note 528). 
621 M. SATTOROVA, Judicial expropriation or denial of justice? A note on Saipem v 
Bangladesh, International Arbitration Law Review, Vol. 2, Issue 35, 2010, pp. 35-41, at p. 
38. 
622 M. SATTOROVA, Investment Treaty Breach as Internationally Proscribed Conduct: Shifting 
Scope, Evolving Objectives, Recalibrated Remedies?, Trade Law and Development, Vol. 4, 
Issue 2, 2012, pp. 315-352, at p. 338. 
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As illustrated in section 4.1 of this Chapter, despite the criticism, the tribunal in 
the Saipem v. Bangladesh case established that the misconduct of municipal 
courts can entail the liability of the State for an unlawful expropriation. 
It is now worth analysing how the ICSID tribunal came to this conclusion. In 
fact, as will be better described below, the tribunal took an innovative approach 
also in this respect, introducing an additional element allegedly necessary to 
establish the existence of a judiciary expropriation, which was not taken into 
consideration by precedent case law. 
The criteria overtly adopted in order to verify the existence of the judiciary 
expropriation was the well-established ‘sole effect’ doctrine, pursuant to which 
the only relevant element to be considered is the impact of the measure on the 
investment, which must be totally and permanently deprived of its value.623  
According to the tribunal, in the case at hand, the Bangladeshi courts’ conduct 
substantially deprived Saipem of its property (i.e., ‘the residual contractual 
rights under the investment as crystallized by the ICC Award’)624 and such 
deprivation was irreversible, since Petrobangla did not have any asset outside 
of Bangladesh and, therefore, the possibility to enforce the ICC award 
elsewhere on the basis of the New York Convention had no realistic basis.625 
This point of the decision has been subject to criticism on different grounds. 
According to Prof. Alvarez, ‘[b]ased on the facts presented, there was arguably 
no substantial deprivation of the underlying “investment” rights in that case 
but only a deprivation of part of those rights as contained in the arbitral 
award.’626 The Professor held that, since the rights arising from the ICC award 
were only a part of the original investment, the Bangladeshi municipal courts 
with their decisions have not taken Saipem’s investment, but only the award, 
                                                          
623 For more, see section 3 of this Chapter III. 
624 Saipem Award, para. 128. 
625 Saipem Award, para. 130. 
626 E. ALVAREZ, Crossing the “Public/Private” Divide: Saipem v. Bangladesh and Other 
Crossover Cases, supra, note 332, at p. 425. 
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that is ‘monies owed to them for delays in payment and not the full contract 
that the ICC award supposedly “crystallizes”.’627  
In relation to this comment, however, it could be argued that the Bangladeshi 
courts through their actions took the entirety of what remained of the 
investment, or, in other words, what of the investment still existed at the time 
when the measures were taken. As already stated,628 I find it difficult to accept 
the concept of investment enshrined in this award; however, if it is accepted, it 
is evident that the municipal court expropriated all that the investment was at 
that given moment. 
Other authors have criticized that the taking was not permanent. This is 
because the denial of recognition and enforcement of the ICC award by the 
Bangladeshi court does not have an erga omnes effect and the recognition and 
enforcement thereof could have been sought elsewhere. According to this line 
of thought, it is true that, as the ICSID tribunal recognized, Petrobangla did 
not have assets outside the boundaries of Bangladesh;629 however, Saipem 
could have waited until Petrobangla acquired assets elsewhere in the world, or 
tried to sell the award to a third party having debts to settle against 
Petrobangla.630 On these grounds the finding of an expropriation in any 
                                                          
627 E. ALVAREZ, Crossing the “Public/Private” Divide: Saipem v. Bangladesh and Other 
Crossover Cases, supra, note 332, at p. 425. The same position is also supported by M. 
SATTOROVA, Judicial expropriation or denial of justice? A note on Saipem v Bangladesh, 
supra, note 621, at p. 40. 
628 See Chapter II, sections 5.1 and 6. 
629 This element induced the arbitrators to believe that the enforcement the ICC award 
elsewhere was unrealistic (Saipem Award, para. 130). 
630 See, inter alia, B. DEMIRKOL, Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitration 
Agreements and Awards in Investment Treaty Arbitration, ICSID Review, Vol. 30, Issue 1, 
2015, pp. 56-77, at p. 70; and L. GUGLYA, International Review of Decisions Concerning 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award: A Threat to the Sovereignty of 
the States or an Overestimated Hazard (so far)? (with Emphasis on the Developments within the 
International Investment Arbitration Setting), in A.J. BĚLOHLÁVEK, N. ROZEHNALOVÁ 
(eds.), Czech Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 2 (2011), Juris Publishing, 2011, pp. 93-
121, at p. 114., 
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situation when the recognition and enforcement scheme is at stake shall be 
considered improbable.631  
Yet, these scholarly writings do not seem to take into account that in the case 
at issue, the rulings of the Bangladeshi courts are more similar to a setting-aside 
than to a mere non-enforcement of a commercial award. Indeed, the 
Bangladeshi Supreme Court refused to set aside the ICC award, simply because 
it considered it as non-existent. Therefore, Saipem in order to enforce its award 
should have found a State that accorded recognition and enforcement to an 
award substantially set aside by the courts of the seat, which, as illustrated in 
section 4 of Chapter I, may be rather complicated, if not impossible.632 In any 
case, assuming that a State may accept the recognition of such an award, it may 
still be argued that requiring the aggrieved award creditor to wait for 
Petrobangla to purchase assets outside of Bangladesh may be too onerous, as 
realistically it would never happen.633 
The tribunal however did not simply rely on the sole effect doctrine. Indeed, it 
stated that due to the peculiar circumstances of the case it had to consider whether 
the conduct of the courts was also illegal. For the panel, a different approach 
would have entailed that any setting aside of an award could imply a claim for 
                                                          
631 L. GUGLYA, International Review of Decisions Concerning Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Award: A Threat to the Sovereignty of the States or an Overestimated 
Hazard (so far)? (with Emphasis on the Developments within the International Investment Arbitration 
Setting), supra, note 630, at p. 114. 
632 Analogously, it should have found a debtor of Petrobangla interested in purchasing an ICC 
award, issued by a panel not recognized in the State where Petrobangla is incorporated and 
declared ‘a nullity in the eye of the law’. 
633 In addition, according to L. GUGLYA, International Review of Decisions Concerning 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award: A Threat to the Sovereignty of 
the States or an Overestimated Hazard (so far)? (with Emphasis on the Developments within the 
International Investment Arbitration Setting), supra, note 630, at p. 114, in addition, requiring the 
investor to enforce the award elsewhere ‘[…] could indeed be subject to criticism, 
foremost because the scheme described above is vulnerable at the point of de facto 
obligating the investor to initiate alternative recognition and enforcement proceedings, in 
case of failing the initial attempt to get the award enforced in order to “exhaust the 
[internationally] available remedies”. This way the enforcement forum shopping seems to 
be encouraged, which is hardly one of the aims pursued by the New York Convention.’ 
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expropriation, even when the setting aside was well grounded and legitimate. 
On this basis, the ICSID tribunal found the Bangladeshi courts’ actions illegal 
as they committed an abuse of right and violated the spirit of the New York 
Convention.634 
This is another controversial passage of the Saipem Award. In particular, some 
authors did not welcome the introduction of the legality requirement. For some 
of them the panel did not sufficiently clarify the special circumstances justifying 
the additional element: was it due to the fact that the case at issue was a judicial 
expropriation or rather that the municipal courts interfered with an arbitration 
proceeding?635 Others highlighted how the tribunal simply added an 
unnecessary element,636 while others wondered about the legal basis for that 
ruling.  
In this respect, the most appropriate explanation is linked to the nature of the 
instrument at hand: a commercial award. National courts have legitimate 
grounds on which they can set aside, or deny recognition and enforcement to, a 
commercial award. Thus, the annulment of an award might be analogized to a 
regulatory taking. Scholarly writings, based on numerous and conflicting 
investment treaty awards, have tried to identify the difference between a 
legitimate regulatory action, which is an expression of the power of a State and 
does not give rise to a claim of compensation, and indirect expropriation 
through a legislative act.637 The result is a wide list of factors to be taken into 
consideration in addition to the effect of the measure, such as a lack of 
                                                          
634 Saipem Award, para. 167. 
635 M. SATTOROVA, Judicial expropriation or denial of justice? A note on Saipem v 
Bangladesh, supra, note 621, at pp. 38-39. 
636 B. DEMIRKOL, Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitration Agreements and 
Awards in Investment Treaty Arbitration, supra, note 630, at p. 70. 
637 See, inter alia, A. NEWCOMBE, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International 
Law, ICSID Review, Vol. 20, Issue 1, 2005, pp. 1-57; C. SCHREUER, The Concept of 
Expropriation under ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties, supra, note 531, at p. 
110; and J.W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, supra, note 9, at p. 313; 
UNCTAD, Expropriation, supra, note 538, at pp. 97-100. 
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proportionality,638 a lack of public purpose and due process, the existence of 
discrimination,639 and a failure to meet the legitimate expectations of the 
investor.640 The situation in the case at hand is similar: the tribunal had to 
distinguish between a correct setting aside of a commercial award and a wrong 
judiciary taking. In fact, when a court engages in normal judicial activities, the 
mere fact that an investor suffers a deprivation is not sufficient to ground an 
expropriation claim. Judiciary expropriation needs something more to exist. 
The tribunal, relying on what both parties to the claim had agreed on, identified 
this additional requirement on the illegality of the decision, and, more precisely, 
on the abuse of right and in the violation of the New York Convention.641  
Yet, both the correctness of the references to the abuse of right and the breach 
of the New York Convention can also be debated. As noted by one author, the 
tribunal, in its cursory explanation, did not analyse why there should be a 
binding rule of international law that would make a State responsible for 
committing an abuse of right.642 In this respect, if it is correct that the ICSID 
tribunal did not explain the concept, it should be noted that abuse of right has 
                                                          
638 See, J.W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, supra, note 9, at p. 313; and 
UNCTAD, Expropriation, supra, note 538, at pp. 97-100. 
639 See, UNCTAD, Expropriation, supra, note 538, at pp. 95-97. 
640 D.B. KING, R. MOLOO, Enforcement after the Arbitration: From National Courts to 
Public International Law Fora, supra, note 84, pp. 393-458, at p. 416. 
641 Of this opinion, D.B. KING, R. MOLOO, Enforcement after the Arbitration: From National 
Courts to Public International Law Fora, supra, note 84, at pp. 416-417; A. NEWCOMBE, 
When is Court Interference in Arbitration Proceeding Expropriatory?, in Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog, posted on 7 July 2009 (available at: 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2009/07/07/when-is-court-interference-in-arbitration-
proceedings-expropriatory/). This explanation is also supported by the fact that in its most 
recent issue on expropriation, UNCTAD (Expropriation, supra, note 538, at pp. 101-102) 
has included among the elements to be considered in order to distinguish between a right 
regulatory activity and a regulatory taking the abuse of power, relying on the Saipem 
Award. 
642 P. NAIR, State responsibility for non-enforcement of arbitral awards: revising Saipem two 
years on, supra, note 495. 
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been considered as a fundamental part of the good faith principle,643 which is 
enshrined in Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention pursuant to which: ‘[e]very 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties and shall be performed by them in 
good faith.’ The theory of abuse of right has been considered as a mere 
application of this principle to the exercise of rights.644 Based on the decisions 
of the international courts and tribunals and the practice of a number of States, 
it has been deemed645 that the principle of abuse of rights constitutes a general 
principle of law under Art. 38(i)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ.646 
The Appellate Body of the WTO has formulated the principle as follows: ‘[the 
good faith] principle, at once a general principle of law and a general principle 
of international law, controls the exercise of rights by States. One application 
                                                          
643 B. CHENG, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006 (reprinted; original version: 1953), at p. 121 and 
following; and G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, Commercial Arbitration Before International 
Courts and Tribunals Reviewing Abusive Conduct of Domestic Courts, supra, note 477, at 
p. 170. For more on abuse of right see T.J. GRIERSON-WEILER, I.A. LAIRD, Standards of 
Treatment, in P. MUCHLINSKI, F. ORTINO AND C. SCHREUER, The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 260-302, at pp. 284-287. 
644 B. CHENG, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
supra, note 643, at p. 121. 
645 G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, Commercial Arbitration Before International Courts and 
Tribunals Reviewing Abusive Conduct of Domestic Courts, supra, note 477, at p. 169. For 
more on the concept of abuse of right and its value as a general principle of international 
law see A. KISS, Abuse of Right, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(voice of), Oxford University Press, 2006.  
646 Art. 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice – which is annexed to the 
Charter of the United Nations and of which it forms an integral part – provides that: ‘[t]he 
Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law.’ 
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of this general principle is widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, which 
prohibits the abusive exercise of a state's rights and enjoins that whenever the 
assertion of a right "impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it 
must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably." An abusive exercise by 
a Member of its own treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights of 
the other Members and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the 
Member so acting.’ 647 
The concept of abuse of right is also well established in investment arbitration, 
where several awards have considered it at the jurisdictional phase in the 
context of access to the ICSID jurisdiction.648 In case the law allows a State a 
wide discretion in the exercise of a right, such as in the case of decisions of the 
judiciary, especially those concerning national law, the principle of abuse of 
right implies that such discretion is to be exercised in a ‘reasonable, honest and 
sincere manner in conformity with the spirit, purpose as well as the letter, of 
the law.’649 
In light of the above, it can be argued that the criticism under analysis is not so 
well grounded and that the Saipem v. Bangladesh tribunal assessed the legality 
of the decisions taken by the municipal courts on the basis of a crucial principle 
of international law that allows international tribunals to investigate if the 
judiciary has properly exercised its discretionary powers. 
On the contrary, the contours of second element of illegality seem more 
blurred. In fact, the tribunal did not find a specific violation of the New York 
Convention, probably because the case under work did not concern the 
recognition of an arbitration agreement or the recognition/enforcement of 
commercial arbitral award, which are the subject matters of the convention. 
Still, the tribunal held that a revocation of the arbitral tribunal’s authority 
                                                          
647 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products - AB-1998-4 - 
Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 158. 
648 See J. CHAISSE, The Treaty Shopping Practice: Corporate Structuring and Restructuring to 
Gain Access to Investment Treaties and Arbitration, Hastings Business Review, Vol. 11, 
Issue 2, 2015, pp. 225-305, p. 254. 
649 B. CHENG, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
supra, note 643, at p. 135. 
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violated the ‘spirit’ of the New York Convention. Although it is correct that, 
according to the Vienna Convention, a treaty should be interpreted consistent 
with its object and purpose, holding that State responsibility could be engaged on 
the ‘more nebulous ground of violating its “spirit” would again probably be 
considered by many to be a step too far.’650  
Moreover, the fact that the tribunal found a breach of the Italy-Bangladesh BIT 
due to the misapplication of the New York Convention raised criticism among 
scholars, which found this contrary to the ‘architecture’ of international 
arbitration.651 Indeed, although the tribunal in the Saipem Decision on 
Jurisdiction stressed that it would have not acted as a supranational appellate 
body overlooking the decisions of the Bangladeshi courts,652 according to 
certain authors it effectively acted as such.653 In fact, if it is true that the 
arbitrators have not reviewed the correctness of the courts’ decisions with 
respect to the application of national law, they still reviewed domestic opinions 
for compliance with international law and the proper discharge of the national 
courts’ responsibilities under the New York Convention, which does not 
envisage a system of review of the national courts’ decisions on its application. 
As noted by one of the supporters of the architecture of international 
arbitration, the Saipem Award ‘is far-reaching in its implications. It adapts the 
mechanisms of international investment law, as expressed in bilateral 
investment treaties, to serve as the criterion for a review of the lawfulness of 
the performance by national courts of their responsibilities under the New 
                                                          
650 P. NAIR, State responsibility for non-enforcement of arbitral awards: revising Saipem two 
years on, supra, note 495. 
651 See Chapter I, section 4, and section 10 of this Chapter III.  
652 Saipem Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 181-184.  
653 G. CARBONE, The Interference of the Court of the Seat with International Arbitration, 
supra, note 64, at pp. 241-242; P. NAIR, State responsibility for non-enforcement of arbitral 
awards: revising Saipem two years on, supra, note 495; W.M. REISMAN, B. RICHARDSON, 
Tribunals and Courts: An Interpretation of the Architecture of International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra, note 488, at pp. 55-56; and A. STEPHENSON, L. CARROLL, J. DEBOOS, 
Interference by a Local Court and Failure to Enforce: Actionable Under a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty?, in C. BROWN, K. MILES (eds.), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law 
and Arbitration, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 429-444, at pp. 439-440. 
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York Convention.’654 Moreover, it has been argued that the ICSID tribunal 
acted as a supranational appellate body as the remedy that Saipem sought 
through the ICSID proceeding was the enforcement of an award issued by an 
ICC tribunal whose authority had been revoked by the courts of the State 
where the arbitral process was held.655 This topic will be addressed in more 
details in the comments to Frontier v. Czech Republic, where the tribunal 
explained its understanding of the role of international investment arbitration 
with respect to national courts applying the New York Convention.656 
 
4.2.3. Exhaustion of local remedies 
Another important issue that the tribunal faced, but unfortunately did not treat 
in detail, concerns the application of the exhaustion of the local remedies' 
principle to the case at work. The tribunal limited to state that exhaustion of 
local remedies is an essential element of denial of justice, but it tended to consider 
that ‘[…] exhaustion of local remedies does not constitute a substantive 
requirement of a finding of expropriation by a court.’657 The tribunal however 
went on to state that: ‘[b]e this as it may, the tribunal does not need to make a 
determination on this issue since it considers that, if the requirement applied, 
Saipem would be deemed to have satisfied it under the circumstances.’658 In 
fact, the tribunal believed that Saipem did not have to pursue unreasonable 
remedies and that, after all that Saipem had done, ‘[r]equiring it to do more and 
file appeals would amount to holding it to "improbable" remedies.’659  
                                                          
654 W.M. REISMAN, B. RICHARDSON, Tribunals and Courts: An Interpretation of the 
Architecture of International Commercial Arbitration, supra, note 488, at p. 56. Notably, it 
seems that the panel in the ATA v. Jordan case, which was composed also by Prof. 
Reisman, did the same in order to asses if the annulment of an arbitration clause was in 
breach of the Jordan-Turkey BIT. For more see para. 6 of this Chapter. 
655 W.M. REISMAN, B. RICHARDSON, Tribunals and Courts: An Interpretation of the 
Architecture of International Commercial Arbitration, supra, note 488, at p. 55. 
656 See section 7.2.1 of this Chapter.  
657 Saipem Award, para. 181. 
658 Saipem Award, para. 182. 
659 Saipem Award, para. 183. 
211 
From the above, despite its vagueness, it is possible to draw two conclusions 
on the reasoning of the tribunal. First, the panel is aligned with the Loewen v. 
US case and the majority of scholarly writings660 according to which exhaustion 
of local remedies represents a substantive element of denial of justice and any 
waiver to such a rule does not apply to claims for denial of justice.661 
Second, the tribunal relied on a flexible approach in discerning the situation 
where the attempt to resort to local remedies is futile, through the application 
of a standard of ‘reasonable’ actions, which is one lower than the one required 
in Loewen v. US. 662 
Having said that, the tribunal did not taken a firm position on the most critical 
aspect: in case of judicial expropriation, or more generally when the courts’ 
actions are under scrutiny for a breach of international law, does the exhaustion 
of local remedies find application? A reply to this question needs to be given in 
order to assess the requirements that must be met by investors that intend to 
file a claim for judicial expropriation. 
As a preliminary remark, if a claim for judiciary expropriation is considered 
inadmissible, since any international wrong by national courts can only 
represent a denial of justice, the problem does not come into existence. Indeed, 
ça va sans dire that, in such a case, the exhaustion of local remedies finds 
application.663  
If, on the contrary, the conduct of the local courts may amount to a different 
international delict (such as a judicial expropriation), the question is well posed.  
In this regard, it is worth noting that certain commentators664 believe that the 
exhaustion of local remedies should apply to any international wrong 
                                                          
660 See section 3 of this Chapter III. 
661 See section 3 of this Chapter III. 
662 See section 3 of this Chapter III. 
663 See section 2 of this Chapter III. 
664 G. CARBONE, The Interference of the Court of the Seat with International Arbitration, 
supra, note 64, at pp. 241-242; G.K. FOSTER, Striking a Balance Between Investor 
Protections and National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, supra, note 514, at p. 244; and pp. 248-249; and M. SATTOROVA, Judicial 
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committed in the process of administering justice.665 Indeed, according to this 
line of thought, since in all cases there is some form of judicial misconduct, the 
considerations made in the case of denial of justice, regarding the special nature 
of the judicial system, should be applied in case of any judicial wrong.666  
This solution is not persuasive. Limiting the analysis to the case of judiciary 
expropriation, it is noted that, if such a delict is to be considered different from 
denial of justice, then the constitutive elements thereof must be different. More 
precisely, the basis for a claim of denial of justice is that the entire legal system 
failed to provide justice; thus, all available judicial remedies must be tested in 
order to find a denial of justice, and the exhaustion of local remedies represents 
a constituent element thereof. In other words, the delict of denial of justice is 
committed exclusively when the adjudicative process reaches its final 
conclusion. On the contrary, an expropriation may take place through the 
activity of exclusively a lower court, provided that through that court’s conduct 
the foreign investor is substantially and permanently deprived of its investment. 
The reinstatement of requirement of exhaustion of local remedies, in this case, 
would frustrate one of the advantages of investor-State arbitration, on which 
the contracting States of the ICSID Convention and/or other investment 
treaties have agreed, granting the waiver to the procedural condition of 
exhaustion of local remedies.667 Further, if investors are required to exhaust 
judicial appeals of judicial decisions, should the same rationale not apply to 
administrative and regulatory decisions, which are invariably subject to review 
by some State judicial authority?668 Indeed, it is well established that investors 
                                                                                                                                                            
expropriation or denial of justice? A note on Saipem v Bangladesh, supra, note 621, at pp. 
38-39. 
665 M. SATTOROVA, Judicial expropriation or denial of justice? A note on Saipem v 
Bangladesh, supra, note 621, p. 40. 
666 M. SATTOROVA, Judicial expropriation or denial of justice? A note on Saipem v 
Bangladesh, supra, note 621, at pp. 38-39. 
667 Of this opinion: A. NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties, 
Standards of Treatment, supra, note 502, at pp. 243-244. 
668 The same question was posed in A. NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and Practice of 
Investment Treaties, Standards of Treatment, supra, note 10, at p. 243. 
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are not required to exhaust administrative appeal to bring an investor-State 
claim: the waiver contained in investment treaties has the exact purpose of 
preventing an aggrieved investor from carrying this burden.  
To sum up, the delict of expropriation is consummated when any body 
through an act or an omission deprives substantially and definitively a foreign 
investor of its investment. This rule should vary only because the organ that 
committed the delict is the judiciary. Notably, the fact that the deprivation 
suffered by the investor through the court’s conduct has to be permanent in 
order for a State to be guilty of expropriation does not mean that the relevant 
decision shall be definitive and unchallengeable. It is indeed sufficient that the 
court’s decision is enforceable to entail that the investor is not only temporarily 
deprived (as in the Saipem v. Bangladesh case). A different solution would 
once again imply the re-introduction of the procedural requirement of 
exhaustion of local remedies.669  
 
4.2.4. Role of the seat of arbitration 
What is described above are the main issues faced, and position taken, by the 
ICSID tribunal in the Saipem Award regarding the topic of judicial 
expropriation versus denial of justice. 
Yet, there is also another interesting aspects of the decision that should be 
briefly analysed, which concerns the theory adopted by the tribunal on the role 
of the seat of arbitration. As mentioned in Chapter I,670 the two main theories 
in this respect are territorialism and delocalization. Considering the former, 
arbitrators derive their powers from the law of the place where they perform 
their duties and the award ‘made’ at the place of arbitration. From the latter, on 
the contrary, international arbitral tribunals are seen as detached from the 
controls imposed by the seat of arbitration. Notably, the territorial approach is 
also characterized by the courts’ deference to the decision to set aside the 
                                                          
669 Of a different opinion is B. DEMIRKOL, Enforcement of International Commercial 
Arbitration Agreements and Awards in Investment Treaty Arbitration, supra, note 630, at p. 
70. 
670 See Chapter I, section 4. 
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award by the courts of the State of the seat of the arbitration. An opposite 
attitude is pursued by the delocalized approach, according to which the 
enforcing court is free to ignore the setting aside disposed by the court of the 
seat of the arbitration.  
In the Saipem Award, the ICSID tribunal implicitly reaffirmed the seat theory 
of international arbitration law, stating that the parties are bound by the 
national law governing the arbitration, which supersedes any rule agreed by the 
parties to the contrary. The tribunal clearly supported the notion that 
international arbitration is based on the legal system of the State of the seat, 
and that the local courts have the right to supervise arbitrations taking place in 
their territory, according to the local national rules.671 
According to some scholars, ‘by following this course the tribunal displayed 
considerable wisdom, were it only because in this way its decision remains 
uncontroversial. What is perhaps more important in practical terms is that, by 
recognizing that international arbitration is rooted in the legal system of the 
State of the seat, the tribunal could sanction the illegality of that State's 
behaviour. This would arguably have been more difficult had the tribunal 
accepted the premise that the arbitration had no connection with the State.’672 
However, one cannot help note that supporters of the territorial approach tend 
to consider that the courts of the seat of the arbitration should have the final 
say with respect to decisions concerning the validity of the issued arbitral 
award, which therefore should not be reviewed by any other 
national/international court/tribunal, including investment tribunals. 
Therefore, if the courts of Bangladesh considered that the award was a nullity, 
a strict adherence to the territorial approach would have implied that such an 
award had no legal significance and no tribunal should have ruled on its 
                                                          
671 Saipem Award, paras. 137-144. Yet, the tribunal seemed to leave the door partially open 
also to the denationalization of commercial arbitration, when, it affirmed that the ICC 
award could in theory have been enforced abroad (had assets been available) despite the 
award was substantially set aside by the courts of the State where the arbitration seated. 
672 L.G. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, L. MALINTOPPI, Unlawful Interference with International 
Arbitration by National Courts of the Seat in the Aftermath of Saipem v. Bangladesh, 
supra, note 594, at pp. 1008-1009. 
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enforcement. On the contrary, in the Saipem Award the ICSID tribunal 
reviewed the Bangladeshi courts' decision, and while it is true that on the one 
hand it confirmed that the courts of the seat may legitimately revoke the 
arbitrators' authority in case of misconduct and that in the exercise of their 
powers they have substantial discretion, it also maintained that such discretion 
should be exercised in accordance with the principle of good faith and, in 
particular, without abusing of their rights.673  
 
5. The FET and MFN standards 
In some of the Relevant Cases,674 the claimants have contested, inter alia, that 
the municipal courts breached the FET standard set out in the applicable BIT. 
It is therefore worth briefly illustrating this standard, in order to have a better 
understanding of such cases. 
The FET standard is one of the centrepieces of most claims by investors 
against host States. This is principally due to its vague and potentially elastic 
nature, which implies that it is a flexible tool that can be adapted to the 
circumstances of each case. In fact, ‘fair and equitable treatment’ does not refer 
to a well-defined juridical concept. Historically, it was not a term of art in 
public international law. In addition, almost no investment treaty provides for a 
definition of what is to be considered fair and equitable and there are 
significant variations in the drafting of the FET clauses in investment treaties, 
which must be taken into account in the determination of the relevant scope of 
protection. Finally, although arbitral tribunals have interpreted and applied this 
standard in a large number of cases, such applications are so tied to the facts of 
the specific case as to sometimes limit the utility of the relevant arbitral 
decisions.675 Therefore the exact content of this term remains elusive.  
                                                          
673 See also section 4.2.2 of this Chapter III. 
674 Reference is made to: ATA v. Jordan (see section 6 of this Chapter III); Frontier v. Czech 
Republic (see section 7 of this Chapter III); GEA v. Ukraine (see section 7 of this Chapter 
III); and White v. India (see section 9 of this Chapter III). 
675 However, as better explained below in this section, from the application of the FET 
standard by arbitral tribunals, scholars have retrieved some of the constitutive elements 
thereof. 
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As mentioned, the meaning of the standard largely depends on the wording 
used in the applicable BIT: the text of FET provisions in investment treaties 
varies considerably, contributing to the lack of certainty surrounding the FET 
standard. More precisely, investment treaties employ the following main 
formulations and approaches to the FET standard:676 
 unqualified obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment; 677  
 FET obligation linked to international law without reference to a minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens; 678  
 FET obligation linked to the notion of minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens in accordance with customary international law; 679  
                                                          
676 This classification among the FET clauses - that is supported by UNCTAD, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series on International Investment Agreements II, 2012.- 
is not the only possible classification. For a different classification, see, inter alias, M. 
KINNEAR, The Continuing Development of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, in 
A. K. BJORKLUND ET AL. (eds.), Investment Treaty Law, Current Issues III, The British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2009, pp. 209-239, at p. 213. 
677 For instance, the Acuerdo Para la Prohocion y la Proteccion Reciproca de Inversiones 
Entre il Reino De Espana y la Republica Argentina, signed on 3 October 1991 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/119), in its Art. 4(1), 
provides that each Party shall accord in its territory fair and equitable treatment to 
investments made by investors of another Party. 
678 For instance, (i) the Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed on 14 
November 1991 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/127) (“US-Argentina 
BIT”), in its Art. II(2)(a), provides that: ‘[i]nvestment shall at all times be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be 
accorded treatment less than that required by international law’; and (ii) the Agreement 
Between the Government of The Republic of Croatia and the Government of the 
Sultanate of Oman on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 
5 April 2004 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/880), in its Article 3(2), 
provides that: ‘[i]nvestments or returns of investors of either Contracting Party in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment in 
accordance with international law and provisions of this Agreement’. 
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 FET obligation with an additional substantive content (such as, prohibition 
of denial of justice, prohibition of unreasonable/discriminatory measures, 
irrelevance of breach of other treaty obligations) and without reference at all 
to international law. 680  
In the cases when the FET standard is not textually linked to the minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens or to international law, the FET has been 
interpreted by many tribunals681 as an autonomous or self-standing standard. 
                                                                                                                                                            
679 For instance, Art. 1105 of the NAFTA, which is titled ‘Minimum Standard of Treatment’, 
provides that: ‘[e]ach Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party 
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security’. In relation to this provision, further to decisions that declared 
the standard additive to the minimum standard of treatment (see especially, Pope and Talbot 
Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 
2001 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0678.pdf)), the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, composed of 
representatives of the three NAFTA countries, issued in 2001 the binding Notes of 
Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, which rejected any notion that NAFTA 
Article 1105 contained any elements that were ‘additive’ to the international minimum 
standard (the note is available at: 
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp). The 
language of the note has influenced the drafting of many subsequent investment treaties by 
NAFTA and non-NAFTA countries (see, inter alia, the U.S. Model Bilateral Agreement 
(2007) and the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Area, signed on 27 February 2009).  
680 With respect to the link between the FET standard and the prohibition to deny justice, see, 
supra, note 493. 
681 See, among others, Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 
17 May 2006, (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0740.pdf), para. 309 (“Saluka v. Czech Republic”); Biwater v. Tanzania, 
para. 591. This approach is also supported by scholarly writings. According to C. 
SCHREUER, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, Journal of World 
Investment & Trade, Vol. 6, Issue 3, 2005, pp. 357–386, at p. 365: ‘[i]n the absence of 
indications to the contrary, the better view is to give to it an autonomous meaning’. See 
also, F. MUTIS TÉLLEZ, Conditions and Criteria For The Protection of Legitimate 
Expectations Under International Investment Law, ICSID Review, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 2012, 
pp. 432-442, at p. 432; and M. KINNEAR, The Continuing Development of the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard, supra, note 676, at pp. 223-224. For a dissenting opinion, see 
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Instead of deriving the content of the standard from its original source (i.e., the 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens), tribunals focused on the 
interpretation of the clause in the context of the relevant treaty. By acting this 
this way, the scope of the standard has been expanded and its content has been 
determined on a case-by-case basis, becoming a topic in continuous 
development.  
On the contrary, when the FET standard is linked to the minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens – whose goal is to preclude conducts against foreigners that 
fall below a certain threshold considered unacceptable in international law682 – 
the scope of the FET has been somewhat limited. The reference to the 
minimum standard of treatment by the treaty drafters is clearly aimed at 
preventing over-expansive interpretations of the FET standard, with an 
attempt to control the discretion of the tribunals when assessing its content.683 
The issue with this approach is however that there is no general consensus as 
to what constitutes the minimum standard of treatment of aliens under 
customary international law. As a consequence, certain tribunals have aligned 
the FET standard and the minimum treatment, substantially widening the 
scope of the protection granted by the minimum standard, and possibly 
                                                                                                                                                            
G. MAYEDA, Playing Fair: the Meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 42, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 273–291, 
according to which the FET standard should be always interpreted in line with the 
minimum standard set out in international law. 
682 See Glamis Gold, Ltd v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, 8 June 2009 (available 
at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0378.pdf) paras. 615-
616.  
683 In this respect, it is worth referring to the definition of the minimum standard given in the 
concurring opinion by American Commissioner, in the context of the influential case L. F. 
H. Neer and Pauline Neer v. United Mexican States, Award, 15 October 1926, Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, Vol. IV, United Nations, 2006, pp. 60-66, at p. 65, whereby 
the General Claims Commission stated that ‘the treatment of an alien, in order to 
constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful 
neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every 
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency’ (emphasis added). Despite 
almost 90 years old this passage is largely still deemed to reflect the high threshold for 
violating the international minimum standard. 
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overruling the presumable will of the parties at the time of the signing of the 
treaty.684 
As a final remark, it is worth noting that also when the FET standard provision 
includes additional substantive content, its scope and purpose remain 
somewhat vague, despite that such elements may help to interpret the will of 
the State parties at the time of the negotiation. 
Anyway, despite this background, on the basis of the interpretation granted by 
arbitral tribunals in their awards, scholarly writings have identified the basic 
content of the FET standard, which may find application in any event, 
regardless of the specific formulation of the treaty clause. 
First, the FET standard is a non-contingent, objective standard, whose content 
is not determined by reference to treatment of other individuals and/or 
investments, like the most favoured nation or national treatment standards. 
The FET standard has its own normative content, though the exact meaning 
needs to be established on the basis of the specific circumstances of the case. 
Second, the FET and its constituting elements are an expression of the 
principle of good faith.685 This however does not imply that bad faith or injury 
are necessary conditions for a violation of the FET standard.686 Their presence 
                                                          
684  See Merrill & Ring Forestry L. P. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID 
Administered case, Award, 31 March 2010 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/MerrillAward.pdf). Notably this approach seems to 
contradict the 2001 NAFTA's Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions 
(see, supra, note 679), whose aim was to draw a clear distinction between the minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens under customary law and an unqualified obligation to grant 
fair and equitable treatment. Also due to the lack of clear arguments, this award 
contributed to create confusion as to the exact level of protection of investor under 
NAFTA's FET clause. 
685 See, inter alia, Tecmed v. Mexico, para. 153. For more on the principle of good faith, see 
section 4.2.2 of this Chapter III. 
686 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 12 
May 2005 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/288) (“CMS v. Argentina”), para. 
280, whereby it is stated that the standard is ‘unrelated to whether the Respondent has had 
any deliberate intention or bad faith in adopting the measures in question. Of course, such 
intention and bad faith can aggravate the situation but are not an essential element of the 
standard.’ Also see Loewen v. US, at para. 132, according to which: ‘[n]either State practice, 
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is, in any event, sufficient for establishing a breach of the FET: a State’s 
conduct, which is aimed at harming a foreign investor, cannot be considered 
fair and equitable.  
Third, the determination of whether there has been a violation of the FET 
standard is highly fact- and context-dependent. As several tribunals put it, ‘the 
judgment of what is fair and equitable cannot be reached in the abstract; it 
must depend on the fact of the particular case’ and the ‘standard is to some 
extent a flexible one which must be adapted to the circumstances of each 
case.’687 Regrettably, relying on the fact that the application of the FET is highly 
fact-specific, some awards have simply summarised the facts of the case and 
reached the conclusion that there had been a violation of the FET, without 
providing any specific legal analysis. Alternatively, some tribunals considered 
the FET as an abstract standard and then concluded that there has been a 
violation thereof after a review of the facts without specifying which elements 
of the standard have been breached.688  
In addition to these general features, tribunals have also identified a number of 
recurrent elements, which may represent the normative content of the FET 
standard, according to the specific circumstances of each case. These elements 
can be summarized in three categories: (i) due process, which comprises denial 
of justice; (ii) transparency and stability, which includes the respect of the 
investor’s legitimate expectations; and (iii) lack of arbitrariness and 
discrimination.689  
                                                                                                                                                            
the decisions of international tribunals nor the opinion of commentators support the view 
that bad faith or malicious intention is an essential element of unfair and inequitable 
treatment or denial of justice amounting to a breach of international justice.’ 
687 See, among others, Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision 
on Liability, 27 December 2010, para. 109, citing Mondev v. US, para. 118; and Waste 
Management v. Mexico, para. 99. 
688 These trends are retraced in A. NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and Practice of 
Investment Treaties, Standards of Treatment, supra, note 10, at p. 278, where other 
scholarly writings are also quoted. 
689 With possible minor differences, these are unanimously considered as the constituting 
elements of the FET standard. See, for instance, M. MOLINUEVO, Protecting Investment In 
Services: Investor-State Arbitration versus WTO Dispute Settlement, Global Trade Law 
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With regard to the first element, a number of investment treaties spell out that 
the content of the FET includes the obligation not to deny justice.690 Notably, 
even when denial of justice is not specifically mentioned, arbitral decisions have 
accepted that the FET treaty rule makes a reference to the customary law of 
denial of justice.691 Having illustrated the meaning of the concept of ‘denial of 
justice’ in section 2 of this Chapter, in this section the focus will be on the 
other elements of the FET standard. What is worth noting is that a breach of 
due process, which entails a violation of the FET standard, may also not 
amount to a denial of justice. In a number of cases, tribunals have held that a 
lack of fair procedure or a grave procedural shortcoming was an important 
element of the FET.692 
The concept of the FET is strictly related to that of transparency and the 
establishment of a stable and predictable regulatory environment. Transparency 
is considered an important element of good governance, generally, and it is 
especially important to investors. To make effective investment decisions, 
investors need to know the applicable legal rules, which therefore must be 
communicated or anyway made available to the concerned persons. 
Analogously, a government acting fairly shall inform investors of changes to 
the applicable rules so that they may plan and manage operations accordingly. 
Thus, governments are obliged to be transparent about the rules in force. In 
light of the above, it may be argued that even where an investment treaty does 
                                                                                                                                                            
Series, Vol. 38, Kluwer Law International, 2011; J.W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment 
Treaties, supra, note 9, at p. 229 and following; K. YANNACA-SMALL, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard, in K. YANNACA-SMALL (ed.), Arbitration Under International 
Investment Agreements: A Guide to Key Issues, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 445-
477. 
690 See, supra, note 493. 
691 See Rumeli v. Kazakhstan, para. 651; Jan de Nul Award, paras. 254-261; Pantechniki v. 
Albania, para. 93. 
692 See, for instance, Waste Management v. Mexico, para. 98; and Petrobart v. Kyrgyz 
Republic, para. 344. For an outline of the criticism of those scholars that believe that any 
misconduct of the judiciary can exclusively amount to a denial of justice and any attempt of 
qualification as violation of a different treaty standard is solely aimed at lowering the bar, 
please refer to section 4.2.1 of this Chapter III., which can apply here mutatis mutandis. 
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not specifically provide for transparency, the FET clause implicitly requires the 
host government to act transparently. 
Governmental transparency clearly affects an investor’s legitimate expectations. 
An investor’s legitimate expectations are based on the host State’s legal 
framework and on any undertakings or representations made by it. Therefore, 
the principle of protecting investment-backed expectations is often combined 
with the principle of transparency. Thus, it may happen that a violation of the 
FET clause occurs through a simultaneous failure to act transparently and to 
protect the investor’s legitimate expectations. Protection of the investors' 
legitimate expectations has been ‘repeatedly identified by tribunals and scholars 
as one of the major components of the standard’.693 Investment tribunals 
however have interpreted the concept of legitimate expectations in different 
ways, and therefore what is to be considered as such is not univocally 
determined yet. Expectations of the investor can qualify as legitimate if they are 
objectively and subjectively reasonable. This means that first of all, from an 
objective standpoint, it must be verified whether the expectation is one of a 
diligent and prudent investor, having taken into account all circumstances 
surrounding the investment, including the political, socio-economic, cultural 
and historical conditions prevailing in the host State. Expectations can be 
considered subjectively legitimate if they do not conflict with the knowledge 
that the investor had on the law and the representations made by the host 
State. The concept of legitimate expectations is linked to the fact that 
investments by their very nature are long-term transactions and, as such, they 
are subject to the risk that conditions thereof may change negatively affecting 
the investment during its term.  
As a general principle, it can be stated that expectations can be considered 
legitimate if they rely on the stability, predictability and consistency of the host 
State's legal and business framework existing at the time when the investment 
                                                          
693 UNCTAD, Series on International Investment Agreements II, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, supra, note 676, at p. 9. Of the same opinion, inter alia, F. MUTIS TÉLLEZ, 
Conditions and Criteria For The Protection of Legitimate Expectations Under 
International Investment Law, supra, note 681, at p. 432. 
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was made and at each later moment when a decisive step concerning the 
investment was made (such as expansions, developments and reorganizations). 
However, this cannot imply that a State cannot legitimately change its legal and 
business framework: protection of legitimate expectations cannot be pushed to 
entail a ‘freeze’ of the host State's regulatory system so it stays the same as at 
the time when the investment (or major decision concerning the investment) 
was made. It is debated whether in order to violate the FET clause, the 
legitimate expectations should be grounded on a specific or unambiguous 
representation made by the host State inducing the investor to make the 
investment. The prevailing case law seems oriented to require specific formal 
assurances or guarantees from the State,694 while no legitimate expectations may 
arise exclusively from existing background and regulation if no promises have 
been made by the host State. This approach is also supported by some 
commentators, who have argued that the doctrine of legitimate expectations 
can be engaged exclusively when a State has made a specific representation.695  
                                                          
694 See CMS v. Argentina, para. 277; and Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0619.pdf), para. 331. For a 
contrary opinion see Saluka v. Czech Republic, where, at para. 329, it was held that 
legitimate expectations ‘need not to be based on an explicit assurance from the Czech 
Government', given that the investor could reasonably expect that the Government would 
act in a consistent and even-handed way. 
695 See, among others, S. FIETTA, Expropriation and the "Fair and Equitable" Standard. The 
Developing Role of Investors' "Expectations" in International Investment Arbitration, 
Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 2006, pp. 375-399, at p. 397. On the 
contrary, M. KINNEAR, The Continuing Development of the Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard, supra, note 676, at p. 228 states that: ‘[t]he weight of authority suggests that an 
undertaking or promise need not be directed specifically to the investor and that reliance 
on publicly announced representations or well-known market conditions is a sufficient 
foundation for investor's expectations’; and F. MUTIS TÉLLEZ, Conditions and Criteria For 
The Protection of Legitimate Expectations Under International Investment Law, supra, 
note 681, at p. 441 who believes that a State can violate the investor's legitimate 
expectations also ‘altering the legal order upon which the investor relied and/or 
repudiating or interfering with investor's licence or contract right’. 
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Turning to the analysis of the third element, it should be noted that a number 
of investment tribunals have highlighted that prohibition of arbitrariness and 
discrimination is part of the FET standard. A conduct may be considered as 
arbitrary if ‘it is founded on prejudice and preference rather than on facts’.696 
Therefore, a measure that inflicts damage on the investor without having any 
underlying purpose or a rational explanation is to be considered as arbitrary. 
The problem is to determine whether governmental conduct in a specific 
situation within the context of a complex and long-term relationship is actually 
discriminatory or arbitrary. Inevitably, the State will try to justify its conduct as 
rational and necessary to protect the public interest, while the investors whose 
interests have been injured will claim to be treated in a capricious or 
discriminatory matter. Tribunals have found that in order to establish whether 
conduct is to be deemed as arbitrary, the factual situation of the State must be 
taken into consideration. For instance, in the Enron v. Argentina697 and LG&A 
v. Argentina cases,698 the fact that the State was facing a financial crisis was 
taken into account in order to exclude that Argentina acted in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory manner.699  
Despite the fact that the FET standard is included in almost all modern 
investment treaties, there are still cases where the applicable treaty does not 
contain such a provision and the investor had to make recourse to the most 
favoured nation (“MFN”) clause, in order to ‘import’ the standard from 
another treaty.700 For the sake of clarity, the MFN standard can operate also 
                                                          
696 Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 3 September 2001, para. 221 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0451.pdf); 
Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, 27 
August 2008 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/documents/PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf), 
para. 184. 
697 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Award, 22 May 2007 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0293.pdf), para. 254 
698 LG&E v. Argentina, para. 161 and following.  
699 Notably, in the two mentioned cases, Argentina has been found guilty for breach of the 
FET, even if its conduct was not arbitrary. 
700 See, among the Relevant Cases, ATA v. Jordan (section 6 of this Chapter III).  
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with respect to any guarantee. For instance, in White v. India, the claimant 
rested in it in order to import an effective means clause into the basic treaty.701  
Preliminarily, it must be noted that MFN is a treaty-based obligation and not a 
principle of international law applicable to any State as a general legal 
obligation. In order for MFN to apply, a specific provision in the relevant 
treaty, which may also specify the content and the limits thereof, should exist. 
Second, it is a ‘comparative’ or ‘relative’ standard, as it does not impose an 
obligation to provide foreign investors with a given quality or level of 
treatment. The required treatment is determined by reference to the treatment 
accorded to other investments in similar circumstances. Its aim is to prevent 
discrimination, by ensuring that foreign investors do not receive treatment that 
is less favourable than the one granted to investors of other countries. 
Therefore, in order to find a breach of the MFN clause, the difference in 
treatment must be grounded on the nationality of the foreign investor.  
It shall however be noted that certain limitations operate with respect to the 
application of the MFN clause. First of all, the scope of the MFN is governed 
by the so called ejusdem generis principle,702 pursuant to which the standard can 
apply only to situations belonging to the same subject matter or the same 
categories of subjects to which the clause relates. Therefore, the third party 
treaty must, in principle, regulate the same subject matter as the basic treaty, 
since, as is well known, investment treaties can have different subject matters 
(investment promotion, investment protection, investment liberalization or a 
combination thereof). No other rights can be claimed under an MFN clause 
                                                          
701 See section 9 of this Chapter III. 
702 This principle was first brought to the light by International Court of Justice in the The 
Ambatielos Claim (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), 
Award, 6 March 1956, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XII, pp. 83-153, at p. 
107, and is now consistently affirmed by practice and jurisprudence. In the context of 
investment claims, the principle has been highlighted in the case Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. 
The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal on the 
Objections of Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0479.pdf) (“Maffezini v. 
Spain”), para. 56 and following, and not challenged by the other subsequent cases on 
dealing with MFN clauses. 
226 
than those falling within the limits of the subject matter of the clause. Notably, 
even where the treaty does not specify that the MFN standard applies only to 
‘like circumstances’ or in ‘like situations’, the ejusdem generis principle should be 
considered applicable, as an inherent principle underlying any MFN clause.  
In addition, the MFN clause’s scope of application depends on the specific 
wording set out in the treaty. Indeed, it is normally the treaty itself that 
identifies the substantive coverage of the MFN clause, specifying the covered 
beneficiaries (investors and/or investments)703, the covered phases of the 
investment (the post-establishment phase704 or both the pre- and post-
                                                          
703 Most investment treaties contain MFN clauses that refer to both investors and investments 
(see UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements II, 2010, at p. 45); however, this is not always the 
case as certain treaties refer only to investments. See, for instance, Art. 4 of the Agreement 
Between Australia And Uruguay on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 
on 3 September 2001 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/167), pursuant to which: 
‘[e]ach Party shall at all times treat investments in its own territory on a basis no less 
favourable than that accorded to investments of investors of any third country, provided 
that a Party shall not be obliged to extend to investments any treatment, preference or 
privilege resulting from […]’. 
704 See, for instance, the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United Mexican States for 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 12 May 2006 
(available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2009), which 
provides for an ‘admission clause’ in the basic treaty explicitly subjecting the entry of 
investments to the domestic legal framework, while the MFN clause does not refer to any 
establishment-related activity. More precisely, Art. 2, named Admission of Investments, 
states that: ‘1. Each Contracting Party shall admit investments in accordance with its laws 
and regulations’, while Art. 4, named National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation 
Provision, provides that: ‘1. Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject 
investments or returns of investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment less 
favourable than that which it accords, in like circumstances, to investments or returns of its 
own investors or to investments or returns of investors of any third State. 2. Neither 
Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investors of the other Contracting Party, as 
regards the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, to 
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establishment phases705) and any applicable exception (in relation, for instance, 
to certain sectors706 or rights granted on the basis of specific instruments707).708 
                                                                                                                                                            
treatment less favourable than that which it accords, in like circumstances, to its own 
investors or to investors of any third State.’ 
705 See, for instance, Art. 10.4 of the Free Trade Agreement between Central America, the 
Dominican Republic and the United States of America (CAFTA), signed on 5 August 2004 
(available at: 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CAFTA/CAFTADR_e/CAFTADRin_e.asp), pursuant to 
which: ‘1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of 
any non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, 
and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. 2. Each Party shall accord to covered 
investments treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to 
investments in its territory of investors of any other Party or of any non-Party with respect to 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments’. 
706 This sort of exceptions are typical in MFN which regards the pre-establishment phase. See 
for instance the Canada Model BIT of 2004, pursuant to which:  
‘1. Articles 3, 4, 6 and 7 shall not apply to: 
(a) any existing non-conforming measure that is maintained by  
(i) a Party at the national level, as set out in its Schedule to Annex I, or 
(ii) a sub-national government; 
(b-c) [...] 
2. Articles 3, 4, 6 and 7 shall not apply to any measure that a Party adopts or maintains with 
respect to sectors, subsectors or activities, as set out in its schedule to Annex II. 
3. Article 4 shall not apply to treatment accorded by a Party pursuant to agreements, or 
with respect to sectors, set out in its schedule to Annex III. 
4. In respect of intellectual property rights, a Party may derogate from Articles 3 and 4 in a 
manner that is consistent with the WTO Agreement. 
5. The provisions of Articles 3, 4 and 6 of this Agreement shall not apply to: 
(a) procurement by a Party or state enterprise; 
(b) subsidies or grants provided by a Party or a state enterprise, including government-
supported loans, guarantees and insurance; 
6. [...] 
7. The provisions of Article 4 of this Agreement shall not apply to financial services.’ 
707 This is a typical post-establishment exception. See, for instance, Art. 4 of the Agreement 
between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Paraguay for the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 21 October 1998 (available at: 
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Moreover, the clause may include specific qualifications or representations, 
which shall guide and provide clarifications to the interpreters.709  
Notably, the general scope of the clause is still debated. In particular, much 
attention has been drawn to the debate of whether the MFN may entail the 
importing in the concerned treaty of: (i) substantive protections from other 
investment treaties; and (ii) provisions relating to procedural matters. 
With respect to the first issue, tribunals seem to have accepted that protection 
provisions that are absent in the basic treaty can be imported from other 
treaties.710 On the contrary, it seems that the absence of a provision in a third 
                                                                                                                                                            
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/973), which provides that: 
‘3. The treatment of the most favoured nation, shall not be applied to the privileges which 
one Contracting Party grants to the investor of a third State in pursuance of its 
participation to a free trade zone, customs union, similar international agreements to such unions or 
institutions, common market, monetary unions or other forms of regional agreements to which each 
Contracting Party is a party or may become a party. 4. The treatment granted by this Article does 
not refer to the advantages that one of the Contracting Parties grants to the investor of a 
third State as a result of an agreement to avoid the double taxation or other agreements 
relating to taxation matters’ (emphasis added).  
708 For more on this topic, see A.R. ZIEGLER, Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment, in A. 
REINISCH (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 
59-86, at pp. 75-83; and UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, supra, note 703, at 
pp. 38-53. 
709 See for instance, Art. 3(3) (National Treatment and Most-favoured-nation Provisions) of 
the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of El Salvador for the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, signed on 14 October 1999 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1138), pursuant to which: 
‘[f]or the avoidance of doubt it is confirmed that the treatment provided for in paragraphs 
(1) and (2) above shall apply to the provisions of Articles 1 to 11 [investor-State disputes] 
of this Agreement.’ As illustrated hereinbelow, this clarification is particularly important, as 
precedent arbitral awards have not taken a unanimous approach with respect to the 
possibility to include dispute settlement provisions within the ambit of the MFN clause. 
710 See, MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 2004, (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0544.pdf) (“MTD v. 
Chile”), paras. 100-104; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of 
229 
treaty cannot be the basis for the removal of such a clause in the basic treaty 
through the application of the MFN.711  
With respect to the second issue,712 tribunals have adopted different 
approaches. 713 According to one line of thought, supported by many 
subsequent awards, dispute resolution clauses in principle should not be treated 
differently from other clauses, but there are certain ‘core matters’ that have 
been subject to specific negotiations that cannot be implanted into other 
instruments.714 More precisely, an investor cannot be permitted to rely upon 
the MFN clause to override public policy considerations that the contracting 
States have envisaged as fundamental conditions for their acceptance of the 
treaty, such as: (i) the condition represented by the exhaustion of local 
remedies; (ii) the fork in the road provision; (iii) the choice of a particular 
arbitration system (such as the ICSID); and (iv) the agreement to arbitrate 
                                                                                                                                                            
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, 27 August 2009 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/133) (“Bayindir v. Pakistan”), paras. 153-160. 
This approach was endorsed also in White v. India (see section 9 of this Chapter III). 
711 See CMS v. Argentina, para. 377. 
712 For the purposes of this work, it shall be noted that the only Relevant Case where this 
issue was raised is Frontier v. Czech Republic, where Frontier claimed that, if the tribunal 
deemed that it had no jurisdiction on the basis of the Canada-Czech Republic BIT, the 
MFN should have applied (Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 247). However, the tribunal 
did not deal with this issue as it accepted its jurisdiction on the basis of the Canada-Czech 
Republic BIT (see Chapter II, section 5.4). 
713 See A.R. ZIEGLER, Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment, supra, note 708, at p. 58. 
According to A.C. SMUTNY, L.A. STEVEN, The MFN Clause: What are its Limits?, in K. 
YANNACA-SMALL (ed.), Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide 
to Key Issues, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 351-381, at p. 381, the divergent results 
are simply due to the fact that ‘each individual tribunal reached its decisions upon a careful 
analysis of the available evidence relevant to the intent of the contracting Parties in each 
case. In this sense we might expect divergent results because the evidence of intent in 
some cases will favour the extension of MFN benefits to dispute settlement, whereas in 
other cases it will favour the opposite result.’ Of an analogous opinion seems to be M. 
VALENTI, The Most Favoured Nation Clause in BITs as a Basis for Jurisdiction in Foreign 
Investor—Host State Arbitration, Arbitration International, Vol. 24, Issue 3, 2008, pp. 
447-465. 
714 See Maffezini v. Spain; Tecmed v. Mexico, para. 69. 
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under a highly institutionalized system of arbitration.715 Other ‘core matters’ 
identified by investment tribunals include clauses concerning the temporal 
scope of a treaty716 and the subject matter jurisdiction of a treaty.717 However, 
there are also ICSID awards, where the tribunal came to the conclusion that 
                                                          
715 See Maffezini v. Spain, paras. 62-63. In this case the tribunal considered that the first resort 
to domestic courts for a period of 18 months before establishing the investor-State dispute 
did not reflect a fundamental question of public policy which would have limited the scope 
of the MFN clause. According to A. REINISCH, Maffezini v Spain, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (voice of), Oxford University Press, 2007, the 
Maffezini v. Spain approach was endorsed or used in a number of cases, including, inter 
alia, MTD v. Chile and Tecmed v. Mexico (for additional reference to case-law see also A.R. 
ZIEGLER, Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment, supra, note 708, at p. 85). 
716 See Tecmed v. Mexico, para. 69, whereby it is stated that: ‘matters relating to the 
application over time of the Agreement, which involve more the time dimension of 
application of its substantive provisions rather than matters of procedure or jurisdiction, 
due to their significance and importance, go to the core of matters that must be deemed to be specifically 
negotiated by the Contracting Parties. These are determining factors for their acceptance of the 
Agreement, as they are directly linked to the identification of the substantive protection 
regime applicable to the foreign investor and, particularly, to the general (national or 
international) legal context within which such regime operates, as well as to the access of 
the foreign investor to the substantive provisions of such regime. Their application cannot 
therefore be impaired by the principle contained in the most favoured nation clause’ (emphasis added). 
See also MCI v. Ecuador, paras. 118-128. 
717 See Société Générale In respect of DR Energy Holdings Limited and Empresa Distribuidora de 
Electricidad del Este, S.A. v. The Dominican Republic, UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No. UN 7927, 
Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction, 19 September 2008 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0798.pdf), para. 41, 
whereby it is stated that: ‘[e]ach treaty defines what it considers a protected investment and 
who is entitled to that protection, and definitions can change from treaty to treaty. In this 
situation, resort to the specific text of the MFN Clause is unnecessary because it applies 
only to the treatment accorded to such defined investment, but not to the definition of 
"investment" itself.’ In its reasoning, the panel analysed a basic legal notion: in order to 
resort to the MFN treatment clause, the basic treaty has to be validly invoked. Therefore, 
first comes the application of the treaty itself, through the scope and definition clauses, and 
only after, the MFN clause can be invoked. 
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the relevant MFN provision did not cover the dispute settlement at all.718 
Finally, it is worth noting an isolated case, whereby the panel deemed that the 
MFN clause could incorporate the host State’s broader consent to arbitrate 
under third-State treaties into the basic treaty and serve as a basis of 
jurisdiction.719 Against this background, more and more States seem to prefer 
to clearly express their will to include in,720 or exclude from,721 the relevant 
MFN clause procedural provisions, especially dispute settlement, by stating the 
exception or the clarification in an appropriate way in the text of the treaty. 
 
6. ATA v. Jordan 
In the second Relevant Case in chronological order, which is Romak v. 
Uzbekistan, the tribunal did not analyse the merits, as it denied its 
                                                          
718 See, for instance, Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 November 2004, para. 102 and 
following (available at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/954); and Plama Consortium Ltd v. 
Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005 (available 
at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/858). 
719 RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 079/2005, Award on 
Jurisdiction, October 2007 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/924). 
S.W. SCHILL, Most-Favored-Nation Clauses as a Basis of Jurisdiction in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: Arbitral Jurisprudence at a Crossroads, The Journal of World Investment & 
Trade, Vol. 10, Issue 210, 2009, pp. 189-225, endorsed this approach. Also Z. DOUGLAS, 
The International Law of Investment Claims, supra, note 357, is along this line of 
reasoning. In his Rule 43, it is stated that: ‘[a] most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause in the 
basic investment treaty does not incorporate by reference provisions relating to the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, in whole or in part, set forth in a third investment 
treaty, unless there is an unequivocal provision to that effect in the basic investment treaty.’ 
720 See, supra, note 709. 
721 See, for instance, the Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 17 
May 2006 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/803), whose Art. 4(2) 
provides that: ‘[f]or greater certainty, it is further understood that the most favourable 
nation treatment […] does not encompass mechanisms for the settlement of investment 
disputes provided for in other international agreements concluded by the Party concerned. 
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jurisdiction722 and did not take any position on whether the assertions of the 
claimant were grounded. 
On the contrary, in ATA v. Jordan, the tribunal accepted its jurisdiction with 
respect to the set aside of the arbitration agreement included in the 
construction contract entered into between ATA and APC.723 It is worth 
recalling that, conversely, the tribunal rejected its jurisdiction with respect to 
the set aside of the commercial arbitral award itself. 724 
 
6.1. The merits phase 
Prior to analysing the positions held by the panel at the merits phase, it should 
be noted that, though the arbitral tribunal declined its jurisdiction with respect 
to the annulment of the commercial arbitral award, in an obiter dictum, it 
maintained that, even if there had been jurisdiction, such annulment would 
have not represented a denial of justice, as the actions of the municipal courts 
‘could hardly be said to have constituted abusive misconduct, bad faith or 
denial of justice’,725 thus endorsing the reconstruction pursuant to which for 
denial of justice to occur it must be egregious.726 
With respect to the setting aside of the arbitration agreement, the decision of 
the tribunal is rather peculiar, as it did not address in the specific any of the 
claims made by ATA, but considered the misconduct of the Jordan judiciary 
contrary to the ‘letter and the spirit’727 of the Turkey-Jordan BIT because its 
decision was based on the retroactive application of the JAL. More precisely, 
the national courts of the Kingdom of Jordan retroactively applied the JAL, 
which mandated the extinguishment of an arbitration agreement in the event of 
a final decision on the part of the Jordanian courts nullifying an arbitral award 
                                                          
722 See Chapter II, section 5.2. 
723 See Chapter II, section 5.3. 
724 See Chapter II, v section 5.3. 
725 See ATA v. Jordan, section 126 
726 See section 2 of this Chapter III. 
727 See ATA v. Jordan, para. 125. 
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based on that arbitration agreement,728 and thus declared the arbitration 
agreement between ATA and APC null. 
Stepping back to the alleged violations of the Turkey-Jordan BIT, ATA claimed 
that, when the Jordanian court extinguished the arbitration agreement, it 
unlawfully expropriated ATA’s investment, violated the MFN clause and, 
broadly, took an unfair and inequitable decision, contrary to the Turkey-Jordan 
BIT.729 According to ATA, the fact that such an extinguishment resulted from 
the application of the JAL did not preclude the wrongfulness of the measure as 
a matter of international law. More precisely, the claimant asserted that: ‘[t]he 
mere existence of legislation does not constitute a violation of a State’s 
international obligations owed to a foreign investor. If a State passes legislation 
entitling its judiciary or executive to expropriate property, the State does not 
violate its international obligation not to expropriate an individual investor’s 
property until the judiciary or executive actually effects an unlawful taking of 
that investor’s property.’730 Notably, Jordan rebutted this position, affirming 
that the: ‘Claimant has failed to prove that the final sentence of Article 51 of 
the Jordanian Arbitration Law violates the Turkey-Jordan BIT, either on its 
face or as applied in this case, and the provision does not run afoul of 
applicable international norms. For example, the provision and its operation in 
this case are consistent with Article II(3) of the New York Convention, and 
[the] Claimant has not shown otherwise.’731 
As mentioned, the tribunal upheld ATA’s position. More precisely, it referred 
to the Preamble of the Turkey-Jordan BIT, according to which ‘the fair and 
equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable 
framework for investment and a maximum effective utilization of economic 
                                                          
728 This provision was set out in Art. 51 of the Jordanian Arbitration Law. 
729 See ATA v. Jordan, para. 128. ATA made a number of claims also in relation to the setting 
aside of the arbitral awards, but the panel did not consider them as it blocked the relevant 
judgment at the jurisdictional phase. Therefore such aspects will not be considered 
hereinafter. 
730 See ATA v. Jordan, para. 82. 
731 See ATA v. Jordan, para. 93. 
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resources.’732 In light of this provision of the Preamble, the tribunal considered 
that the extinguishment of ATA’s right to arbitration by Jordan violated both 
the letter and the spirit of the BIT. Interestingly, the tribunal in a footnote also 
noted that: ‘[…] by virtue of Article II(2) of the Treaty (i.e., the MFN clause), 
the Respondent has assumed the obligation to accord to the Claimant’s 
investment fair and equitable treatment (see the UK-Jordan BIT) and treatment 
no less favourable than that required by international law (see the Spain-Jordan 
BIT).’733 However, it did not take any explicit position on the application of the 
MFN clause and violation of the FET clause possibly imported in the Turkey-
Jordan BIT from third-party treaties.  
The tribunal also maintained that: 
- the retroactive effect of the JAL, which extinguished a valid right to 
arbitration, deprived the claimant of a valuable asset in violation of the 
treaty’s investment protections;734 and 
- the annulment of the arbitration agreement also violated the duty of Jordan, 
arising from Art. II of the New York Convention, to recognize valid 
arbitration agreements: this would have probably required the Jordanian 
courts to refuse to apply retroactively the provision of the JAL. In an obiter 
dictum the tribunal also added that ‘[i]t is arguable […] that the 
extinguishment rule might be deemed to be prospectively compatible with 
Article II insofar as parties electing Jordan as the venue for an arbitration or 
electing Jordanian law as the law of the arbitration had notice of the rule 
and accepted it. But this argument cannot work retroactively. Retroactivity 
is the problem here.’ 735  
 
6.2. Remarks 
On the merits, this award is very short and not detailed. It is not therefore 
possible to understand in depth the line of reasoning followed by the panel. 
                                                          
732 See ATA v. Jordan, para. 125. 
733 See ATA v. Jordan, note 16. 
734 See ATA v. Jordan, para. 126. 
735 See ATA v. Jordan, para. 128. 
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On the basis of its cursory explanation, it seems that the panel deemed that 
through the retroactive application of the Jordanian Arbitration Law – which 
was not in place at the time the investment of ATA in Jordan was made – and 
the ensuing annulment of a valid arbitral award, Jordan violated the New York 
Convention and the Jordan-Turkey BIT.   
However, many passages of the tribunal’s reasoning remain obscure. More 
precisely it is not clear: (i) which standard(s) of protection of foreign 
investment included in the Jordan-Turkey BIT the tribunal considered 
breached; and (ii) how the violation of the New York Convention amounted to 
a violation of the Jordan-Turkey BIT or in any event entailed the international 
liability of the State vis-à-vis the investor.  
With respect to the first topic, it must preliminarily be noted, as illustrated in 
section 6.1 of this Chapter, that from the summary of ATA’s allegations made 
by the tribunal of the award, it seems that ATA itself failed to clearly frame its 
claim in relation to the extinguishment of the arbitration agreement.736 Indeed, 
ATA claimed a violation of the MFN clause, but the award does not specify 
which provisions of which treaty should have been imported in the basic treaty 
as a consequence of the application of the MFN clause. In addition, it also 
asserted a breach of the expropriation clause of the Turkey-Jordan BIT and the 
existence of conduct that was imprecisely considered ‘unfair and inequitable 
contrary to the BIT’.737 The tribunal in its decision seems to have somewhat 
endorsed this third and latter claim of ATA (i.e., that the national court 
adopted an unfair and inequitable decision) because no express reference to the 
MFN clause or to the expropriation clause is made in the tribunal’s decision on 
the merits, even though implicit or explicit references to the MFN clause and 
to the prohibition to expropriate are present here and there.  
More precisely, in relation to the expropriation claim, the tribunal itself stated 
that, through the retroactive application of the Jordan arbitration law, which 
                                                          
736 This flaw was also noted by Jordan (see ATA v. Jordan, para. 93). However, the claims 
concerning the setting aside of the arbitral awards (which was dismissed on temporal 
grounds, see Chapter II, section 5.3) were extensively explained and motivated by ATA. 
737 ATA v. Jordan, para. 81. 
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extinguished a valid arbitration right, the national courts deprived the investor 
of a valuable asset ‘in violation of the Treaty’s investment protection.’738 
However, the tribunal did not expressly mention the Jordan-Turkey BIT’s 
provision on expropriation. The reason the tribunal did not expressly rely on 
the relevant clause of the Turkey-Jordan BIT is not clear. Indeed, it is 
recognized that immaterial rights, such as contractual rights, can be 
expropriated.739 Moreover, once it is accepted that (i) an arbitration agreement 
constitutes by itself an investment740 and (ii) an indirect expropriation can take 
place through the loss of control over the investment, in the case at issue the 
substantive elements for an expropriation seem to be met.  
In relation to the MFN clause, one may still consider that the tribunal took it 
into consideration as it is mentioned in a footnote of the award. 741 The above 
premised, the point is now to understand on which grounds the tribunal found 
the Jordan State liable for annulling the arbitration agreement. In this respect, 
some authors deemed that the tribunal did not take into consideration any 
particular guarantee and, relying on the Preamble, which highlights the 
importance to ensure a fair and equitable treatment to foreign investors, it 
considered that the Turkey-Jordan BIT was breached by the actions of the 
Jordanian courts, without identifying exactly which clause thereof.742 This 
reconstruction adheres to the wording of the award, but does not really provide 
an explanation of the panel’s thoughts. Moreover, such an approach would be 
quite an inappropriate position, as it is a well-known principle that a paragraph 
                                                          
738 ATA v. Jordan, para. 126. 
739 See section 3 of this Chapter III. 
740 This statement was made by the tribunal itself (ATA v. Jordan, para. 117). See Chapter II, 
section 5.3. 
741 Reference is made to footnote 16 of the award (see, supra, note 733). For more on this 
point, see infra in this section. 
742 M.D. GOLDHABER, The Rise of Arbitral Power Over Domestic Courts, supra, note 491, at 
p. 392. 
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of the Preamble does not create rights or obligations, but can only be used to 
interpret a clause of the treaty.743 
According to other scholarly writings,744 the tribunal concluded that there was a 
violation of the FET standard. In this respect it should however be noted that 
the Jordan-Turkey BIT did not contain a FET provision and that, as illustrated, 
the tribunal did not expressly rely on the MFN clause to apply the FET 
standard included in other treaties stipulated by Jordan. As noted above, a 
reference to the FET clause of other treaties is exclusively made in a footnote, 
with no specific explanation.745 Therefore, it is not clear whether the tribunal 
effectively based its decision on them. If the tribunal deemed that a violation of 
the FET standard set out in other treaties was existent, it should have explained 
its reasoning with more details, as, for instance, was done in the context of the 
Bayindir v. Pakistan case, which presented various features analogous to those 
of ATA v. Jordan. Also in Bayindir v. Pakistan, the tribunal had to establish 
whether a FET clause could be imported in the base treaty through the 
application of the MFN clause set out therein. Notably, the applicable BIT746 
was very similar to the Jordan-Turkey BIT with specific respect to the 
provisions relevant in this context as: (i) it contained a reference to the FET in 
its Preamble; (ii) it provided for a MFN clause having an analogous wording; 
and (iii) the exceptions to the application of the MFN standard were the same 
as those included in the Jordan-Turkey BIT (i.e., obligations assumed in certain 
                                                          
743 A. NEWCOMBE, L. PARADELL, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties, Standards of 
Treatment, supra, note 10, at p. 124. Relevance to the Preamble in the interpretation of a 
treaty is given by Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention pursuant to which: ‘[a] treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ 
744 J. DINGWALL, H. HAERI, Jordan: ICSID Tribunal finds Jordan in Violation of its 
Investment Treaty Obligations, supra, note 393, at pp. N34-35; D.B. KING, R. MOLOO, 
Enforcement after the Arbitration: From National Courts to Public International Law 
Fora, supra, note 84, at pp. 421. 
745 Footnote 16. See, supra, notes 733 and 741. 
746 Agreement Between the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on 16 March 
1995 (available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2135). 
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specific investment instruments and with respect to tax matters). In that case, 
the tribunal ruled that: ‘[i]n the Tribunal's view, such language [i.e., the wording 
of the Preamble] is of little assistance as it does not establish any operative 
obligation. It is true that the reference to FET in the preamble together with 
the absence of a FET clause in the Treaty might suggest that Turkey and 
Pakistan intended not to include an FET obligation in the Treaty. The Tribunal 
is, however, not persuaded that this suggestion rules out the possibility of 
importing an FET obligation through the MFN clause expressly included in the 
Treaty. The fact that the States parties to the Treaty clearly contemplated the importance of 
the FET rather suggests the contrary. Indeed, even though it does not establish an operative 
obligation, the preamble is relevant for the interpretation of the MFN clause in its context 
and in the light of the Treaty's object and purpose pursuant to Article 31(1) of the 
VCLT’.747 The panel went on to state that the ordinary meaning of the MFN 
clause, together with the relevant limitations, showed that the parties to the 
treaty did not intend to exclude the importation of a more favourable 
substantive standard of treatment accorded to investors from third countries. 
For the tribunal, this reading was supported by the Preamble's insistence on the 
FET.748 Once it had been established that the MFN could entail the 
importation of the FET standard from other treaties, the tribunal analysed 
which FET clauses of other treaties entered into by Pakistan with third States, 
if any, may have been relevant, and if so their content, so it could understand if 
an effective breach of the basic treaty had occurred. 
Unfortunately, the tribunal in the ATA v. Jordan award did not articulate its 
reasoning in such a precise way, which renders the interpretation of the award 
particularly complex. 
One could also argue that the tribunal considered the FET standard part of 
customary international law749 and therefore applicable despite the lack of a 
                                                          
747 Bayidir v. Pakistan, para. 155 (emphasis added). 
748 Bayidir v. Pakistan, para. 157. 
749 A. DIEHL, The Core Standard of International Investment Protection, supra, note 502, at p. 
541. Also certain investment tribunals have embraced the proposition that the FET 
standard reflects a rule of customary international law (see, for instance, Mondev v. US, 
paras. 110-117; Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award in 
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specific FET clause in the Jordan-Turkey BIT,750 but no specific indication of 
this is given in the award. In any event, assuming that the tribunal effectively 
deemed that the Jordanian courts breached the FET standard, it has been 
highlighted how the tribunal ‘did not articulate the elements it viewed as 
necessary to justify [that] violation.’751  
Finally, according to one author,752 the tribunal substantially considered that 
Jordan, through its courts, violated the prohibition of abuse of rights.753 More 
precisely, the national courts retroactively applied an unusual national law, 
which entered into force after the conclusion of the arbitration agreement. 
Notably, all the above reconstructions are somewhat grounded, even if none of 
the results are particularly persuasive. The fault however does not lie in the 
scholarly interpretations, but on the award, as it does not allow the interpreter 
to properly understand the line of reasoning followed by the tribunal. 
With respect to the second obscure aspect of the merits of this award, it is 
noted that the tribunal did not explain how the wrongful application of the 
New York Convention assumed relevance in the context of the claim. More 
                                                                                                                                                            
Respect of Damages, 31 May 2002, pp. 52-66 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0686.pdf)). Please, 
however, note that the inclusion of the FET standard within customary international law is 
debated. For instance, H. HAERI, A Tale of Two Standards: ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ 
and the Minimum Standard in International Law, Arbitration International, Vol. 27, Issue 
1, 2011, pp. 27-43, at pp. 43-44 is of the contrary opinion.  
750 It has been argued that when the clause relating to the dispute settlement and consent to 
jurisdiction is very broad (as the one included in the Jordan-Turkey BIT), the aggrieved 
investor could bring an investor-State claim also for violations of international norms 
which have an impact on the investment, without being limited to the violations of 
substantive standards set out in the applicable investment treaty. For more on this see 
section 10 of this Chapter. 
751 D.B. KING, R. MOLOO, Enforcement after the Arbitration: From National Courts to 
Public International Law Fora, supra, note 84, at pp. 421. 
752 G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, Commercial Arbitration Before International Courts and 
Tribunals Reviewing Abusive Conduct of Domestic Courts, supra, note 477, at p. 172. 
753 Of a different opinion, S. FIETTA, J. UPCHER, Public International Law, Investment 
Treaties and Commercial Arbitration: an emerging system of complementarity?, supra, note 
441, at p. 192. 
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precisely, the tribunal clearly explained that the national courts, in applying the 
new provisions of JAL, breached Art. II of New York Convention, which 
requires the recognition of written agreements under which the parties 
undertake to submit to arbitration. However, the missing passage is how this 
violation is relevant in the context of an investment treaty claim. More 
precisely, the question is whether the tribunal considered that through the 
breach of the New York Convention, the investor also breached the Turkey-
Jordan BIT (and, had this been the case, which provisions thereof had been 
breached) or whether it considered that international law generally had been 
violated.754  
Notably, the tribunal, when deciding on the relief, stated exclusively that the 
reparation was due since the extinguishment of the right to arbitration was 
‘unlawful’,755 once again without making reference to any provision of the 
Turkey-Jordan BIT. 
To conclude, in light of the above considerations, one may argue that also in 
this case the tribunal adopted an approach which can be considered more 
solomonic than juridical:756 it noted that the retroactive application of a law 
which did not exist at the time the parties stipulated the construction contract 
and entails the annulment of the arbitration agreement frustrated the legitimate 
reliance of the Parties on the arbitration agreement included in the contract and 
violated the New York Convention. Indeed, at the time of execution of the 
contract the parties agreed and expected to preclude the submission to national 
courts of potential disputes under the contract. The peculiarity in this case is 
that the ICSID tribunal could have resorted to a number of effective legal 
solutions to reach the same result, but apparently opted not to. 
                                                          
754 Indeed, ‘it is widely accepted that frustration of the arbitral proceeding by the state is in 
itself a violation of international law’ (S. SATTAR, National Courts and International 
Arbitration: A Double-edged Sword?, supra, note 64, at p. 68). 
755 ATA v. Jordan, para. 129. 
756 E. ALVAREZ, Crossing the “Public/Private” Divide: Saipem v. Bangladesh and Other 
Crossover Cases, supra, note 332, at p. 426, commented the Saipem v. Bangladesh case as 
follows: ‘Saipem award might be seen as Solomonic or just result grounded in inelegant (if 
not erroneous) international investment law’. 
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Moreover, the remarks concerning the fact that ICSID tribunal in Saipem v. 
Bangladesh adapted the mechanisms of investment law expressed in BITS for a 
review of the lawful application of the New York Convention also seems 
applicable in this case.757 
As a final remark, it is worth noting that the fact that the tribunal did not 
clearly expressed its point of view renders this award a difficult precedent to 
rely on for future cases. In any event, it continued the trend pursuant to which 
frustrated winners of commercial awards have an opportunity to bring their 
claims before investment tribunals alleging violations of investment treaties.  
 
7. Frontier v. Czech Republic 
The case at issue is to be considered relevant for the level of details that the 
tribunal went into to support its positions and also for certain peculiar 
positions that the tribunal took, such as the one about the role of investment 
arbitration with respect to domestic courts’ decisions concerning the 
application of the New York Convention. 
Prior to beginning with the analysis of the merits of the award, a couple of 
preliminary remarks need to be made. First, Frontier alleged that several 
behaviours of the Czech courts and Czech officials entailed violations of 
provisions of the BIT. However, only one of these claims will be considered 
herein as all the others do not deal with the interference of the national courts 
with the enforcement of arbitral awards, and therefore fall outside the scope of 
this work.758 Second, although Frontier argued that the non-enforcement of the 
                                                          
757 See, supra, para. 4.2.2 Notably the Author that made this critic vis-à-vis Saipem was also a 
component of the ATA v. Jordan panel.  
758 The other claims that are not described herein and that have been integrally dismissed by 
the panel regarded: (i) a violation of the FET standard for the alleged delays of the 
Regional Court in Brno in the proceeding concerning Frontier’s request of declaration of 
invalidity of two resolutions adopted at LZ’s general meeting held on 13 September 2002; 
(ii) violation of the FET and full protection and security standards because of a meeting 
between national judges and the bankruptcy trustee before the issuance of courts’ decision; 
(iii) violation of the good faith principle as well as the FET and full protection and security 
standards for the failure of Czech officials to assist the claimant. 
242 
award amounted to a violation of: (i) the effective means standard,759 (ii) the 
FET standard,760 (iii) the obligation to provide favourable conditions for the 
investment,761 and (iv) the full protection and security standard,762 the arbitral 
panel substantially disregarded all causes of actions, and focused on the 
violation of the FET standard exclusively. Therefore, in this section 7 only this 
cause of action will be considered.  
 
7.1. The merits phase 
Frontier’s claim under analysis focused on the refusal by the Czech courts to 
recognize and enforce all of the orders contained in the interim award and in 
the final award issued by the SCC, respectively on 30 January 2004 and 30 
December 2004.763  
In this respect, it is useful to briefly recall the content of the parts of the 
interim and final awards that according to Frontier’s reconstruction the Czech 
courts had wrongfully not enforced, as it had an impact on the decision of the 
investment tribunal. Both the interim and the final awards upheld Frontier’s 
claims. More precisely, in the interim award, LZ and MA were enjoined from, 
inter alia, improperly selling and disposing of the LET Assets acquired with the 
claimant’s funds until the issuance of the final award. The final award provided, 
inter alia, that Frontier was entitled to a first secured charge against the LET 
Assets and all of the property of MA for an amount of 204,170,000 Czech 
crowns plus interest and ordered the trustee in the bankruptcy of MA and the 
                                                          
759 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 469. 
760 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 470. 
761 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 470. 
762 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 470. 
763 Indeed, some of the orders of the interim award and of the final award have been 
enforced. More precisely, with respect to the interim award, the Regional Court accepted 
to appoint a receiver of MA. In relation to the final award, see, infra, note 764. For more on 
the facts, see Chapter II, section 5.4. 
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trustee in the bankruptcy of LZ, respectively, to immediately grant to Frontier 
first secured charges in accordance with the content of the final award.764 
Turning to the analysis of the positions of the investment tribunal with respect 
to the lack of recognition and enforcement of the interim award, the tribunal 
noted that the municipal courts did not act in an improper manner. More 
precisely, the tribunal highlighted that in the letters that Frontier wrote on 27 
February 2004 to the District Courts in Uherske ́ Hradište, enclosing, inter alia, 
the interim award, the claimant merely suggested to terminate or interrupt all 
executions of judgements against MA and LZ and it requested to be updated in 
this respect, without specifying on which grounds it had such a right. In 
addition, the tribunal noted that Frontier’s requests to the Regional Courts to 
enjoin all parties from any disposition of the assets of MA and open 
proceedings with respect to the nullity of any sale contract or other acts of MA 
and LZ were not clearly connected to the terms of the interim award. Finally, 
the relief sought with respect to the interim award by Frontier also regarded 
third parties, while the interim award addressed only MA and LZ. In light of 
the above, the tribunal was ‘unable to conclude that the alleged inactions of the 
                                                          
764 Notably, the final award contained several additional orders in favour of Frontier. More 
precisely: (i) Frontier was entitled to an accounting of the LET Assets held at that time or, 
otherwise, sold, pledged or otherwise disposed from 15 August 2001; (ii) Frontier was 
entitled to 49% of the shares of LZ, against the consideration of USD 100, to be paid by 
way of set off against amounts otherwise owed to Frontier by MA and LZ; (iii) MA and 
LZ were ordered to pay to Frontier certain interests, the damages for lost of business 
opportunities, the arbitration costs and to repay Frontier the share of advanced payments 
to cover the fees and the costs of arbitration (Frontier v. Czech Republic, paras. 141; 523). 
In relation to the order referred to under (i) above, the investment tribunal found refusal to 
enforce it justifiable as it noted that such refusal ‘was based on more technical grounds, 
such as the impossibility of the trustee to trace the assets of a third party (i.e. LET), and the 
lack of concordance between the wording of the Claimant’s request and the Final Award’ 
(Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 523). With respect to the order referred to under (ii) 
above, the share certificates were duly delivered to Frontier (Frontier v. Czech Republic, 
para. 142). With respect to the orders referred to under (iii), the investment tribunal 
maintained that ‘these claims were ultimately upheld.’ In light of the above, the investment 
tribunal focused only on the lack of enforcement of the order concerning the granting of a 
first security over the Let Assets. 
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Regional Court and the District Court […] constituted a failure to properly give 
effect to the Interim Award.’765 
The investment tribunal then moved on to the claims connected to non-
enforcement of the final award, which, as illustrated in section 5.4 of Chapter 
II, was based on the public policy exception set out in Art. V(2)(b) of the New 
York Convention. More precisely, substantially all the Czech judicial authorities 
called to decide upon the recognition and enforcement of the part of the final 
arbitral award regarding the granting of a secured charge over the LET Assets 
and the assets of MA stated that such an act would have been contrary to: (i) 
the national bankruptcy law, as it purported to accord to the Claimant an 
exceptional status after the bankruptcy had been declared; and (ii) the Czech 
public policy principle of equality of rights of bankruptcy creditors.766 
Therefore, they all refused the enforcement under Art. V(2)(a) of the New 
York Convention. According to the claimant, the Czech courts acted in bad 
faith and based their decisions on applicable municipal law, while under Art. 27 
of the Vienna Convention ‘[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.’767 
Prior to the analysis of the merits of this claim, the investment tribunal had to 
face a preliminary issue raised by the Czech Republic, according to which the 
claimant’s claim was inadmissible ‘because the tribunal must […] make a ruling 
on the correctness of the Czech courts’ reliance upon the public policy 
exception in Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention. This would mean that 
the Tribunal would be acting as a court of appeal in respect of a decision of the 
Czech courts or as an international court with supervisory jurisdiction over 
contracting states’ obligations under the New York Convention.’768 This was, 
according to the respondent, contrary to the wording and the spirit of the New 
York Convention, where the final word on the issue of public policy as a bar to 
recognition and enforcement was given to the national competent 
                                                          
765 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 524. 
766 Frontier v. Czech Republic, paras. 502-475. 
767 Frontier v. Czech Republic, paras. 474. 
768 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 485 
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authorities.769 In addressing this point, the tribunal made an important assertion 
with respect to the role that investment tribunals have in the review of the 
activities of the local courts. The tribunal highlighted that its ‘role under this 
claim is to determine whether the refusal of the Czech courts to recognise and 
enforce the Final Award in full violates Article III(1) of the BIT [i.e., the FET 
standard clause].’770 Therefore, it recognised its power to review the decisions 
of national courts applying the New York Convention, in order to assess if 
through such decisions the State had breached a provision of the applicable 
investment treaty. As already mentioned, the tribunal limited its analysis to a 
breach of the FET clause, while it apparently disregarded all other claims raised 
by Frontier (e.g., violation of the effective means clause and the full protection 
and security clause).  
In order to assess if a violation of the FET clause had occurred,771 the tribunal 
deemed that its analysis should focus on whether the Czech courts’ refusal to 
enforce amounted to an abuse of rights contrary to the international principle 
of good faith, meaning in particular that the interpretation given by the Czech 
courts to the public policy exception in Art. V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention was made in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner or was 
otherwise fundamentally unfair.772  
In this respect, the tribunal first held that it is widely accepted that the concept 
of public policy for the purposes of the New York Convention also refers to 
international public policy. Still, it found that the New York Convention leaves 
some room for national conceptions of the public policy exception. In light of 
the above, the tribunal deemed it unnecessary to ‘determine whether the 
findings of the Czech courts meet the applicable standard of international 
public policy, or to determine the precise contents of that standard. States 
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in determining what their own 
                                                          
769 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 485 
770 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 525. 
771 As already mentioned in section 7 of this Chapter III, the tribunal limited its analysis to a 
breach of the FET clause, while it apparently disregarded all other claims raised by Frontier 
(e.g., violation of the effective means clause and of the full protection and security clause). 
772 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 525. 
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conception of international public policy is.’773 The tribunal went on to state 
that it was sufficient to assess whether the interpretation given to the public 
policy exception by the municipal courts was plausible, i.e., made in good faith 
and reasonably tenable.774 After having found that the equality of creditors in 
bankruptcy proceedings is considered as a public policy principle sufficient to 
refuse enforcement of arbitral awards in several jurisdictions, it came to the 
conclusion that the ‘interpretation of the international public policy […] 
adopted by the Czech courts is reasonably tenable.’775 Therefore there was no 
indication that the national courts acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily or in bad 
faith and, as a consequence, in violation of the FET standard.776 On this 
ground, Frontier’s claim was dismissed.  
 
7.2. Remarks 
Differently from ATA v. Jordan, in the case at issue, the panel took certain 
clear positions, clarifying the role of investment arbitration in reviewing 
national courts’ conduct and the conditions under which a decision of national 
                                                          
773 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 527. 
774 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 527. In this respect it must be noted that the tribunal, in 
the course of its analysis of the content of the ‘full protection and security standard’, stated 
that: ‘[i]n this Tribunal’s view, where the acts of the host state’s judiciary are at stake, “full 
protection and security” means that the state is under an obligation to make a functioning 
system of courts and legal remedies available to the investor. On the other hand, not every 
failure to obtain redress is a violation of the principle of full protection and security. Even 
a decision that in the eyes of an outside observer, such as an international tribunal, is “wrong” 
would not automatically lead to state responsibility as long as the courts have acted in good faith and have 
reached decisions that are reasonably tenable. In particular, the fact that protection could have 
been more effective, procedurally or substantively, does not automatically mean that the 
full protection and security standard has been violated’ (para. 127, emphasis added). 
Therefore, despite the fact that in the decision, the tribunal referred only to the FET 
standard, one may argue that it considered also the full protection and security standard 
and that in future cross over cases, aggrieved investors can bring claims also for violations 
of that standard.  
775 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 529. 
776 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 529. 
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courts can entail a breach of the FET clause of an investment treaty. These 
aspects will be considered in detail in the following two sub-sections. 
 
7.2.1. The role of investment tribunals  
The first remarkable statement of this award is the one concerning the role to 
be attributed to investment tribunals in the review of decisions of domestic 
courts concerning the enforcement of commercial arbitral awards. As already 
noted in this Chapter, international tribunals have always had a deferential 
approach vis-à-vis the decisions taken by national courts.777 In addition, they 
have unanimously asserted that they cannot, and will not, act as an international 
court of appeal against the decisions assumed by national courts concerning the 
application of the New York Convention or the setting aside of commercial 
arbitral awards.778 The reason underlying this position is that traditionally it was 
not considered possible for investment tribunals to review the national courts' 
decisions on the topic, in light of the so-called ‘architecture’779 of international 
                                                          
777 See sections 1 and 2 of this Chapter III.  
778 For instance, in the Saipem v. Bangladesh Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 155; 158, the 
tribunal expressly stated that: ‘[t]o avoid any ambiguity, the Tribunal stresses that Saipem’s 
claim does not deal with the courts’ regular exercise of their power to rule over annulment 
or setting aside proceedings of an award wrongful interference [...]. By accepting jurisdiction, 
this Tribunal does not institute itself as control body over the ICC Arbitration, nor as enforcement court, 
nor as supranational appellate body for local court decisions. This Tribunal is a treaty judge. It is called 
upon to rule exclusively on treaty breaches, whatever the context in which such treaty breaches arise’ 
(emphasis added). In Romak v. Uzbekistan, the denial of jurisdiction was based on the 
grounds that the mechanical application of the broad definition of investment included in 
the Switzerland-Uzbekistan BIT: ‘would create, de facto, a new instance of review of State 
court decisions concerning the enforcement of arbitral awards. […] The refusal or failure 
of the host State’s courts to enforce such an award would therefore arguably provide 
sufficient grounds for a de novo review – under a different international instrument and on 
grounds different from those that would normally apply – of the State courts’ decision not 
to enforce an award’ (para. 186). 
779 The term architecture is coined by W.M. Reisman (see, inter alia, W.M. REISMAN, H. 
IRAVANI, The Changing Relation of National Courts and International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra, note 64; W.M. REISMAN, B. RICHARDSON, Tribunals and Courts: An 
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commercial arbitration. As already illustrated in sub-section 4.2.2 of this 
Chapter,780 according to this doctrine, commercial arbitration awards should be 
considered as the final decision on the contended matter, with the courts of the 
seat of the arbitration being competent to annul the award and courts of the 
place of enforcement being competent to rule upon the recognition and 
enforcement of the award in that particular State.781 This architecture does not 
envisage any form of recourse against the final decision on the annulment or 
on the enforcement of the awards. In particular, with respect to the 
enforcement of arbitral commercial awards, the New York Convention – 
which does not provide for any dispute resolution clause – seems to prevent 
any further review of the decision taken by national courts involved in the 
application of the Convention itself. In this respect, it has been noted that: 
‘[…] the drafters of the New York Convention (some more than 50 years ago) 
were most likely not intending to see the international investment arbitration 
forum considering the compliance of the states with the provisions thereof.’782 
In relation to the annulment of arbitral awards, the power to rule on the topic, 
according to the school of thought that adheres to the territorialist theory, is 
granted exclusively to the courts of the place where the arbitration is held: they 
are given the ultimate say as to the validity of the award and their decision in 
this respect should have effects erga omnes.  
As illustrated, in relation to the topic connected to the enforcement of the 
arbitral award, the tribunal in the Frontier v. Czech Republic award seems to 
                                                                                                                                                            
Interpretation of the Architecture of International Commercial Arbitration, supra, note 
488). 
780 See also Chapter I, section 4.  
781 There are, of course, other conceptions of the architecture of international commercial 
arbitration. However, they are not reflective of the generally accepted conceptions of 
international law (see G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, Commercial Arbitration Before 
International Courts and Tribunals Reviewing Abusive Conduct of Domestic Courts, supra, 
note 477, at p. 154) 
782 L. GUGLYA, International Review of Decisions Concerning Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Award: A Threat to the Sovereignty of the States or an Overestimated 
Hazard (so far)? (with Emphasis on the Developments within the International Investment Arbitration 
Setting), supra, note 630, at p. 109. 
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challenge the above-mentioned architecture, expressly recognising that 
investment tribunals are entitled to review how the New York Convention was 
applied by national courts.783 However, the tribunal itself somewhat limited this 
power: the review of the decisions of national courts in this respect could be 
made exclusively to the extent necessary to establish if a violation of the 
standards set out in the applicable investment treaty occurred. Therefore, if the 
non-enforcement of an arbitral award due to a bad faith application of the New 
York Convention also amounts to a violation of a standard of the applicable 
BIT (e.g., FET, full protection and security, denial of justice, etc.), the 
investment tribunal is entitled to judge the conduct of the national courts. 
Consequently, investment tribunals are not called to rule on the application of 
the New York Convention and/or national law, but rather on allegations of 
treaty violations by a State, even if it is undeniable that in order to do that they 
have to review the content of the decision rendered by the national courts.784  
This framing of investment tribunals' activities supports the theory that they 
are not acting as a mere body of appeal, but are exclusively exercising their 
jurisdiction, assessing whether a treaty breach has occurred. 
The tribunal’s position is endorsed by one author, according to whom: ‘[t]here 
is no reason why [an investment arbitral tribunal] should not entertain a claim 
simply because the circumstances under which the alleged breach occurred 
involve the application of another treaty (i.e., the New York Convention).’785 
This author maintains that investment tribunals do not act as an appellate body 
in relation to the enforcement of commercial arbitral awards; rather, they assess 
                                                          
783 In Saipem v. Bangladesh the issue was different, as it concerned how the national courts 
decided on the revocation of the powers of an ICC award and on the substantial 
annulment of the award it rendered. Also in that case, the tribunal found a violation of the 
New York Convention, which had a role to play in establishing the liability of Bangladesh 
for expropriation.  
784 Notably, according to S. FIETTA, J. UPCHER, Public International Law, Investment Treaties 
and Commercial Arbitration: an emerging system of complementarity?, supra, note 441, at 
pp. 215-216, the investment tribunal did not act as a simple forum of appeal, since it 
considered only certain egregious misconducts of national courts. 
785 G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, Commercial Arbitration Before International Courts and 
Tribunals Reviewing Abusive Conduct of Domestic Courts, supra, note 477, at p. 164. 
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whether a violation of the BIT took place. Pursuant to this author, if the 
jurisdictional requirements under the applicable investment treaty are met,786 
the tribunal should exercise its jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that in order 
to do that it also has to consider other international instruments, such as the 
New York Convention. This statement is probably the key to understanding 
the entire theme: the cornerstone of the Relevant Cases is represented by the 
inclusion of commercial arbitral awards and arbitration agreements within the 
concept of protected investment under the applicable investment treaty. Once 
this is accepted, it goes without saying that, in order to establish if a violation 
of the applicable BIT took place, the investment tribunal shall assess how the 
New York Convention was applied.787 
The above notwithstanding, it is noted that this position has been rebutted in a 
quite recent case, where the tribunal denied its jurisdiction with respect to a 
claim concerning the enforcement of a commercial arbitral award that, 
pursuant to the claimant, should have been denied.788 In that case, the decision 
was apparently based on the reasoning that, by accepting the jurisdiction, the 
tribunal would have assumed the role of an appellate body empowered to 
scrutinize the correctness of domestic decisions regarding the application of 
the New York Convention.789 According to the tribunal, in fact, the New York 
                                                          
786 As illustrated in Chapter II, this is in my opinion the cornerstone of this issue. Once it is 
accepted that the subject matter jurisdiction is correctly established, it is true that the 
investment tribunal shall apply the treaty and possibly review the national courts’ 
application of the New York Convention.  
787 See Romak v. Uzbekistan, supra, note 778. 
788 Government of the Kaliningrad Region v. Republic of Lithuania, ICC Arbitration, Final Award, 28 
January 2009 (unpublished). The case under work is somehow the opposite of the Relevant 
Cases: in fact, the commercial award was recognized and enforced in Lithuania and the 
claimant asserted that Lithuania should have denied such enforcement. It shall also be 
noted that this case does not regard an investor-State arbitration, but a claim made by a 
State vis-à-vis the other State party to the BIT. 
789 Despite the award is not published, the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal and certain 
excerpts of the award can be retrieved from the decision of Paris Court of Appeal rejecting 
the application for annulment of the ICC award (Government of the Kaliningrad Region v. 
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Convention provided exclusive jurisdiction in favour of national courts of the 
place of enforcement, with the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other 
tribunal or court on these issues. Remarkably, the French court involved in the 
judgment concerning the setting aside of the investment award790 established 
that the BIT could not be interpreted as giving rise to a State’s liability for 
complying with its obligations under the New York Convention. 
Along the same lines are those scholarly writings that have criticised the 
tribunal’s position in Frontier v. Czech Republic as well as the other Relevant 
Cases where the claimant’s position was upheld,791 on the grounds that the 
international arbitral award acted as a court of appeal against the decision of 
the national courts regarding the annulment or the enforcement of commercial 
arbitral awards.792  
The risk envisaged by scholarly writings in this case is that investment 
arbitration might displace the national courts of the place where the arbitration 
was held as the final decision-maker with respect to the validity of an 
international commercial award. Once again, in such a case the architecture of 
investment arbitration would be demolished.793 
                                                                                                                                                            
Republic of Lithuania, Paris Court of Appeal, Decision of 18 November 2010, available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0443_0.pdf). 
790 Being an award issued by a non-ICSID tribunal, broadly the courts of the place of the 
arbitration are competent with respect to its set aside. For more on the topic, see Chapter I, 
section 4. 
791  In fact, analogous to the issue analysed by the Frontier v. Czech Republic’s tribunal in the 
passage under analysis herein is the problem relating to the possibility to invoke a BIT in 
order to initiate investment arbitration against the States whose courts annulled an 
arbitration agreement or an arbitral award on the grounds that the State’s judiciaries 
violated some of the guarantees included in such BIT, as it happened in the Saipem v. 
Bangladesh and ATA v. Jordan cases. 
792 See sections 4.2.3 and 6.2 of this Chapter III.  
793 W.M. REISMAN, B. RICHARDSON, Tribunals and Courts: An Interpretation of the 
Architecture of International Commercial Arbitration, supra, note 488. 
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In this regard, it shall however be recalled that, in recent times, some authors794 
have started to challenge the foundations of the architecture of international 
arbitration itself. Relying, inter alia, on the literal wording of Art. V of the New 
York Convention, they have argued that no rule prescribes that the State of the 
place of the arbitration shall have the final say with respect to the annulment of 
an international commercial award. In light of the above, investment arbitration 
is entitled to review the decisions of national courts deciding on the set-aside.  
As a final remark with respect to the paragraph of the Frontier v. Czech 
Republic award analysed herein, notably it seems to deny that a mere violation 
of the application of the New York Convention can per se entail the 
international liability of the State vis-à-vis the aggrieved investor and that there 
must always be a breach of the applicable BIT. This aspect will be analysed in 
more detail in section 10 of this Chapter.  
 
7.3. Violation of the FET Standard 
Another important finding of this case is that the tribunal, as a matter of 
principle, seemed to accept that the court’s non-enforcement of a commercial 
arbitral award could amount to a breach of the FET standard, without the need 
for the court’s conduct to reach the threshold of a denial of justice. The 
comments made in section 4.2.1 of this Chapter apply mutatis mutandis to this 
case. In addition, scholarly writings have highlighted how in Frontier v. Czech 
Republic, the investment tribunal established that a breach of the FET could 
occur in case of an implausible interpretation of Art. V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention. This statement raised criticism as, while it is recognised that the 
implausible interpretation of a national norm does not imply the international 
                                                          
794 See, inter alia, J. PAULSSON, Interference by National Courts, in L.W. NEWMAN, R.D. HILL 
(eds.), The Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (2nd Edition), JurisNet, 
2008, pp. 33-62; L.G. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, The Control System of Arbitral Awards: A 
Pro-Arbitration Critique of Michael Reisman’s “Architecture of International Commercial 
Arbitration”, in A. JAN VAN DEN BERG (ed.), Arbitration – The Next Fifty Years. 50th 
Anniversary Conference, Geneva, 2011, ICCA Congress Series No. 16, 2012, pp. 74-101. 
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responsibility of the court,795 it seems that, pursuant to the tribunal’s line of 
thought, an opposite principle applies with respect to implausible 
interpretations of international norms. According to one author, since there is 
no valid distinction between an implausible interpretation of national and 
international norms, the ‘focus of the enquiry at international level cannot be 
whether the domestic court arrived at a ‘plausible interpretation’ of an 
international norm; instead the focus must be whether the court denied the 
national’s substantive rights (whether their source is international or national 
law) in a manner that was violative of that national’s procedural rights as 
protected by international law.’796  
According to this author, therefore, any claim concerning misconduct of 
national courts must be framed as a denial of justice. Any different approach 
would entail that the national courts act as a court of appeal with respect to the 
national court’s decisions upon the enforcement of the New York 
Convention.797 It should be noted that this line of reasoning is based on the 
principle that a denial of justice can also be substantial. However, this position 
is still somewhat unclear. If denial of justice can also be substantial, the 
investment arbitration would in any event review the merits of the decision 
taken by the national tribunal concerning the application of the New York 
Convention. Of course, the threshold for a violation of the BIT would be 
higher,798 but the methodology applied by the tribunal would be the same. On 
the contrary, if denial of justice is to be considered only procedural, there 
would be an effective difference. The investment tribunal would not be entitled 
to review the merits of the decisions, but only if the principles of due process 
were respected. Notably, the majority of scholarly writings considering that 
denial of justice is only procedural still tend to state that a delict also takes place 
                                                          
795 Waste Management v. Mexico, para. 129; Jan de Nul Award, para. 209; Iberdrola v. 
Guatemala (see, infra, note 566), paras. 491; 502; 507. 
796 Z. DOUGLAS, International Responsibility for Domestic Adjudication: Denial of Justice 
Deconstructed, supra, note 495, at pp. 898. 
797 For more on this topic see section 7.2.1 of this Chapter III. 
798 See section 2 of this Chapter III.  
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in the event of manifest substantial errors that show a procedural injustice.799 
Hence, also in this case there would be room for reviewing the merits of the 
decision. 
 
8. Effective means of asserting claims  
Historically the ‘effective means’ standard was not commonly included in 
investment treaties800 and until recent times few investors brought claims 
alleging that the rights protected by this standard were violated. The first 
publicly available award that addressed the issue is Petrobart v. Kyrgyz 
Republic, dated 2005. It is largely as a consequence of this situation that there 
has not been substantial scholarly analysis on the content of the standard and 
today ‘providing an authoritative definition of effective means presents an 
immediate challenge’.801 A very broad definition of the standard that is in line 
with the few jurisprudential findings on it is as follows: the right of foreign 
investors to the means required to assert claims against and enforce the rights 
of a host State before the courts of that host State. 
In 2012, the effective means standard was considered by the White v. India 
tribunal, which found a violation thereof due to the undue delays of the Indian 
municipal courts to decide upon the setting aside of a commercial award issued 
in favour of White.  
Since this ICSID award, the recourse to the effective means standard has 
become more frequent. As mentioned, before White v. India, the standard was 
                                                          
799 For more on this topic, see section 2 of this Chapter III. 
800 A.P. KARREMAN, K. DHARMANANDA SC, Time to Reassess Remedies for Delays 
Breaching ‘Effective Means’, supra, note 504, at p. 124, where reference is made to a study 
published in 2012, according to which, out of a sample of 412 BITs, only 68 contained an 
effective means standard, representing approximately 16.5% of the surveyed BITs. 
According to the Chevron Partial Award (infra, note 809): ‘BIT provisions such as this one 
are relatively rare. They appear only in U.S. BITs, the ECT, and a handful of other BITs.’  
801 M. ALLEN, Effective Means and the Perils of Standard-Setting, SPIL International Law 
Journal, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 86-108, at p. 91. A very broad definition (maybe tautological) 
provided by the same Author could be as follows: the right of foreign investors to the 
means required to assert claims against and enforce rights a host State before the courts of 
that host State (ibid.). 
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only marginally applied by investment tribunals. On the basis of publicly 
available sources, after Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic and before White v. India 
only three investment tribunals addressed the topic.  
In order to have a better understanding of the standard, it is worth briefly 
analysing the principal findings of each of the tribunals that dealt with it.  
Starting with the analysis of the first case, in Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic, the 
tribunal agreed with the claimant’s allegations that the obtainment by the 
State’s executive of a stay of a judgement issued in the claimant’s favour against 
a State-owned entity through ex-parte interactions with the judiciary amounted 
to a breach of the effective means clause included in the ECT.802 However, the 
tribunal did not provide substantive analysis of the requirements for 
establishing such a breach.803  
The second investment arbitration dispute concerning a violation of an 
effective means clause is AMTO v. Ukraine804 from 2008. In this case, the 
tribunal agreed that an inadequacy in a statute forming part of the host State’s 
legislation could be considered tantamount to a breach of the effective means 
standard, to the extent that such shortcoming had the effect of denying an 
investor the ability to assert a claim in the courts of the host State. In its 
reasoning, the tribunal individuated the main features of the standard. More 
precisely, in its view, effective means was a ‘systematic, comparative, progressive and 
practical standard. It is systematic in that the State must provide an effective 
framework or system for the enforcement of rights, but does not offer guarantees in 
individual cases. Individual failures might be evidence of systematic inadequacies, 
but are not themselves a breach of Article 10(12). It is comparative in that 
compliance with international standards indicates that imperfections in the law 
might result from the complexities of the subject matter rather than the inadequacies of the 
legislation. It is progressive in the sense that legislation ages and needs to be modernized 
and adapted from time to time, and results might not be immediate [...] it is a practical 
                                                          
802 Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic, para. 28-29. 
803 Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic, para. 26. 
804 Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, Final Award, 26 March 
2008 (available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0030.pdf) (“AMTO v. Ukraine”). 
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standard in that some areas of law, or the application of legislation in certain 
circumstances, raise particular difficulties which should not be ignored in assessing 
effectiveness.’805 On these grounds, the panel did not consider Ukraine’s law under 
issue in breach of the standard.  
The third arbitration tribunal to consider an effective means clause was Duke 
v. Ecuador,806 where the panel in its brief analysis of the clause considered it an 
implementation of the more general guarantee against denial of justice.807 More 
precisely, the tribunal found that the effective means standard concerns 
systemic or institutional means of protecting investments, such as access to the 
courts. According to the tribunal, the effective functioning of the institutional 
mechanism, rather than the mere existence thereof, is the crucial aspect for 
determining a breach of the effective means standard.808  
The three awards mentioned above are limited in their contribution to the 
identification of a standard autonomous from denial of justice. In Duke v. 
Ecuador, the panel even seems to deny this possibility, considering it as a 
provision exclusively aimed at implementing the prohibition to deny justice. 
A significant step forward in the identification of an autonomous effective 
means standard was made by the Chevron Partial Award.809 As to the facts of 
the case, making a very long story short, in 1991 Texaco Petroleum Corp. 
(“Texaco”), a company subsequently acquired by Chevron Corporation 
(“Chevron”), initiated before Ecuadorian courts the first of seven claims 
against Ecuador for breach of an oil exploitation contract entered into in the 
early 1970s. Since in 2006 many of these cases were still pending, Ecuador filed 
                                                          
805 AMTO v. Ukraine, para. 88 (emphasis added). 
806 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/19, Award, 18 August 2008 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0256.pdf) (“Duke v. 
Ecuador”). 
807 Duke v. Ecuador, para. 391. 
808 Duke v. Ecuador, para. 392. 
809 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2009-23, Partial Award on the Merits, 30 March 2010 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0151.pdf) (“Chevron 
Partial Award”).  
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an investor-State claim for breaches of the US-Ecuador BIT under the auspices 
of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Specifically, Chevron argued that the 
egregious delays amounted to a denial of justice under customary international 
law and/or a breach of the FET clause, the effective means clause as well as of 
provisions relating to the non-arbitrary protection of investments included in 
the US-Ecuador BIT.  
In the Chevron Partial Award, the tribunal focused on the analysis of the 
effective means clause. It recognised that such a rule significantly overlaps with 
the prohibition of denial of justice under customary international law and to 
some extent implements and forms part of the more general guarantee against 
denial of justice. However, it contradictorily went on to say that effective 
means represents lex specialis: an independent treaty obligation and not a mere 
reinstatement of the principle of denial of justice. Indeed, while denial of 
justice requires a serious shortcoming on the part of the national courts, ‘a 
distinct and potentially less-demanding test is applicable’810 under the effective 
means clause. Thus, actions that would not amount to a denial of justice could 
still qualify as a violation of the effective means clause.  
The tribunal then identified the features of this standard. First, a State must set 
up a legal system and laws that work properly and, inter alia, allows investors' 
claims to be adjudicated without ‘indefinite or undue delay’,811 defined as the 
ability to ‘enforce legitimate rights within a reasonable amount of time.’812 In 
order to assess the reasonableness of the delay the tribunal suggested looking at 
the same factors that inform the determination of denial of justice under 
customary international law, i.e., ‘the complexity of the case, the behaviour of 
the litigants involved, the significance of the interests at stake in the case, and 
the behaviour of the courts themselves.’813 Then, the tribunal noted that for a 
breach of the effective means standard to exist, there is no need for the 
claimant to prove the interference of the host State in judicial proceedings. 
                                                          
810 Chevron Partial Award, para. 244. 
811 Chevron Partial Award, para. 250. 
812 Chevron Partial Award, para. 250. 
813 Chevron Partial Award, para. 250. 
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Finally, the tribunal also considered that investors have a role to play in 
domestic litigation. More precisely, the tribunal found that, even if the 
exhaustion of local remedies' rule does not apply, a claimant must adequately 
utilize the means available to it to assert claim and enforce rights.814 
The Chevron Partial Award is full of meaning in a number of respects. First 
and foremost, the effective means standard was conceived as an independent 
standard through this sentence, which definitively distinguished it (with some 
caveats) from the concept of denial of justice. Additionally, the findings of the 
Chevron Partial Award have been largely applied in the White v. India case. 
Notwithstanding the above, it should be noted that the tribunal’s findings can 
be considered quite controversial. Ecuador itself contested them: after the 
tribunal’s decision, Ecuador transmitted a diplomatic note to the United States, 
whereby it, inter alia, maintained that its obligations under the effective means 
clause were not greater than those under denial of justice under customary 
international law. The United States refused to reply to Ecuador’s request and 
therefore the issue still remains outstanding.815  
                                                          
814 More precisely, the tribunal found that ‘a qualified’ requirement of exhaustion of local 
remedies applies under the “effective means” standard, which means that ‘the Tribunal 
must consider whether a given claimant has done its part by properly using the means 
placed at its disposal.’ Chevron Partial Award, paras. 323-324. 
815 On June 28, 2011, the Republic of Ecuador instituted arbitral proceedings concerning the 
interpretation and application of Article II(7) of the Treaty between the United States of 
America and the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment, signed on 27 August 1993 (available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43558.pdf) (“US-Ecuador BIT”), 
pursuant to Article VII of the US-Ecuador BIT. The Permanent Court of Arbitration acted 
as Registry in this arbitration (all relevant public documentation is available at: 
http://archive.pca-cpa.org/showpage7d72.html?pag_id=1455). The decision of the 
tribunal is not public. However, reports indicate that the tribunal dismissed the claim 
affirming that there was no dispute between the two States because the silence of the 
United States did not amount to an actual opposition to Ecuador’s view, nor could the 
United States be forced to give an interpretation (J. Hepburn, L. Eric Peterson, US-
Ecuador Inter-state Investment Treaty Award Released to Parties; Tribunal Members Part 
Ways on Key Issues, Investment Arbitration Reporter (subs. req.), 30 October 2011 
(available at: www.iareporter.com/articles/20121030_1.J)). 
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It is against this background that in 2012 the White v. India award was issued. 
 
9. White v. India 
White v. India is the last of the Relevant Cases that will be analysed in this 
Chapter and it is also the last award rendered in the context of cross-over 
arbitration, though subsequent claims concerning the interference by national 
courts in the enforcement of commercial arbitral awards have been filed.816  
It should also be noted that, before White v. India, the tribunal in GEA v. 
Ukraine – despite its rejection of GEA’s allegations at the jurisdictional phase, 
on the grounds of the lack of an investment –817 ‘out of an abundance of 
caution’ addressed ‘the merits of all the claimant’s claim.’818 Therefore, the 
tribunal considered whether Ukraine, by refusing enforcement of the 
commercial arbitral award, committed an unlawful expropriation and/or 
violated the FET clause, denying justice to GEA under the Germany-Ukraine 
BIT.819  
In relation to the expropriation claim,820 the tribunal made reference to the 
Saipem v. Bangladesh case, where, according to the GEA v. Ukraine panel, the 
‘non-enforcement of the ICC Award amounted to an expropriation due to the 
                                                          
816 For more on the topic, see section 11 of this Chapter. 
817 See Chapter II, section 5.5. 
818 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 205. 
819 For the sake of completeness, it shall be noted that for the purposes of this work, GEA’s 
allegations concerning conducts of Ukraine different from the non-enforcement of the 
arbitral award have not been considered. Additionally, the tribunal dismissed GEA’s claim 
concerning the breach of the Art. 2(3) of the Germany-Ukraine BIT prohibiting arbitrary 
and discriminatory measures ‘for the same reasons as the Claimant’s claims in respect of 
the fair and equitable treatment were rejected’ (para. 331), having found that the protection 
against arbitrariness or discrimination is related to that the FET. 
820 Art. 4(2) of the German-Ukraine BIT provided that: ‘investments by nationals or 
companies of either Contracting State may not, within the territory of the other 
Contracting State, be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to such other measures the 
effect of which would be tantamount to expropriation or nationalization except for the 
public interest and against compensation […]’ (translation provided in GEA v. Ukraine, 
para. 207). 
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particularly egregious nature of the acts of the Bangladeshi courts.’821 Applying 
the Saipem v. Bangladesh standard to the case, the tribunal found that ‘even 
assuming that the ICC Award could somehow qualify as an “investment” […] 
the tribunal has been presented with no evidence that the actions taken by the 
Ukrainian courts were “egregious” in any way; that they amounted to anything 
other than the application of Ukrainian law; or that they were somehow 
deliberately taken to thwart GEA’s ability to recover on the ICC Award.’822  
Further, with respect to the breach of the FET clause,823 the tribunal came to 
an analogous conclusion. More precisely, in order to make its assessment, it 
applied the test identified in Mondev v. US,824 and, on the basis of the 
circumstances of the case, it held that there was nothing clearly improper and 
discreditable about the decisions taken by the Ukrainian courts in relation to 
the enforcement of the commercial arbitral award.825 Therefore the tribunal, 
                                                          
821 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 234. 
822 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 236. 
823 Art. 2(1) of the German-Ukraine BIT provided that: ‘[e]ither Contracting State shall, if 
possible, promote within its territory investments by nationals or companies of the other 
Contracting State and shall permit such investments in accordance with its legislation. It 
shall in any case grant investments fair and equitable treatment’ (translation provided in 
GEA v. Ukraine, para. 268). 
824 In particular, the tribunal in para. 312 quoted para. 348 of the Mondev v. US award, 
whereby it is stated that: ‘[t]he test is not whether a particular result is surprising, but 
whether the shock or surprise occasioned to an impartial tribunal leads, on reflection, to 
justified concerns as to the judicial propriety of the outcome, bearing in mind on the one 
hand that international tribunals are not courts of appeal, and on the other hand that 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA (like other treaties for the protection of investments) is intended to 
provide a real measure of protection. In the end the question is whether, at an international 
level and having regard to generally accepted standards of the administration of justice, a 
tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available facts that the impugned decision was 
clearly improper and discreditable, with the result that the investment has been subjected 
to unfair and inequitable treatment. This is admittedly a somewhat open-ended standard, 
but it may be that in practice no more precise formula can be offered to cover the range of 
possibilities.’ 
825 GEA v. Ukraine, para. 319. 
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had it had jurisdiction, would have dismissed GEA’s claims at the merits phase 
in any case.  
To sum up, it is possible to conclude that the panel in GEA v. Ukraine adopted 
an approach of reasonable deference to the domestic courts on issues regulated 
by domestic laws and, since there was not convincing evidence of misconduct 
by the municipal courts in the application of such laws to the fact of the case, it 
considered that Ukraine did not breach the Germany-Ukraine BIT. 
 
9.1. The merits phase 
Turning back to White v. India, the tribunal, as anticipated, found a breach of 
the effective means standard through the actions of the municipal courts. It is 
however noted that White alleged the existence of other breaches of the BIT. 
The tribunal considered all the alleged breaches in detail and this is worth 
analysing in the context of this work, as it adds content to the standards already 
analysed in the previous sections of this Chapter. 
More precisely, the first claim considered by the tribunal concerned the 
violation of Art. 3(1) of the Australia-India BIT, according to which the 
contracting States shall encourage and promote favourable conditions for 
investors to make investments in its territory. According to White, this 
provision gave rise to, inter alia, the following obligations on India (all of which 
were allegedly breached): to create a suitable governance framework for 
supervising the actions of State-owned corporations (such as Coal India); to 
ensure that India’s arbitration laws were administered in line with the New 
York Convention; and to take steps to reduce the backlog of cases in its courts. 
White’s allegations were rejected by the tribunal, which found that the 
provision of Art. 3(1) regarded the pre-establishment phase and was too 
generic to give rise to the substantial claims identified by White.  
The second claim put forward by White concerned the breach of the FET 
standard. More specifically, White contested that India frustrated its legitimate 
expectations that: (i) India would have applied the New York Convention in 
accordance with international standards; and (ii) India would have afforded 
justice to White by allowing it to enforce the award in a timely manner. In 
addition White claimed that India committed a denial of justice. In relation to 
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the first aspect (i.e., violation of White’s legitimate expectations), the tribunal 
preliminarily assessed whether, at the time of its investment, White had 
expectations that could be considered as legitimate regarding the conduct of 
the Indian courts with respect to the enforcement and setting aside of arbitral 
awards. As to the setting aside, the panel pointed out that, at the time of 
White’s investment, White should have known that awards made outside of 
India were also subject to being set aside if the arbitration agreement was 
governed by Indian law.  
For the sake of completeness, it is worth recalling that this approach was based 
on the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940, which allowed Indian 
courts to have jurisdiction on applications to set aside a foreign award if the 
law governing the contract and the law governing the agreement to arbitrate 
were the laws of India. However, the Arbitration Act of 1940 was subsequently 
replaced by a new Arbitration Act of 1996, which distinguished between 
national and foreign arbitration on the basis of the place where the arbitration 
was made. While the new Arbitration Act of 1996 contains a provision 
regarding the setting aside of national (i.e., Indian) awards, it does not regulate 
the setting aside of foreign awards. Hence, after 1996, some Indian courts 
started taking a view that foreign awards could not be set aside by Indian 
courts.826 It is in this context that Coal India’s request to set aside the award 
won by White was made. In light of the above, the tribunal concluded that 
White could not legitimately have expected that India would have applied the 
New York Convention in an appropriate manner, in particular not setting aside 
awards rendered outside of India. 
With respect to the expectations regarding a timely enforcement of the arbitral 
award, the tribunal noted that White should have known that the domestic 
court structure in India was overburdened and, in the absence of any specific 
assurance from India that any award could be enforced in a particular time 
                                                          
826 For more on the context, see S. KACHWAHA, The White Industries Australia Limited – India 
BIT Award: A Critical Assessment, supra, note 450, pp. 275-293, at pp. 277-278. 
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frame, White could not have legitimately expected the timely enforcement of 
the arbitral award.827 
At this point, the tribunal turned to White’s allegations about Indian courts 
denying justice to White. Substantially, White alleged that the courts failed to 
provide justice by allowing the enforcement process and the setting aside 
proceedings to last for more than nine years with no realistic end in sight. In 
this respect the tribunal recognised that denial of justice is a very demanding 
standard and that various elements are relevant to assess whether a judicial 
delay amounts to a denial of justice, such as the complexity of the proceedings, 
the need for swiftness, the behaviour of the litigants involved, the significance 
of the interests at stake and the behaviour of the courts themselves.828 The 
tribunal then analysed each of these factors in turn against the factual 
background of the case and concluded that, while the overall duration of the 
proceedings was ‘certainly unsatisfactory in terms of efficient administration of 
justice’, the delay had not ‘reached the stage of constituting a denial of 
justice’.829  
The last claim considered by the tribunal regarded the breach of the clause of 
the Australia-India BIT prohibiting expropriation.830 Remarkably, this analysis 
was made even though the panel had already found India liable under the 
                                                          
827 Notably, the tribunal considered also whether White could have legitimate expectations 
regarding India as a place to invest and transparency of court proceedings. The tribunal 
found no evidence of legitimate expectations also in these respects. 
828 White v. India, para. 10.4.10. 
829 White v. India, para. 10.4.22. 
830 Art. 7(1) of the Australia-India BIT provided that: ‘[n]either Contracting Party shall 
nationalise, expropriate or subject to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation 
or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as 'expropriation') the investments of investors of 
the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, in 
accordance with its laws and against fair and equitable compensation.’ Notably, White 
claimed that India violated also Art. 9 of the BIT, which provides that: ‘each Contracting 
Party shall permit all funds of an investor of the other Contracting Party related to an 
investment in its territory to be freely transferred without unreasonable delay and on a 
non-discriminatory basis [...]’. However, this claim was dismissed as the tribunal found that 
the acts of Coal India could not be attributed to India. 
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effective means clause. India alleged that the award rendered in its favour 
(which crystallized the rights and obligations arising from the original 
investment) was unlawfully expropriated. The tribunal correctly found that, 
since the Indian courts had yet to dispose of the set aside and the enforcement 
of the arbitral award, the awards was not ‘taken’. It continued: ‘[a]ll that has 
happened is that the determination of its validity has not yet occurred. This 
does not sound in expropriation.’831 From this it is possible to infer that a delay 
cannot amount to an expropriatory taking.  
The last cause of action to analyse represents the cornerstone of this award: the 
violation of the effective means clause. This part of the award is particularly 
relevant because, on the one hand, the panel effectively found a breach of this 
standard perpetrated by the Indian courts and, on the other hand, the tribunal 
also briefly described the features thereof, contributing to the development of 
effective means as an autonomous guarantee distinguishable from the principle 
of denial of justice.  
It should be noted that the violation of the standard was found to exist even 
though the Australia-India BIT did not contain an effective means provision. 
However, the treaty provided for a MFN clause,832 which according to India 
allowed the incorporation in the Australia-India BIT of the effective means' 
clause set out under the India-Kuwait BIT,833 according to which: ‘[e]ach 
Contracting State shall maintain a favourable environment for investments in 
its territory by investors of the other Contracting State. Each Contracting State 
shall, in accordance with its applicable laws and regulations, provide effective means of 
asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to investments [...].’834 India, on the 
                                                          
831 White v. India, para. 12.3.6. 
832 Art. 4(2) of the Australia-India BIT provides that: ‘[a] Contracting Party shall at all times 
treat investments in its own territory on a basis no less favourable than that accorded to 
investments or investors of any third country.’ 
833 Agreement Between the Republic of India and the State of Kuwait for the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 27 November 2001 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1569) (“India-Kuwait 
BIT”). 
834 Art. 4(5) of the India-Kuwait BIT (emphasis added). 
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contrary, claimed, inter alia, that if such a provision was to be introduced in the 
Australia-India BIT, it would ‘fundamentally subvert the carefully negotiated 
balance of the BIT.’835 The panel upheld White’s position and considered that 
White was correctly availing itself of the right to rely on more favourable 
substantive provisions included in the third-party treaty,836 which, in the 
tribunal’s view, was ‘exactly the result which the parties intended by the 
incorporation in the BIT of a MFN clause.’837  
Having accepted the application of the effective means clause in the case at 
issue, the tribunal went on to analyse the standard. In doing this, it relied upon 
the Chevron Partial Award, which was the first decision that considered the 
effective means as an autonomous standard and provided a comprehensive 
analysis thereof.838 In its following analysis, the tribunal scrutinized the court 
proceedings in India in much more detail than it had with respect to the denial 
of justice and, contrary to previous decisions,839 it considered the enforcement 
proceeding and the set-aside proceeding separately.  
With respect to the enforcement proceeding before the High Court in New 
Delhi, the delays did not represent a breach of the standard. Specifically, the 
panel differentiated between three-and-a-half years of normal proceedings and 
the following six years during which the proceedings were stayed. The three-
and-a-half years before the stay was ordered were ‘not exceptional’, either in 
India or elsewhere, and the delays were caused by both parties asking for 
adjournments on several occasions.840 The delay after the stay was considered 
ascribable to White’s conduct, as it did not appeal the stay decision. According 
to White’s allegations, it did not appeal as it would have been fruitless 
considering the delays suffered in the context of the appeal before the Supreme 
                                                          
835 White v. India, para. 11.2.1. 
836 White v. India, para. 11.2.3. 
837 White v. India, para. 11.2.4. 
838 For a summary of its content, see section 9 of this Chapter III.  
839 AMTO v. Ukraine, para. 76, whereby the tribunal maintained that: ‘the experience of an 
investor in domestic courts may involve a series of decisions, and these decisions should be 
considered in their entirety.’ 
840 White v. India, para. 11.4.8. 
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Court regarding the set-aside proceedings. The tribunal, however, was not 
convinced: the delay of an appeal decision in one set of proceedings does not 
necessary imply that an appeal in a different set of proceedings would be 
futile.841  
On the contrary, the delay in the set-aside proceedings was considered by the 
panel undue and in violation of India’s obligation of providing White with 
effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights.842 The tribunal did not 
find any excuse for Indian courts’ delay amounting to nine years in the 




This award has contributed to the development of cross-over arbitration. After 
an award (GEA v. Ukraine) where the tribunal declined its jurisdiction and 
denied that, in any event, there would have been a treaty breach, White v. India 
re-opens the gates of investment arbitration to a frustrated award winner. It 
should however be noted that the tribunal took a very cautious approach to the 
wide number of claims presented,844 recognizing exclusively the breach of the 
effective means' clause in relation to the set-aside proceeding pending before 
the national courts. Moreover, it contributed to the development of a new 
standard: after this claim, other investors sought the enforcement of the 





                                                          
841 White v. India, para. 11.4.12-13. 
842 White v. India, para. 11.4.19. 
843 White v. India, para. 11.4.18. 
844 E. ALVAREZ, Crossing the “Public/Private” Divide: Saipem v. Bangladesh and Other 
Crossover Cases, supra, note 332, at p. 420. 
845 See, generally, Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1 (documentation available at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/1687). 
267 
9.2.1. Effective means: the rise of a new standard? 
Undoubtedly, the keystone of the award is represented by the recognition of a 
breach of the effective means standard, to be considered as an autonomous 
guarantee, whose existence is not subject to the high thresholds required for a 
denial of justice. In fact, the tribunal, following the path traced by the Chevron 
Partial Award, clarified that the provisions of investment treaties affording 
investors access to effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights are 
not mere positive reinstatements of the customary international law 
requirement not to deny justice, but represent an autonomous standard, with 
its own content.  
In this sense, the White v. India tribunal found that undue delays of the 
municipal judiciary can breach the effective means guarantee which represents 
a special (lex specialis) cause of action, intended by the treaty drafters as a less 
demanding standard than denial of justice under customary international law. 
More precisely, the White v. India award846 provided a list of the key features of 
the standard, summarizing the findings of Chevron Partial Award, as follows:  
a) the effective means guarantee requires that the host State establishes a 
proper system of laws and institutions that work effectively; 
b) the interference of the host State in judicial proceedings is not a condition 
to find a breach of the standard; 
c) indefinite or undue delay may amount to a breach of the effective means 
standard. Whether or not a delay in dealing with an investor's claim 
breaches the effective means clause will depend on the circumstances of 
the case, which include (as in the context of denial of justice) the 
complexity of the case, the behaviour of the litigants involved, the 
significance of the interests at stake in the case and the behaviour of the 
courts themselves; 
d) court congestion and backlogs may be taken into account, but they do not 
represent a complete defence. On the contrary, the host State's courts 
regular and extensive delays may show a systemic problem with the court 
                                                          
846 White v. India, para. 11.3.2 
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system, which would also constitute a breach of the effective means 
standard; 
e) the effective means is an objective international standard; 
f) the exhaustion of local remedies is not a substantive element of the 
standard. However, the means available to the investor to assert claims 
and enforce rights must have been effectively used. 
There is nothing wrong in the fact that the White v. India tribunal relied on the 
findings of another investment tribunal. Indeed, though precedents are not 
binding in the context of investment arbitration, many tribunals have 
highlighted how they need to be taken into account, also with a view to 
harmonizing the outcomes of different proceedings that deal with the same 
matters.847  
However, it has been highlighted848 that the Chevron Partial Award may not be 
the most appropriate precedent to follow. As noted in section 8 of this 
Chapter, in this award the tribunal departed from the precedent that 
considered the effective means within the ambit of the international standard 
of denial of justice. This different outcome was also due to the particular 
interpretation of the specific provisions included in the applicable BIT. More 
precisely, the tribunal in Chevron v. Ecuador noted that the effective means 
clause was situated near the FET clause. Yet, whereas the latter required that 
‘in no case [shall] be accorded treatment less than that required by international 
law’, the effective means clause did not have such accompanying explanation. 
From this different drafting the tribunal inferred that the effective means 
                                                          
847 See, for instance, Saipem Award, para. 90, where it is stated that: ‘[t]he Tribunal considers 
that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, it is of the opinion that it 
must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals. It believes that, 
subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a 
series of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and 
of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the 
harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate 
expectations of the community of States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law.’ 
848 S. KACHWAHA, The White Industries Australia Limited – India BIT Award: A Critical 
Assessment, supra, note 450, at p. 288 and following. 
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standard had a lower bar for violation than that required under international 
law.849 However, the FET and effective means provisions in the Kuwait-India 
BIT relevant for the White v. India case850 are very different from those 
included in the US-Ecuador BIT, applied in the Chevron Partial Award. More 
precisely, Art. 5(1) of the Kuwait-India BIT provides that ‘[e]ach Contracting 
State shall at all time ensure investments and associated activities, made in its 
territory by investors of the other Contracting State, fair and equitable 
treatment’, with no reference to customary international law. Moreover, Art. 
4(5) of the Kuwait-India BIT provides that ‘[e]ach Contracting State shall in 
accordance with its applicable laws and regulations provide effective means of 
asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to investments the right of 
access to its courts of justice, administrative tribunals and agencies, and all 
other bodies exercising adjudicatory authority, and the right to employ persons 
of their choice, for the purpose of the assertion of claims and the enforcement 
of rights with respect to their investments.’851  
Such differences in drafting were not explicitly addressed by the White v. India 
tribunal. However, one may argue that the different wordings may have an 
impact on the interpretation of the effective means clause and the mere 
incorporation of the outcome of the reasoning made in the Chevron Partial 
Award by the White v. India tribunal could be shallow.  
Moreover, it has been noted852 that the exact content of the effective means 
standard, as identified by the Chevron Partial Award and in White v. India, 
remains somewhat unclear. More precisely, effective means appears to be a 
                                                          
849 Chevron Partial Award, para. 121. For a critical analysis to the interpretative method 
adopted in the Chevron Partial Award, see J. WIRTH, 'Effective Means' Means? The Legacy 
of Chevron v. Ecuador, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2013, pp. 
326-367. Indeed, the interpretation given to the FET clause by the tribunal is not 
undisputed. See supra para. 5. 
850 As explained in section 9.1 of this Chapter III, the White v. India tribunal applied the 
effective means provision of the Kuwait-India BIT by operation of the MFN clause 
included in the Australia-India BIT. 
851 Emphasis added. 
852 M. SANAN, The White Industries award – Shades of Grey, The Journal of World 
Investment & Trade, Vol. 13, 2012, pp. 661-685, at p. 682. 
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denial of a justice-less standard, as its features are identified through a comparison 
with the standard of denial of justice, whose difficult requirements do not need 
to be met. This however makes the boundaries of the new autonomous 
standard relatively blurred and subject to the discretion of the panel involved in 
the relevant case. Indeed, some authors have wondered how the two standards 
effectively differ from each other and how the White v. India tribunal 
distinguished denial of justice from effective means, considering it a less 
demanding standard.853 In fact, the tribunal rejected the denial of justice claim, 
but considered the same conduct sufficient to meet a violation of the effective 
means standard; in addition, it failed to explain how these two international 
standards diverge from each other in terms of the undueness of the same delay. 
Moreover, with respect to the circumstances to be considered in order to 
exclude a violation of the standards at issue, the tribunal took into 
consideration the situation of India – a developing country with 1.2 billion 
people and a seriously overstretched judiciary – in the exclusion of the 
existence of a denial of justice, yet these same circumstances were not taken 
into account in the assessment of the breach of the effective means guarantee, 
regardless of the fact that, in the list of the elements of the effective means 
standard retrieved from the Chevron Partial Award, the panel expressly stated 
that: ‘as with denial of justice under customary international law, some of the 
factors that may be considered are the complexity of the case, the behaviour of 
the litigants involved, the significance of the interests at stake and in the case 
and the behaviour of the courts themselves.’854  
Arguably, tribunals may work on the difference between obligation of conduct 
(which is the effective means clause) and obligations of result (which is the 
prohibition to deny justice) to trace the distinguishing features of the two 
standards. 855 As a consequence of such a distinction, the results reached by the 
                                                          
853 P. NACIMIENTO, S. LANGE, White Industries Australia Limited v The Republic of India, 
ICSID Review, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 2012, pp. 274-280; and M. SANAN, The White Industries 
award – Shades of Grey, supra, note 852, at p. 682 and following. 
854 White v. India, para. 11.3.1(i). 
855 For more on the distinction in the context of public international law, see C.P. 
ECONOMIDES, Content of the Obligation: Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result, 
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analysed case could not be confirmed, but at least the effective means clause 
would eventually find a specific meaning.  
As a final remark, it is noted that also with respect to the breach of the 
effective means clause, the arbitrators imposed a relatively high burden of 
proof on the claimant. In fact, the tribunal found that a delay in the 
enforcement of a commercial arbitral award lasting more than nine years did 
not amount to a violation of the effective means standard, since part of the 
delay was attributable to the backlog of cases before the Indian courts, the 
availability of counsels and White's decision not to appeal the decision of the 
Delhi court before the Supreme court. 
 
9.2.2. The other standards considered 
A few considerations can be made about the analysis made by the tribunal in 
relation to other standards that, according to White, had been violated through 
the non-enforcement/set-aside of the ICC award. 
With respect to the denial of justice claim, preliminarily, it must be noted that, 
even if the tribunal did not explicitly address the matter, it made it clear that it 
did not consider this standard to be exclusive when dealing with the conduct of 
domestic courts. Indeed, the panel also considered the other claims submitted 
by White and, more precisely, in relation to the violation of the FET clause, it 
analysed if there was a violation of White’s legitimate expectations. 
As to the content of the standard, the tribunal affirmed that the test for 
establishing a denial of justice remains high. In addition to the exhaustion of 
local remedies, it required, in line with Mondev v. US and Chevron v. Ecuador, 
evidence of ‘ “a particularly serious shortcoming” or “egregious conduct that 
                                                                                                                                                            
in J. CRAWFORD, A. PELLET, S. OLLESON (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility, 
Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 372-381. The distinction between obligations of 
conduct (or means) and obligations of result derives from the domestic laws of civil law 
countries, while it is largely unknown in the common law systems. Obligations of means 
are those by which the debtor promises to use all possible means to perform its obligation; 
by contrast, through an obligation of results the obligor commits itself to reach the agreed 
result. The obligation of result is evidently more flexible than obligations of result, which 
by definition is more rigid.  
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‘shocks, or at least surprise a sense of judicial proprietary’.” ’856 The same 
approach was adopted by other tribunals, including the tribunal in GEA v. 
Ukraine, and confirms that it is very difficult for an aggrieved investor to prove 
the existence of a denial of justice, and that the recourse to other treaty 
guarantees may represent the easiest solution, also in light of the fact that 
tribunals seem keen to verify the national courts’ behaviours under different 
standards. An investment tribunal following this approach is by itself 
reasonable: municipal courts can engage a liability of the State they belong to 
for any violation of applicable international provisions, including any clause of 
an investment treaty.  
Of course, the tribunal must carefully analyse the existence of the constitutive 
elements of each standard in order to establish if the courts committed any 
breach thereof, and must maintain a deferential approach vis-à-vis the national 
courts, in light of the peculiar functions of this State’s organ. For instance, in a 
claim for judicial expropriation, the tribunal must examine if there has been a 
substantial and permanent deprivation of an investment. With specific regard 
to the violation of the effective means standard, however, it seems that the 
relevant constitutive elements are not that clear and a tribunal may find it 
applicable at all times that a denial of justice claim cannot be upheld, but the 
panel believes that the behaviour of the national courts is somewhat 
regrettable. However, if on the one hand it seems doubtful that the treaty 
drafters had any specific intent to provide an easy substitute for denial of 
justice, on the other hand, the fact that such a provision is present must mean 
something. In this respect, one could argue that at the time the treaty was 
drafted the denial of justice standard was not clearly framed and, therefore, for 
the avoidance of doubt, the drafters opted to include the effective means 
clause, which merely represented a specification of the denial of justice 
principle and that therefore was part of it. Here, reference should be made to 
the position taken in this respect by the Chevron v. US tribunal, which noted 
that ‘the latter intent [i.e., the implementation of part of the denial of justice 
guarantee] could have been easily expressed through the inclusion of explicit 
                                                          
856 White v. India, para. 10.4.23. 
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language to that effect or by using language corresponding to the prevailing 
standard for denial of justice at the time of drafting.’857 
With respect to the violation of the investor’s legitimate expectation, it is only 
worth noting that the tribunal rejected the claimant’s allegation that FET 
requires the States not to affect the basic expectations of the foreign investor 
when making its investment. On the contrary, the tribunal’s decision implied 
that legitimate expectation might rest only on more specific and less ambiguous 
undertakings.858  
As to the expropriation, although the tribunal did not find it to have occurred 
because of the lack of actual set-aside of the award, it still endorsed the 
reasoning of Saipem v. Bangladesh, considering that an arbitral award could per 
se be subject to a judiciary expropriation. It could be argued that had the Indian 
courts, at the end of this judicial odyssey, set aside the arbitral award and White 
had commenced the ICSID arbitration after that decision, the investment 
tribunal would have found the existence of expropriation.  
 
9.2.3. The approach vis-à-vis the application of the New York 
Convention 
It should be noted that, at the merits stage, the tribunal did not address the 
issue of whether India was acting in accordance with the New York 
Convention, either by delaying the enforcement of the commercial award or by 
allowing setting aside proceedings in India, even if the award was rendered 
abroad. It did not analyse those aspects and limited its assessment to whether 
the delays were unduly long under the India-Australia BIT. Also, when it 
considered White’s legitimate expectation, it rejected taking into account 
                                                          
857 Chevron Partial Award, para. 242.  
858 Notably, as described in section 9 of this Chapter III, the tribunal deemed that, even 
considering the claimant’s expectations relevant, White knew that the enforcement of 
commercial awards was not timely made in India and that local courts tended to find their 
jurisdiction with respect to set-aside proceedings to the extent that the arbitral award was 
governed by Indian laws. With respect to the features that expectations must have to be 
considered legitimate, please refer to section 5 of this Chapter III. 
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India’s obligations under the New York Convention and only deemed relevant 
the actual situation in Indian courts at the time the investment was made.  
In this way, the tribunal avoided the criticism of those who believe that in 
cross-over cases investment tribunals act as courts of appeal, entitled to assess 
the correct application by national courts of the New York Convention.859 
However, once the breach of the BIT was established, the tribunal, in order to 
assess the compensation due to White, asked itself if ‘the Award [was] 
enforceable under the laws of India.’860 In this context the investment tribunal 
wore the shoes of the national courts involved in the enforcement proceeding 
and, through the application of the New York Convention, and the analysis of 
White’s and Coal India’s expectations, established that: ‘[h]aving determined 
that none of the grounds advanced by Coal India for resisting the enforcement 
of the Award support such an outcome, the tribunal concludes that the Award 
is enforceable under the laws of India.’861 The tribunal, therefore, carried out 
                                                          
859 Notably, this criticism is not endorsed by those who believe that there is no real 
architecture of international commercial arbitration and that investment tribunals should 
assess the responsibility of a State in light of its obligations under international law. 
According to this line of thought (see section 7.2.1 of this Chapter III), the New York 
Convention contains specific obligations and exceptions. In particular, Art, V(e) establishes 
that only the courts of the seat of arbitration are competent to set aside foreign arbitral 
awards. This consideration arguably renders the decision of Indian Courts to suspend the 
enforcement proceeding unlawful. Indian courts had to enforce the arbitral award, since in 
any event it could have not been set aside by the courts of the seat. And the investment 
tribunal should have recognised this. On the contrary, in assessing whether a denial of 
justice occurred, the tribunal ‘excused’ the conduct of the municipal courts on the ground 
that there was a debate in India on whether Indian courts could properly entertain an 
application to set aside an arbitral award not made in India (White v. India, para. 10.4.11). 
However, it is a principle of international law that the laws of the country cannot excuse 
the commission of an international wrong by a State. This position seems supported by 
one of the arbitrators that in a footnote explained that: ‘[f]or Arbitrator Brower, the 1996 
Act cannot justify the actions of the Indian judiciary since, as explained by Professor Van 
den Berg, the New York Convention supersedes domestic law concerning the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards’ (White v. India, footnote 69). 
860 White v. India, para. 14.1.1. 
861 White v. India, para. 14.2.66. 
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the task that Indian courts should have done, acting as a court of appeal at a 
later stage. Based on this finding the tribunal awarded White the entire value of 
the commercial award.862  
 
10. An investment tribunal’s jurisdiction for violations of the New York 
Convention 
On the basis of the Relevant Cases analysed in this Chapter, it seems that a 
breach of the New York Convention is not sufficient to establish a 
responsibility of the State vis-à-vis the aggrieved investor. Something more is 
required: such violation shall also amount to a breach of the investment treaty, 
where the consent to arbitration is granted.  
As noted, the excerpt of the Frontier v. Czech Republic award analysed in sub-
section 7.2.1 of this Chapter seems to support this proposition. This is also in 
line with the general principle that no delictual responsibility towards foreign 
nationals can arise from the breach of an obligation that a State has assumed 
vis-à-vis another State. Foreign nationals do not have a general right to 
reparation for damages caused when States do not comply with their 
international obligations towards other States. In the context of the New York 
Convention, this implies that a national court’s decision that is inconsistent 
with an international provision prescribed by that convention may entail the 
international responsibility of the State in question vis-à-vis the other 
contracting States.  
In light of the above, the investment tribunals in the Relevant Cases have 
considered that for the municipal courts' decisions to amount to delictual 
responsibility in international law via-à-vis a foreign investor, something more 
                                                          
862 White v. India, para. 14.3.6. This remedy has been strongly contested, as the courts of 
India were still in time to rule on the enforcement of the award. Substantially, the tribunal 
awarded to White the same compensation that would have been awarded in case of denial 
of justice. This, once again, contributed to blur the lines between the two standard. 
Moreover, if in case of denial of justice, such a compensation would be justifiable (also in 
light of the exhaustion of local remedies), in case of delay, probably other remedies (e.g., 
damages for the delay), would have been more suitable.  
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is required, namely, a violation of a provision of the treaty where the State in 
question has given its consent to investor-State arbitration.  
However, it could be argued863 that upon the occurrence of certain conditions, 
investment tribunals may also have jurisdiction with respect to pure breaches 
of the New York Convention. 
More precisely, these conditions regard: (i) the breadth of the consent to 
investor-State arbitration granted by the State in the applicable treaty; and (ii) 
the law applicable to the treaty itself. Obviously, the pre-requisite also in this 
case is that the subject matter jurisdiction is established and, therefore, the 
commercial award/arbitration agreement at issue is considered as an 
investment (or part thereof) under the ICSID Convention and/or the 
applicable investment treaty, as the case may be. 
With respect to the first condition, it should be recalled that, as already 
illustrated,864 the consent to investor-State arbitration arises, first, from the 
State expressing its willingness to submit certain disputes to arbitration, mostly 
in the form of a standing offer by the State, and then from the acceptance by 
the investor of such an offer, which can also be expressed through the 
commencement of an arbitration.  
                                                          
863 See B. DEMIRKOL, Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitration Agreements and 
Awards in Investment Treaty Arbitration, supra, note 630. Contra G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, 
Commercial Arbitration Before International Courts and Tribunals Reviewing Abusive 
Conduct of Domestic Courts, supra, note 477, at p. 170; F. ROSENFELD, The Systemic 
Integration of International Investment Treaties and the New York Convention, posted on 
5 December 2012 on the Transnational Notes (available at: 
http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/transnational/2012/12/the-systemic-integration-of-
international-investment-treaties-and-the-new-york-convention/). With respect to the last 
two writings, it should be noted that Prof. Kaufmann-Kohler is mainly engaged in 
defending the outcome of the Relevant Cases and, therefore, she does not even seem to 
consider that a State-investor dispute may concern per se a breach of the New York 
Convention, while the second Author limits to say that: ‘[e]ven if ICSID tribunals have 
jurisdiction, they are not entitled to award damages based on a mere finding that the New 
York Convention has been violated’. 
864 See, supra, Chapter I, section 2 and Chapter II, section 2. 
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The State’s offer to arbitrate in investment treaties may take several forms. 
However, after a review of treaty practise, scholarly writings865 have recognised 
four core typologies of provisions regarding the States’ consent. The first group 
allows ‘all’ or ‘any’ investment disputes to be submitted to arbitration.866 The 
second group restricts consent to arbitration to disputes arising out of or 
related to: (i) an investment authorization; (ii) an investment contract; or (iii) 
the allegation of a violation of any right conferred, created or recognized by the 
respective treaty in relation to an investment.867 The third group limits the 
                                                          
865 See, inter alia, R. DOLZER, C. SCHREUER, Principles of International Investment Law, s 
supra, note 49, at p. 102; Z. DOUGLAS, The International Law of Investment Claims, supra, 
note 357, pp. 234-235; C. SCHREUER, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment 
Treaty Obligations, McGill Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 1-24, 
at pp. 6-11; C. SCHREUER, Consent to Arbitration, in P. MUCHLINSKI, F. ORTINO AND C. 
SCHREUER, The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, Oxford University 
Press, 2008, pp. 837-843; C. SCHREUER, L. MALINTOPPI, A. REINISCH, A. SINCLAIR, The 
ICSID Convention: A Commentary, supra, note 23, at p. 526 and following; UNCTAD, 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II, 2014, at pp. 38-41. This reconstruction is endorsed by case law. See, for 
instance, Iberdrola Energía S.A. v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/5. Award, 
17 August 2012 (unofficial translation in English available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1173.pdf) (“Iberdrola 
v. Guatemala”), para. 304. 
866 See, for instance, Art. 139 of the Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, and the Government of the Republic of Peru, signed on 28 
April 2009 (available at: http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex/bilu_xdwb_10_en.pdf), 
which enables the investment arbitral tribunal to hear ‘[a]ny dispute between an investor of 
one of the Party and the other Party in connection with an investment in the territory of the 
other Party’ (emphasis added). This approach is very common, despite the fact that there 
may be some differences in detail among different treaties. 
867 See, for instance, Article VII of the US-Argentina BIT, which offers consent for investment 
disputes which are defined as follows: ‘a dispute between a Party and a national or 
company of the other Party arising out of or relating to (a) an investment agreement 
between that Party and such national or company; (b) an investment authorization granted 
by that Party’s foreign investment authority (if any such authorization exists) to such 
national or company; or (c) an alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this 
Treaty with respect to an investment.’ 
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jurisdiction to violations of the substantive provisions of the treaty itself.868 The 
fourth and last group confines the relevant tribunal’s jurisdiction to disputes 
about expropriation or the quantum to be paid in the event of an illegal 
expropriation.869 The most commonly used models870 are the first and third 
one, that will hereinafter be referred to as the ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ consent, 
respectively. 
In case the investment treaty contains any consent to jurisdiction clauses 
different from the broad one, it goes without saying that it is not possible for 
the aggrieved award creditor to bring a claim for a violation of a norm different 
from those expressly mentioned in the consent clause. With specific reference 
to the narrow clause, in the recent case Iberdrola v. Guatemala, the ICSID 
tribunal ruled that it had no jurisdiction to review any kind of dispute related to 
an investment, but only those connected to a matter covered by the treaty.871 
                                                          
868 See, for instance, Art. 9 of the Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments between the Republic of El Salvador and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
signed on 12 November 1999 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1133), which regards: ‘[t]he 
disputes which arise within the scope of this agreement between one Contracting Party and an 
investor of the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of that investor in the 
territory of the former Contracting Party […]’ (emphasis added). 
869 See, for instance, the Italy-Bangladesh BIT applicable in the Saipem v. Bangladesh case (see, 
supra, note 580). 
870 Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitration Agreements and Awards in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, supra, note 630, at p. 57. 
871 Iberdrola v. Guatemala, paras. 301; 356. The relevant consent to jurisdiction clause was 
included in Art. 8 of the Acuerdo entre el Reino de Espan ̃a y la Repu ́blica de Guatemala 
para la promocio ́n y la proteccio ́n reci ́proca de inversiones, signed on 9 December 2002 
(available at: http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2004-11256), according 
to which: ‘1. Any dispute relating to investments that arises between one of the 
Contracting Parties and an investor of the other Contracting Party, concerning matters governed 
by this Agreement shall be notified in writing, including detailed information, by the investor 
to the Contracting Party receiving the investment. As far as possible, the parties to the 
dispute, shall endeavour to settle these differences by mutual agreement’ (non-official 
translation from the original Spanish wording; emphasis added). In the case, the tribunal 
dismissed the claim as it exclusively related to the law of Guatemala and the mere mention 
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Therefore, if a dispute concerning an international commercial arbitration 
award originates from the conduct of the courts of a State party to a treaty 
providing for a narrow consent clause, the investment tribunal would not have 
jurisdiction to decide whether the State has violated international norms, 
different from those included in the investment treaty, such as the New York 
Convention. In light of the above, a State’s conduct violating the New York 
Convention may be assessed by the relevant investment panel only to the 
extent it also amounts to a denial of justice or, according to certain scholars 
and case law,872 an unlawful expropriation, a breach of the FET clause or other 
treaty standard expressly set out in the applicable treaty. 
On the contrary, in the event of a treaty containing a broad consent to 
arbitration, it could be deemed that the relevant investment tribunal has 
jurisdiction to assess a State’s liability for a breach of the New York 
Convention. Indeed, to the extent that a connection with the investment is 
established, the broad consent may be considered to grant jurisdiction with 
respect to any claim, and not only to disputes that are connected to the 
violation of a treaty’s standards. In this regard, it should be noted that the 
coverage of broad consent clauses has been considered by investment tribunals 
in the ambit of the analysis of the possibility for investment tribunals to rule 
upon contractual claims and that scholarly writings have elaborated two 
opposite schools of thought based on, inter alia, such decisions.  
According to the restrictive interpretation,873 the fact that the consent is 
included in the investment treaty necessarily implies that the consent is in 
                                                                                                                                                            
of the treaty by the claimant and the qualification of the actions of Guatemala according to 
the standards of the applicable treaty is not sufficient to convert the dispute into one on 
issues covered by the treaty. 
872 See, for instance, Saipem v. Bangladesh.   
873 See, inter alia, E. DE BRADANDERE, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International 
Law, Cambridge University Press, 2014, at pp. 26 and pp. 42-49; E. GAILLARD, Treaty-
Based Jurisdiction: Broad Dispute Resolution Clauses, New York Law Journal, Col. 234, 
Issue 68, 2005, pp. 1-3; C. MCLACHLAN, L. SHORE, M. WEINIGER, International 
Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles, supra, note 53, at p. 100-101; J.W. 
SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, supra, note 9, at p. 381; and J.O. VOSS, The 
Impact of Investment Treaties on Contracts between Host States and Foreign Investors, 
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principle limited to the invocation by the foreign investor of the specific rights 
attributed to it in that treaty. More precisely, this line of thought deems that: 
‘[i]t would be relatively odd to accept that an investment treaty, which contains 
substantive protection standards for the treatment of foreign investors, would 
provide jurisdiction over investment disputes in cases where the tribunal would 
not even be called upon to rule on the violation of the substantive provisions 
of that treaty.’874 This reasoning is supported by arbitral decisions that denied 
that a broad consent clause entitled the investor to bring contract claims 
without the simultaneous occurrence of any treaty breach.875  
There is also an opposite view,876 according to which broad consent clauses do 
not restrict a tribunal’s jurisdiction to claims arising from alleged violations of 
                                                                                                                                                            
Studies on the Law of Treaties 4, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, at pp. 73-81. Please 
note that the doctrine and the case-laws relating to the scope of consent to investor-State 
arbitration mentioned in this paragraph investigated whether the consent included claims 
for breaches of investment contracts. The Author’s considerations have been used in the 
context of this work to analyse the different question concerning the possibility to 
encompass within such consent also claims for breaches of the New York Convention. 
874 E. DE BRADANDERE, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law, supra, 
note 873, at p. 45. In the same vein, E. GAILLARD, Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
Jurisdiction over Contract Claims – The SGS Cases Considered, in T. WEILER (ed.), 
International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, 
Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law, Cameron May, 2005, pp. 325-346. 
875 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0779.pdf), 
para. 161. 
876 See, inter alia, A.K. BJORKLUND, Applicable Law in International Investment Disputes, in 
C. GIORGETTI (ed.), Litigating International Investment Disputes. A Practitioner’s Guide, 
Brill Nijhoff, 2014, pp. 261-286, at pp. 265 and following; C. SCHREUER, Jurisdiction and 
Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Obligations, supra, note 865, at p. 8; C. SCHREUER, 
Consent to Arbitration, supra, note 865, pp. 837-843; C. SCHREUER, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims- the Vivendi I Case Considered, in T. 
WEILER (ed.), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the 
ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law, Cameron May, 2005, 
pp. 281-323; and A.M. STEINGRUBER, Consent in International Arbitration, supra, note 
150, at p. 256. 
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the BIT’s substantive standards. As noted by one author, ‘[b]y their own terms, 
these consent clauses encompass disputes that go beyond the interpretation 
and application of the BIT itself and would include dispute[s] that arise from a 
contract and other rules of law in connection with the investment.’877 Authors 
supporting this line of thought based their reasoning on two main arguments. 
The first one regards the fact that if a State wanted to limit its offer regarding 
investor-State disputes, it could have done so. Indeed, as noted above, certain 
States have adopted consent clauses whereby the scope of their offer to 
arbitrate is reduced to BIT claims or even to certain guarantees included 
therein. If the BIT does not contain any such limitation, it means that 
contracting States accepted that an investor may bring claims relating to 
investment contracts or based on other rules of law.878 The second argument 
invoked in this context comes from the comparison between the broad 
consent clause to arbitrate with private investors with the narrowly formulated 
inter-state dispute clause, which, indeed, is mostly limited to disputes related to 
the interpretation or application of the relevant investment treaty. This line of 
thought has been supported by case law. In particular, the ad hoc Committee 
which had to decide on the request for the annulment of the Vivendi v. 
Argentina award879 ruled that: ‘[r]ead literally, the requirements for arbitral 
jurisdiction in Article 8 do not necessitate that the Claimant allege a breach of 
the BIT itself: it is sufficient that the dispute relate to an investment made 
under the BIT.’880 In light of the above, the tribunal concluded that contractual 
claims are included within the scope of its jurisdiction. 
                                                          
877 C. SCHREUER, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Obligations, supra, 
note 865, at p. 8. 
878 Interestingly, the supporters of the opposite view believe that should the parties have 
intended to include contract claims they would have inserted a specific language, as 
envisaged, for instance, in Art. 24 of the 2012 US Model BIT. 
879 See, supra, note 549. 
880 Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002 (available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0210.pdf), para. 55. Art. 8 
of the applicable treaty (Accord entre Ie Gouvernement de la République Française at Ie 
Gouvernement de la République Argentine sur I'encouragement et la protection 
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Adhering to this latter school of thought implies that disputes concerning 
violations of other conventions and treaties that have an impact on the 
investment made by the investor in accordance with the applicable BIT may be 
included in the scope of application of the broad consent clause. Therefore, if 
it is accepted that a commercial arbitral award (or an arbitration agreement) is 
included in the concept of protected investment, the New York Convention is 
a multilateral treaty that has an impact on the investment, since it regards its 
recognition and enforcement.  
However, the consent clause is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the 
investment tribunal. The second element to be taken into account regards the 
rules on applicable law included in treaties. Indeed, if the consent clause is 
wide, but the clause on applicable law is limited to the provisions of the 
investment treaty, it would not be possible for the tribunal to rule on breaches 
of the New York Convention. In this respect a couple of considerations need 
to be made.  
First, most of investment treaties setting out a broad consent do not contain 
provisions concerning the law to be applied by investment tribunals.881 In such 
a case the rules set out in the ICSID Convention or in the rules applicable to 
the proceeding on the governing law shall apply. 
In this respect, Art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that: ‘[t]he 
tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be 
agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the tribunal shall apply 
the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the 
conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.’ In 
this respect the Report of the Executive Directors explains that the reference 
to international law should be understood in the sense given in Art. 38(1) of 
the Statute of the ICJ, which provides for the application of: 
                                                                                                                                                            
réciproques des investissements (ensemble une déclaration), signed on 3 July 1991 
(available at: http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/laws/italaw6009.pdf) ) offered 
consent for ‘[t]out differend relatif aux investissements, au sens du present Accord.’ Along 
the same lines, see, inter alia, SGS v. Philippines). 
881 C. SCHREUER, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Obligations, supra, 
note 865, at p. 14. 
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(i) international conventions, general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the relevant State; 
(ii) international custom; 
(iii) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and 
(iv) judicial decisions and the teaching of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations.882 
Therefore, it has been deemed that this provision covers, inter alia, the law of 
the host State, the substantive rules of the treaty where the consent to 
jurisdiction is granted and other relevant treaties and general customary 
international law.883  
In case of non-ICSID arbitration, the rules applicable to the proceeding usually 
identify the set of provisions applicable, giving a prominent role to the choice 
made by the parties. In the absence of a choice it is usually envisaged that the 
tribunal can apply the rules that it deems appropriate.884   
On the contrary, in case the laws are indicated in the investment treaty, the 
relevant content is not uniform. Limiting the analysis to the treaties relevant in 
this sub-section (i.e., those providing for a broad consent clause), some of 
them notably make reference to the investment treaty and the principles of 
international law.885 Others are more elaborate, referring to the treaty, the law 
                                                          
882 The position included in the Report of the Executive Directors seems endorsed by case 
law. For more, see D. DI PIETRO, Applicable Law Under Article 42 of the ICSID Convention 
– The case of Amco v. Indonesia, in T. WEILER (ed.), International Investment Law and 
Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary 
International Law, Cameron May, 2005, pp. 223-279, at p. 255-258. 
883 C. SCHREUER, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Obligations, supra, 
note 865, at p. 12. 
884 See, for instance, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which provide that in the absence of 
agreement between the parties, the tribunal shall apply the law ‘which it determines to be 
appropriate’ (Article 35(1) of the UNCITRAL 2010 Rules; Article 33(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Rules adopted in 1976). The same provision is found in the ICC Rules (Art. 
17). 
885 See, for instance, the 2003 Italy Model BIT according to which: ‘[w]hen delivering its 
decision, the Arbitration Tribunal shall apply the provisions contained in this Agreement, 
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of the State party to the dispute, and the rules and principles of international 
law. 886 Finally, there are some clauses on applicable law, which are broader and 
expressly refer to the treaty where the consent is granted, other treaties in force 
between the contracting parties, the law of the State party to the dispute, and 
the rules and principles of international law.887 
As clearly emerges, it is not always possible to find a correspondence between 
the rules on applicable law and the rules on jurisdiction. When the clause 
relating to the applicable law is particularly broad and makes reference to the 
treaties in force between the contracting States, it seems possible to state that 
the investment tribunal has jurisdiction to assess whether the host State has 
complied with the New York Convention.  
In other cases, the crucial point is to understand if the New York Convention 
may be deemed to be included in the reference to the applicable principles or 
rules of international law. According to a wider interpretation, the inclusion of 
international law could imply the applicability of any rule of international law 
that is invoked and that is significant to the claim put forward, including 
                                                                                                                                                            
as well as the principles of international law recognized by the two Contracting Parties’ 
(Art. X(4)). 
886 See, for instance, Art. 8(3) of Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on 26 
June 2002 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/465), which provides that: 
‘[t]he arbitration award shall be based on: 
- the provisions of this Agreement; 
- the laws of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment has been made 
including the rules relative to conflict of laws; and 
- the rules and universally accepted principles of international law.’ 
887 See, for instance, Art. 10(5) of the Tratado entre la Republica Federal de Alemania y la 
Republica Argentina sobre Promoción y Protección Reciproca de Inversiones, signed on 9 
April 1991 (available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/92), according to which: ‘eI 
Tribunal arbitral decidirá sobre la base del presente Tratado y, en so caso, sobre Ia base de 
otros tratados vigentes entre las Partes, del derecho interno de la Parte Contratante - en 
cuyo territorio se realizó la inversión, incluyendo sus normas de derecho internacional 
privado, y de los principios generales del derecho internacional.’ 
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multilateral treaties governing a variety of aspects of international law,888 such 
as the New York Convention. Under a narrower interpretation, the applicable 
rules would be those that have a direct bearing on investment law.889 Perhaps, if 
a commercial award is considered included within the scope of protected 
investment, the New York Convention may be deemed included within the 
scope of applicable rules of international law also pursuant to this 
interpretation.  
In light of the above, it seems possible to argue that if a treaty contains a broad 
consent clause coupled with a clause on the applicable law referring to the rules 
of international law, the investment tribunal could also assess the State’s 
liability vis-à-vis an investor with respect to the wrongful application of the 
New York Convention, provided that the commercial award under discussion 
can be qualified as an investment. The same conclusion should be reached with 
regard to breaches of customary international law. 
Notably, it has been possible to make the considerations above in light of 
certain specific features of the New York Convention.890 Indeed, the New York 
Convention itself does not establish an exclusive jurisdiction that impairs other 
dispute settlement mechanisms. Otherwise, the exclusive dispute settlement 
clause set out in the Convention would prevail over the one included in the 
treaty.891  
                                                          
888 C. SCHREUER, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Obligations, supra, 
note 865, at p. 17. Please however note that this reasoning may not be applicable when the 
treaty exclusively refers to the principles of international law recognized by the contracting 
States, which is a more stringent concept. 
889 C. SCHREUER, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Obligations, supra, 
note 865, at p. 17.  
890 These considerations have been retrieved from the reflections made by scholarly writings 
with respect to contract claims under investment treaties. See J. CRAWFORD, Treaty and 
Contract in Investment Arbitration, supra, note 481; B. DEMIRKOL, Enforcement of 
International Commercial Arbitration Agreements and Awards in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, supra, note 630, at pp. 59-60. 
891 This would have been the case, for instance, of Art. 23(1) of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (i.e., the Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement 
of disputes, attached as Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement), which establishes exclusive 
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Additionally, the New York Convention grants rights to the benefit of 
individuals,. i.e., the parties to an arbitration agreement and the award winners. 
Indeed, ‘if an international convention regulates exclusively inter-State issues 
which concern the individual interests of the contracting States, their collective 
interests, or the interests of the international community as a whole, and the 
obligations are strictly owed to other contracting States, [an] individual’s 
interests would not be infringed directly by the breach.’892  
In this respect, it should be pointed out that, as mentioned above, individuals 
are not party to treaties and therefore do not derive any legal obligations under 
the treaties. However, under general international law, it is generally accepted 
that international treaties concluded between two or more States can grant 
certain rights to individuals and corporations. Therefore, the obligations 
contracted in treaties are inter-state obligations, but States can also grant treaty 
rights to foreign persons that become beneficiaries of these rights, even if they 
do not become contracting parties thereof.893 In light of this, if an international 
convention regulates individual legal relationships or provides individual rights, 
such as the New York Convention, its violation might directly infringe an 
individual’s legal interests and the aggrieved investor would be entitled to bring 
an investor-State claim connected to such violation. 
It is undeniable that applying the reasoning discussed in this sub-section to 
cross-over cases would make an investor’s position much easier. Releasing the 
                                                                                                                                                            
jurisdiction over disputes arising from the violation of obligations stipulated under relevant 
trade agreements. 
892 B. DEMIRKOL, Enforcement of International Commercial Arbitration Agreements and 
Awards in Investment Treaty Arbitration, supra, note 630, at p. 60. 
893 On the topic see, inter alia, E. DE BRADANDERE, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public 
International Law, supra, note 873, at p. 55 and following; B. DEMIRKOL, Enforcement of 
International Commercial Arbitration Agreements and Awards in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, supra, note 630, at p. 60; C. MCLACHLAN, L. SHORE, M. WEINIGER, 
International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles, supra, note 53, at pp. 61-65; 
and J.J. VAN HAERSOLTE-VAN HOF, A.K. HOFFMANN, The Relationship between 
International Tribunals and Domestic Courts, in P. MUCHLINSKI, F. ORTINO, C. 
SCHREUER (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, pp. 963-1006, at pp. 985-990. 
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dispute from the finding of a violation of the investment treaty where the 
consent clause is contained, the investor would not have to prove that a denial 
of justice had occurred, nor that the national courts involved had acted in bad 
faith, committed an abuse of right, etc. In addition, all discussions concerning 
whether national courts’ conduct may entail exclusively a denial of justice or 
also a violation of a different BIT standard would become irrelevant. The mere 
wrongful application of the New York Convention by national courts would 
grant the investor the right to make a claim vis-à-vis the relevant State on that 
ground. Perhaps investment tribunals may also be keen to accept such a cause 
of action considering that they have shown interest in expanding their 
jurisdiction as much as possible.894 This however may have an additional 
negative impact on the entire system of investment arbitration. States may be 
worried of this over-expansive interpretation of the arbitral tribunals’ 
jurisdiction and deny their consent to investment arbitration with private 
investors in future BITs.  
Moreover, in this scenario, the entire architecture of international arbitration 
would collapse: investment tribunals would be entitled to act as a court of 
appeal against the decisions of national courts concerning the enforcement of 




From the analysis conducted in this Chapter it emerges that, in three out of the 
four Relevant Cases in which jurisdiction was accepted, the tribunal considered 
that a provision of the applicable BIT was breached by the host State through 
an action of the municipal courts, which refused to enforce, or set aside or 
                                                          
894 This is evident, for instance, from all the Relevant Cases where jurisdiction has been 
deemed to exist: the boundaries of the concept of investment have been broadened 
probably beyond the contracting States’ will at the time the investment treaty was 
concluded, which entailed that in newer BITs the definition of the term investment is very 
detailed and circumscribed.  
895 G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, Commercial Arbitration Before International Courts and 
Tribunals Reviewing Abusive Conduct of Domestic Courts, supra, note 477, at p. 170 
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delayed enforcement of, an arbitral award or an arbitration agreement. While it 
may be too early to acknowledge the existence of an effective trend, these 
awards have contributed to the development of a theory pursuant to which the 
abusive interference of a State with international arbitration constitutes an 
international wrong. The existence of this theory is also witnessed by the fact 
that at the time of writing, at least three more investor-State claims have been 
brought before investment tribunals for issues connected to, inter alia, the non-
enforcement of commercial awards.896 Of course, the decisions at issue are very 
                                                          
896 Those cases are: 
(i) Enel Green Power S.p.A. v. Republic of El Salvador (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/18): 
the documents relating to this claim are not published. However, based on 
reports (http://0-www.iareporter.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/articles/parties-
in-enel-v-el-salvador-arbitration-agree-on-a-former-senior-counsel-at-icsid-to-
serve-as-chair-in-pending-arbitration/), the claimant launched arbitration under a 
1999 Salvadoran statute that offers a pathway to arbitration, alleging that El 
Salvador has failed to abide by the terms of a 2011 arbitral award issued in a 
dispute between the claimant and a state-owned Salvadoran energy company. The 
case ended with an award embodying the parties’ settlement agreement, pursuant 
to ICSID Arbitration Rule 43(2) on 14 September 2015 (see: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseno
=ARB/13/18); 
(ii) KBR, Inc. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/1). The claim arose 
out of the Mexican courts' annulment of an ICC arbitration award issued in 
favour of the claimant's subsidiary. KBR’s claims included, indirect expropriation, 
denial of justice, breach of the FET clause and of the national treatment standard, 
set out in the NAFTA. Despite the award is not published at the date of this 
work, according to reports (see: http://0-
www.iareporter.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/articles/mexico-secures-dismissal-
of-nafta-claim-brought-by-kellogg-brown-and-root-kbr-in-dispute-arising-out-of-
unpaid-icc-arbitration-award/) arbitrators have dismissed KBR’s claims; and 
(iii) Marco Gavazzi and Stefano Gavazzi v. Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/25). 
None of the documents concerning the claim are publicly available. However, 
according to reports (see: http://www.iareporter.com/articles/romania-loses-
another-intra-eu-bit-case-this-time-under-a-treaty-that-was-mutually-terminated-
but-whose-sunset-clause-provided-arbitral-footing/ ) one of the claims raised by 
the claimants focused on the Romanian court system’s handling of a commercial 
arbitration award issued in their favour. In particular the claim regarded a breach 
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fact-specific, yet ‘they are all inspired on the assumption that states are under 
some form of obligation to respect arbitration, the violation of which may 
entail international responsibility.’897 
On the basis of the analysis conducted in this Chapter, it is possible to draw 
conclusions as to: (i) the causes of actions that may be invoked by an aggrieved 
award winner with respect to national courts' misconduct; and (ii) the role to 
the played by investment tribunals in the review of national courts' behaviour. 
 
11.1. Investment treaties’ causes of action 
With respect to the first aspect, as illustrated, the sources of obligations are 
wide-ranging, including the prohibition to expropriation, the violation of an 
effective means clause, and the violation of FET. Interestingly, none of the 
awards analysed herein have recognised the occurrence of a denial of justice by 
the national courts; instead, the tribunals accepted the claimants’ 
reconstructions as to the occurrence of breaches of different guarantees by the 
national courts. This approach has aroused the criticism of certain scholars898 
that believe that the panels’ intent was to accord justice to investors in cases 
where the conditions for a denial of justice would have not been met. Indeed, 
as illustrated in section 2 of this Chapter, claims for denial of justice can 
exclusively be hosted if certain specific conditions are met: there must be a 
procedural error, the error has to be egregious, and all local remedies available 
to correct the error shall have been exhausted. According to these authors, in 
light of the deference that has to be paid towards the domestic judiciary and 
respect for judicial finality, the only claim that can be brought vis-à-vis a State 
                                                                                                                                                            
of the ‘effective means’ clause found in Article 2.5 of the Italy-Romania BIT (now 
terminated). Despite the ICSID award was issued in favour of the two brothers, 
the claim concerning the breach of the effective means clause was unsuccessful. 
Additional claims may have been lodged which will become public available in the future.  
897 L.G. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Arbitration in Asia – 
Towards Less State Interference, Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 8, Issue 5, 
December 2011, pp. 1-16, at p. 14. 
898 See, infra, note 613. 
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concerning the conduct of the national courts is denial of justice.899 As 
illustrated, case-law900 seems however oriented on a different route, through the 
recognition of violations of the FET standard, not for a breach of denial of 
justice, but for a breach of the relatively new treatment standard providing 
investors with effective means to assert claims and enforce rights. This has 
resulted in an increase in cases of actionable judicial wrongs. This 
jurisprudential approach is to be welcomed, since if it is recognised that 
wrongful interference of the courts can entail the State’s responsibility, why 
should such liability be limited to cases of denial of justice? As long as the 
constitutive elements of a different cause of action are met by the conduct of 
the judiciary, such conduct should entail a liability of the State. 
Moving on to the analysis of guarantees considered by the Relevant Cases, in 
the Saipem Award, the tribunal recognized that the national courts committed 
a judicial expropriation, by means of the revocation of the powers of the 
arbitral panel and the labelling of the award issued by such panel as a nullity. In 
this case, judicial expropriation was correctly treated as a different cause of 
action from denial of justice.901 In order to come to its conclusion, the tribunal 
took an innovative approach, applying the sole effect doctrine, but introducing 
an additional element allegedly necessary. More precisely, after having 
established that the Bangladeshi courts’ conduct substantially deprived Saipem 
of the residual contractual rights under the investment as crystallized by the 
ICC Award902 and that such deprivation was irreversible,903 the tribunal stated 
that due to the peculiar circumstances of the case it had to consider whether the 
conduct of the courts was also illegal. For the panel, a different approach would 
have entailed that any setting aside of an award could have implied a claim for 
                                                          
899 Other commentators believe that, regardless of the cause of action, whenever a claim is 
made against the State local remedies remain relevant, regardless of how the claim is 
characterised. See, infra, note 664. 
900 Government of the Kaliningrad Region v. Republic of Lithuania, supra, note 788. 
901 For the relationship between denial of justice and judicial expropriation after the Saipem 
Award, see, supra, note 620. 
902 Saipem Award, para. 128. 
903 Saipem Award, para. 130. 
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expropriation, even when the setting aside was legitimate. In this respect, the 
ICSID tribunal found the Bangladeshi courts’ actions illegal as they committed 
an abuse of right and violated the spirit of the New York Convention.904 
The ATA v. Jordan case and the Frontier v. Czech Republic case dealt with the 
FET standard. Despite the fact that the panel’s reasoning in the ATA v. Jordan 
case was very succinct and that the tribunal in the Frontier v. Czech Republic 
case came to the conclusion that no breach of the FET had occurred, these 
cases are still relevant as they found that a State may be in principle responsible 
for the municipal courts’ breach of the FET for a reason different from denial 
of justice. Interestingly, in the Frontier v. Czech Republic case, the tribunal 
stated that it had to assess whether the Czech courts’ refusal to enforce the 
award amounted to an abuse of rights contrary to the international principle of 
good faith.905  
In White v. India, the tribunal recognised that the delays in proceeding 
concerning the set-aside of an arbitral award entailed a breach of the effective 
means' clause. White v. India is the fith case in which an arbitral panel dealt 
with such a guarantee and the second one in which effective means was 
expressly considered as autonomous standard, detached from denial of justice. 
The tribunal’s approach was however very rigid. It did not consider that a six-
year delay in the enforcement proceeding could fall within a breach of the 
standard, due to the specific circumstances of the case. Notably, the tribunal in 
this case endorsed the Saipem Award’s decision, implicitly asserting that, had 
the Indian courts set aside the arbitral award, a claim for judicial expropriation 
could have been lodged. 
In light of the above, it can be stated that an award creditor frustrated in its 
rights due to the non-recognition or set-aside of an arbitral award or the non-
recognition of an arbitration agreement may bring an investment treaty claim 
alleging the occurrence of: 
(i) a denial of justice: this is the traditional cause of action in case of judicial 
wrongs. However, the bar to find a violation thereof remains high and, as 
                                                          
904 Saipem Award, para. 167. 
905 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 525. 
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almost all tribunals dealing with it in the Relevant Cases noted, its finding 
requires egregious misconduct; 
(ii) a judicial expropriation: this cause of action had already been considered 
by investment tribunals. In the context of the Saipem v. Bangladesh case, 
the panel recognised that an arbitral award can be expropriated and 
suggested that, in addition to the sole effect doctrine, tribunals must also 
consider whether the expropriation was illegal under an international law 
perspective;  
(iii) a violation of the FET standard, for a reason different from denial of 
justice, such as for breach of legitimate expectations or abuse of right; 
(iv) a violation of the ‘effective means’ standard. In relation to this latter 
guarantee, it must be noted that its contours are somewhat vague, as it is a 
recent standard that probably needs to be further elaborated by case law. 
On the basis of the current background, it can be argued that undue delays 
not amounting to a denial of justice can imply a violation of this standard; 
(v) a violation of the full protection and security standard. In the Frontier v. 
Czech Republic case, the tribunal found such a standard implies an 
obligation on the State to make a functioning system of courts and legal 
remedies available to the investor. However, it went on to say that the 
State responsibility arises only if the courts have acted in bad faith and 
have reached decisions that are not reasonably tenable. 
As already noted, all the studied awards are very fact-specific. How future 
investment tribunals will act remains highly unpredictable also in light of the 
non-binding nature of precedents. Moreover these few decisions do not tell us 
what other types of judicial interferences can be considered relevant or whether 
other BIT standards may prove useful in challenging undue judicial 
interferences.906 As noted by one author: ‘[m]any unresolved issues obviously 
                                                          
906 See in particular, E. ALVAREZ, Crossing the “Public/Private” Divide: Saipem v. Bangladesh 
and Other Crossover Cases, supra, note 332, who at p. 411, wondered: ‘does a national 
court's issuance of an injunction to prevent arbitration ever constitute a violation of a BIT, 
for example? Does a local court action decision to vacate an arbitral award on permissible 
grounds under local law or the New York Convention nonetheless be re-examined and if 
found to be erroneous as a matter of law by an investor-state arbitral tribunal be the basis 
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loom now that this Pandora's Box has been opened. Whether those issues are 
resolved through wildly inconsistent rulings or serious efforts to produce 
jurisprudence constant will exacerbate or lessen fears concerning the internal 
fragmentation of international investment law.’907 
 
11.2. The role of investment tribunals 
The second relevant aspect concerns the role played by investment tribunals in 
the Relevant Cases analysed in this Chapter. Indeed, as illustrated, 
commentators criticised that investment tribunals acted as a sort of 
supranational court of appeal against the decisions of municipal courts, 
through the verification of how the New York Convention was applied or on 
which grounds an arbitration agreement/award was set aside. In fact, while it is 
true that the arbitrators did not review the correctness of the courts’ decisions 
with respect to the application of national law, they still reviewed domestic 
opinions for compliance with international law and the proper discharge of the 
national courts’ responsibilities under the New York Convention, which does 
not expressly provide for any review of the national courts’ decisions upon its 
application.  
Moreover, the end result sought by the claimants in the Relevant Cases was the 
enforcement of a commercial award, which for a number of reasons was 
denied by municipal courts. The traditional approach of investment tribunals 
was to assert that they could not, and would not, act as an international court 
of appeal against the decisions assumed by national courts concerning the 
application of the New York Convention or the setting aside of commercial 
                                                                                                                                                            
of a BIT claim (as for violation of FET) – or should a BIT claim in such contexts be 
limited to certain egregious actions by a local court that can have no justification under the 
rule of law? Does it matter for this purpose whether the local court action was taken by the 
court in which the arbitration occurred or by another jurisdiction in which enforcement of 
a commercial arbitral award is sought? Does it matter whether the local court's action will 
make it impossible to enforce the arbitral award anywhere, as where no attachable assets 
exist elsewhere or because the local courts' action effectively voids the award?’ 
907 E. ALVAREZ, Crossing the “Public/Private” Divide: Saipem v. Bangladesh and Other 
Crossover Cases, supra, note 332, at p. 411. 
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arbitral awards,908 as this would have represented a violation of the so-called 
‘architecture’ of international commercial arbitration. As already illustrated in 
this Chapter and in Chapter I, according to this doctrine, commercial 
arbitration awards should be considered as the final decision on the contended 
matter, with the courts of the seat of the arbitration being competent to annul 
the award and the courts of the place of enforcement being competent to rule 
upon the recognition and enforcement of the award in that particular State.909 
This architecture does not envisage any form of recourse against the final 
decision on the annulment or on the enforcement of the awards.  
In this respect, it should be noted that this investment tribunal’s ‘mantra’ was 
somewhat unlocked by the Frontier v. Czech Republic tribunal, which stated 
that its role was to determine whether the refusal of the Czech courts to 
recognize and enforce the Final Award in full violated the FET standard 
clause.910 Therefore, it expressly recognized its power to review the decisions of 
                                                          
908 For instance, in the Saipem v. Bangladesh Award, paras. 155; 158, the tribunal expressly 
stated that: ‘[t]o avoid any ambiguity, the Tribunal stresses that Saipem’s claim does not 
deal with the courts’ regular exercise of their power to rule over annulment or setting aside 
proceedings of an award wrongful interference [...]. By accepting jurisdiction, this Tribunal does 
not institute itself as control body over the ICC Arbitration, nor as enforcement court, nor as supranational 
appellate body for local court decisions. This Tribunal is a treaty judge. It is called upon to rule exclusively 
on treaty breaches, whatever the context in which such treaty breaches arise’ (emphasis added). In 
Romak v. Uzbekistan, the denial of jurisdiction was based on the grounds that the 
mechanical application of the broad definition of investment included in the Switzerland-
Uzbekistan BIT: ‘would create, de facto, a new instance of review of State court decisions 
concerning the enforcement of arbitral awards. […] The refusal or failure of the host 
State’s courts to enforce such an award would therefore arguably provide sufficient 
grounds for a de novo review – under a different international instrument and on grounds 
different from those that would normally apply – of the State courts’ decision not to 
enforce an award’ (para. 186). 
909 There are, of course, other conceptions of the architecture of international commercial 
arbitration. However, they are not reflective of the generally accepted conceptions of 
international law (see, G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, Commercial Arbitration Before 
International Courts and Tribunals Reviewing Abusive Conduct of Domestic Courts, supra, 
note 477, at p. 154). 
910 Frontier v. Czech Republic, para. 525. 
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national courts applying the New York Convention, in order to assess if 
through such decisions the State may have breached a provision of the 
applicable investment treaty. However, the Frontier tribunal itself somewhat 
limited this power: the review of the decisions of national courts in this respect 
could be made exclusively to the extent necessary to establish if a violation of 
the standards set out in the applicable investment treaty had occurred. 
Therefore, only if the non-enforcement of an arbitral award due to a bad-faith 
application of the New York Convention also amounts to a violation of the 
applicable investment treaty guarantees is the investment tribunal entitled to 
judge the conduct of the national courts.  
This framing of investment tribunals' activities supports the theory that they 
are not acting as a mere body of appeal, but are exclusively exercising their 
jurisdiction, assessing whether a treaty breach has occurred. Moreover, this 
approach seems to be the logical consequence of the recognition of arbitration 
agreements and/or arbitral commercial awards as part of an investment. As 
correctly noted, ‘[t]here is no reason why [an investment arbitral tribunal] 
should not entertain a claim simply because the circumstances under which the 
alleged breach occurred involve the application of another treaty (i.e., the New 
York Convention).’911 Consequently, however, not all the failures to respect the 
New York Convention may be included within the framework of investment 
treaties' protection. In fact, many clear violations of the New York Convention 
will remain without remedy due to the absence of any relevant investment 
providing the jurisdictional hook on which to hang a claim.  
This is probably the correct angle to analyse the topic: the cornerstone of the 
Relevant Cases is represented by the inclusion of commercial arbitral awards 
within the concept of protected investment under the applicable investment 
treaty. Once this is accepted, it goes without saying that, in order to establish if 
a violation of the applicable BIT took place, the investment tribunal shall 
assess, inter alia, how the New York Convention was applied.912 
                                                          
911 G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, Commercial Arbitration Before International Courts and 
Tribunals Reviewing Abusive Conduct of Domestic Courts, supra, note 477, at p. 164. 
912 See Romak v. Uzbekistan, supra, note 778. 
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Along the same lines are those scholarly writings that have criticised a tribunal’s 
position in the Relevant Cases where a claimant’s position was upheld, on the 
grounds that the international arbitral award acted as a court of appeal against 
the decision of the national courts regarding the annulment or the enforcement 
of commercial arbitral awards.913 The risk envisaged by scholarly writings in this 
case is that investment arbitration might replace the national courts of the place 
where the arbitration was held as the final decision-maker with respect to the 
validity of an international commercial award or arbitration agreements. Once 
again, in such a case the architecture of investment arbitration would be 
demolished.914 
In this regard, it should however be recalled that some authors915 have recently 
started to challenge the foundations of the architecture of international 
arbitration itself. Relying, inter alia, on the literal wording of Art. V of the New 
York Convention, they have argued that no rule prescribes that the State of the 
place of the arbitration shall have the final say with respect to the annulment of 
an international commercial award.916 In light of the above, investment 
arbitration is entitled to review the decisions of national courts deciding on a 
set-aside. 
 
11.3. Jurisdiction over breaches of the New York Convention  
A brief final remark connected to both the topics discussed in this section 11 
concerns the possibility of bringing an investor-State claim for a mere violation 
of the application of the New York Convention. The Frontier statement 
referred to, inter alia, in section 11.2 of this Chapter seems to deny this 
possibility. However, it could be argued that if the consent to jurisdiction is 
                                                          
913 See sections 4.2.3 and 6.2 of this Chapter III. 
914 W.M. REISMAN, B. RICHARDSON, Tribunals and Courts: An Interpretation of the 
Architecture of International Commercial Arbitration, supra, note 488. 
915 See, inter alia, J. PAULSSON, Interference by National Courts, supra, note 794; and L.G. 
RADICATI DI BROZOLO, The Control System of Arbitral Awards: A Pro-Arbitration 
Critique of Michael Reisman’s “Architecture of International Commercial Arbitration”, 
supra, note 794. 
916 For more, see, supra, Chapter I, section 4. 
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sufficiently wide – making reference, for example, to any claims concerning an 
investment – and the provisions of law included in the applicable investment 
treaty do not make reference only to the BIT and the national law, then the 
tribunal could be allowed to establish a responsibility of the State for the 
misapplication of the New York Convention by its national courts.917 This 
approach would, however, imply the final dismantling of the architecture of 
international arbitration, with the recognition of investment tribunals as the 
final reviewer of national courts’ application of the New York Convention. 
Moreover, it could imply a negative reaction from the States that would 
probably restrict their consent to jurisdiction in future investment treateties. 
Indeed, the partial cession of sovereignty inherent in all international treaties is 
less accepted when national courts are involved, in light of the ‘sanctity’ of 
judicial independence that puts the judiciary at the core of sovereign pride and 
identity. Therefore, if the recognition of the power of investment treaty 
tribunals to review the national courts’ behaviour in light of the applicable 
investment treaty provisions may be acceptable, the application of other 
parameters may be considered a too strong conditioning on the State.  
                                                          
917 It shall be however noted that the most prominent doctrine seems to be of a different 
view. See G. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, Commercial Arbitration Before International Courts 
and Tribunals Reviewing Abusive Conduct of Domestic Courts, supra, note 477, at p. 170; 
F. ROSENFELD, The Systemic Integration of International Investment Treaties and the 
New York Convention, supra, note 863. 
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CHAPTER IV – CONCLUSIONS 
1. Investment arbitration as a tool for reviewing national courts’ conduct 
dealing with commercial arbitration  
The core issue of each of the Relevant Cases is the extent to which a State can 
be held liable on the international plane for interference by its national courts 
with arbitration proceedings and, in particular, with the enforcement process of 
an arbitral award.  
This is slippery ground and the finding of a State’s liability in the Relevant 
Cases has aroused the interest of the international community and given rise to 
divergent positions among scholarly writings. 
The sensitivity of the topic is mainly due to the fact that the conduct under 
review in the Relevant Cases were performed by national courts and the 
consistent position at the international level is that there should be a 
presumption of deference towards the decisions of domestic courts. This, of 
course, does not mean that the activities of municipal courts cannot be 
assessed by international courts and tribunals, as it is a well-established 
principle that the conduct of the judiciary are capable of creating a State’s 
liability, likewise all other State organs. However, it is largely believed that the 
judiciary should have a relatively broad margin of operation and that its 
conduct must be particularly serious to amount to an international wrong. One 
should only consider that many authors maintain that the only cause of action 
available against national courts is denial of justice, which requires a serious 
procedural error and the exhaustion of local remedies.918 All other substantive 
claims would only represent an attempt to lower the bar for finding a liability 
of national courts on the international plane.  
With specific reference to the activity of domestic courts concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards, the margin of 
operation of domestic courts is also recognised, to a certain extent, by the New 
York Convention. Indeed, the scope of the New York Convention is limited to 
                                                          
918 See, supra, Chapter III, sections 2 and 4.2.1. 
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the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards and arbitration 
agreements, while it does not regulate all other areas where the national courts 
and international arbitration may meet. It is a well-established principle that 
international arbitration needs the support of national courts. As arbitration is a 
private manner of dispute settlement not incardinated in a specific legal system, 
the intervention of the courts of the seat of the arbitration may be necessary in 
a number of circumstances: for the appointment of arbitrators, in case of a lack 
of collaboration of one of the parties, for obtaining the cooperation of third 
parties which are not bound by the arbitration agreement, or for applying for 
the annulment of arbitral awards. In all these cases, the courts of the seat will 
be responsible for taking the relevant decisions and, of course, such decisions 
will be made according to the domestic rules, which all differ from each other. 
In this respect, the main instrument that attempts to achieve a minimum level 
of harmonisation among the various jurisdictions is the Uncitral Model Law. 
Firstly, however, the Uncitral Model Law is not binding and each State can 
freely decide to adapt its national laws to it, and, secondly, it is silent on many 
matters. Therefore, the laws of the State of the seat, as well as their application 
by the national judiciary, still remain relevant. Of course, the parties are free to 
determine the seat of the arbitration, and should be aware of the risks of a 
specific country when they decide to arbitrate at a particular place. Therefore, 
one may argue that the parties only have themselves to blame in case of 
assistance by the courts of the seat that turns into interference, because they 
could have expected that when they chose to refer to arbitration in that 
country. However, one must consider that in some cases, certain parties, such 
as governmental entities, would accept to go to arbitration only in the State 
where their legal seat is placed or where the transaction that the parties will 
perform will be located. In addition, in the context of the negotiations of an 
investment agreement, and of the mutual concessions necessary to reach a 
contractual arrangement, it is very possible that one party is forced to accept a 
forum that is less than optimal for it.  
Moreover, despite its success (it currently counts more than 150 signatories), 
the New York Convention has not been able to achieve a harmonised 
international regime concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
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awards. This is due to the fact that many of the concepts that are crucial for its 
application are not spelled out in detail and, therefore, remain subject to 
different interpretation and applications. Hence, the role for national law has 
been left relatively open in the structure of the New York Convention and, not 
surprisingly, this has contributed to the failure in reaching a truly international 
standard for international commercial arbitration. To cite the most evident 
situation: the New York Convention lists the limited cases where recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral award can be refused by a State.919 However, on 
the one hand, the New York Convention leaves each contracting State free to 
accept or refuse enforcement in any of such cases. Thus, there may be 
situations where enforcement is granted to an award annulled by the courts of 
the seat. On the other hand, if enforcement is refused, it is difficult to draw a 
distinction between cases where national courts effectively interfered with the 
arbitral proceeding and cases where national courts legitimately exercised their 
rights to intervene in the arbitration proceeding and to have a divergent 
opinion from that of the arbitrators.  
The Relevant Cases are framed in this context. In all of them an award holder 
frustrated in its attempt to have an arbitral award or an arbitration agreement 
enforced, brought an investment treaty claim alleging that provisions of a BIT 
had been violated by the national courts that denied the enforcement.  
At first, this may sound a bit strange: what is the nexus between the denial of 
recognition and enforcement of an award and the violation of a BIT? Shouldn’t 
the (possibly) wrongful lack of recognition merely represent a violation of the 
New York Convention or a denial of justice by national courts? How does 
investment law deal with this issue?  
                                                          
919 Those cases, provided by Art. V of the New York Convention, are: awards made without 
jurisdiction; a party being affected by some relevant incapacity; a failure to comply with the 
rules of natural justice; the composition of the tribunal being contrary to the arbitration 
agreement or the law of the seat; the award having been set aside by the courts of the seat; 
the subject matter of the dispute not being capable of resolution by arbitration in the 
country where enforcement is sought or enforcement of the award being otherwise 
contrary to the public policy of that country. 
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The replies to these questions are relatively simple. One must consider that in 
case of non-enforcement of an international award in breach of the New York 
Convention the award winner does not have an effective method to seek 
justice. This is mainly due to the fact that the New York Convention does not 
envisage an international appellate body that has the power to review the 
decisions of national courts regarding the application of the New York 
Convention. Therefore, the frustrated award winner should seek redress before 
the courts of the same State, which, especially in case of collusion with the 
award loser, would be unlikely to reverse the decision of the court of the lower 
instance. The other available remedy under traditional public international law 
would be diplomatic protection, which, for the reasons illustrated in Chapter I, 
is a far from perfect remedy.920   
Against this background, international lawyers have tried to be creative in 
finding a venue where the award holder may have an effective relief in case of 
wrongful interference by national courts. Besides human rights courts,921 the 
location was found in investment treaty arbitration, which over the past 30 
years has gained momentum. Every year dozens of cases are submitted to the 
Centre, and, presumably, an analogous number of investment cases are dealt 
with by other institutions, such as the ICC and the SCC.922 This may be also 
explicable by the fact that investment tribunals have been relatively keen on 
finding the State hosting the investment liable under the invoked 
instruments.923. 
                                                          
920 For more, see Chapter I, sections 2 and 5. 
921 For more, see Chapter I, section 5, where the downsides of this remedy are highlighted, 
especially if compared to the recourse to investment arbitration.  
922 While the Centre makes available the main details of the cases filed before it, the same is 
not done by other institutions, where the protection of confidentiality of the party is 
prevailing.  
923 In 2012 investment arbitration was strongly criticised as a system of ‘pro-investor 
interpretation of the treaties’ by P. EBERHARDT, C. OLIVET, T. AMOS, N. BUXTON in 
Profiting from Injustice: How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are fuelling an 
investment arbitration boom, November 2012, Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), p. 
11 (available at: http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-
from-injustice.pdf). Of the same opinion is, also, G. VAN HARTEN, Pro-Investor or Pro-
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Of course, to access investment treaty arbitration, certain jurisdictional 
requirements must be met and an investment treaty breach must have been 
committed.  
In particular, one of the basic jurisdictional requirements is represented by the 
presence of an investment. If the claim does not concern an investment made 
by an investor in the territory of the other contracting State, then access to an 
investment treaty tribunal shall be denied. This means that the award must 
qualify as an investment for the award winner to achieve access to investment 
tribunals empowered to review actions of the national courts, in order to 
establish if a breach of the standards of protections envisaged by the 
investment instrument has occurred. 
However, this is not a straightforward passage. In fact, prima facie, the link 
between an arbitral award and an investment is not immediate. In order to 
include arbitral awards within the scope of the protected investment, the 
concept of investment must be over-expanded. In addition, even assuming that 
access is obtained, investment tribunals need to be granted with the right to 
verify the correctness of the actions of national courts in a field where the latter 
have a large degree of discretion and in the lack of a system of revision of 
national court decisions by an international ad-hoc body.   
The six Relevant Cases address these topics: in four of them the tribunals 
accepted jurisdiction, and in three a liability of the State for a wrongful 
interference with the arbitration process was found.  
While it may be too early to acknowledge the existence of an effective trend, 
these awards have contributed to the development of a theory pursuant to 
which the abusive interference of a State with international arbitration 
constitutes an international wrong. This is also witnessed by the fact that at the 
time of writing, at least three more investor-State claims have been brought 
before investment tribunals for issues connected to, inter alia, the non-
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enforcement of commercial awards.924 Of course, the decisions in the Relevant 
Cases are very fact-specific, yet ‘they are all inspired on the assumption that 
states are under some form of obligation to respect arbitration, the violation of 
which may entail international responsibility.’925 
 
2. The existence of an investment 
As known, there are several conditions that must be met for an investor to 
access the jurisdiction of investment tribunals. These conditions vary 
depending on the wording of the invoked investment instrument and on 
whether the case is brought before ICSID or other tribunals.  
First of all, it is true that a pre-requisite to access investment treaty arbitration 
is the existence of an investment made by a national of one contracting State in 
the other contracting State. 
Each treaty normally contains its own definition of investment and the 
claimant should prove before the investment tribunal that its claim concerns an 
investment falling within the definition envisaged by the applicable treaty. In 
this respect, it should however be noted that nearly all of the current 
international investment treaties provide for a broad definition of investment. 
More precisely, investment is defined as ‘every kind of asset’, followed by a list 
of investments, which is illustrative and not exhaustive, and which often 
includes ‘claims to payment or performance having a financial value’. It is self-
explanatory that such a broad definition is of support in the attempt to access 
Investor-State arbitration in those cases where the alleged investment is 
represented by a commercial arbitral award. In particular, if a claim to money is 
an investment, any right to any amount under a commercial award may be 
included in the definition. In any case, whether the investment in question falls 
into the scope of investment defined in the applicable investment treaty has to 
be decided by the tribunal established for the dispute, and practice shows that 
                                                          
924 See, supra, note 896. 
925 L.G. RADICATI DI BROZOLO, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Arbitration in Asia – 
Towards Less State Interference, supra, note 897, at p. 14. 
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tribunals tend to broadly interpret the investment at issue so as to acquire 
jurisdiction over the case.926 This is evident in the Relevant Cases.  
However, in case of ICSID Arbitration, the definition of investment set out in 
the investment treaty is not the only element that comes into play. Art. 25(1) of 
the ICSID Convention states that: ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend 
to any dispute arising directly out of an investment between a contracting State (or 
any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State) and a national of 
another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing 
to submit to the Centre’. This means that the Centre imposes its own 
jurisdictional requirements, which add to those of the applicable investment 
treaty where consent is granted. Among such requirements, the Centre compels 
the existence of an investment. However, it should be noted that the 
Convention itself does not provide for a definition of investment. ICSID 
tribunals have attempted to fill this gap and define the term, but have failed to 
come up with a consistent approach. More precisely, some tribunals have 
adopted an ‘objectivist’ approach, pursuant to which investment under the 
Convention has a self-standing meaning that does not depend on the 
instrument containing consent to ICSID jurisdiction. According to the 
supporters of the objectivist approach, the meaning of investment is to be 
found in a number of criteria that distinguish it from an ordinary commercial 
transaction; the absence of any of them means that the operation at issue 
cannot qualify as an investment. The main problem with this approach is that 
tribunals have not yet agreed on the number and the content of the elements 
that must be met for an investment to exist. This of course does not come out 
in favour of an approach that is grounded on the idea that investment has an 
objective intrinsic meaning.   
Other tribunals have adopted a more flexible approach, pursuant to which the 
criteria that have been developed by tribunals for the clarification of the notion 
of investment should not be considered as mandatory conditions of an 
investment, but rather as descriptive features. Therefore, the absence of any of 
                                                          
926 C. HUIPING, The Expansion of Jurisdiction by ICSID Tribunals: Approaches, Reasons and 
Damages, supra, note 138, pp. 671-687. 
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them would not per se impair the qualification of a given transaction as an 
investment. Finally, other tribunals have deemed that, having the drafters of 
the Washington Convention decide not to give a definition of the term 
investment, it is left to the parties to the legal instruments embodying their 
consent to ICSID jurisdiction to identify what an investment is. According to 
this approach (which is named ‘subjectivist’), the only test to be made regards 
the definition of investment included in the applicable investment treaty.927 
In this context, four out of six arbitral tribunals dealing with the Relevant Cases 
accepted the subject matter jurisdiction. Notably, two of them were constituted 
under the auspices of the Centre.  
However, in none of the Relevant Cases did the tribunals go so far as to state 
that an arbitral award per se constitutes an investment for the purposes of the 
BIT and/or the ICSID Convention. 
The case where the tribunal pushed itself the most forward in this respect is 
ATA v. Jordan, whereby the arbitrators recognised that the arbitration 
agreement in itself represented an investment. This result was reached by the 
application by an ICSID tribunal of the subjectivist approach, which, as 
illustrated, relies exclusivity on the treaty definition of investment. Since the 
applicable treaty contained a broad definition of investment, the tribunal found 
it easy to accept the jurisdiction. Notably, the tribunal did not take a position 
on whether an arbitral award can also constitute in and of itself an investment, 
since it dismissed that part of the claim on temporal grounds. However, if an 
arbitration agreement can be considered as an investment, I see no reason why 
the tribunal should have taken a different position with respect to an award.928 
Another ICSID tribunal, in Saipem v. Bangladesh, adopted a different 
approach to reach the same result as ATA v. Jordan. In Saipem v. Bangladesh, 
the tribunal adhered to the objectivist approach, but in order to assess its 
jurisdiction it looked at the entire underlying economic transaction out of 
which the arbitral award resulted. The tribunal therefore considered the 
operation that started with the construction contract and ended with the award 
                                                          
927 For more see Chapter II, section 3. 
928 For more see Chapter II, section 5.3. 
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that crystallized the rights and obligations arising from the original contract. In 
having recourse to the objectivist approach, through the application of the 
Salini test,929 the arbitrators basically referred to the features of the underlying 
transaction. Having established that the underlying transaction satisfied the 
Salini test, the tribunal concluded that the ICC award, which represented the 
residual outstanding portion of the transaction, was part of Saipem’s 
investment. On these grounds the tribunal accepted its jurisdiction.  
Following the path traced by Saipem v. Bangladesh, other investment tribunals 
stated that they have subject matter jurisdiction. In Frontier v. Czech Republic 
the tribunal aligned with Saipem v. Bangladesh’s line of reasoning, considering 
not the award per se, but rather the overall operation carried out by the investor. 
However, differently from Saipem v. Bangladesh, the UNCITRAL tribunal did 
not have to consider the gateway conditions set out by the Convention and 
simply relied on the wording on the BIT, according to which ‘[a]ny change in 
the form of an investment does not affect its character as an investment’.930 On 
that basis, the panel ruled that Frontier made an investment by way of, inter alia, 
the loans granted to a JV company incorporated in the Czech Republic, which 
was transformed into an entitlement of a first security charge by means of the 
commercial arbitral award.931 
Also in White v. India, the most recent of the Relevant Cases, the tribunal, in 
line with Saipem v. Bangladesh, considered that the award was part of the 
overall transaction made by the investor and that, through it, the rights of the 
investor arising from the original investment had been crystallised. 
Interestingly, in this case, the tribunal identified a developing jurisprudence, 
pursuant to which awards made by tribunals arising from investments represent 
                                                          
929 As mentioned, there is no unanimous consent as to the features of an investment among 
the supporters of the objectivist approach. However, as better explained in section 3.1 of 
Chapter 2, the most relied upon method to establish if there is an investment is to rely 
upon the Salini test, which defines an investment as having at least three elements: (1) a 
contribution of money or assets (2) a certain duration and (3) an element of risk. 
930 Art. 1(1) of the Canada-Czech Republic BIT. 
931 For more see Chapter II, section 5.4. 
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a continuation or a transformation of the original investment and, therefore, 
are capable of being protected under the applicable investment treaty.932  
In light of the above in Saipem v. Bangladesh, Frontier v. Czech Republic and 
White v. India, the tribunals had recourse to an expedient to accept jurisdiction 
that otherwise would have had to have been declined. Considering the entire 
transaction, rather than the award in and of itself, these tribunals were able to 
accept the jurisdiction. In ATA v. Jordan, the tribunal adopted a different 
approach and considered the arbitration agreement by itself: relying exclusively 
on the wording of the BIT, the tribunal recognised its subject matter 
jurisdiction.  
In two of the Relevant Cases, the arbitrators declined their jurisdiction. 
However, the positions taken by the said tribunals are divergent. In the first 
one, the UNCITRAL case Romak v. Uzbekistan, the tribunal, on the one hand, 
considered the overall transaction, rather than the commercial award per se, 
following the path traced by Saipem v. Bangladesh, but, on the other hand, 
applied the objectivist approach developed by ICSID tribunals, 
notwithstanding the fact that it was not bound by Washington Convention. In 
fact, being an UNCITRAL case, the tribunal could have simply relied on the 
very broad wording of the applicable BIT in order to assess if the transaction at 
issue represented an investment. Still, the tribunal decided to bring the Salini 
test into play. This can be perceived as a stratagem used by the panel to decline 
jurisdiction, possibly due to the fact that the arbitrators were not ready to 
review the host State court's behaviour.933  
In GEA v. Ukraine, the tribunal took a completely different approach. Indeed, 
the tribunal denied tout court that an arbitral award could represent an 
investment per se or a part thereof. For this tribunal, a commercial award was 
considered analytically different from the underlying transaction. Therefore, 
even if the operation underpinning the award could qualify as an investment, 
the award would not be considered as part of that investment or a 
crystallization thereof. In other words, for the tribunal, an arbitral award does 
                                                          
932 For more see Chapter II, section 5.6. 
933 For more see Chapter II, section 5.2. 
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not represent the continuation or the transformation of an investment, even 
when the award concerns rights and obligations arising from an investment, as 
stated by other tribunals in the Relevant Cases and therefore investment 
tribunals are not entitled to deal with the non-recognition/enforcement of 
arbitral awards and/or arbitration agreements.934 
GEA v. Ukraine can, however, be regarded as an exception to the tendency of 
investment tribunals to review acts of the judicial body of a State that 
interfered with the enforcement of a commercial award. This tendency is 
probably based more on a ‘sense of justice’, rather than on pure legal grounds, 
as none of the tribunals, including non-ICSID tribunals, whose gateway 
conditions are less narrow, dared to say that an award by itself represents an 
investment for the purposes of the Convention and/or the applicable BITs. 
Rather, the tribunals worked on the concept of investment to broaden its 
boundaries in order to include commercial awards and the rights arising 
therefrom in the overall transaction, which qualifies as an investment. As noted 
by the tribunal in White v. India, it is possible to assist in ‘developing 
jurisprudence on the treatment of arbitral awards to the effect that awards made 
by tribunals arising out of disputes concerning ‘investments’ (…) represent a continuation of 
transformation of the original investment’.935  
This approach, if understandable from a practical point of view, can hardly be 
supported from a merely juridical standpoint. Indeed, an award may arise out 
of a claim connected to an operation that could qualify as an investment, but it 
is logically and structurally distinct therefrom. In Saipem v. Bangladesh and in 
subsequent awards that followed its lines of reasoning, the tribunal functionally 
applied investment law to accept jurisdiction, but, as noted by the arbitrators in 
GEA v. Ukraine, the Saipem tribunal ‘made statements that are difficult to 
reconcile’936 in order to achieve this result. 
It should however be noted that if a tribunal wants to accept jurisdiction, 
Saipem’s approach is probably the only solution, at least in the context of 
                                                          
934 For more see Chapter II, section 5.5. 
935 White v. India, para. 7.6.8. 
936 White v. India, para. 163. 
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ICSID arbitration, whereby the majority of tribunals concur on the existence of 
outer limits to the notion of investment, and a commercial award could barely 
fall within those boundaries per se. But a different approach may be taken in 
non-ICSID arbitration. As already stated, in that contest, the arbitrators are 
free to base their jurisdiction exclusively on the wording of the investment 
treaty where consent to arbitration is given. Therefore, if the contracting States 
included in the treaty a definition of investment broad enough to cover an 
arbitral award, the arbitrators should simply assess that, pursuant to the 
language of the treaty, the subject matter jurisdiction is grounded. 
As a final remark, it must be noted that, as already highlighted in Chapter II, 
the approach tracked by Saipem v. Bangladesh may not always guarantee access 
to ICSID jurisdiction.937 Many bilateral and multilateral investment treaties 
expressly require that the investment is located in the territory of one of the 
contracting States (different from the one of which the investor is a national). 
This implies that the frustrated award creditor will not be allowed to bring a 
claim against the State whose courts wrongfully interfered with the 
enforcement of the award, unless this State is the same as the one where the 
original investment was made. Indeed, if the award is not considered by itself 
as an investment, but a crystallisation of the underlying original operation, the 
investment is not constituted by a single activity, but by a number of activities 
that collectively make it. Thus, it needs to be determined at what point 
sufficient activity has taken place in the host country to meet the territoriality 
requirement. Even if the existing case law does not come with a conclusive 
answer to this question, the few tribunals that have considered the question 
seem to support that the operation in the entirety is decisive and not whether a 
particular aspect of it is performed inside or outside the territory of the host 
State. On the basis of this line of reasoning, in all cases where enforcement to 
an award is wrongfully denied in a country different from the one where most 
of the original transaction was made, the aggrieved award creditor will likely 
not be entitled to bring an investment claim against the State for a 
                                                          
937 See, supra, Chapter II, section 6. 
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misbehaviour of its courts. Please however note that this issue was not 
addressed in the Relevant Cases since there was only one country involved, 
which was the place where the debtor was domiciled and in which the 
investment had the closest link.  
 
3. Conducts that can be sanctioned 
Once the jurisdiction is established, the award winner (i.e., the investor) must 
frame its claim to show that the national courts breached the State’s obligations 
under the applicable investment treaty and that the claim is covered by the 
consent to jurisdiction clause. 
Starting with this second aspect, it is worth recalling that in investment treaty 
arbitration, jurisdiction is generally structured as a standing offer to arbitrate 
made by each contracting State in favour of the investors of the other 
Contracting State(s). This offer may be accepted by nationals of another State 
party to the relevant investment treaty, also through the commencement of 
arbitration proceedings. The scope of a tribunal's jurisdiction varies 
considerably from one treaty to another. Based on treaty practice, scholarly 
writings938 have identified four core typologies of consent to arbitrate 
provisions. The first one is the broadest and allows ‘all’ or ‘any’ investment 
disputes to be submitted to arbitration. This means that the only element that 
matters is that the dispute concerns an investment, as defined in the investment 
treaty. The second one limits consent to arbitration to disputes arising out of or 
related to: (i) an investment authorization; (ii) an investment contract; or (iii) 
the allegation of a violation of any right conferred, created or recognized by the 
respective treaty in relation to an investment. The third kind of provision 
allows jurisdiction only to violations of the substantive provisions of the treaty 
itself. The fourth and more restrictive typology confines the relevant tribunal’s 
jurisdiction to disputes about expropriation or the quantum to be paid in the 
event of an illegal expropriation.939 Obviously, depending on the breadth of the 
                                                          
938 See, supra, note 859.  
939 For examples thereof, see, supra, Chapter III, section 10. 
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consent to jurisdiction clause, the investor has more or less chance of bringing 
a claim against the State.  
The provisions regarding consent to jurisdiction must be coupled with those 
setting out the protection allowed to the foreign investor. Usually, investment 
treaties provide a wide spectrum of obligations on the State hosting the 
investment. Though each treaty has its own wording, in general terms it can be 
stated that investment protection includes the prohibition to expropriate, as 
well as various standards of investment protection, including full protection 
and security, effective means of asserting claims, FET and MFN. It is largely 
considered that the FET obligation comprises the obligation of the host State 
not to deny justice. Denial of justice is the typical misconduct attributable to 
national courts. At its most general, denial of justice occurs when a State 
administers justice to aliens in a fundamentally unfair manner.940  
According to the majority of scholarly writings, in order for a denial of justice 
to occur, certain elements must be met. First, the factual situation must be 
egregious, embodying a fundamental violation of the principle of fair process. 
Several investment arbitral tribunals have highlighted the high threshold of 
misconduct required to establish a denial of justice. Second, no denial of justice 
can be claimed unless the investor has exhausted all (reasonable) municipal 
remedies. Third, denial of justice occurs exclusively in the event of procedural 
misbehaviour.941  
From the above it emerges clearly that the bar for establishing a denial of 
justice is high, which probably explains why in the Relevant Cases none of the 
involved tribunals found that the national courts had committed a denial of 
justice. Rather, tribunals accepted the claimants’ reconstructions, pursuant to 
which the misconduct of national courts entailed a breach of different treaty 
guarantees, including the prohibition of unlawful expropriation, or the violation 
of the FET or the effective means standards.  
                                                          
940 For more on denial of justice, see, supra, Chapter III, section 2. 
941 This latter requirement is not unanimously agreed. See Capter III, para. 2 and the relevant 
notes.  
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Certain authors942 have strongly criticized this approach, maintaining that the 
tribunals’ intent was to accord justice to investors in cases where the conditions 
for a denial of justice would have not been met. What is sure is that the cases 
of actionable judicial wrongs have increased, as accordingly have the 
possibilities for an aggrieved award creditor to obtain redress.   
Starting with the Saipem Award, the tribunal recognized that the national 
courts committed a judicial expropriation, by means of the revocation of the 
powers of the arbitral panel and the labelling of the award issued by this panel 
as a nullity. In order to come to its conclusion, the tribunal took an innovative 
approach. Indeed, even though it overtly declared it was applying the sole 
effect doctrine – pursuant to which the effect of the government action is the 
only factor to be considered in the determination of the existence of an indirect 
expropriation – it introduced an additional element allegedly necessary due to 
the peculiar circumstances of the case. More precisely, after having established that 
the Bangladeshi courts’ conduct substantially deprived Saipem of the residual 
contractual rights under the investment as crystallized by the ICC Award,943 
and that such deprivation was irreversible,944 the tribunal considered whether 
the conduct of the courts was illegal. For the panel, a different approach would 
have entailed that any setting aside of an award could have implied a claim for 
expropriation, even when the setting aside was legitimate. In this respect, the 
ICSID tribunal found the Bangladeshi courts’ actions illegal as they committed 
an abuse of right and violated the spirit of the New York Convention.945  
This solution is probably correct: as noted by the tribunal, the mere application 
of the sole effect doctrine would imply that any exercise of the right to set 
aside awards amounted to an expropriation. Once again, the tribunal should 
maybe have thought twice before accepting its jurisdiction, rather than adapting 
and amending well-established principles of international law in order to square 
the circle.946 In addition, it is worth noting, as stated in White v. India, that a 
                                                          
942 See, supra, Chapter III, section 4.2.1.  
943 Saipem Award, para. 128. 
944 Saipem Award, para. 130. 
945 Saipem Award, para. 167. 
946 See, supra, Chapter III, section 4. 
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claim for judicial expropriation along the same lines of those of Saipem v. 
Bangladesh may be hosted only if the arbitral agreement is set aside; on the 
contrary, in cases of specious delays in the recognition and /or enforcement 
process of an arbitral award or arbitration agreement, such a claim shall be 
declined.947 
The ATA v. Jordan case and the Frontier v. Czech Republic case considered 
the FET standard. Despite the fact that the panel’s reasoning in the ATA v. 
Jordan case was very succinct and that the tribunal in the Frontier v. Czech 
Republic case came to the conclusion that no breach of the FET had occurred, 
these cases are still relevant as they considered in principle possible that a State 
may be responsible for the municipal courts’ breach of the FET standard for a 
cause different from denial of justice.948 
In White v. India, the tribunal recognised that the delays in proceeding 
concerning the set-aside of an arbitral award entailed a breach of the effective 
means clause. This case is also to be considered relevant because it is the fith 
public case in the history of investment arbitration in which an arbitral tribunal 
dealt with the effective means guarantee, and the second one in which effective 
means was expressly considered as an autonomous standard, detached from the 
denial of justice.949  
In light of the above, an award creditor frustrated in its rights due to the non-
recognition or set-aside of an arbitral award or the non-recognition of an 
arbitration agreement potentially has a variety of substantial claims to lodge, 
depending on the factual situation and the provisions of the invoked 
international instrument. 
The possible claims could regard: 
(i) a denial of justice, which is the traditional cause of action in case of 
judicial wrongs. However, the bar to find a violation thereof remains 
high as it requires, inter alia, egregious misconduct; 
                                                          
947 See, supra, Chapter III, section 9. 
948 See, supra, Chapter III, sections 6 and 8. 
949 Even if, as noted in Chapter III, section 9, the identifying features remain unclear.  
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(ii) a judicial expropriation, whose existence has been recognized by 
investment tribunals. In the context of the Saipem v. Bangladesh case, 
the panel accepted that an arbitral award can be expropriated and 
suggested that, in addition to the sole effect doctrine, tribunals must 
also consider whether the conduct of the national courts was illegal 
under an international law perspective;  
(iii) a violation of the FET standard, for a reason different from denial of 
justice, such as for breach of legitimate expectations; 
(iv) a violation of the ‘effective means’ standard, whose contours are 
somewhat vague, as it is a recent standard that probably needs to be 
further elaborated by case law. On the basis of the current background, 
it can be argued that undue delays in the recognition process not 
amounting to a denial of justice can imply a violation of this standard. 
The conclusions that may be drawn from the above is that, if it is accepted 
that: (i) an arbitral award may be an investment, and (ii) the wrong interference 
of the courts can entail a State’s responsibility, a State’s liability shall not be 
limited to the delict of denial of justice, but may also concern the breach of 
different investment protections, as long as the relevant constitutive elements 
are met.  
One may also take a step further and argue that a mere violation of the New 
York Convention may represent the substantive claim before the investment 
tribunal. Even if none of the Relevant Cases has taken this route, it could still 
be argued that if the consent to jurisdiction is sufficiently broad – making 
reference, for example, to any claims concerning an investment – and the 
provisions of law included in the applicable investment treaty do not make 
reference only to the BIT and the national law, but also to international law, 
then the tribunal could be allowed to establish a responsibility of the State for 
the misapplication of the New York Convention by its national courts.950 This 
approach would, however, imply the final dismantling of the architecture of 
international arbitration, with the recognition of the role of investment 
                                                          
950 See Chapter III, sections 9 and 11. 
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tribunals as the final reviewers of the application by the national courts of the 
New York Convention.951  
 
4. What is next: a difficult forecast of the impact of the Relevant Cases on 
the investment arbitration plane  
Saipem v. Bangladesh and the Relevant Cases that followed the line traced by it 
can be certainly considered revolutionary. However, as often happens in cases 
of revolutionary decisions, it is difficult to establish the exact consequences that 
they may have. As stated by one eminent author, it is difficult to predict what 
will happen now that the Pandora's box has been opened.952   
However, a few predictions can be made. First, it is undeniable that investors 
will feel safer if they know that they have a powerful weapon to use in case the 
award rendered in the context of a commercial arbitration is disregarded by the 
courts of the State, where enforcement and recognition is sought because it 
goes against the interests of the relevant State. This is even more important in a 
context where domestic courts sometimes seem reluctant to acknowledge the 
difference between judiciary decisions and arbitral awards and appear keen to 
treat awards as if they were decisions rendered by an inferior court, rather than 
a different form of dispute settlement. As a consequence, it is possible that new 
investments will be made under the protection of investment treaties currently 
in force and also that new cases will be brought with the same underlying 
reasons of the Relevant Cases, which may lead to an increase and development 
of investment arbitration.  
However, such an increase of investment law cases is not necessarily a positive 
consequence, especially in the long term. Indeed, contracting States have 
shown their concern with respect to decisions that, in their opinion, go beyond 
what the parties to the investment treaty wanted to included within the scope 
of protection of the investment treaty.953 Taking as an example Saipem v. 
                                                          
951 See Chapter III, section 7.2.1.  
952 E. ALVAREZ, Crossing the “Public/Private” Divide: Saipem v. Bangladesh and Other 
Crossover Cases, supra, note 332, p. 410. 
953 S. BOUWHUIS, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Some Concerns, in N.J. CALAMITA, D. 
EARNEST, M. BURGSTALLER, The Future of ICSID and the Place of Investment Treaties 
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Bangladesh, I feel relatively safe to say that neither Italy nor Bangladesh 
expected, at the time when the Italy-Bangladesh BIT was entered into, that a 
commercial award could be considered as an investment protected thereunder. 
The same can be probably said in relation to the expectations of the fathers of 
the ICSID Convention, when they decided not to define the term investment 
in the Convention.954   
The expression of this concern is evident by the fact that certain States, 
including western ones, have in recent times declared that they do not intend to 
include investor-States dispute settlement clauses in future investment treaties 
or national investment laws,955 or by the denunciations submitted by certain 
States in order to withdraw from the Convention.956 In addition, States have 
rather decided to circumscribe the definition of investment included in the 
treaty or to clarify in which cases the standard of protection can apply. 
This represents the Governments’ counteraction to the proliferation of claims 
by investors that take advantage of drafting gaps to achieve advantages that go 
beyond the parties’ will.  
The blame in these cases should be put on certain arbitration practices, 
pursuant to which provisions of investment treaties are extensively interpreted 
                                                                                                                                                            
in International Law, Investment Treaty Law Current Issues IV, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 2013, pp. 325-338.  
954 See Chapter II, section 3.  
955 The Australian Government was the first developed state openly to declare that it will no 
longer agree to investment arbitration as the mechanism of dispute resolution within its 
bilateral and regional trade agreements. Nicaragua has recently passed a legislation to avoid 
investment arbitration. For more see L.E. TRAKMAN, Investor State Arbitration or Local 
Courts: Will Australia Set a New Trend?, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 46, February 2012, 
pp. 83-120. 
956 For example, Venezuela gave notice in 2008 that it was terminating its BIT with 
Netherlands and in 2012 it announced its withdrawal from the ICSID Convention. Bolivia 
withdrew from the ICSID Convention in 2007 and, theresince, it has stated that it intends 
to renegotiate several BITs, particularly their dispute resolution clauses. Ecuador gave 
notice in 2007 that it would not recognise ICSID tribunals’ jurisdiction over disputes 
concerning certain natural resources, terminating nine BITs in 2008 and then withdrew 
from the ICSID Convention altogether in 2009.  
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and there is a presumption of favour towards the investor. In this respect it is 
worth noting that Prof. Radicati di Brozolo, who acted as counsel for Saipem 
in the Saipem Cases, in a speech he gave at the Law School of NYU in 
February 2014, candidly admitted that such decision went far beyond its 
expectations. Of course, he endorsed the decision and he considered it as a big 
step forward in the safeguard of foreign investors, but he was undoubtedly 
surprised by it. The astonishment should be greater if one considers that this 
decision has been followed by subsequent tribunals, and now additional claims 
are brought before investment tribunals on the same grounds. Indeed, all 
changes in the drafting policies of States will start to be relevant once the 
previous treaties have expired and new treaties will have been entered into. 
Until then arbitrators shall continue to rely on the previous wording and shall 
be free to accord the protection they deem more adequate.  
In theory, arbitrators should be independent, neutral and impartial in deciding 
cases. However, from the above, States saw that some arbitrators are prone to 
expanding interpretations to investment treaty provisions and show keenness 
to acquire jurisdiction over some cases. This is for a number of reasons, 
including the fact that arbitrators have an individual interest in the expansion 
and that, broadly, tribunals pay more attention to private investors’ interests. 
In light of the above, a turnaround in this approach needs to be made in order 
for investment law and investment arbitration to continue to proliferate in the 
future and be seen as a tool where both parties, the State and the investor, are 
effectively put on an equal footing with the purpose of reducing injustice and 
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